Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)

6 July 2022 (*)

(Civil service – Open competition – Notice of Competition EPSO/AD/363/18 for the recruitment of administrators in the field of taxation (AD 7) – Non-inclusion on the reserve list – Composition of the selection board – Stability – Manifest error of assessment – Liability)

In Case T‑179/20,

JP, represented by S. Rodrigues and A. Champetier, lawyers,

applicant,

v

European Commission, represented by T. Lilamand, D. Milanowska and A.‑C. Simon, acting as Agents,

defendant,

THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of J. Svenningsen, President, R. Barents (Rapporteur) and T. Pynnä, Judges,

Registrar: P. Cullen, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 8 February 2022,

gives the following

Judgment

1        By her action under Article 270 TFEU, the applicant, JP, seeks, first, annulment of the decision of 10 December 2019 by which the selection board for Competition EPSO/AD/363/18 refused, after review, to include her name on the reserve list of successful candidates in that competition (‘the contested decision’) and, second, compensation for the damage which she claims to have suffered as a result of that decision.

 Background to the dispute

2        On 13 November 2018, the applicant applied to take part in Competition EPSO/AD/363/18 for the recruitment of administrators (grade AD 7) in the field of taxation. She sat the case study test on 4 April 2019 and the tests at the assessment centre on 22 May 2019.

3        On 17 July 2019, she was informed by the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) that her name had not been included on the relevant reserve list since she had not obtained the minimum number of points required, which was 116.5. In an attachment to that letter, EPSO provided the applicant with her competency passport, which awarded her a total score of 99 points out of 180.

4        On 25 July 2019, the applicant submitted a request for review of the decision of 17 July 2019 pursuant to point 4.2.2 of Annex III to the notice of competition and an application for access to certain documents relating to that competition.

5        On 12 October 2019, the applicant submitted an application for access to other documents relating to the competition in question, inter alia with a view to obtaining the weighting applied to the marks obtained in each field.

6        On 29 October 2019, EPSO refused to grant her access to the requested documents.

7        On 19 November 2019, the applicant submitted a confirmatory application to the Secretary-General of the European Commission asking the latter to reconsider its position on her applications for access to documents, pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43).

8        On 10 December 2019, by a letter signed by the Head of Unit of EPSO in the name of the chairperson of the selection board, EPSO confirmed its decision not to include the applicant’s name on the reserve list and refused to grant her access to other documents.

9        On 3 February 2020, the Commission granted her partial access to two documents, entitled, respectively, ‘Field-related interview (FRI) – Building the interview grid – (AD/363)’, and ‘Interview in the field – EPSO/AD/363/18 – Taxation (confidential)’.

10      On 5 March 2020, pursuant to point 4.3.2 of Annex III to the notice of competition, the applicant submitted to the Director of EPSO, by registered letter and by email, a complaint against the contested decision in accordance with Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’). That complaint was rejected by decision of 7 July 2020.

 Forms of order sought

11      The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision;

–        order the Commission to pay damages as compensation for the harm suffered;

–        order the Commission to pay the costs.

12      The Commission contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the action;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

13      At the hearing, the Commission withdrew its claim that the action was inadmissible, formal note of which was taken in the minutes of the hearing.

 Law

14      In support of her claim for annulment, the applicant raises three pleas in law, alleging, respectively, (i) that the members of the selection board must have the necessary abilities to make an objective assessment of her performance and professional qualifications during the field-related interview, and breach of the principles of equal treatment and the protection of legitimate expectations; (ii) infringement of the principle according to which the composition of the selection board must be sufficiently stable; and (iii), in the alternative, manifest error of assessment.

 The first plea in law, alleging that the members of the selection board must have the necessary abilities to make an objective assessment of the performance and professional qualifications of the applicant during the field-related interview, and breach of the principles of equal treatment and the protection of legitimate expectations

15      According to the applicant, the type of qualifications required, coupled with the specific field in which successful candidates will perform their duties, makes the competition in question a specialist competition aimed at selecting the most suitable candidates in the specific field of taxation. Thus, she submits that it would be sensible and logical that those who are entrusted with the task of assessing whether a candidate possesses the appropriate qualifications are themselves specialists in that same field.

16      In the present case, the applicant claims that two members of the selection board who conducted the field-related interview did not possess the tax expertise necessary in order to make a competent assessment of the candidates’ tax expertise. She argues that, although the case-law recognises a broad discretion in the choice of members of the selection board, that choice may not, however, be arbitrary or unwarranted.

17      The first assessor, Mr B, is Head of Sector for ‘Documentary management and legal analysis’ within the Commission’s Publications Office of the European Union (PO). In addition, he is an expert on access to EU legal information. The second assessor, Mr P, was a case handler for mergers in the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) for Competition (‘DG COMP’), and therefore specialised in mergers rather than taxation. The applicant maintains, therefore, that they were not able to understand properly and assess the answers of the candidate being interviewed. In her view, the assessors’ lack of tax expertise constituted a manifest irregularity in the composition of the selection board, undermining the principle that candidates should be assessed objectively.

18      According to the applicant, that lack of tax expertise also gave rise to discrimination with respect to other candidates in the same competition who were able to rely on assessors proficient in tax matters. For those candidates, the assessment was more objective and their answers were better understood. The applicant states that she was also anxious, which affected her performance, since she did not know whether or not she had to explain certain tax concepts in greater detail.

19      In the reply, the applicant submits that her assessors had five times less experience than the assessors of other candidates and could not therefore apply the assessment criteria in the same way as an assessor with more than 10 years’ experience, especially in an oral test.

20      Finally, she submits that there was a breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, since candidates should be able to expect that the assessors have a level of tax expertise comparable to their own. According to her, the Staff Regulations support that presumption by requiring that the members of the selection board belong to a function group at least equal to that of the post to be filled by the competition.

21      The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

22      It should be noted that the EU agencies and institutions have a wide discretion with regard to the procedure for organising a competition and that, in that connection, review by the EU Courts must be limited to the extent necessary to ensure equal treatment of candidates and objectivity in the choice made between them (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 January 2021, ZR v EUIPO, T‑610/18, not published, EU:T:2021:5, paragraph 36).

23      In addition, the obligation to recruit officials of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity means that the appointing authority and the selection boards must each ensure, when exercising their powers, that competitions take place in such a way that the principles of equal treatment of the candidates, consistent marking and objectivity of the assessment are observed (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 January 2021, ZR v EUIPO, T‑610/18, not published, EU:T:2021:5, paragraph 37).

24      To that end, Article 30 of the Staff Regulations and Article 3 of Annex III to those regulations provide, first, that for each competition a selection board is appointed by the appointing authority; second, that, apart from the chairman of the selection board, the other members must be designated by the appointing authority and the Staff Committee, each designating the same number; third, that the members of the selection board chosen from officials must be officials whose function group and grade is at least equal to that of the post to be filled; and, fourth, that if a selection board consists of more than four members, it must comprise at least two members of each gender (judgment of 15 June 2010, Pachtitis v Commission, F‑35/08, EU:F:2010:51, paragraph 54).

25      However, the requirements which the abilities of the members of the selection board must satisfy vary according to the particular circumstances of each competition. In that regard, the appointing authority and the Staff Committee have a wide discretion in assessing the abilities of the persons whom they are called on to appoint as members of the selection board and it is not for the Court to criticise their choice unless the limits of that discretion have not been observed (judgments of 27 June 1991, Valverde Mordt v Court of Justice, T‑156/89, EU:T:1991:33, paragraph 107, and of 25 May 2000, Elkaïm and Mazuel v Commission, T‑173/99, EU:T:2000:142, paragraph 70).

26      In the present case, the applicant’s interview was conducted by two members of the selection board, Mr P and Mr B, of grades AD 10 and AD 7 respectively, and therefore of a function group and grade at least equal to that of the post to be filled, namely AD 7. Mr B was the member appointed by the Staff Committee.

27      The applicant claims that the lack of tax specialists on the selection board undoubtedly affected the selection board’s ability to assess, with full knowledge of the facts, the field-related interview, which represented 55.56% of the total score.

28      In that regard, it is clear that the members of the selection board must also have the necessary abilities to make an objective assessment of the performance of the candidates in the tests (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 September 2005, Pantoulis v Commission, T‑290/03, EU:T:2005:316, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).

29      The notice of competition to which the applicant applied was intended to select candidates specialised in the fields of taxation and customs. The field-related interview, which was carried out at the assessment centre and which is particularly at issue in the present case, was specifically intended to assess the competencies inherent in the duties required for a specific profile.

30      Point 2 of the notice of competition, entitled ‘Taxation’, states that future policy officers are expected to be immediately operational in a unit ‘in the indirect or direct tax directorate of DG TAXUD’ or in a fiscal State aid unit of DG COMP. Furthermore, Annex I to the notice of competition states that ‘the general role of administrators (AD 7) in the taxation field is to support the decision-makers in fulfilling the mission of their institution, provide legal, economic and/or statistical analysis required for the initiation, development, management and/or evaluation of EU policies in direct and/or indirect taxation, including transfer pricing or fiscal state aid’, that ‘successful candidates will be called upon to analyse direct and/or indirect taxation issues, make a legal assessment under the applicable tax or state aid rules and procedures, analyse their impacts and present legal drafts or prepare economic analysis of those issues’ and that ‘they may also be asked to develop communication activities on their area of work, take part in conferences and other events, to perform coordination duties and negotiation at international level, related to the tax policy of the European Union’.

31      Thus, the objective of the selection procedure was to recruit the most competent candidates in the field of taxation for the purposes of the DG for Taxation and Customs Union (‘DG TAXUD’) and DG COMP, in particular the unit responsible for fiscal State aid.

32      In that context, the competent authorities had a wide discretion in assessing the abilities and experience of the persons to be appointed as members of the selection board in that field.

33      In the light of the information provided by the Commission in its written pleadings, as regards the relevant details of the curricula vitae of the two selection board members who sat during the applicant’s interview, the complaint concerning the alleged lack of appropriate abilities within the selection board in the area of taxation cannot be upheld.

34      In particular, Mr P has been an official in DG COMP since 2008. He has acquired experience in the fields of monitoring compliance with competition law, State aid control, merger control and taxation. While attached to a unit dealing with mergers, he handled tax cases. Since 2015, he has specialised in ‘Tax Planning Practices’ in DG COMP’s unit H5. He is responsible for monitoring compliance with EU competition rules in the field of State aid control, and more particularly for international affairs concerning taxation and transfer pricing as well as issues relating to combating tax avoidance and evasion. It therefore appears indisputable that, since 2008, and in particular since 2015, he has gained considerable experience in tax matters while working in DG COMP, and therefore in the DG that is recruiting tax specialists from candidates in the present competition. He would therefore be able to identify candidates specialised in taxation who meet the needs of that DG in particular. There is also no doubt that, in view of his experience in DG COMP, he was very well able to determine the accuracy of the applicant’s answer to the question regarding the difference between direct and indirect taxation, since the question could inter alia have been raised with regard to the relevant post in DG COMP.

35      Mr B was the member of the selection board appointed by the Staff Committee. Although the fields in question are ‘Application or enforcement of tax rules’, ‘Tax policy development’ and ‘Negotiation in the field of taxation’, it follows from paragraph 30 above that successful candidates in the competition will also be required to provide legal, economic and/or statistical analyses, present legal drafts, prepare economic analysis, develop communication activities or perform coordination duties and negotiation at international level. Although those activities are all related to EU tax policy, the experience of a Head of Sector for ‘Documentary management and legal analysis’ within the PO, who is an expert on access to EU legal information, a lawyer by training, including in tax law and EU law, and who has experience, albeit brief, as a tax consultant, is appropriate for assessing candidates’ competencies. Such qualifications and experience may be regarded as relevant, if not complementary to those of Mr P in the field of taxation. In any event, the appointing authority did not exceed the limits of its discretion by appointing a Head of Sector at the PO as a member of a selection board in a competition seeking tax specialists.

36      Accordingly, the appointing authority did not exceed the limits of its wide discretion in appointing the members of the selection board, since those members had all the necessary abilities to make an objective assessment of the performance of the candidates in the competition.

37      It follows that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment either.

38      It is clear from the case-law that there is a breach of the principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination where two categories of persons whose factual and legal situations are not essentially different receive different treatment or where different situations are treated in the same way, unless the differentiation is objectively justified (judgments of 14 December 2004, Swedish Match, C‑210/03, EU:C:2004:802, paragraph 70; of 26 February 2003, Drouvis v Commission, T‑184/00, EU:T:2003:39, paragraph 39; see, also, judgment of 29 April 2015, CC v Parliament, T‑457/13 P, EU:T:2015:240, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).

39      It is clear that the candidates were all in the same factual and legal situation, namely taking an oral test before a selection board. The applicant claims that she received different treatment from that of the other candidates in that test, since she had different assessors from those of the other candidates.

40      It must be pointed out that the fact that, in the present case, several pairs of selection board members were called upon to assess the candidates is not a ground of irregularity, provided that all the members of the selection board had the necessary abilities to make an objective assessment of the performance of the candidates in the tests.

41      It is apparent from paragraph 36 above that the two selection board members who assessed the applicant’s performance had the necessary abilities for that purpose.

42      The fact that other members of the selection board who were allegedly more experienced in taxation interviewed candidates other than the applicant is not, in itself, sufficient for a finding that the candidates interviewed by the more experienced members were given an advantage over those who, like the applicant, were interviewed by members with less expertise in taxation.

43      It therefore follows from the foregoing that the composition of the selection board did not, in the course of the field-related interview, result in a situation whereby the candidates interviewed by a different composition of the selection board were given an advantage over the candidate interviewed by the selection board members in question. On the contrary, the members of the selection board had the necessary abilities to ensure that the selection procedure was conducted properly, inter alia in terms of assessing the candidates’ knowledge.

44      As regards the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, that right extends to any individual who is in a situation in which it is apparent that the EU administration has led him or her to entertain justified expectations by giving him or her precise assurances in the form of precise, unconditional and consistent information coming from authorised and reliable sources. However, a person may not plead breach of that principle unless he or she has been given precise assurances by the administration (see judgment of 13 October 2015, Commission v Verile and Gjergji, T‑104/14 P, EU:T:2015:776, paragraph 165 and the case-law cited).

45      The complaint that candidates were entitled to expect the assessors to have a level of expertise in the field comparable to their own must be rejected, since the applicant has adduced no evidence to support her assertion that the Commission gave her precise assurances in that regard. Moreover, the notice of competition does not provide any indication on that point.

46      The first plea in law must therefore be rejected.

 Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle according to which the composition of the selection board must be sufficiently stable

47      According to the applicant, the chairperson of the selection board was present only at the beginning of the interviews at the assessment centre and not for the entire duration of those interviews. During his absence, he was not replaced by the alternate chairperson. She maintains that the composition of the selection board was therefore not sufficiently stable, since there were fluctuations in its composition and unjustified absences of the chairperson and the alternate chairperson during the interviews at the assessment centre.

48      In the reply, the applicant submits that it cannot be inferred from the judgment of 12 February 2014, De Mendoza Asensi v Commission (F‑127/11, EU:F:2014:14), that the principle of stability is no longer relevant. She states that other, more recent judgments refer to the principle of stability.

49      At the hearing, the applicant requested that the Court take account of the judgment of 13 January 2021, ZR v EUIPO (T‑610/18, not published, EU:T:2021:5), in support of her second plea in law. In that judgment, she contends, the Court confirmed that stability in the composition of the selection board is always required and concluded that a failure to ensure such stability breaches essential procedural requirements, thereby entailing the annulment of the contested decision.

50      The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

51      According to point 2 of Annex III to the notice of competition, ‘a Selection Board is appointed to compare candidates and select the best ones on the basis of their competencies, aptitudes and qualifications in the light of the requirements set out in this notice of competition’ and ‘the names of the Selection Board members are published on the EPSO website (www.eu-careers.eu) before the beginning of the assessment centre/phase’.

52      It is common ground between the parties that the field-related interview which took place at the assessment centre was conducted by two members of the selection board, that the chairperson of the selection board was present only at the beginning of the interview and not for its entire duration, and that the alternate chairperson did not replace him during his absence. In the present case, the applicant challenges only the absence of the chairperson of the selection board during a part of the interview, which the applicant claims constitutes an infringement of the principle according to which the composition of the selection board must remain stable throughout the tests.

53      In that regard, it should be noted that stability in the composition of the selection board is not a requirement in itself but a means of ensuring equal treatment of the candidates, consistent marking and objectivity of the assessment (see judgment of 13 January 2021, Helbert v EUIPO, T‑548/18, EU:T:2021:4, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).

54      Accordingly, it cannot be excluded that compliance with those principles may be guaranteed by means other than maintaining the stability of the selection board throughout the tests, such as putting in place the coordination necessary to ensure consistent application of the marking criteria (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 January 2021, Helbert v EUIPO, T‑548/18, EU:T:2021:4, paragraph 66 and the case-law cited).

55      In that context, it was held that the participation of the chairperson of the selection board during the first few minutes of each interview was precisely one of those coordination measures, since his role was to ensure proper application of the pre-established methodology and of the assessment criteria adopted before the beginning of the tests by the selection board (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 January 2021, Helbert v EUIPO, T‑548/18, EU:T:2021:4, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited).

56      Since the applicant does not dispute that the presence of the chairperson of the selection board during only a part of each interview was sufficient to ensure the coordinating role incumbent upon him, it must be held that the second plea in law, alleging infringement of the principle of stability in the composition of the selection board, is unfounded.

57      That conclusion is not invalidated by the applicant’s argument that the presence of the chairperson of the selection board during specific parts of the interview did not enable him to perform his role during the assessment, which was, according to the applicant, to compare the respective merits of the candidates. It must be borne in mind that the chairperson’s role was not to assess the candidates directly, but to observe the assessors in order to ensure that they were applying the pre-established assessment criteria in a consistent and objective manner. The applicant does not explain how that role of observer, which the chairperson of the selection board was required to perform, infringed the principles of equal treatment, consistent marking and objectivity of the assessment.

58      The second plea in law must therefore be rejected.

 The third plea in law, submitted in the alternative and alleging manifest error of assessment

59      The applicant claims that the contested decision is vitiated by several manifest errors of assessment and that it should therefore be annulled. She submits that she has extensive and relevant professional experience and an educational background which make her suitable for the duties described in Annex I to the notice of competition.

60      In the first place, she argues that the marks awarded for the general competencies assessed during the interview, the case study and the group exercise contain manifest errors. As regards the section entitled ‘Analysis and problem-solving’, she claims that she neither misinterpreted nor misquoted any information and none of the other candidates pointed to an incorrect interpretation on her part. Regarding the ‘Communication’ section, she gave concrete and relevant examples, while remaining concise, taking more time to answer where additional questions were put or she was asked for clarification. With respect to the section entitled ‘Delivering quality and results’, she maintains that her case study was structured rationally, was complete in all aspects, addressed the issues raised and offered solutions as appropriate. The applicant submits that ‘Learning and development’ demonstrates one of her strongest character traits. She submits that she has always sought to improve her personal skills, and also to acquire knowledge in areas previously unknown to her. The applicant argues that she therefore clearly did not have a weak interest in developing her personal skills. As regards the section entitled ‘Resilience’, she ensured that she presented the lessons learned from all of the experiences she mentioned. She claims that, during the group exercise, she contributed to the discussion by helping the group to address the relevant issues and by drawing the attention of the other candidates to the time constraints. She clarified the exact parameters of the tasks in a polite yet firm manner, and also gave the group her opinion on how it could proceed, which was appreciated. The applicant contends that the marks therefore do not reflect her actual performance and that the selection board’s assessment is implausible.

61      In the second place, the applicant maintains that the score obtained in the field-related interview (55 out of 100) gives a wholly misleading representation of her professional experience. She submits that she has double the required 6 years’ experience, that is to say, more than 12 years in the field of taxation. Her application was, in her view, founded on a solid and extensive education, including a postgraduate diploma in Italian taxation, a Master of Laws in international taxation and a PhD in European taxation. She submits that, with regard to the score of ‘good’ in ‘Application or enforcement of tax rules’, it is patent that seven years of professional experience within DG TAXUD in the application and enforcement of tax rules in a legal role deserves a significantly higher score than the one awarded. Moreover, she maintains that no other candidate on the reserve list can claim long and extensive professional experience in that field. In view of the weighting of that domain (40%), a higher score would, according to the applicant, have led to a higher final score and therefore to her obtaining the number of points required for inclusion on the reserve list.

62      In addition, she states that the score of ‘satisfactory’ in ‘Tax policy development’ does not take any account of her experience in that area. She provided numerous relevant examples drawn from her professional experience. According to her, monitoring developments in national legislation was a substantial part of her work and, regarding her involvement in policy-making and drafting legislation, she gave plenty of examples drawn from her professional experience. The score of ‘satisfactory’ obtained and the weighting of that domain (40%) therefore pulled the total score downwards.

63      Furthermore, the applicant argues that the score of ‘satisfactory’ does not reflect her professional experience in the area of ‘Negotiation in the field of taxation’ in view of the examples she provided. That low score also pulled the final score downwards, given the 20% weighting attributed to that domain.

64      In the reply, the applicant states that she does not base her arguments on the quality of her performance, but on the objective content of the answers she gave during the interview. The reference to the Talent Screener was intended to illustrate her professional experience. That is because, she claims, the Commission has, to date, refused to grant access to the relevant reports on her performance during the assessment procedure. While the Commission maintains that the factual assessments of a decision must be implausible in order for the existence of a manifest error of assessment to be established, the applicant submits that the term ‘implausible’ should be interpreted as ‘unconvincing’. She submits that, if her highly relevant professional experience in the field of infringement of tax legislation is taken as an example, it is unconvincing that such experience was awarded a mere 6 points out of 10. According to the applicant, the manifest error of assessment is based not on the quality of her performance or on her own merits, but on the objective information communicated during that interview, that is to say, on the objective recognition of the various activities she performed in a professional capacity, and which may now be verified in the light of the criteria indicated by the Commission. She contends that the assessors were unable to appreciate the relevance of a professional activity during which she implemented one of the Commission’s fundamental institutional powers. To that end, the applicant requests that the Court order the Commission to produce the assessors’ evaluation of her answers during the field-related interview, which would make it possible to determine the extent of the manifest error made during that interview. She also requests that the Court order the Commission to produce the assessors’ evaluation of her answers during the general competency interview, all the minutes of the meetings of the selection board concerning the performance and marking of candidates, in particular those held between 4 April and 17 July 2019, and a copy of her case study and its correction notes; in the alternative, she requests that the present proceedings be stayed pending the delivery of the judgment in Case T‑247/20.

65      The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

66      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, the assessments which a selection board in a competition makes when it evaluates the knowledge and abilities of candidates and also the decisions whereby the selection board determines that a candidate has failed a test constitute the expression of a value judgement. They fall within the wide discretion enjoyed by the selection board and are amenable to review by the European Union judicature only where there has been a flagrant breach of the rules governing the selection board’s work. It is not for the Court to substitute its own assessment for that of the selection board (see judgment of 28 September 2017, Hristov v Commission and EMA, T‑495/16 RENV I and T‑495/16 RENV II, not published, EU:T:2017:676, paragraph 117 and the case-law cited).

67      It should also be noted that, where it is required to review the legality of a decision refusing to include the name of a candidate on a reserve list for a competition, the Court verifies whether the relevant rules of law have been observed, that is to say, the rules, in particular the procedural rules, laid down in the Staff Regulations and the notice of competition and those governing the proceedings of the selection board, in particular the selection board’s duty of impartiality and its observance of the principle of equal treatment of candidates, as well as the absence of any misuse of powers. The Court also verifies whether the content of a test goes beyond the limits laid down in the competition notice or is not consonant with the purposes of that test in the competition. In some circumstances where the selection board has no discretion, the Court’s review may also cover the accuracy of the facts on which the selection board based its decision (see, to that effect, order of 25 May 2011, Meierhofer v Commission, F‑74/07 RENV, EU:F:2011:63, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).

68      However, a selection board’s assessment of candidates’ knowledge and ability is not open to review by the Courts. Moreover, it has been held that the oral tests are those for which the selection board has the widest discretion (see, to that effect, order of 25 May 2011, Meierhofer v Commission, F‑74/07 RENV, EU:F:2011:63, paragraph 63 and the case-law cited).

69      The same does not apply regarding a review of consistency between the mark awarded and the selection board’s written assessments. Such consistency, which furnishes a guarantee of equal treatment of candidates, is one of the rules governing the proceedings of the selection board, such that compliance with it must, by virtue of the case-law cited above, be verified as part of judicial review. Consistency between the mark awarded to the candidate and the selection board’s written assessment may form part of the Court’s review of the selection board’s assessment of the candidate’s performance (order of 25 May 2011, Meierhofer v Commission, F‑74/07 RENV, EU:F:2011:63, paragraph 64).

70      In the present case, the applicant does not plead infringement of any of the rules governing the proceedings of the selection board, such as its duty of impartiality, the board’s observance of the principle of equal treatment of candidates or the absence of any misuse of powers. She merely claims that the answers she gave during the oral test were not properly appreciated by the selection board and thus challenges the selection board’s evaluation of her oral performance. It follows from the case-law cited above that the applicant cannot properly plead before the Court even the manifest error which, in her view, vitiates the selection board’s assessment.

71      Furthermore, none of the arguments put forward by the applicant is capable of establishing that the selection board made a manifest error of assessment by awarding her only 44 points out of 80 for the eight general competencies and 55 points out of 100 for the specific competencies, bringing her total score to 99 points out of 180, whereas she had a remarkably high total of 37 points in the Talent Screener. Although the applicant claims that the score of 99 points out of 180 is not compatible with the high score she obtained in the Talent Screener, that circumstance does not suggest the existence of such an error, since the performance of a candidate in successive tests may vary from one test to another (see, to that effect, judgment of 13 December 2012, Mileva v Commission, F‑101/11, EU:F:2012:197, paragraph 45). Next, it has been held that a selection board, in assessing the candidates’ professional knowledge and their abilities and motivation, is bound to base its decisions exclusively and autonomously on the candidates’ performances alone, in accordance with the requirements of the notice of competition in question (judgment of 14 July 2000, Teixeira Neves v Court of Justice, T‑146/99, EU:T:2000:194, paragraph 41). Accordingly, the applicant cannot profitably rely on her lengthy previous professional experience in order to challenge the mark awarded to her in the assessment centre tests. Lastly, the applicant’s personal belief that the marks obtained do not reflect her actual performance and that the selection board’s assessment is therefore implausible do not constitute proof of a manifest error of assessment either.

72      Even if the applicant criticises a manifest inconsistency between the selection board’s assessments and the mark awarded to her – a question which, by contrast, is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Court – she has not shown that such an inconsistency would vitiate the selection board’s assessment in the present case. The applicant bases her criticism solely on her own belief that she correctly answered most of the questions put to her by the selection board, which does not give grounds for establishing that there has been a manifest error of assessment (see, to that effect, order of 25 May 2011, Meierhofer v Commission, F‑74/07 RENV, EU:F:2011:63, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).

73      It follows from the foregoing that the plea in law alleging manifest error of assessment by the selection board must be rejected.

 Claim for compensation

74      The applicant seeks compensation for the material and non-material damage which she claims to have suffered as a result of the contested decision. She submits, first, that she suffered material damage since she lost the opportunity to be recruited as an administrator at grade AD 7. According to the applicant, if her name had been included on the reserve list, she would have had every chance of being recruited into the services of DG TAXUD, where she had already worked successfully for seven years. As regards the difference in remuneration, she claims that it amounts to EUR 2 686 per month. As for the percentage of chance she had of being recruited, she argues that it was close to 100%. She also maintains that she suffered considerable non-material damage as a result of a feeling of great injustice, discouragement and anxiety caused by the contested decision which improperly excluded her from the reserve list, and of the fact that her professional experience was greatly underestimated. She therefore claims EUR 5 000, since, in her view, it is not possible to compensate for that damage by annulling the contested decision.

75      The Commission disputes the applicant’s arguments.

76      In accordance with settled case-law concerning civil service proceedings, where a claim for compensation is closely linked to a claim for annulment, the rejection of the latter, either as inadmissible or as unfounded, also entails the rejection of the claim for compensation (see judgment of 30 September 2003, Martínez Valls v Parliament, T‑214/02, EU:T:2003:254, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).

77      In the present case, such a link exists between the claim for annulment and the claim for compensation.

78      Since the claim for annulment has been rejected, the claim for compensation must also be rejected.

79      The action must therefore be dismissed in its entirety.

 Costs

80      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders JP to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 6 July 2022.

*      Language of the case: English.

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