Court of Justice of the European Communities (including Court of First Instance Decisions)

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

23 April 2018 (*)

(Civil service — Officials — Social security — Opinion of the Invalidity Committee — Discretion of Appointing Authority — Articles 53 and 78 of the Staff Regulations — Error of assessment — Obligation to state reasons)

In Case T‑747/16,

Guillaume Vincenti, official of the European Union Intellectual Property Office, residing in Alicante (Spain), represented by H. Tettenborn, lawyer,

applicant,

v

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by A. Lukošiūtė, acting as Agent,

defendant,

ACTION brought under Article 270 TFEU, seeking annulment of the decision of EUIPO of 18 December 2015 refusing to recognise the applicant’s permanent total incapacity and to declare that he is to be retired,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),

composed of G. Berardis, President, S. Papasavvas and O. Spineanu-Matei (Rapporteur), Judges,

Registrar: P. Cullen, Administrator,

having regard to the written part of the procedure and further to the hearing on 7 December 2017,

gives the following

Judgment

 Background to the dispute

1        The applicant, Mr Guillaume Vincenti, is an official of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

2        On 18 July 2005, the applicant suffered an accident at work, following which he was placed on sick leave for a period of nine days. He then returned to work until 10 June 2013, at which time he was again placed on sick leave.

3        By letter of 28 November 2014, the President of EUIPO, acting in his capacity as Appointing Authority, informed the applicant that, since his sick leave had totalled more than 12 months within a three-year period, his medical situation would be referred to the Invalidity Committee pursuant to Article 59(4) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’).

4        The Invalidity Committee was established on 23 January 2015. Pursuant to Article 7 of Annex II to the Staff Regulations, it comprised three doctors, namely the doctor appointed by EUIPO, the doctor appointed by the applicant, and the doctor appointed by agreement between the first two doctors (‘the joint doctor’).

5        On 9 February 2015, the Invalidity Committee delivered its opinion to EUIPO. It is apparent from that opinion that, in the committee’s view, the applicant was suffering from permanent invalidity which it regarded as total and which prevented him from carrying out his duties. On those grounds, the Invalidity Committee took the view that it was necessary to terminate the applicant’s duties. It also stated that the applicant’s illness, which had developed over time, was a direct result of the accident at work that had taken place on 18 July 2005 (see paragraph 2 above).

6        By email of 12 May 2015, EUIPO informed the applicant’s doctor and the joint doctor that the doctor which it had appointed had been replaced for personal reasons. In addition, EUIPO indicated that the opinion of the invalidity committee did not contain a statement of reasons and, consequently, requested the invalidity committee to continue its work in order to provide detailed findings in respect of the case in question, so that EUIPO might adopt a final decision.

7        By joint letter of 16 June 2015, the applicant’s doctor and the joint doctor provided EUIPO with an additional analysis of the applicant’s medical situation, confirming the initial opinion.

8        By email of 17 July 2015, the applicant’s doctor provided EUIPO with additional explanations.

9        By letter of 31 August 2015, the applicant’s counsel requested that EUIPO recognise the applicant’s permanent, regarded as total, incapacity to perform his duties, and retire him automatically.

10      By letter of 18 December 2015 (‘the contested decision’), EUIPO refused the applicant’s request on the ground that the opinion did not contain any statement of reasons enabling it to verify the lawfulness of (i) the considerations expressed and (ii) the procedure followed. In particular, EUIPO drew attention to the fact that the Invalidity Committee was not able to adduce the slightest information making it possible to understand the steps and actions undertaken in order to conclude that the applicant was invalid, and that it had provided no further explanation as to the existing connection between that invalidity and its origin. Having regard, in particular, to the doubts expressed regarding the lawfulness of the proceedings for a declaration of invalidity and to the potential impact on the financial interests of the European Union, EUIPO informed the applicant that it had referred the matter to the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), which had decided to open an investigation, of which the applicant was informed by letter of 11 December 2015 from OLAF. Lastly, EUIPO indicated that, during that investigation, it was suspending the proceedings for a declaration of invalidity.

11      By letter of 18 March 2016, the applicant’s counsel lodged a complaint against the contested decision on the basis of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations.

12      On 15 July 2016, EUIPO rejected the applicant’s complaint. In essence, EUIPO took the view that neither the opinion of the invalidity committee nor the joint letter of 16 June 2015 had enabled it to assess either the considerations on which the Invalidity Committee had based its opinion or the evidence on which that committee had relied in order to establish the existence of a connection between the applicant’s invalidity and the accident at work referred to in paragraph 2 above.

13      By letter of 24 November 2017, EUIPO informed the Court that OLAF had notified it, on 7 November 2017, of the closure of the investigation referred to in paragraph 10 above and had sent the EUIPO its recommendations.

 Procedure and forms of order sought

14      By application lodged at the Court Registry on 25 October 2016, the applicant brought the present action.

15      By decision of 17 January 2017, the case was assigned to the Sixth Chamber of the Court and a Judge-Rapporteur was appointed.

16      On 8 February 2017, EUIPO requested that the proceedings be stayed pending the completion of OLAF’s investigation. By document lodged at the Court Registry on 1 March 2017, the applicant stated his opposition to a stay of the proceedings.

17      On 8 May 2017, acting upon a proposal of the Judge-Rapporteur, the General Court (Sixth Chamber), by adopting a measure of organisation of procedure pursuant to Article 89 of its Rules of Procedure, requested EUIPO to comment on the current state of OLAF’s investigation and the possible consequences for the applicant of a stay of proceedings in the present case.

18      After examining the response of EUIPO, lodged at the Court Registry on 19 May 2017, and the additional observations of the applicant regarding the request that the proceedings be stayed, lodged at the Court Registry on 13 June 2017, the President of the Sixth Chamber of the General Court, by decision of 21 June 2017, rejected the request to stay the proceedings.

19      By that same decision of 21 June 2017, the Court held that, pursuant to Article 83(1) of the Rules of Procedure, a second exchange of pleadings was unnecessary, because the contents of the case file were sufficiently comprehensive.

20      On 17 July 2017, pursuant to Article 83(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the applicant submitted a reasoned request for leave to submit a reply, which was rejected by the Court.

21      On a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, the Court decided to open the oral part of the procedure.

22      The parties presented oral argument and answered the questions put to them by the Court at the hearing on 7 December 2017.

23      The applicant claims that the Court should:

–        annul the contested decision;

–        order EUIPO to pay the costs.

24      EUIPO contends that the Court should:

–        dismiss the application;

–        order the applicant to pay the costs.

25      The applicant also asks the Court, by way of measures of inquiry, first, to conduct the hearing of his doctor and the joint doctor, as regards the question of the lawfulness of the proceedings for a declaration of invalidity, and, secondly, to ask EUIPO whether any other opinions of the Invalidity Committee existed which had a similar structure and form to the opinion at issue of the committee in the present case.

 Law

 Admissibility

26      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that EUIPO stated, in the defence, that the applicant had expounded various arguments relating to the pleas raised, without making a distinction between them.

27      In particular, EUIPO argued that it is not clear on what specific grounds the infringement of Articles 7 to 9, 13 and 33 of the Staff Regulations, alleged as part of the first plea, is based, in view of the lack of legal arguments. In that regard, in reply to a question asked by the Court at the hearing, and although it has not raised a formal plea of inadmissibility under Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure, EUIPO confirmed that it is arguing that the first plea is inadmissible, in so far as it relates to an infringement of the aforementioned articles.

28      It should be recalled that under the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is applicable to proceedings before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute, and under Article 76(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, all applications must state the subject matter of the dispute, the pleas and arguments put forward and a brief statement of the pleas in law on which the application is based.

29      Moreover, in accordance with settled case-law, irrespective of any question of terminology, that summary must be sufficiently clear and precise as to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the Court to rule on the action, even without having to request further information. For an action to be admissible, it is necessary that the basic matters of fact and of law relied on be indicated, at least in summary form, coherently and intelligibly in the application itself, so as to guarantee legal certainty and sound administration of justice (judgments of 12 May 2016, Italy v Commission, T‑384/14, not published, EU:T:2016:298, paragraph 38, and of 15 June 2017, Bay v Parliament, T‑302/16, not published, EU:T:2017:390, paragraph 25).

30      In the present case, it is admittedly true that the structure of the application is not the clearest, which the applicant himself concedes, while stating that the facts and arguments relating to all of the pleas in the action are interlinked, as a result of which they were expounded together.

31      It must be stated that, in the part of its application relating to the substance of the dispute, the applicant formally relies on three pleas in law, (i) alleging infringement of Articles 7 to 9, 13, 33, 53 and 78 of the Staff Regulations and Articles 13 to 16 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations and relating, in essence, to the discretion of EUIPO, as the Appointing Authority, when notified of the findings of the Invalidity Committee acknowledging a permanent invalidity; (ii) alleging ‘distortion of the facts’ and infringement of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, of the principle of sound administration and of the obligation to state reasons, set out in Article 41(1) and (2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’); and (iii) alleging infringement of Article 3(1) of the Charter.

32      In the first place, as regards the first plea, it should be noted that the elements contained in the application in fact relate exclusively to the alleged infringement of Articles 53 and 78 of the Staff Regulations and Articles 13 to 16 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations. By contrast, the application does not contain any argument or complaint relating to an alleged infringement of Articles 7 to 9, 13 and 33 of the Staff Regulations. Accordingly, the first plea must be declared partly inadmissible, since, as regards those provisions, it does not meet the conditions laid down in Article 76(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure.

33      Secondly, as regards the third plea, it must be stated that the applicant merely states that ‘unlawful prolongation of the ... invalidity procedures breaches [his] right to respect for his physical and mental integrity’. He does not set out any argument in support of that plea, which would have allowed the Court to assess the alleged infringement of Article 3(1) of the Charter; accordingly it must be declared inadmissible.

34      It follows from the foregoing that the first plea, in that it alleges infringement of Articles 7 to 9, 13 and 33 of the Staff Regulations, and the third plea must be rejected as inadmissible. It is therefore appropriate to consider, first of all, the first plea, in so far as it relates to the infringement of Articles 53 and 78 of the Staff Regulations and Articles 13 to 16 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations, and, secondly, the second plea, alleging, in essence, an error of assessment and an infringement of Article 41 of the Charter.

 Substance

 First plea in law: infringement of Articles 53 and 78 of the Staff Regulations and Articles 13 to 16 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations

35      The applicant submits that, in the context of proceedings for a declaration of invalidity, EUIPO, as the Appointing Authority, has no discretion and that, consequently, it must, on the one hand, give effect to the Invalidity Committee’s findings without delay and, on the other, recognise the official’s permanent incapacity to perform his duties. Accordingly, EUIPO, as the Appointing Authority, should have automatically retired the applicant, pursuant to Article 53 of the Staff Regulations.

36      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

37      As a preliminary point, Article 53 of the Staff Regulations provides that an official to whom the Invalidity Committee finds that the provisions of Article 78 of the Staff Regulations apply is to be automatically retired on the last day of the month in which the Appointing Authority recognises his permanent incapacity to perform his duties.

38      Under Article 59(4) of the Staff Regulations, the Appointing Authority may refer to the Invalidity Committee the case of any official whose sick leave totals more than 12 months in any period of 3 years.

39      The first paragraph of Article 78 of the Staff Regulations states that:

‘An official shall be entitled, in the manner provided for in Articles 13 to 16 of Annex VIII, to an invalidity allowance in the case of total permanent invalidity preventing him from performing the duties corresponding to a post in his function group.’

40      Pursuant to the fifth paragraph of Article 78 of the Staff Regulations, where the invalidity arises from an occupational disease, contributions to the pension scheme to which the invalidity allowance is subject shall be paid in full from the budget of the institution.

41      It should be noted that Article 78 of the Staff Regulations refers to Annex VIII, entitled ‘Pension Scheme’, more specifically Articles 13 to 15 thereof in order to define the conditions for the grant of an invalidity allowance. According to Article 13 of Annex VIII of the Staff Regulations, it is for the Invalidity Committee to establish whether the staff member is suffering from total permanent invalidity preventing him from performing the duties corresponding to a post in his function group (see, to that effect, judgments of 27 February 1992, Plug v Commission, T‑165/89, EU:T:1992:27, paragraph 57).

42      Firstly, it should be observed that, contrary to what the applicant implies, EUIPO has never disputed that the invalidity committee alone was competent to issue findings on his potential incapacity.

43      It is also apparent from settled case-law in this connection that the Invalidity Committee has exclusive competence to make assessments of a medical nature (see, to that effect, order of 15 November 2006, Jiménez Martínez v Commission, T‑115/05, EU:T:2006:346, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

44      Moreover, contrary to what the applicant also claims, EUIPO does not dispute the fact that it is not entitled to disregard the opinion of the Invalidity Committee, in so far as this would involve assessing medical information.

45      Secondly, it is necessary to examine the conclusions that EUIPO, as the Appointing Authority, must draw from the opinion of the Invalidity Committee.

46      First of all, it should be noted that there are no provisions in the Staff Regulations which specify the scope of the opinions or findings of the Invalidity Committee, or the inferences that an Appointing Authority must draw therefrom. At most, the second paragraph of Article 9 of Annex II to the Staff Regulations states that ‘the Invalidity Committee’s conclusions shall be communicated to the Appointing Authority and to the official concerned’. However, that provision prescribes no time limit in that regard, as a result of which it cannot be inferred that an official must be automatically retired following the opinion of the Invalidity Committee setting out its findings.

47      In that regard, the reliance, by the applicant, on the judgment of 12 July 2011, Commission v Q (T‑80/09 P, EU:T:2011:347) is based on an incorrect reading of the provisions of the Staff Regulations. Although paragraph 158 of that judgment states that ‘an official who is recognised by the Invalidity Committee as being in a state of total permanent invalidity is automatically retired pursuant to Articles 53 and 78 of the Staff Regulations’, the reference, at the end of that passage, to Articles 53 and 78 of the Staff Regulations cannot be omitted. Article 53 of the Staff Regulations, referred to in paragraph 37 above, expressly states that the official’s retirement only comes into effect after the Appointing Authority’s decision recognising his permanent incapacity to perform his duties. The judgment relied upon by the applicant does not contradict that fact, merely mentioning it implicitly, through the reference to the aforementioned provisions of the Staff Regulations. It follows that the applicant cannot draw from that judgment the conclusion that a permanent invalidity recognised by the Invalidity Committee has the effect of automatically retiring the official.

48      Next, the case-law makes it quite clear that as the Appointing Authority’s decision relates to a procedure covered by Articles 53 and 78 of the Staff Regulations, it is to be taken on the basis of the Invalidity Committee’s opinion (see, to that effect, order of 15 November 2006, Jiménez Martínez v Commission, T‑115/05, EU:T:2006:346, paragraph 29).

49      Although it is admittedly true that it is not up to EUIPO, as the Appointing Authority, to call into question the medical findings, the fact remains that it is a matter for it alone to determine, subject to review by the Court, the legal inferences to be drawn from those findings. That is moreover clear from the preparatory nature of the opinion of the Invalidity Committee, which is only a step in the procedure for retirement (judgment of 3 June 1997, H v Commission, T‑196/95, EU:T:1997:79, paragraph 48, and order of 15 November 2006, Jiménez Martínez v Commission, T‑115/05, EU:T:2006:346, paragraph 30).

50      The Invalidity Committee is medically competent to make a determination of the cause of the incapacity for work and to verify whether the applicant’s pathological condition has a sufficiently direct relationship with a specific and normal risk inherent in the performance of his duties, while it is for the administration alone to determine the inferences which may properly be drawn in law from the medical findings (judgment of 21 January 1987, Rienzi v Commission, 76/84, EU:C:1987:17, paragraphs 10 and 11).

51      Finally, it should be noted that the provisions relating to the Invalidity Committee are designed so as to confer upon medical experts the task of definitively appraising all medical questions. Judicial review may not extend to medical appraisals as such, which must be considered final, provided that the conditions in which they were made are not flawed. On the other hand, judicial review may extend to questions concerning the proper constitution and functioning of those committees, and also the regularity of the opinions which they issue. In that regard, the Court has jurisdiction to examine whether the opinion contains a statement of reasons making it possible to assess the considerations on which the findings which it sets out were based and whether it has established a comprehensible link between the medical findings which it sets out and the conclusions reached by the committee (see judgment of 23 November 2004, O v Commission, T‑376/02, EU:T:2004:338, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).

52      Similarly, although EUIPO, as the Appointing Authority, cannot call into question the medical findings of the Invalidity Committee, it is nonetheless required, in exercising its own powers, to take decisions which are not marred by irregularities. It must therefore be able to assess that the functioning of the committee is proper.

53      Accordingly, EUIPO, acting as the Appointing Authority, had a discretion as to the action to be taken in relation to the opinion of the invalidity committee and was under no obligation to adopt that committee’s findings automatically. However, that discretion cannot be assimilated to a purely discretionary power of EUIPO, in the sense that it does not permit it to refuse indefinitely, without giving any reasons, to adopt a decision on the basis of the Invalidity Committee’s opinion.

54      Moreover, the references by the applicant to Articles 13 to 16 of Annex VIII to the Staff Regulations are irrelevant in the present case, since those provisions relate to disability allowances and do not specify the circumstances in which the Appointing Authority’s decision must take effect, and even less the latter’s discretion following the receipt of the committee’s opinion. It follows that that complaint is ineffective.

55      In the light of the foregoing, the first plea, in so far as it has not been declared inadmissible (see paragraph 34 above), must be rejected on the merits.

 The second plea, alleging an error of assessment and an infringement of Article 41 of the Charter

–       The first part, alleging an error of assessment

56      The applicant submits that, even if EUIPO, as the Appointing Authority, enjoys a wide discretion, there was no justification in his case for not recognising his permanent incapacity. Furthermore, he states that none of the arguments put forward by EUIPO, in its capacity as Appointing Authority, are valid.

57      In particular, the applicant complains that EUIPO incorrectly took the view that the opinion of the Invalidity Committee ‘did not contain any motivation enabling [it] to assess the regularity of the considerations and proceedings’ of the invalidity committee.

58      In that regard, the applicant states that EUIPO ‘distorted’ the facts, since, on the one hand, the statement of reasons set out in the decision of the Invalidity Committee, unanimously adopted, was sufficient and, on the other, two members of the committee presented their findings to EUIPO by the joint letter of 16 June 2015. In addition, it observes that that letter was supplemented by an email on 17 July from his doctor.

59      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

60      On the one hand, it should be recalled that, as agreed in the context of the first plea, EUIPO, acting as the Appointing Authority, must be acknowledged as having some discretion following the receipt of the opinion of the Invalidity Committee.

61      On the other hand, the failure to adopt a decision recognising the applicant’s permanent, regarded as total, incapacity, following the opinion of the Invalidity Committee, was within the discretion of the Appointing Authority and was in the present case linked, firstly, to the deficiencies of that opinion which it had identified and in respect of which it had invited the Invalidity Committee to continue its work and, secondly, to the suspicions as to the lawfulness of the proceedings for a declaration of invalidity, concerning which it had accordingly notified OLAF (see paragraph 10 above), which the General Court is not, in any event, required to rule on in the context of the present proceedings.

62      Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s arguments referred to in paragraphs 57 and 58 above, it must be held that, although he formally alleged ‘distortion of the facts’, he intended, in fact, to rely on an error of assessment of EUIPO, in its capacity as the Appointing Authority, concerning the possible inadequacy of the statement of reasons of the opinion issued by the Invalidity Committee.

63      In that regard, even if the opinion of the Invalidity Committee was unanimously adopted, as the applicant submits, the Court has jurisdiction to examine whether the opinion contains a statement of reasons enabling the reader to assess the considerations on which the findings which it contains were well founded and if it has established a comprehensible link between the medical findings it contains and the conclusions reached by the invalidity committee (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 December 1987, 277/84, Jänsch v Commission, EU:C:1987:540, paragraph 15; of 16 June 2000, T‑84/98, C v Council, EU:T:2000:156, paragraph 43; and of 23 November 2004, O v Commission, T‑376/02, EU:T:2004:338, paragraph 29).

64      It is in the light of that principle that the Court must assess the applicant’s argument.

65      First, without a substantive examination of the Invalidity Committee’s opinion as such, it should be noted that it consists of three paragraphs, which set out the findings reached by the doctors who made up the initial Invalidity Committee. First of all, the first paragraph states that the committee took into consideration the applicant’s current clinical status and the potential evolution of his pathology. Next, the second paragraph mentions, in a single sentence, the conclusion that the applicant is in a state of permanent invalidity which must be considered as total. Finally, the third paragraph states that the pathology from which the applicant suffers is the direct consequence of the work accident of 18 July 2005 (see paragraph 2 above).

66      It follows that EUIPO, in its capacity as the Appointing Authority, was entitled to conclude that the Invalidity Committee’s opinion did not provide a statement of reasons which made it possible to assess the considerations on which the final position set out therein was based, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 63 above.

67      The conclusion reached by EUIPO, acting as the Appointing Authority, referred to in paragraph 66 above, cannot be called into question by the mere fact that, as the applicant submits, the Invalidity Committee used a template provided by EUIPO to prepare its opinion. The finding by EUIPO that the statement of reasons in the Invalidity Committee’s opinion was inadequate does not relate to the template used in its preparation, but to the fact that the opinion was incomplete.

68      It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question EUIPO’s finding that the statement of reasons set out in the Invalidity Committee’s opinion was inadequate.

69      Secondly, it is necessary to examine whether the joint letter of 16 June 2015 should be taken account of in the assessment by EUIPO, acting as the Appointing Authority, of whether the Invalidity Committee’s opinion was sufficiently reasoned, as the applicant submits.

70      It should be recalled that the joint letter of 16 June 2015 followed the email from EUIPO of 12 May 2015, by which EUIPO requested the Invalidity Committee to continue its work, as the committee is entitled to do, in accordance with settled case-law. If the Invalidity Committee does not, in a first opinion, completely fulfil its remit, it may be invited by the institution concerned to supplement or clarify its findings in a new opinion (judgment of 9 July 1997, S v Court of Justice, T‑4/96, EU:T:1997:103, paragraph 42; see also, to that effect, judgments of 15 December 1999, Latino v Commission, T‑300/97, EU:T:1999:328, paragraph 53, and Nardone v Commission, T‑27/98, EU:T:1999:329, paragraph 60).

71      Despite the fact that the invitation to continue its work related to the invalidity committee, which must be made up of three doctors (see paragraph 4 above), only two of the three doctors from that committee submitted to EUIPO the joint letter of 16 June 2015.

72      In that regard, first, it should be noted that the joint letter of 16 June 2015 does not constitute a collective work from all the doctors on the Invalidity Committee, since it was only signed by the applicant’s doctor and the joint doctor. The opinion of the Invalidity Committee must set out the collective discussions between the three designated doctors (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 May 2013, McCoy v Committee of the Regions, F‑86/11, EU:F:2013:56, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

73      The fact that the doctor appointed by EUIPO had to be replaced for personal reasons and that a new doctor had accordingly been appointed, as EUIPO indicated in its email of 12 May 2015 (see paragraph 6 above), does not call into question the finding in paragraph 71 above, namely that a document signed by only two out of the three doctors making up the Invalidity Committee does not satisfy the requirement of collegiality. First of all, Article 7 of Annex II to the Staff Regulations states that ‘the Invalidity Committee shall consist of three doctors’. Next, the replacement of the EUIPO doctor made it all the more necessary for the Invalidity Committee to meet and to have a meeting with the new doctor, in order to be able to continue its work. Finally, the email of 12 May 2015, although addressed only to the two other doctors, was in fact directed at the Invalidity Committee in its entirety and invited those doctors to continue their work with the newly appointed doctor. Moreover, contrary to what the applicant claims, it is not at all apparent from the email of 12 May 2015 that EUIPO had requested from the two doctors referred to above that they provide it with an additional statement of reasons for the Invalidity Committee’s opinion.

74      Secondly, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 70 above, given that the Invalidity Committee was asked by EUIPO to continue its work, it was up to that committee to send EUIPO a new opinion, in which it was able to supplement or clarify its initial opinion.

75      The formulation of a new opinion by the Invalidity Committee necessarily entailed it being signed by all the members of the Invalidity Committee, including the new doctor representing EUIPO, replacing the doctor originally appointed by it.

76      Thirdly, it must be stated that the analysis carried out in paragraphs 70 to 73 above can be applied mutatis mutandis to the email of 17 July 2015, since that email was sent by the applicant’s doctor alone.

77      Accordingly, the joint letter of 16 June 2015 and the email of 17 July 2015 cannot be a substitute for the Invalidity Committee’s opinion nor supplement it, as a result of which EUIPO was not required to take them into account. It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not succeeded in calling into question EUIPO’s finding that the statement of reasons pertaining to the Invalidity Committee’s opinion was inadequate.

78      It follows from the foregoing considerations that the first part of the second plea must be rejected as being unfounded.

–       The second part, alleging infringement of Article 41 of the Charter

79      The applicant claims that, in view of the error of assessment alleged in the first part of the second plea in law and the refusal to recognise his permanent incapacity, EUIPO infringed the principle of sound administration. He also claims that EUIPO breached its ‘fiduciary duty’.

80      Furthermore, the applicant submits that the contested decision is not adequately reasoned, inasmuch as it does not explain in what way the procedure followed by the Invalidity Committee is irregular.

81      EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.

82      Given the rejection of the first plea and the first part of the second plea, it is not necessary to examine the complaint alleging infringement of Article 41 of the Charter.

83      As regards the second complaint put forward in support of the second part of the present plea, alleging a failure to state reasons for the contested decision, it should be noted that, in that decision, EUIPO indicated that it took the view that the Invalidity Committee’s opinion did not contain a statement of reasons enabling it to verify the validity of the stated considerations. Furthermore, with regard to suspected irregularities concerning the procedure followed by the invalidity committee, once the matter was referred to OLAF, OLAF asked EUIPO to keep its involvement in the proceedings confidential. Therefore, the applicant’s argument, set out in paragraph 80 above, cannot be upheld.

84      It follows that the remainder of the second part of the second plea must be rejected as unfounded.

85      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the second plea must be dismissed.

 The relief sought by the Applicant

86      The applicant asked the Court, first, to conduct the hearing of his doctor and the joint doctor as to whether the proceedings for a declaration of invalidity were lawful, and, secondly, to ask EUIPO as to whether there were any other opinions of the Invalidity Committee which had a similar structure and form to the relevant opinion.

87      It should be noted that Article 90 of the Rules of Procedure provides that measures of organisation of procedure are to be prescribed by the General Court. Furthermore, it is apparent from Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure that the General Court has exclusive jurisdiction to assess the usefulness of measures of inquiry for the purpose of resolving the dispute (judgment of 10 July 2012, Interspeed v Commission, T‑587/10, not published, EU:T:2012:355, paragraph 81).

88      In the present case, as regards the first measure, mentioned in paragraphs 45 to 54 above and, as regards the second requested measure, mentioned in paragraph 67 above, they do not appear to be relevant or useful to the outcome of the dispute.

89      In those circumstances, since the Court has been able to rule on the application on the basis of the pleas in law and the arguments expounded during the proceedings, and in the light of the documents lodged by the parties, there is no need to grant the measures sought.

90      In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed.

 Costs

91      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by EUIPO.

On those grounds,

THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)

hereby:

1.      Dismisses the action;

2.      Orders Guillaume Vincenti to pay the costs.

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 April 2018.

*      Language of the case: English.

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