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Reasonable Expectations Of Geo-Privacy?(2008) 5:2 SCRIPT-ed 375 (2008)
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Reasonable Expectations Of Geo-Privacy?(2008) 5:2 SCRIPT-ed 375
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Reasonable Expectations of Geo-Privacy?
Sjaak
Nouwt
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Table of Contents:
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Cite as: S Nouwt, "Reasonable Expectations of Geo-Privacy?", (2008) 5:2 SCRIPTed
375 @:
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol5-2/nouwt.asp
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DOI: 10.2966/scrip.050208.375 |
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© Sjaak Nouwt 2008.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Licence.
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1. Introduction
The Tilburg Institute
for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT) has been participating in an
extensive Dutch innovation programme, entitled ‘Space for
Geo-Information’ since 2006.1
Under this programme the TILT-GEOGOV research group, together with
computer scientists and political scientists, are participating in
the research project called GEOGOV. This project particularly focuses
on the use of spatial or geographic information (geo-information) by
governments. The starting point for the GEOGOV project is that there
is a need for a social scientific approach of the process, from the
development of geo-applications to their implementation in society.
More specifically, TILT concentrates on the legal and political
aspects of governments using geo-information about their citizens to
provide Location Based Services (LBS).
It is obvious that
privacy and data protection are important issues to be considered
when governments use geo-information about their citizens. Personal
information enables governments to deliver LBS to their citizens.
This article endeavours to highlight the developments of LBS by
governments in relation to the data protection rules and to the
concept of ‘Reasonable Expectations of Privacy.’
This concept was introduced as a litmus test in 1967 by Judge
John Marshall Harlan, a former member of the US Supreme Court.
According to this test, a person can have a reasonable expectation of
privacy when (1) he has an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
in a certain situation, and (2) society is prepared to recognise this
(objective) expectation as reasonable (see also section 4.2).
This article deals with
different types of data. The general context of this article is the
protection of privacy and ‘personal data.’ ‘Geographic
data’ becomes ‘personal data’ when it is related to
an identified or identifiable natural person. When it provides
information about locations of people we call this: ‘location
data.’ Apart from location data, which in general provides
information about where you are, it also deals with ‘traffic
data’, which can provide information about where you have been.
Traffic data is, for example, necessary for the conveyance and
billing of mobile communications. Finally, ‘movement data’
can provide information about the route you (or your terminal
equipment) have taken or about the duration of your movement.
This article also deals
with different privacy concepts. ‘Privacy’ is a general
concept and this article is more particularly about ‘information
privacy’ or data protection. A more specific concept of privacy
is the ‘reasonable expectations of privacy’
concept. In this article, the concept of ‘geo-privacy’
refers to the protection of ‘information privacy’ with
regard to geo-information.
This article is set-out
as follows. In section 2, I will first explain the importance,
meaning, and possibilities of geo-information. In this respect, I
will also provide an overview of a number of positioning techniques
that make it possible to generate geo-information. In section 3, I
will explain how the European legal framework is applicable when
geo-information can be related to individuals. More specifically,
this legal framework consists of the general Data Protection
Directive, the e-Privacy Directive, and the Data Retention Directive.
In section 4, I will discuss the concept of ‘reasonable
expectations of privacy’, in particular with regard to
geo-information collected in public places. I will explain that,
according to European case law, we can also have reasonable
expectations of privacy in public places. In section 5, I will
conclude that the privacy concept of article 8 ECHR seems to provide
more legal certainty and a better privacy protection than the concept
of ‘reasonable expectations of privacy.’
2. Geo-information
2.1 The importance of time and place
In the virtual world of
electronic communications, like the Internet, time and place have
become obsolete factors. At least, that is what we have come to
believe for a number of years. However, it seems that we are now at a
stage of ‘reterritorialisation’ where time and place are
becoming important again.2
Mobile communications by the Global System for Mobile Communications
(GSM) or Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) use a
cellular based network architecture. The geographic area within which
we communicate is divided into cells, varying from several
meters to tens of kilometers. Such a geographic area is covered by a
number of Base Transceiver Stations (BTS or antennas). A cell
is the part of the area that is covered by one antenna. The area is
divided into a number of overlapping uniquely identifiable cells
by means of the antenna. The reach of one cell can vary from
100m in the city to 30 km in the countryside. For mobile
communication to take place it is necessary to know the location of
the cell phone. This is required to establish the communication and
also for billing purposes. As a result, information is available
about the geographic position where the user of a mobile phone
equipment is at a certain moment. Therefore, time and place have
again become important elements.
2.2 What is geo-information?
By using the concept of
‘geo-information’ several types of data can be covered.
In this respect we will focus on geographic data, location data, and
movement/mobility data.
Geographic data
(hereafter referred to as geo-information) is “information
describing the location and attributes of things, including their
shapes and representation.” Geographic data is the composite of
spatial data and attribute data.3
This data is related to a place on earth. Geo-information is for
example the location of buildings, roads, and parcels in a landscape,
combined with information about these objects, like the function of
the building, the type of road, and the use of the parcel.4
Other examples are the position of cables and wires in the subsoil,
combined with information about their functions and administrators.
Borders are also geo-information, e.g. borders of parcels and borders
of municipalities.
Geo-information is used
by governments, the private sector, and by citizens.5
In the public sector, geo-information is used for example by the land
registry, meteorological institutes, and the ministry of transport
(for example for road pricing). In the last two decades, the private
sector has invested largely in creating geo-information databases and
some well-known private businesses that have made that investment
are: TeleAtlas, NavTeq, Google, Cyclomedia. And citizens are also
increasingly using geo-information, for example to upload pictures to
Google Earth or to use Google Streetview, navigate with TomTom or use
it for vehicle tracking with GPS.
A legal definition of
‘location data’ can be found in the European Directive
2002/58/EC (Privacy and electronic communications), Article 2(c),
where it describes location data as:
any data processed in an electronic communications network,
indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a
user of a publicly available electronic communications service.
Preamble (14) of
Directive 2002/58/EC explains that location data may refer to the
latitude, longitude and altitude of the user’s terminal
equipment. Furthermore, it may also refer to the direction of travel,
to the level of accuracy of the location information, to the
identification of the network cell in which the terminal equipment is
located at a certain point in time, and to the time the location
information was recorded. Sometimes, the location of the terminal
equipment of the sender or the recipient can also be called “traffic
data.” This is the case in digital mobile networks, when
location data giving the geographic position of the terminal
equipment of the mobile user are processed to enable the transmission
of communications.6
Location data is more precise than is necessary to enable the
transmission of communications. They are very useful to deliver
value-added services to the subscriber or user, like providing
individualised traffic information and guidance to motorists.
Another category of
geo-information is ‘movement data’ or ‘trajectories.’7
Movement data are data about changes in the physical position of an
entity with respect to a reference system within which positions can
be assessed. For example, geographical space is such a reference
system. A trajectory can be described as the path made by the moving
entity through the space where it moves. Such a path requires a
certain amount of time. As a result, trajectories and time are
inseparable. Trajectories relate to the movement of entities, like
people, vehicles, or terminal equipment. Movement data can result in
a route a person has taken or other characteristics of the movement,
like the duration of the movement. Such information can also be of
legal importance. In a famous Dutch murder case, the Court of Justice
at ’s-Hertogenbosch was of the opinion that on 23rd
September 1999 at 8:36 p.m. the suspect made a phone call with his
cell phone via Base Transceiver Station 14501 in the city of
Deventer, which proved that at that time, the suspect must have been
in or near the city of Deventer and not 24 kilometers away.
2.3 Location services
To make things clear,
the TILT-GEOGOV research group has divided geo-information into
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Location Based Services
(LBS). Because LBS are services meant for large groups of
non-professional users (citizens, consumers, employees) and are based
on the recent evolution of public mobile services, we will
concentrate on LBS because these services often need personal data
from their receivers in order to be able to deliver the service.
Therefore, we think that privacy and data protection issues are more
(although not exclusively) related to LBS rather than to GIS.
Location Based Services
(LBS or ‘Location Services’) deliver information about
location to people who are using wireless, position-aware devices
such as cell phones and PDAs. LBS is defined as “Information or
a physical service delivered to multiple channels, exclusively based
on the determined location of a wireless device. Some location-based
applications include emergency services, information services, and
tracking services.”8
LBS are also called
Mobile Location Systems (MLS).9
An MLS is defined as “a location system, including applications
that determine the geographic position of mobile subscribers and
provide them with relevant information and services.” This
definition illustrates that an MLS is associated with one or more
positioning techniques (satellite-based or cellular-based, see also
section 2.4) and that it supports the communication of information
and services between the system and the subscriber.
Location data can be
very important for emergency services to locate the caller of “112.”
In this respect, we refer to the “E112” service
(location-enhanced 112): an emergency communications service using
the single European emergency call number, “112”, which
is enhanced with location information regarding the calling user.
“eCall” is an enhanced version of “E112” and
is an electronic safety system that is in-built in cars and
automatically calls the emergency services if the car is invovled in
an accident.10
2.4 Positioning Techniques
In this section, a
short overview will be presented of technologies that make it
possible to generate location information. These technologies are
also known as “positioning techniques.”11
These positioning techniques can be either cellular-based,
satellite-based, or nonconventional.
Cellular-Based
Positioning Technologies are for example, GSM and UMTS. A general
description of these techniques was given in section 2.1. The most
commonly used cellular positioning techniques are called Cell
Identity (CI), Cell Identity and Timing Advance (CI+TA), Enhanced
Observed Time Differences (E-OTD), and Assisted GPS (A-GPS). With CI,
the location of a mobile device is identified by the cell to which it
is connected. The accuracy varies from 100 meters to several
kilometers. CI+AD improves CI by measuring the distance between the
antenna and the mobile device. The accuracy is slightly better than
CI, depending on the environmental conditions that can affect the
strength of the signal, like high buildings and other obstacles. In
the E-OTD positioning method, the handset measures the arrival time
of signals transmitted from three or more antennas. The accuracy can
vary from 50 to 100 meters. A-GPS is a simpler and cheaper
positioning technique. The handset measures the arrival time of
signals from three or more satellites, instead of antennas. The
accuracy can vary from 2 meters in rural areas to 20 meters in urban
areas.
Galileo satellite
systems and GPS are well-known examples of Satellite Vehicles
(SV)-Based Positioning Technology. Other examples are: EGNOS
(European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service), and Glonass
(ex-USSR satellite-based localisation system). SV-based positioning
techniques can be Mobile Terminated (MT) or Mobile Originated (MO).
GPS is a technology funded by the US Department of Defense that uses
transmitters on board of Satellite Vehicles and receivers held by the
user. This technique is called Mobile Terminated (MT) and differs
from Mobile Originated (MO) techniques, wich use transmitters on
board of the user equipment. Information like positioning, speed and
timing are only available to the receiver. In response to the US GPS
system, the European Union and the European Space Agency started the
Galileo satellite radio navigation system.12
Satellite radio navigation is an advanced technology that can
indicate the precise location or position of a moving or stationary
object with an accuracy of one meter. Other than the GPS system,
Galileo is not focused on defense applications, but on civil
applications, like transport (navigation), social services (for
disabled or elderly), justice (locaton of suspects), customs (border
control), public works (GIS), search and rescue services (E112), and
leisure (finding directions at sea or in the mountains).
Nonconventional
Positioning Technologies are new positioning technologies that are
becoming widespread. Examples of these new positioning technologies
are Indoor GPS, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi. GPS positioning techniques
sometimes have trouble i operating indoors because the signal
strength is too low to penetrate the building. Indoor GPS uses a
GPS-like navigation signal that is generated by a number of
pseudosatellite devices. It can be used in wide space areas, like
airport terminals and conference centers, where no significant
barriers exist. Bluetooth is a tracking and positioning technique
that makes it possible to locate a Bluetooth device (like a
Bluetooth-enabled cell phone) and track the device’s movement.
The maximum range of a standard Bluetooth dongle is 100 meters. For
indoor application, Bluetooth can have many advantages. Wi-Fi
Positioning Systems (WPS) were originally developed for indoor
purposes, but can also be used for outdoor purposes. WPS can replace
GPS in urban areas, where the signal strength can be too low. By
using Wi-Fi access points, the distance can be measured between at
least three access points (trilateration) and the mobile device of
the user with an accuracy up to 6 meters. WPS is very useful in urban
and indoor areas, where there are enough access points.
There are also a number
of other techniques with which location information can be generated:
RFID, Biometrics, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Automated Teller
Machines, and Optical Object Recognition.13
An example of generating location information with RFID is the toll
collection system. RFID can be used in road pricing systems. RFID
systems can also use static RFID receivers in logistics, Tourist
Information service points, electronic-detention systems etc.
Biometric systems can generate location information by using static
(optical) sensors such as video surveillance systems in combination
with face recognition systems, finger printing systems, iris scan
systems etc. Border control systems using ICAO-compatible Machine
Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs), like passports, can also generate
location information about the traveler. Automated Teller Machines
and other paying machines where users identify themselves with a bank
card can register where you are or where you have been. An example of
generating your location with Optical Object Recognition is the
license plate scanner.
These techniques can be
categorised in the following table:
Category
|
Technology
|
Method
|
Cellular-Based
Positioning Technologies
|
GSM; UMTS
|
Cell
Identity; Cell Identity and Timing Advance; Enhanced
Observed Time Differences; Assisted GPS
|
Satellite
Vehicles-Based Positioning Technologies
|
GPS; Galileo; Glonass; EGNOS
|
Mobile
Terminated; Mobile Originated
|
Nonconventional
Positioning Technologies
|
Indoor
GPS; Bluetooth; WiFi; RFID; Biometrics; Machine
Readable Travel Documents; Automated Teller Machines
|
Pseudosatellites; Trilateration; RFID
receivers; Optical sensors; Optical object recognition
|
2.5 SMS Text Messages
Our GEOGOV research
project covers a case study on the use of SMS Text Messages by the
government. We are investigating a number of applications of SMS Text
Messaging by the government: SMS Alert, Group SMS, SMS-Bomb and Cell
Broadcast. SMS Alert is a service provided by the police to increase
safety within a city district. Subscribers to an SMS Alert who live
in a certain city district receive SMS Text Messages from the local
police department for example when a child is missing, or when a
burglar is active in the neighbourhood. A Group SMS is an SMS Text
Message that is sent to a group of people who were in a certain area
at a certain time, to ask them whether they have seen anything
suspicious at a determined time and place. For example, an SMS Text
Message was sent to 3000 people who were in the Nijmegen city centre
at around 9 p.m. on the day a murder was committed. This system has
been used in a number of murder cases in the Netherlands. An SMS Bomb
is an SMS Text Message sent to discourage the use of a stolen cell
phone. Every five minutes an SMS Text Message is sent to the cell
phone that has been recorded stolen. Finally, governments can use
Cell Broadcasts to send warnings by SMS Text Messages to people who
are in a specific area. In fact, the message is sent to an area (a
cell) instead of phone numbers. Every cell phone within this area can
receive such a warning about an explosion, a flood, a toxic cloud,
etc. Citizens only have to activate their cell phone to receive a
Cell Broadcast message.
Some of these
applications need personal data to perform. But even when no personal
data is used, citizens may experience the receipt of such a message
on their mobile equipment as an interference with their right to
privacy, especially if they did not subscribe to the service.
3. Geo-Data Protection
3.1 Personal Data Protection
Privacy must be
differentiated from data protection.14
Data protection involves the ‘traffic rules’ for the
protection of personal data, and is regulated at European level by
the Directives 95/46/EC (Data Protection Directive), 2002/58/EC
(Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive) and 2006/24/EC
(Data Retention Directive). It is a rather two-fold or ‘binary’
decision to answer the question whether data protection legislation
is applicable to LBS. The question is whether personal data is being
processed or not. If so, the data protection legislation is
applicable.
So, for the
applicability of data protection legislation, it does not really
matter whether someone experiences the processing of location data or
geo-information about him as an interference with his privacy or
private life. The processing of geo-information that is related to an
identified or identifiable individual must comply with the above
mentioned Directives, which must be implemented in national
legislation and other applicable rules, like the ones in criminal
procedure law. Because of the general international character of this
contribution, we will focus on the above-mentioned data protection
Directives, instead of on national regulations.
Directive 95/46/EC is
applicable to “the processing of personal data wholly or partly
by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic
means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are
intended to form part of a filing system” (Article 3, par. 1).
For the applicability of the Directive it must be determined whether
the information that is being processed is personal data in
the meaning of Article 2 (a), and whether this personal data is being
processed as meant in Article 2 (b).
3.2 Personal Data
3.2.1 Definition
‘Personal data’
is “any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person
is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular
by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural
or social identity.” In Opinion 4/2007, the Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party recently analysed the concept of personal
data.15
According to the Article 29 Working Party, there seems to be some
uncertainty and some diversity in practice among the Member States
with regard to the concept of personal data. The outcome of the
analysis by the Article 29 Working Party would be especially relevant
for topics like Identity Management in the context of eGovernment and
eHealth, and in the RFID context.16
The definition of
‘personal data’ is very broad and includes all
information concerning an identifiable individual.17
This is confirmed by the Article 29 Working Party in their Opinion
4/2007.18
Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC clarifies that “to determine
whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the
means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any
other person to identify the said person.” The Directive is not
applicable to the processing of personal data for purposes like
public security, State security, defence, or criminal law, because
these activities fall outside the scope of Community Law.19
The data protection rules are also not applicable to the processing
by a natural person for purely personal or household activities.
3.2.2 ‘Any information’
In their Opinion
4/2007, the Article 29 Working Party give explanations of the four
‘building blocks’ of personal data: ‘any
information’, ‘relating to’, ‘an identified
or identifiable’, ‘natural person’. The explanation
of ‘any information’ by the Article 29 Working Party
shows that ‘personal data’ must be broadly interpreted.
First, ‘any information’ can consist of objective
information (the amount of glucose in one’s blood) and
subjective information (opinions, assessments). Subjective
information can be used for the assessment of an individual at work
or in society in general, and is therefore also considered ‘personal
data.’ Second, information does not have to be correct or
proven to be ‘personal data’: the data protection rules
are also applicable to incorrect personal data. Third, ‘any
information’ also means any sort of information, including
sensitive data. Fourth, Directive 95/46/EC is applicable to personal
data beyond the scope of the home and the family.20
Activities of a professional or business nature are not excluded from
the Directive.21
Fifth, personal data is protected in any form: e.g. alphabetical,
numerical, graphical, photographical or acoustic. It includes sound
and image data relating to natural persons. Examples are the voice of
a customer of a bank that has been recorded in telephone banking, an
image captured by a video surveillance system, and a child’s
drawing that provides information about the child’s mood and
how it feels about different members of the family. Sixth, biometric
data are personal data in two ways: it can be considered as content
of information about an individual (you have these fingerprints or
DNA) and it can be considered as identifiers (this object has been
touched by you).
3.2.3 ‘Relating to’
With regard to the
second element, ‘relating to’, the Article 29 Working
Party explains that information can be considered to relate to
an individual, when the information is about that individual.
It can be evident that information is related to an individual (e.g.
the name, address, birth date of an individual), but it can also not
be evident but only indirectly ‘related to’ an
individual, like the value of your house. In 2005, the Article 29
Working Party explained when personal data is ‘relating to’
an individual: “data relates to an individual if it refers to
the identity, characteristics or behavior of an individual or if such
information is used to determine or influence the way in which that
person is treated or evaluated.”22
According to this explanation, a ‘content’ element, a
‘purpose’ element, or a ‘result’ element must
be present.23
When information is given ‘about’ a particular person,
this information has a ‘content’ element. The result of a
medical analysis is such information ‘about’ an
individual. Information can also relate to an individual when the
information is used or likely to be used with the ‘purpose’
to evaluate, treat in a certain way, or influence the status or
behavior of an individual. For example, the information on the use of
a telephone inside a company office can be used for different
purposes: to collect information about the use of the telephone by
the employee, about the persons who were called, or about the
cleaning staff that confirm by phone the time they leave. Finally,
despite the absence of a ‘content’ or ‘purpose’
element, information can relate to an individual when the ‘result’
of using the information has an impact, minor or major, on the
individual’s rights and interests. An example is the monitoring
of a taxi’s positions by a taxi company using a satellite
location system. The content is not related to a person but to a car
and the purpose is not to evaluate the taxi driver’s
performance. However, this system can have an impact on the taxi
drivers and therefore theis data is subject to data protection rules.
3.2.4 ‘Identified or identifiable’
The third element is
that a person must be ‘identified or identifiable.’ This
means that it should be possible to identify the person to whom the
information is related to. Identification is possible by means of
identifiers (height, hair colors, and clothing) or by a quality of
the person (name, function, profession). A person can be identified
directly (by name) or indirectly (by telephone number, passport
number, etc.). A person can be identified indirectly when the
information, combined with other information, makes it possible to
distinguish the individual from others. Indirect identification is
possible by factors like someone’s physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity. As a result, a person
is for example identifiable by means of a device, like a personal
computer or a cell phone, while it is possible to relate this device
to its user. “All the means likely reasonably to be used”
by the controller or by any other person to identify the individual
should be taken into account to determine whether a person is
identifiable. When these means are not available, the individual is
considered not to be identifiable and the information is not
‘personal data’. A hypothetical possibility to identify
the individual is not enough to consider a person to be identifiable.
What should be taken into account are the costs of conducting
identification, the intended purpose, the structure of the
processing, the advantage expected by the controller, the interests
of the individuals, risks like breaches of confidentiality, and
technical failures. However, it should also be considered that
identification may not be possible today, but could be possible when
the information is still being processed in five years time. In this
respect, the purpose of the data controller is also of importance for
the identifiability of the data subject. For example, the purpose of
a video surveillance system is to identify persons when necessary.
This means that the whole video surveillance system must be
considered as processing information about identifiable individuals.
An IP address is also a personal data, because Internet service
providers and managers of local area networks can identify Internet
users by using reasonable means.24
3.2.5 ‘Natural person’
The fourth element of
‘personal data’ is ‘natural person’, in other
words human beings. This means that, with regard to the Directive,
personal data is information related to an identified or identifiable
living individual. Apart from a number of exceptions, the
Directive is not applicable to the personal data of deceased persons.
The exceptions are for example when the controller does not know that
a data subject is no longer alive, or when data of a deceased person
is related to a living individual at the same time,25
or other sets of rules protect the personal data of a deceased
individual, like medical secrecy, or when a Member State has extended
the applicability of the national data protection rules to deceased
persons.26
Furthermore, whether the data protection rules are applicable to the
personal data of unborn children depends on the general approach of
the national legal system.
In principle, the
Directive is not applicable to information about legal persons,
although a small number of Member States have extended the
application of their data protection law to legal persons.27
Exceptions are to be found for example in Directive 2002/58/EC where
subscribers, who can also be legal persons, are protected against
unsolicited commercial communications. The question whether data
protection law should also be applicable to legal persons is becoming
relevant, because individuals’ personal and professional lives
are becoming more and more intertwined. Therefore, geo-information
about an employee can be related to the individual but also to the
organisation of the employer.
From the Opinion 4/2007
by the Article 29 Working Party, we can conclude that the definition
of ‘personal data’ must be interpreted very broadly. This
means that most information about a natural person must be considered
to be ‘personal data.’ This is advisable for the
protection of privacy of the individual, and for compliance with the
data protection rules. It is obvious that geo-information falls
within the scope of ‘personal data’ when the information
relates to a natural person who can be identified. In that case, the
general Directive 95/46/EC is applicable to geo-information. Because
geo-information can be personal data and location data and/or traffic
data at the same time, the special Directives 2002/58/EC and
2006/24/EC are also applicable to geo-information.
3.3 Electronic communications data
Electronic
communications data is legally protected by national law, which
implements Directive 2002/58/EC (Privacy and electronic
communication, or e-privacy Directive).28
More specifically, the Directive protects traffic data and location
data. Both kinds of communication data are relevant in this context,
because they can provide geo-information about where you are or where
you have been.
The Directive defines
traffic data as:29
any data processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a
communication on an electronic communications network or for the
billing thereof.
Traffic data refers,
for example, to the routing, duration, time or volume of a
communication. Traffic data that is used for mobile communications
will also use location information about the terminal equipment (the
mobile device) of the sender or recipient, to the network on which
the communication originates and terminates, and to the beginning,
end or duration of the connection.30
These categories of information can be necessary for three kinds of
purposes:31
the transmission of the communication, the billing thereof, and the
deliverance of value-added services.32
Value-added services
may consist, for example, of advice on the least expensive tariff
packages, route guidance, traffic information, weather forecasts, and
tourist information. Value-added services are often location based
services, because the information is often attuned to the actual
location of the recipient.
The Directive defines
location data as:33
any data processed in an electronic communications network,
indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a
user of a publicly available electronic communications service.
Terminal equipment is
for example a mobile phone or a pocket-pc (PDA). The geographic
position is indicated by the latitude, longitude, and altitude of the
terminal equipment.34
Location data can also refer to the direction of travel, and the
identification of the network cell in which the terminal equipment is
located at a certain time.35
Location data can also
be traffic data at the same time. For communications by mobile
devices, information is being processed about the base transceiver
station with which the mobile device is connected. This information
is necessary for the transmission of the communication between the
sender and the recipient. Location data is also traffic data at the
same time, when location data is being used for the delivery of value
added services.
Traffic data and
location data are privacy-sensitive because they can be related to
individual natural persons (users and subscribers). They can paint a
picture of the user’s communication behavior, of his acting,
and even of the content of his communications.36
Traffic data can be data at the transporter and may not yet be
related to an individual, they can provide information about the
user’s communication, necessary for the billing,37
or even about the content of the communication.38
Location data is more precise than is necessary for the transmission
of communications. With location data it is also possible to follow
the user or subscriber ‘in real time’. Therefore,
location data can be even more privacy-sensitive than traffic data.
That is why, according to Directive 2002/58/EC, the processing of
location data is only allowed when subscribers have given their
consent.39
According to Directive
2002/58/EC, the processing of location data is only allowed:
Furthermore:
When
the subscribers or the users have been informed by the service
provider prior to obtaining their consent about:
the
type of location data other than traffic data which will be
processed;
the
purposes of the processing;
the
duration of the processing; and
whether
the data will be transmitted to a third party for the purpose of
providing the value added service;
when
the processing of location data is necessary for the purposes of
providing the value added service.
When
the service provider gives the users or subscribers the possibility,
using a simple means and free of charge, of temporarily refusing the
processing of such data for each connection to the network or for
each transmission of a communication.
When
the processing of location data is restricted to persons acting
under the authority of the provider of the public communications
network or publicly available communications service or of the third
party providing the value added service, and is restricted to what
is necessary for the purposes of providing the value added service.
Subscribers and users
have the right to withdraw their consent for the processing of
location data at any time. After users or subscribers have given
their consent, the processing of location data (being traffic data)
is only allowed when and as long as it is necessary for delivering
the value added service. After that, the location data can only be
used for billing purposes. As soon as the bill has been paid, and the
bill is not disputed, the location data has to be deleted or
anonymised.
One of the conditions
for processing location data, mentioned above, is that the service
provider should inform the users or subscribers about the possibility
of temporarily refusing to grant permission to process their data,
using simple, free means. However, it is possible that within Member
States the service providers can override the elimination of calling
line identification in instances of malicious or nuisance calls, or
in case of emergency calls, for the purpose of responding to such
calls.41
Member States can limit
the scope of the rights and obligations with regard to traffic data
and location data (Article 15). This is possible when such a
restriction is a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure
within a democratic society to safeguard national security (i.e.
State security), defence, public security, and the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences. In
such a case, a service provider is allowed to comply with a request
to provide location data to a law enforcement agency.
Location data that is
not anonymised is also personal data. Therefore, Directive 95/46/EC
is also applicable to the processing thereof. This means for example
that the data subject has a right of access to his own personal data42
and that the processing of the location data must be in compliance
with the criteria for making data processing legitimate.43
An employer (subscriber), who has subscribed to a geo-location
service, must verify whether the service provider (operator) acts in
compliance with the rules for electronic communications. Otherwise,
the employer might process and use the location data in an
illegitimate way.44
Location data about
employees may be processed only by the network operator, the provider
of the value-added service, and by the employer. These actors can
process the same location data, but they might use that data for
different purposes. The network operator processes location data to
establish the communication. The operator concludes a contract with
the employer (subscriber), who, in turn, puts the terminal equipment
at the disposal of the employee (user). The location data can then be
used for locating the employee. The same operator or the service
provider can offer the value-added service by using the location data
about the employee that has been provided by the operator. The
employer can receive the same data from the operator to be able to
monitor the employee. As a result, the operator can provide the
location data to the employer, if necessary through the service
provider. Such transmissions fall under the scope of the processing
of personal data, as meant in the Directives 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC,
and are only allowed when they comply with their provisions. 45
3.4 Data retention
At the end of April
2004, shortly after the Madrid attacks, the United Kingdom, France,
Ireland and Sweden proposed to the Council of the European Union to
introduce a general retention period of 12-36 months for electronic
communications traffic data for the prevention, investigation,
detection, and prosecution of criminal offences. This would result in
the systematic retention of traffic data about telephone
conversations, including cell phone communications, e-mail
communications and web pages visited on the Internet, of about 450
million European citizens. The proposal has resulted in Directive
2006/24/EC.46
This Directive amended Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC by
inserting a new paragraph 1a, that should bring an end to the variety
of data retention periods in the Member States. Therefore, the aim of
Directive 2006/24/EC is the harmonization of data retention laws. The
Directive applies to traffic data and to location data, but not to
the content of electronic communications. However, sometimes it is
quite easy to deduce content information from traffic data or
location data, like from the websites you have visited.
Article 5 of Directive
2006/24/EC gives an overview of the categories of data that have to
be retained by the providers of public electronic communication
services:
data necessary to trace and identify the
source of a communication;
data necessary to identify the destination of
a communication;
data necessary to identify the date, time and
duration of a communication;
data necessary to identify the type of
communication;
data necessary to identify users’
communication equipment or what purports to be their equipment; and
data necessary to identify the location of
mobile communication equipment.
The data that is
necessary to trace and identify the source of the communication,
concerning fixed network telephone and mobile telephony are the
calling telephone number and the name and address of the subscriber
or the registered user. Concerning Internet access, Internet e-mail,
and Internet telephony, these data are the user ID(s) allocated, the
user ID and telephone number allocated to any communication entering
the public telephone network, and the name and address of the
subscriber or registered user to whom an Internet Protocol (IP)
address, user ID or telephone number was allocated at the time of the
communication. The data that is necessary to identify the location of
mobile communication equipment is the location label (Cell ID) at the
start of the communication, and data identifying the geographic
location of cells by reference to their location labels (Cell ID)
during the period for which communications data is retained.
The Member States must
ensure that all this data is being retained by providers of
electronic communications for a period of not less than six months
and not more than two years from the date of the communication.47
The European Parliament and the Council are of the opinion that the
retention of this data is a necessary and effective investigative
tool for law enforcement in several Member States, with regard to
Article 8 ECHR:48
9. […] Public authorities may interfere with the exercise
of that right only in accordance with the law and where necessary in
a democratic society, inter alia, in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Because
retention of data has proved to be such a necessary and effective
investigative tool for law enforcement in several Member States, and
in particular concerning serious matters such as organized crime and
terrorism, it is necessary to ensure that retained data are made
available to law enforcement authorities for a certain period,
subject to the conditions provided for in this Directive. The
adoption of an instrument on data retention that complies with the
requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR is therefore a necessary
measure.
In the explanatory
memorandum to the Data Retention Bill, the Dutch government cited a
research report by the Erasmus University Rotterdam about the benefit
and necessity of the obligation to retain historical traffic data
about electronic communications.49
The report concluded that a retention period of three months could be
sufficient for simple criminal investigations at district level.
However, such a period would be too short for long term and complex
investigations at regional and national level. Examples are:
investigations of drug crimes, serious environment crimes,
trafficking in human beings, organised fraud, murder, and serious
sexual offences. Legal requests for assistance and investigations of
cold cases are also examples that would need a longer retention
period, according to this research.
On 11 March 2008, the
German Supreme Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) limited the
scope of the German Data Retention Act.50
The Court concluded that the traffic and location data can only be
claimed and used by law enforcement agencies in investigations of
serious crimes. It is forbidden to claim and use this data for
pattern analysis with electronic communications data and for
investigating crimes committed by electronic communications.
In the parliamentary
discussions in the Netherlands, senator Hans Franken who is also a
professor in IT and Law at Leiden University, characterised the Dutch
Bill which is used to implement Directive 2006/24/EC into Dutch
national legislation, as ‘nonsensical’, ‘dangerous’,
and ‘involving considerable expenses’.51
According to Franken, it is nonsensical because as a result of the
large amount of traffic data and location data that will be retained.
Law enforcement agencies will be searching for a needle in a
haystack. It is also dangerous, because this large amount of data
will probably be stored at a central institute, which would make its
access vulnerable to criminals. Finally, it is foreseeable that the
communication providers will pass on the additional expenses to the
consumer. As a result, the retention of traffic data and location
data is not only a threat to the consumer’s privacy, but also
to his bank account. Would consumers value their privacy more if they
realised what the financial consequences of the retention of their
geo-data were?52
4. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Public
Places
4.1 Privacy according to citizens
What people experience
as an interference with their privacy or private life is being
regularly surveyed.53
In 1999, the Dutch national technology assessment organisation
(Rathenau Institute) published the results of a privacy survey.54
The survey shows that Dutch citizens associated the following nine
values with the concept of privacy: (1) independence, (2) freedom of
movement, (3) equality, (4) freedom from stigmatization, (5)
undisturbed life, (6) self-esteem, (7) freedom from manipulation, (8)
integrity, and (9) autonomy.
Recently, the Dutch
National Freedom Survey 2007 (Nationaal Vrijheidsonderzoek 2007)
shows that between 2002 and 2007, the importance of privacy was
constantly valued.55
Throughout these years, about 39% of the Dutch citizens considered
the right to privacy as the most important fundamental right. This
survey also shows how citizens experience security measures in
relation to an interference with their right to privacy.
Citizens think that the
following measures are a relatively small interference with privacy:
The following measures
are considered to be a relatively more serious interference with a
person’s privacy (in ascending order):
the
transfer of passenger data by airline companies to the country of
destination;
tracing
and recording people’s location by automatic scanning and of
car license plates;
the
government taking everyone’s DNA-profile;
preventive
searches by the government;
tracing
and recording people’s location through mobile phone traffic
data;
preventive
custody of a suspect;
a house
search on the grounds of suspicion;
government
monitoring of every e-mail and Internet communication; and
government
eavesdropping of every telephone communication.
Nowadays, the youth
show a more selective opinion regarding their privacy. However,
another recent survey by Digibewust and Mijn Kind Online (November
2007) shows that young people (12-18 years old) willing leave their
pictures and their names on social networking sites on the Internet.56
Despite this, they do seem to be a lot more careful with their phone
numbers and addresses. The British Information Commissioner’s
Office (ICO) web page ‘Social networking’ also warns
young people in particular that their privacy, their professional
career, or even their personal safety is at risk when putting
personal information online on social networks. In November 2007, the
ICO published a leaflet entitled: “Using social networking
sites safely to stimulate privacy awareness and encourage the safe
use of social network sites by young people.”57
4.2 Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
The question whether
the right to privacy has been invaded is more difficult to answer
than the question whether data protection rules are applicable. This
is mainly because privacy is a rather vague concept, and difficult to
define. Warren and Brandeis’ well-known definition is ‘the
right to be left alone’.58
This definition, and more generally the whole concept of privacy,
illustrates that privacy is a rather ‘personal’ thing.
Not just because the function of privacy is to protect individuals,
but also because every individual may have their own opinions about
what he or she experiences as an unwanted interference with his or
her privacy. From the aforementioned Dutch National Freedom Survey
2007, it appears that 63% of the respondents (Dutch citizens) think
that locating people by cell phones is a major interference with
their private life. At the same time, 37% of the respondents think
that this is not a major interference with their private life.
Therefore, other than the ‘binary’ decision whether data
protection legislation is applicable, the decision to decide whether
privacy is invaded is not so easy to make and appears to be an
individual balancing of interests.
However, there is a
concept that could make it possible to give an objective answer to
the question whether there is an interference with the privacy of an
individual. This concept is the reasonable expectations of privacy
test. This litmus test was introduced in 1967 in the United States by
Judge John Marshall Harlan in his concurring opinion in the US
Supreme Court case of Katz v United States.59
In this case, a telephone call by Katz, made from a glass phone
booth, was overheard and recorded by FBI agents. The Supreme Court
concluded that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a
home, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that
electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this
sense private, may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, the Court concluded that the invasion of a constitutionally
protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held,
presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant. The
Supreme Court stated that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.” For Mr. Justice Harlan, this raised the
question what protection it affords to those people. According to
Harlan, the answer to that question requires reference to a ‘place’.
This resulted in the reasonable expectations of privacy test.
According to this test, there are two standards to determine whether
a person can have a reasonable expectation of privacy. First, a
person must have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in a
certain situation. Second, society is prepared to recognise this
(objective) expectation as reasonable. As a result, a man’s
home is a place where he expects privacy. In this case, Katz expected
that his telephone conversation would not be intercepted after
closing the door of the telephone booth and paying the toll to place
a call.
The reasonable
expectation of privacy test has also been recognised in several
judgments from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In the
case of Lüdi v Switzerland, the ECtHR concluded that a
citizen who is involved in criminal activities (drug trafficking) has
a less expectation of privacy.60
In this case, the undercover police officer installed technical
devices in order to gain access to Lüdi’s home and record
his conversations. The Court concluded that Lüdi must have been
aware that he was engaged in a criminal act and that he was running
the risk of his private life being interfered with by an undercover
police officer.
In the case of Halford
v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR used the reasonable
expectations of privacy test for the first time.61
The Court recognised that having a telephone conversation at the
workplace falls within the scope of ‘private life’ and
‘correspondence’ of Article 8 ECHR. In this case, the
Court concluded that it had not been proven that Mrs. Halford had
been warned by her employer (the Merseyside police headquarters) that
her telephone conversations could be monitored. As a result, she
would have had “a reasonable expectation of privacy for such
calls”, according to the Court.
However, for the
protection of privacy the reasonable expectations of privacy
test is not without risks. In this respect, Paul Schwartz has
indicated the risk of the ‘silent ability of technology to
erode our expectations of privacy’, pointing to the principal
theme of the struggle about defining expectations of privacy in
relation to new technologies.62
We could say that the reasonable expectation of privacy is
diminishing as a result of the ongoing technological possibilities
for monitoring citizens. If this is true, then we are sitting on a
sliding scale of privacy: the more personal information becomes
public, the less privacy we have. However, any interference with our
private life, including monitoring citizens, is limited by the
conditions of the second paragraph of Article 8 ECHR, which states
that an interference with our ‘private and family life, home
and correspondence’ is only allowed in the following cases:
in accordance with the law and
necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of:
national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.63
The condition of
‘necessity’ means that there must be a ‘pressing
social need’ to make an interference. A pressing social need
means that there must be ‘need-to-know’ personal
information; that it would be ‘nice-to-know’ is not
sufficient. Necessary also means that the purpose cannot be achieved
without the interference (proportionality principle), and that the
purpose cannot be achieved by less privacy invading measures
(subsidiarity principle). In 2006, the Dutch Attorney General Brouwer
suggested, with regard to the collection of road pricing traffic
data, that “those traffic data can be very useful for criminal
investigations.” This is a typical example of ‘nice-to-know’,
and therefore it seems very questionable whether this would be a
lawful interference with the privacy of the motorists. That road
pricing could also be realised without logging the ‘trajectories’
of the motorists by GPS, has been argued by the Dutch entrepreneur
professor Roel Pieper. As early as 2001, he introduced the idea of
creating a system of road types. The idea is to divide the road
system into a limited number of road types and to base the
calculation of the price on the use of the number and kind of road
types. This is an example of applying the subsidiarity principle.
With regard to the
government’s use of citizens’ geo-information, an
important question is whether citizens have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in public places? The answer seems to be affirmative, as
will be illustrated later.
4.3 Privacy in public places
4.3.1 Definition of ‘public place’
What actually
distinguishes a private place from a public place seems obvious, but
this led in 2004, at least in the Netherlands, to discussions in
parliament when the Bill on Camera Surveillance in Public Places was
discussed.64
The (present) Act is only applicable to camera surveillance for the
prevention of public disorder in municipalities. The explanatory
memorandum defines ‘public place’ as “a place that
is open to the public, according to its function or regular use”.
‘Open to the public’ means that there are no barriers to
enter the place, like a duty to report, preceding permission, or
levying an admission ticket. As a result, stadiums, post offices,
department stores, restaurants, and hospitals are in this respect not
considered as public places.
‘Function’
refers to the nature given to the place. The nature of a place may
follow from a decree or from the purpose that follows from the
functionality of the place.
A place becomes a
public place through ‘regular use’ when this is used for
this purpose, and the rightful claimant allows the place being used
as such. Therefore, a public place is a place where people come and
go, like for example:
Shops, discotheques,
parking garages, town halls, churches and mosques, public sections of
a railway stations (if private property) are private, not public
places.
During the discussion
of the Dutch Camera Surveillance Bill, the Christian Democratic Party
stated that in their opinion it is impossible to have a right to
privacy in a public place because whoever exposes themselves in a
public place would relinquish the right to see this as a private
part of their lives. Therefore, there is no question of interference
of an individual’s private life in a public place.65
As we will show
hereafter, this opinion obviously differs from that of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),66
but also from the opinion of the Dutch government. According to the
Dutch government, the right to privacy is not spatially limited. The
government refers to a judgment by the Dutch Supreme Court in 1991,
about the seizure of videotapes from a public demonstration,67
and concludes that camera surveillance on a public road can interfere
with the right to one’s private life. However, according to the
Dutch government, the more public a citizen’s behavior is, the
less the right to privacy will be an issue. So, according to the
Dutch government, a citizen’s behavior can be less or more
public. This also means that a citizen can expect less or more
privacy.
The right to privacy
protects our ‘private and family life, home, and
correspondence’ (Article 8 ECHR). These four elements are
typical elements of our privacy. Therefore, it seems that the right
to privacy is especially applicable to private places. However, at
present these private places do not seem to be so private anymore: we
store a lot of our personal data on our personal hard disks, laptops,
Blackberries, or iPods; a lot of personal information is stored on
the servers of our Internet service provider or on Google’s
servers; our personal computers are easy victims for computer
searches by law enforcement agencies because physical admittance is
no longer necessary; all our telephone and electronic communications
data is being retained by service providers to be made available when
needed for law enforcement, etc. Big Brother is not only watching
you, but he also knows where you are, where you have been and
probably even where you are going to. Thanks to the technical
possibilities for large scale collection and analysis of personal
data, including geo-information (location data, whereabouts),
telecommunications data, etc., it will become much easier, for
example, for law enforcement agencies to compare this data with so
called risk profiles. As a result, the privacy of ordinary citizens
will come under pressure because they are becoming more transparent
to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It also enhances the
risk of mistakes being made because criminal investigations could
then be extended to cover everyone. There is a big difference between
legitimising the preventive monitoring of everyone and the limited
application of a means of coercion against specific suspects.68
If we do not have
privacy any longer in our private places, do we have privacy then in
public places? Or are there any private places in public space? This
question is of special importance for the collection, storage, and
use of geo-information about citizens. In the following section, we
will analyse how the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has
recognised the right to privacy in public places.
4.3.2 European case law
In 2000, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) passed a judgment on the difference
between private and public places in the case of Rotaru v
Romania.69
In this case, the ECtHR confirmed their earlier judgments by
recognising that information about the applicant’s life, in
particular his studies, his political activities and his criminal
record, when systematically collected and stored in a file held by
agents of the State, falls within the scope of ‘private life’
for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR.70
The Court disagreed with the Romanian government that this
information is related to the applicant’s public life, and
therefore did not fall within the scope of ‘private life’.
With regard to public information that can fall within the scope of
the right to private life, the Court made an interesting remark:
Moreover, public information can fall within the scope of private
life where it is systematically collected and stored in files held by
the authorities. That is all the truer where such information
concerns a person's distant past.71
The Court recognised
that a right to privacy exists when a government agency
systematically collects and stores personal information, even when
this is public information.
In the case of P.G.
and J.H. v The United Kingdom,72
the Court dealt with the scope of privacy in public places. The
applicants complained that covert listening devices were used by the
police to monitor and record their conversations in an apartment,
that information was obtained by the police concerning the use of a
telephone at the apartment, and that, while they were at the police
station, listening devices were used to obtain voice samples. In the
Court’s opinion, there is an area, also in public space, where
people may have interactions, which are protected by the right to
privacy:
There is therefore a zone of interaction of a person with others,
even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of ‘private
life.’73
Furthermore, the Court
gave a number of elements that are relevant to the consideration of
whether a person’s private life is concerned by measures
effected in public places:
Since there are occasions when people knowingly
or intentionally involve themselves in activities which are or may be
recorded or reported in a public manner, a person’s reasonable
expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not
necessarily conclusive, factor. A person who walks down the
street will, inevitably, be visible to any member of the public who
is also present. Monitoring by technological means of the same public
scene (for example, a security guard viewing through closed-circuit
television) is of a similar character. Private-life considerations
may arise, however, once any systematic or permanent record comes
into existence of such material from the public domain. It is for
this reason that files gathered by security services on a particular
individual fall within the scope of Article 8, even where the
information has not been gathered by any intrusive or covert method…74
The Court concluded
that the recording of the voices of the suspects at the police
station was an interference with their right to respect for private
life. In this case, the Court recognised that personal information
collected in a public place, falls under the scope of the right to
privacy when this information has been collected and stored
systematically, for example by a government agency. This conclusion
can also be applied to geo-information, when that information is
related to an identified or identifiable natural person.
Systematically collecting, storing, and analysing geo-information
must be considered an interference with the right to privacy of the
individual. The next question is whether the interference is
legitimate.
In August 1995, a
British citizen (Peck) walked down Brentwood High Street (UK),
carrying a kitchen knife in his hand and attempted suicide by cutting
his wrists.75
Unknowingly, his action had been filmed by a CCTV camera. Although
the footage did not show Peck actually cutting his wrists, the
operator was alerted because of the possession of a knife. The police
were notified and having arrived at the scene, took the knife, gave
the applicant medical assistance, and after bringing him to the
police station released him without charges. In October 1995,
photographs taken from the CCTV footage, with Peck’s face
unmasked, were published in a number of newspapers. In the meantime,
the Brentwood Borough Council also disseminated the footage for a
documentary program to Anglia Television and to the BBC producers of
‘Crime Beat’. Afterwards, Peck was recognised in the
newspapers and on television by family and friends. Peck complained
to the Court that the Brentwood Council disproportionately interfered
with his right to private life by the disclosure of the CCTV footage.
The Court agreed with Peck that a serious interference with his
private life had been made because the pictures of the relevant
moment were viewed to an extent which far exceeded any exposure to a
passer-by or to security observation, and to a degree surpassing that
which Peck could possibly have foreseen when he walked in Brentwood
High Street on that day.
In the case of Peck
v The United Kingdom, the Court also refers to two other
judgments by the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission)
about collecting photographs of people in public places and the
unforeseeable use thereof. In the case of Friedl v Austria,
the Commission concluded that there was no intrusion with Friedl’s
right to privacy because the photographs were taken of a public
demonstration related to a public event and that they had only been
used as an aid to policing the demonstration.76
Furthermore, the photographs remained anonymous.
In the case of Lupker
and Others v The Netherlands, the Commission concluded that the
police only used photographs to identify offenders in criminal
proceedings, and that there was no reason to believe that the
photographs have been made available to the general public or that
they would be used for any other purpose.77
The case of Perry v
The United Kingdom78
deals with the right to privacy in the public place of a police
station. Mr. Perry agreed to participate in an identification parade
on 5th of June 1997, with regard to a series of armed robberies, but
in the end, he did not show up. Because he neither appeared in a
number of other identification parades, the police decided to video
him with the custody suite camera of the Bilston Street police
station. A compilation tape was made and shown to a number of
witnesses of the armed robberies of whom two positively identified
him as involved in one of the robberies.
With reference to the
case of P.G. and J.H. v The United Kingdom, the court
concluded in Perry v The United Kingdom that the right to
privacy can also exist outside a person’s home or private
premises.79
In the case of Perry v The United Kingdom, the applicant did
not expect that video footage would be taken of him within the police
station for use in a video identification procedure and, potentially,
as evidence prejudicial to his defence at trial. The recordings went
beyond the normal and expected use of this type of camera, what is
demonstrated by the fact that the police had to obtain permission and
an engineer had to adjust the camera.
The Court considered
that the recording and use of the video footage of the applicant in
this case discloses an interference with his right to respect for
private life. Furthermore, the Court concluded that this interference
is not in accordance with the (British) law, because the police
failed to comply with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and
with the Code of Practice annexed to this Act, which concerned the
failure to ask the applicant for his consent to the video, to inform
him of its creation and use in an identification parade, and of his
own rights in that respect.80
In Perry v The
United Kingdom, the Court also concluded that camera surveillance
in public places without recording the visual data, does not as such
result in an interference with the individual’s private life.81
Also the normal use of security cameras whether in the public street
or on premises, where they serve a legitimate and foreseeable
purpose, does not interfere with the right to private life.82
However, this situation is changing as a result of the new
technological developments for recording personal data and by the
systematic and permanent character of the files in which this data is
stored. The publication of the recorded data that is not normally
foreseeable, may also bring such security recordings within the scope
of Article 8 ECHR. That was also the opinion of the Court in the case
of Peck v The United Kingdom, when the disclosure of the video
footage to the media for broadcasting on television, was considered a
serious interference with the applicant’s private life,
notwithstanding that he was in a public place at the time.83
Despite the fact that
celebrities are public figures, they also have a right to respect for
their private lives. An example is the case of Princess Caroline von
Hannover, daughter of Prince Rainier III of Monaco. Photographs of
Caroline von Hannover were taken in private situations (not in her
function as a Princess) and published in the German tabloid press.84
According to the Court, the determining factor that allows the
publication of pictures of public figures is the contribution they
can have to a debate of general interest. In the case of Caroline von
Hannover, there was no contribution to such a debate, because the
pictures were not made of her in an official function but were
related to details of her private life only. That is why in this case
the right to privacy overrules the freedom of expression.
Furthermore, the Court considered that each individual, including
public figures like Caroline von Hannover, should have “a
legitimate expectation of protection of her private life.”
5. Conclusion
Modern positioning
techniques make time and place relevant issues again. They make it
possible to locate mobile terminal equipments and their users. As a
result, like the private sector, governments are able to deliver a
new kind of services: Location Based Services (LBS), based on the use
of geo-information.
It is obvious that the
use of postioning techniques, described in section 2, also makes it
interesting to collect geo-information for profiling purposes.
Geo-information, combined with other types of personal data, can
provide new possibilities for finding patterns, sequences, and
relationships e.g. in the fields of marketing, crime control, or
insurance. From a privacy perspective not only the application of
data protection regulation is relevant, but also more fundamental
interests, like autonomy, democracy, pluralism, non-discrimination,
rule of law and balanced control.85
Governments that (are
preparing to) offer LBS, should be aware of the data protection rules
and the privacy expectations of the citizens. With regard to the data
protection rules, we are of the impression that up to now,
governments have been paying too scant attention to the application
of these ‘traffic rules’ to protect personal data. With
regard to the applicability of these data protection rules, there is
one important rule of thumb: data protection rules are applicable
when personal data is being processed. It leads to a rather binary
conclusion: applicable or not.
On the other hand, as
regards the extent citizens expect privacy when geo-information, and
more particular LBS is used, appears to be more complicated. We have
discussed two concepts that might provide guidance to answer this
question in specific cases. The first one is the reasonable
expectations of privacy concept, introduced by Judge John
Marshall Harlan, former member of the American Supreme Court in 1967,
and also accepted in a number of judgments by the European Court of
Human Rights. This concept means that a right to privacy should be
recognised if 1) a person has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy, and 2) that expectation is one that society
is prepared to recognise as reasonable. The second concept is Article
8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, more
specifically paragraph 2, requiring compliance with the necessity
principle, including proportionality and subsidiarity.
The European Court of
Human Rights has recognised the existence of the right to privacy in
public places. Therefore, while geo-information about citizens will
in general be collected in public places, governments should also
realise that citizens can have legitimate privacy expectations with
regard to the use of geo-information. However, the distinction
between a private and public place is diminishing. This is
illustrated by the fact that even in a public space there are private
places, and by the fact that new technologies make it easier to have
access to the citizens’ personal information, because this
information is more often stored on mobile devices and on servers
from service providers who are obliged to retain those data for a
certain period, especially for law enforcement purposes. As a result,
the distinction between public and private seems to fail as a litmus,
but the reasonable expectation of privacy concept could still
be a standard for the law to rely on.86
And within the context of geo-information, this standard might work
even better because privacy protects people and not places.
However, we can also
conclude that the reasonable expectation of privacy concept
appears to be already diminishing as a result of the ongoing
technological possibilities of locating and monitoring citizens. The
result could be that citizens may no longer have actual expectations
of privacy (the subjective element), or that society might no longer
recognise these expectations as reasonable (the objective element)
because the technology has become of common use. In that case, we are
on a sliding scale of privacy: the more personal information is
public, the less privacy we have. Fortunately, we still have our
second privacy concept: Article 8 ECHR, especially paragraph 2. The
necessity principle, including the proportionality and subsidiarity
principle, seems to provide a better guidance for determining whether
an interference with our private life is legitimate. There must be a
‘need-to-know’ factor about citizens’ personal data
and the purpose for collecting personal data could not be realised
with other means that are less invasive of privacy. In this era of
technological turbulence, these principles seem to provide a better
basis than the reasonable expectations of privacy concept.
However, the recognition by the European Court of Human Rights might
also be considered an uncertain factor because it does not require
blood, but technology, to violate the right to privacy.87
It will be clear that questions like these remain to be discussed,
and hopefully this article will stimulate those discussions.
*
Assistant Professor at TILT – Tilburg Institute for Law,
Technology, and Society. Tilburg University, the Netherlands.
1
Ruimte voor Geo-Informatie (RGI). Information about this
program is available in English at http://www.rgi.nl/?l=eng.
Information about the GEOGOV-project is available at:
http://www.geogov.eu/.
2
See also: C van Ooijen, ‘Territorialising eGovernment: A new
perspective on the government-citizen relationship in the ICT-age?’
Paper submitted to panel track 12: eGovernment and Institutional
Change. XII Annual Conference of the International Research Society
for Public Management, 26-28 March 2008, Brisbane, Australia.
3
ESRI Online, GIS Dictionary (http://support.esri.com: Home >
Knowledge base > GIS Dictionary)
4
H Scholten, Geografische Informatie
Systemen. Lelystad: IVIO uitgeverij,
2006. AO 2869, p. 6.
5
See also: B van Loenen, J Zevenbergen, J de Jong, ‘Geo-informatie:
wat is het en wat is de juridische context?’, in: L van der
Wees, S Nouwt (eds.), Recht en locatie.
Geo-informatie in een juridische
context. Den Haag: Elsevier Juridisch,
2008, p. 11-33.
6
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of The Council
of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications). Official
Journal 2002, L 201/37, amended by Directive 2006/24/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006. Official
Journal 2006, L 105/54, preamble 35.
7
See for example: N Andrienko et al, ‘Basic Concepts of
Movement Data’, in: F Gianotti, D Pedreschi (eds.), Mobility,
Data Mining and Privacy. Geographic Knowledge Discovery. Berlin
– Heidelberg: Springer Verlag 2008, p. 15-38.
8
ESRI Online, GIS Dictionary. Available at: http://support.esri.com:
Home > Knowledge base > GIS Dictionary (last modified October
31, 2006).
9
C Renso et al, ‘Wireless Network Data Sources’, in: F
Gianotti, D Pedreschi (eds.), Mobility, Data Mining and Privacy.
Geographic Knowledge Discovery. Berlin – Heidelberg:
Springer Verlag 2008, p. 83, with reference to G. Swedberg,
Ericsson’s mobile location solution. Ericsson Review,
Issue no. 4/1999.
10
European Commission, Information Society and Media, ‘eCall -
saving lives through in-vehicle communication technology.’
General factsheet 49, July 2007. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/esafety/doc/esafety_library/049_ecall_en.pdf.
11
See for example: C Renso et al, ‘Wireless Network Data
Sources: Tracking and Synthesizing Trajectories’, in: T
Gianotti, F Pedreschi (eds.), Mobility, Data Mining and Privacy.
Geographic Knowledge Discovery. Berlin – Heidelberg:
Springer Verlag 2008, p. 73-101; M Meints, D Royer, ‘Location
Information from a Technical Perspective’, in: C. Cuijpers, A
Roosendaal, B-J Koops (eds), D11.5: The legal framework for
location-based services in Europe. FIDIS Report D11.5, version
1.0, 12 June 2007, p. 15-24.
12
European Commission, Directorate General Energy and Transport,
GALILEO. On the Internet:
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/index_en.htm.
13
See also: M Meints, D Royer, ‘Location Information from a
Technical Perspective’, in: C Cuijpers, A Roosendaal, B-J
Koops (eds), D11.5: The legal framework for location-based
services in Europe. FIDIS Report D11.5, version 1.0, 12 June
2007, p. 15-17.
14
See also C Cuijpers, ‘A Private Law Approach to Privacy;
Mandatory Law Obliged?’ (2007) 4 SCRIPT-ed 4, p
312-314.
15
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the
concept of personal data. Adopted on 20th June.
01248/07/EN, WP136.
17
It must be noted that for example in the United Kingdom, this wide
interpretation of ‘personal data’ has been narrowed by
the English Court of Appeal in the case of Durant v. FSA
[2003] EWCA Civ 1746
(http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2003/1746.html).
19
Directive 95/46/EC, article 3. However, in 2005, the Commission
published a Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the
protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. {SEC(2005) 1241}.
Brussels, 4.10.2005. COM(2005) 475 final.
2005/0202 (CNS).
20
European Court of Justice, 6 November 2003, Case C-101/01, (Bodil
Lindqvist v. Sweden) European Court reports 2003 Page I-12971:
“The term undoubtedly covers the name of a person in
conjunction with his telephone coordinates or information about his
working conditions or hobbies”. The text of Bodil Lindqvist
v. Sweden is available on the Internet at
www.privacynetwork.info.
21
European Court of Human Rights, 23 November 1992 (Niemietz v.
Germany), series A No. 251/B; and European Court of Human
Rights, 25 June 1997 (Halford v. The United Kingdom), Reports
1997-III. The texts of Niemietz v. Germany and Halford v.
The United Kingdom are available on the Internet at
www.privacynetwork.info.
22
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working document on
data protection issues related to RFID technology. January 19,
2005. 10107/05/EN, WP105, p. 8.
23
See note 15, p. 10-12.
24
Furthermore, in Opinion 4/2007, the Article 29 Working Party also
explains in this respect the meaning of pseudonymised data,
key-coded data, and anonymous data (see note 15, p. 18-21).
25
For example, personal data can be derived from personal data
relating to the hereditary characteristics of one’s parents.
See also: R Gertz, ‘An analysis of the Icelandic Supreme Court
judgement on the Health Sector Database Act’ (2004) 1 SCRIPTed
2, 241-258.
26
The fact that Directive 95/46/EC left unclear whether data
protection rights are also applicable to deceased persons, resulted
in a recommendation by the PRIVIREAL project to the European
Commission to determine whether or not deceased persons should be
included in the definition of a “natural person” in the
Directive. European Commission Project, Privacy in Research Ethics &
Law (PRIVIREAL).
(http://www.privireal.org/content/recommendations/#Recf).
27
D Korff, ‘Study on the protection of the rights and interests
of legal persons with regard to the processing of personal data
relating to such persons’ (2000) Commission of the European
Communities (Study Contract ETD/97/B5-9500/78) Final Report,
02-02-2000.
(http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/studies/legal-persons_en.htm).
28
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of The Council
of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector
(Directive on privacy and electronic communications). Official
Journal 2002, L 201/37, amended by Directive 2006/24/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006. Official
Journal 2006, L 105/54.
29
Directive 2002/58/EC, article 2, under (b).
30
Directive 2002/58/EC, recital 15.
31
See e.g. A Ekker, ‘Publiekrechtelijke bescherming van
verkeersgegevens’, in L Asscher and A Ekker (ed),
Verkeersgegevens. Een juridische en
technische inventarisatie(2003).
Available on the Internet at
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/overig/gedeelteverkeersgegevens.pdf
32
A value-added service is “any service which requires the
processing of traffic data or location data other than traffic data
beyond what is necessary for the transmission of a communication or
the billing thereof.” Directive 2002/58/EC,
article 2, under (g).
33
Directive 2002/58/EC, article 2, under (c).
34
Positioning techniques used for locating the terminal equipment can
for example be cellular based (GSM) or satellite based (GPS). See
also section 2.4.
35
Directive 2002/58/EC, recital 14.
37
For example: Alice called Bob at 3.00 p.m. from the Princes Street
Gardens in Edinburgh, while Bob was at the Edinburgh University and
moving to the Castle.
38
For example: Alice downloaded the programme of a political party and
ordered a folder by which she can subscribe as a member of that
political party.
39
Directive 2002/58/EC, recital 35.
40
Directive 2002/58/EC, article 9, part 1.
41
Directive 2002/58/EC, article 10.
42
Directive 95/46/EC, article 15.
43
Directive 95/46/EC, article 7.
44
D de Bot, S Renette, ‘Employee, where are thou?’ (2006)
Privacy & Informatie 2006/237, 213.
46
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic
communications services or of public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC. Official Journal 2006, L
105/54.
47
Directive 2006/24/EC, article 6.
48
Directive 2006/24/EC, recital 9.
49
Kamerstukken II, 2006/07, 31 145, n 3, p 5. The report is
available (in Dutch) at:
http://www.justitie.nl/images/aanbieding%20rapport%20Erasmus%20Universiteit_4147_tcm34-14299.pdf
50
Bundesverfassungsgericht, ‘Eilantrag in Sachen
"Vorratsdatenspeicherung" teilweise erfolgreich’.
Press report Nr. 37/2008, 19 March 2008.
(http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg08-037)
51
A Veenman, ‘Senator Franken ten strijde tegen dataretentie
wetsvoorstel.’
(http://www.ispam.nl/archives/591/senator-franken-ten-strijde-tegen-dataretentie-wetsvoorstel)
52
On 22 May 2008, the proposed retention period in the Bill has been
amended by the Dutch House of Representatives and decreased from 18
months to 12 months. Handelingen 2007/08, n 87, Tweede Kamer,
6155-6156.
53
See for example: Roger Clarke’s Survey List: Reference
List: Surveys of Privacy Attitudes, available on the Internet:
(http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Surveys.html)
(started in 1996 with revisions to 2006); EPIC Public Opinion and
Privacy Page, available on the Internet:
(http://epic.org/privacy/survey/)
54
G Smink, A Hamstra, H van Dijk, Privacybeleving
van burgers in de informatiemaatschappi(1999)
Werkdocument 68, 11.
55
Dieter Verhue, Nationaal
Vrijheidsonderzoek – opiniedeel
meting 2007. Amsterdam: Veldkamp, April 2007.
56
‘Nemen van privacyrisico’s inherent aan opgroeien’
Webwereld, 27 November 2007.
57
Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Using social
networking sites safely’,
(http://www.ico.gov.uk/Home/for_the_public/topic_specific_guides/social_networking.aspx)
58
S Warren and L Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4
Harvard Law Review 193.
59
389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also R Gellman, ‘A General Survey of
Video Surveillance Law in the United States’, in: S Nouwt, B
de Vries, C Prins (eds), Reasonable Expectations of Privacy?
Eleven Country Reports on Camera Surveillance and Workplace Privacy
(2005) The text of Katz v United States is available at
www.privacynetwork.info.
60
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 15 June 1992 (Lüdi
v Switzerland), Publ. ECtHR, Series A, No. 238. The text of
Ludwig Lüdi v. Switzerland is available at
www.privacynetwork.info.
61
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 25 June 1997 (Halford
v The United Kingdom), no. 200605/92, 1997.
62
Paul Schwartz, ‘Privacy and Participation: Personal
Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States’
(1995) 80 Iowa Law Review 553, 573, cited in Robert Gellman,
note 59.
63
According to the European Court of Human Rights, paragraph 2 of
article 8 ECHR has to be interpreted narrowly. See: European Court
of Human Rights, Judgment of 4 May 2000 (Rotaru v Romania),
no. 28341/95, § 47.
64
‘Wet tot Wijziging van de Gemeentewet en de Wet
politieregisters in verband met de invoering van regels omtrent het
gebruik van camera’s ten behoeve van toezicht op openbare
plaatsen’ (camera surveillance in
public places). Kamerstukken
II, 2004/05, 29 440.
65
Kamerstukken II,
2004/05, 29 440, n 6, p 10.
66
See particularly European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 25
September 2001 (P.G. and J.H. v The United Kingdom), no.
44787/98. The text of P.G. and J.H. v The United Kingdom is
available on at www.privacynetwork.info.
67
Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) 19 February 1991, NJ 1992,
50.
68
About trends in intelligence and security measures and privacy
risks, see also: A Vedder, et al, Van privacyparadijs tot
controlestaat? Misdaad- en
terreurbestrijding in Nederland aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw
(2007) (with summary in English). Available at:
http://www.rathenau.nl/showpageBreed.asp?steID=1&ID=3814
69
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 4 May 2000 (Rotaru v
Romania), no. 28341/95.
72
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 25 September 2001 (P.G.
and J.H. v The United Kingdom), no. 44787/98.
75
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 28 January 2003 (Peck
v The United Kingdom), no. 44647/98, available at
www.privacynetwork.info.
76
Friedl v Austria, judgment of 31 January 1995, Series A no.
305-B, Friendly Settlement, Commission report of 19 May 1994.
77
Lupker and Others v The Netherlands, no. 18395/91, Commission
decision of 7 December 1992, unreported.
78
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 17 July 2003 (Perry v
The United Kingdom), no. 63673/00, available at
www.privacynetwork.info.
84
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 24 June 2004 (Von
Hannover v Germany), no. 59320/00.
85
About profiling, see also: L Bygrave, Data Protection Law.
Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits (2002), especially
Part IV: Profiling – Regulation by Data Protection Laws.
87
P de Hert, ‘Balancing security and liberty within the European
human rights framework. A critical reading of the Court’s case
law in the light of surveillance and criminal law enforcement
strategies after 9/11’ (2005) 1 Utrecht Law Review 1,
89.
(http://www.utrechtlawreview.org/publish/articles/000005/article.pdf)