Tears Shed Over Peer Gynt's
Onion: Some Thoughts on the Constitution of Public Legal
Information Providers
Tom Bruce
Co-Director, Legal Information
Institute
Cornell Law School
New York, USA
trb2@cornell.edu
Abstract
The paper considers possible models
for public legal information systems. It begins with a brief survey
of those qualities of legal information systems that end users have
historically found desirable, and then proceeds to analyze a
variety of existing models for public legal information systems
along three spectra: public sector versus private sector,
government-based versus non-government based, and centralized
versus decentralized (with a strong supposition that decentralized
publication would take place under the auspices of legal content
creators like courts and legislatures). While the author
concludes that centralized, third-party operations such as the
Australian Legal Information Institute (AustLII) are desirable as
sources of technological leadership and transfer, he finds that for
a variety of reasons it is more desirable in the long term that
content creators themselves make legal information freely
available.
Keywords:'public legal information', publishing.
This is a Refereed
Article published on 29 February 2000.
Citation: Bruce T,
'Tears Shed Over Peer Gynt's Onion: Some Thoughts on the
Constitution of Public Legal Information Providers', 2000 (2) The Journal of Information, Law and Technology
(JILT). <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/00-2/bruce.ht
ml>. New citation as at 1/1/04:
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_2/bruce/>
1. Introduction
1.1 The Dimensions of the Debate
Eight years' experience with
Internet delivery of public legal information provides much to draw
on as we think about what we might do in the future. It is
difficult to codify that experience into prescriptions about how
public legal information providers ought to be constituted and
organized. There is no question that the systems of the past failed
to give the public adequate access to the law that the public is
expected to obey. In the United States the barriers have been
largely economic; in theory, most law has been accessible to most
everyone, at a price[ 1 ]. In the United Kingdom and Canada, Crown copyright has
acted as a brake on efforts at electronic dissemination[ 2 ]. At this point
many if not most of us believe that the public is neither
well-served by a private legal-information oligopoly nor by
existing government-operated systems. The problem, then, is to
determine which of a number of alternative arrangements might serve
best in the future.
There is general agreement about
where public legal information services must fall in the overall
market structure[ 3 ] of electronic legal information. Most authors[
4 ] imagine them to
be relatively 'plain-vanilla'[ 5 ] services that
offer information to the public without diminishing potential
addition of value by publishers and other public- or private-sector
actors. As such they necessarily have two characteristics or
constraints: they must be sited somewhere near the headwaters of
the information stream, and they must operate without any exclusive
rights or practical monopolies that would serve to dam that stream.
So far, so good. Is it possible for us to make more detailed
prescriptions?
In his editor's preface to the most
recent edition of the Journal of Information Law and
Technology[ 6 ],
Abdul Paliwala characterizes this search for useful prescriptions
as a 'crucial debate' between the centralized approach represented
by the Australasian Legal Information Institute and the distributed
model I advocate elsewhere in that journal[ 7 ]. A more
sophisticated analysis would be at once simpler and more complex
than the bipolar nature of a debate would suggest. Like Peer Gynt
with the onion, we can peel away complex layers to reveal two
distinct, separable halves. There is no wholly convincing a
priori argument in favor of either. I believe that complex
circumstances viewed over the long term favor a distributed model.
Different circumstances might favor a different approach in the
short term, and ultimately some union of the two as successors in
time.
1.2 Disclaimers
'Different circumstances' is a code
phrase, of course. It is difficult to be sure how well experience
in one country will translate into action in another. The United
States is an idiosyncratic venue. We have an uncharacteristically
complex court system. Our long experience with private-sector
publication is sufficiently diverse to support virtually any
position. We have long denied copyright in government works[
8 ], but we for
many years permitted expansive copyright claims in the apparatus of
citation[ 9 ], and
we permit and even promote exclusive, private arrangements with
publishers[ 10 ] that have an equally restrictive effect. We present a
confused and confusing picture, and one from which it may not be
useful to generalize. It may well be that for Americans complexity
is the deciding factor, leaving distributed solutions as the only
ones that will scale properly. But the situation in America may
also be exactly the kind of pathological case that produces
solutions useful in more tractable settings.
Most of us in the public
legal-information game are in a reactive mode. We see ourselves as
freeing the law from private-sector oligopoly or from Crown
copyright or from bureaucratic inefficacy. But it may be a mistake
to let ourselves be led entirely by what we believe has gone
before, or to assume that the characteristics our institutions have
exhibited in the past are inescapable. There is nothing
foreordained that prevents government from publishing law in a
timely manner, that prevents the private sector from setting a
reasonable price on published law products, that limits the utility
of laws to lawyers, or that relegates academics and librarians to
the role of passive commentators and consumers. We live in a time
when literally everything is up for grabs - including some of the
assumptions made about the evils of the ancien
r?gime.
1.3 Roadmap
Like the layers of the onion, the
layers of this analysis tend to be difficult to separate and array
neatly into a linear structure. I have somewhat arbitrarily divided
the discussion into three brief stage-setting sections that outline
the characteristics of the new marketplace for legal information
and the nature of the 'competing' centralist and decentralized
models. These in turn are followed by detailed exploration of three
broad discussion points that organize a plethora of closely related
questions.
2.
Demands of the Marketplace: What are we Trying to
Achieve?
In the sections immediately
following I consider the primary demands placed by consumers on
legal-information systems, whether public or private. At times it
may appear that I am questioning whether or not end users really
know what is in their best interest. If I am doing so, I am doing
so in a way that can happen only at this particular point in time.
Though this is a less troublesome problem than it was a few short
years ago, consumers still have trouble seeing the qualities they
prize implemented in the new information environment, not because
they are not there but because they have taken on new, largely
cosmetic externalities[ 11 ]. To some extent, this is an evanescent problem that
reflects the youth of the Internet legal-information environment.
In larger part it is a problem first of recognizing what was baby
and what was bathwater in the old environment, and then of figuring
out where the baby has gone in the new milieu. The planner of legal
information services must then somehow predict what the baby is
likely to be like when it is full-grown. Internet-based legal
information services are far from mature.
End users have been conditioned by
training, experience, and careful marketing campaigns to value
particular aspects of familiar systems like LEXIS and WESTLAW.
Those systems are strongly branded, and have a deservedly high
reputation among those who have been able to use them. It is not at
all surprising (though it is at times dismaying) that experienced
users find it difficult to recognize those same virtues when they
are produced by new and unfamiliar implementations. At the core of
this phenomenon is a bias induced by thirty years' experience with
older computer systems and older modes of industrial organization:
centrality equals reliability. The Internet approach stands in
sharp contrast as it argues the contrary: decentralization equals
reliability, attainability, and scalability. On some profound but
subliminal level this is news that shocks and bewilders. New,
distributed models of computing that are reflected in distributed
information systems and distributed models of business organization
must seem inherently anarchic and therefore inherently suspect, no
matter their virtues. That suspicion will subside in time, to a
degree. But it will never vanish entirely until we become more
discerning than we are about what was necessary about older ways of
doing things and what was merely incidental.
2.1 Comprehensiveness
Legal professionals feel a strong
need for comprehensive electronic sources of legal information.
They remain oddly na?ve about the nature of comprehensiveness in
the new, distributed network environment and, to a degree, about
their own research practices. It is understandable that lawyers
researching caselaw would want to feel that they had searched or
seen every single available case on point. What is slightly
surprising is their seeming insistence that these results come from
a central provider, even when it can be demonstrated to their
intellectual satisfaction that an aggregation of providers is
providing the same collection of cases searchable from a central
point[ 12 ].
This is all the more interesting
given that their beliefs about what constitutes comprehensiveness
are demonstrably subjective and often wildly off-base. What they
believe to be a comprehensive search result falls far short of
actual comprehensiveness; one study shows a high degree of
satisfaction with results that produce surprisingly low levels of
recall[ 13 ].
This suggests that we may be dealing in realms that are not
entirely rational, and that have more to do with learned behavior
and the need for assurance that one is doing one's job properly. It
may also have to do with more than one hundred years' worth of
marketing by large commercial providers, each of which is eager to
show itself more comprehensive than the others. Indeed, it is
difficult to see end-user criteria as separable from vendor claims,
in part because the features being trumpeted often do serve market
needs and in part because the influence of vendors has been so
pervasive both with lawyers and with the librarians who make their
information-purchasing decisions.
It was not always that way, though
one has to reach back a considerable distance to find a time when
it was not. The earliest critiques of the West system took it to
task for being too comprehensive and hence,
non-selective[ 14 ]. In 1889, John B. West responded to these complaints
in a way that foreshadowed much that was to come:
It is one of the greatest merits of
the National Reporter System that it gives all the cases. Some of
our critics call it a 'Blanket System,' and we are disposed to
accept the analogy. No policy of insurance is so satisfactory as
the blanket policy; and that is the sort of policy we issue for the
lawyer seeking insurance against the loss of his case through
ignorance of the law set forth in the decisions of the highest
courts.[ 15 ]
To take Mr. West up on his analogy,
concerns about comprehensiveness are exactly as legitimate as
concerns about ones' house burning down. Sensible people take
sensible precautions, and they pay for insurance policies at a rate
they believe appropriate to the value of their goods. They can be
induced to pay still more if they can be persuaded that failure to
do so is risky.[ 16 ] This is not empty analogy; the success of
state-oriented CD-ROM collections and online CALR contracts limited
in volume and scope shows that practitioners are recognizing that
some goods only demand a moderate amount of insurance. Practical
lawyers with limited library budgets have probably always done
so.[ 17 ] It
remains important that we recognize that some of our attitudes
toward any risk involved have been shaped by the subtle influence
over more than a century, reinforced by the adversarial nature of
the system and the competitive nature of graduate legal
education.
Finally, one must also ask,
'Comprehensiveness for whom?' The limitations of print made it
difficult if not impossible for John West to publish more than the
'decisions of the highest courts' in 1889. More than a century
later, the large electronic publishers still lose comprehensiveness
as one moves lower and lower in the hierarchy of the courts - and
closer and closer to the concerns of the average private citizen.
Certainly neither LEXIS nor WESTLAW is a good source of the more
localized legal information that impacts private citizens far more
directly and frequently than the rulings of distant if important
appellate courts. And comprehensiveness is of no concern to anyone
who is barred from access to the database, whether by its cost, or
by accidents of geography, or by its failure to take notice of the
laws and regulations having the most impact for them.
Comprehensiveness takes on new meaning - and becomes significantly
more challenging - as we try to imagine a system that will provide
universal access to the law most directly affecting the
public.
2.2 Currency
Currency takes on two meanings in
the legal-information marketplace. People want up-to-date versions
of statutes and regulations. They also want timely reporting of
judicial decisions, though here the notion of timeliness is more
relaxed. As with other aspects of the legal information market,
this criterion has at times taken on inflated importance as
competing commercial entities seize on it as a point of
competition. For example, a few years ago the currency of Supreme
Court decisions was at issue, with each of the American commercial
providers claiming to 'scoop' the other by a matter of minutes or
hours. It is difficult to see what difference so timely a level of
timeliness could possibly make to an actual legal process; the
information services were acting more like news
organizations[ 18 ].
As a rule American courts seem to
feel more of an obligation to provide currency than
comprehensiveness. The US Supreme Court operates a scrupulously
up-to-the-minute dissemination service in the form of Project
Hermes, but as yet has no Web site offering a fixed archive of
opinions. Several courts put opinions online only until they appear
in the official reporter or for arbitrarily limited
timespans[ 19 ]; others segregate older opinions into separate
archives[ 20 ].
Motives for removal vary; some courts profess concern for
comparative inaccuracies that may creep in as official versions are
refined, while others keep their reasons to themselves. A cynic
might suspect reluctance to interfere with the revenue streams that
flow from exclusive publishing contracts. It may also be that there
is a well-meaning but misdirected attempt being made to establish a
sharp division between public and private systems using timeliness
as the value criterion, much as a free stock ticker might offer
quotes that are delayed by some minutes to avoid stepping on a
sister for-fee service.
Closely related to the notion of
timely dissemination of opinions is the idea of notification or
current awareness - that along with the release of a decision or
the passage of new legislation something would occur that pushes
the event into the view of the user. Usually this also involves
some degree of filtering; the customer does not want to be hit over
the head by every event, but only some definable subset. This is a
need expressed primarily by professionals, but it is worth noting
that the need is not restricted to legal professionals -
it applies equally to anyone affected by law or regulation in some
ongoing and vital way. For the general public, this need is often
filled by traditional news media, trade associations, speciality
newsletters, or simply by word of mouth.[ 21 ] Such systems
are remarkably easy to build once the infrastructure of speedy
information gathering is in place, but of course they rely
crucially on a timely stream of information from the
source.
2.3 Reliability
Concerns about reliability come in
several flavors. Some users are concerned about both short- and
long-term availability of cases through public-sector publishers:
these are concerns about service availability, on the one hand, and
archiving, on the other. Others worry that the texts being
published may not be as accurate as those produced by commercial
houses.
What is interesting about these
assertions is that the virtues attributed to private-sector
services are in some sense accidental and reputational. There is
nothing about a private-sector service that would, a
priori , cause it to publish reliable texts that are
continuously available and scrupulously archived[ 22 ]. There is
nothing that would, a priori , prevent a public-sector
provider from doing so, as many of us are proving. Indeed, digital
signatures make it possible for Internet based providers to prove
that what is being transmitted is exactly what was
received from a court or legislature, without alteration of any
kind.[ 23 ]
There is no guarantee, other than time and experience, that texts
from West are inherently more reliable than those published by
public-sector actors on the Internet. WESTLAW and LEXIS have
reliable brands; the public-sector publishers do not as yet,
because they have had no time to establish them. In short, concerns
about reliability are revealed to be concerns about the new, and
they can really only be allayed by experience with new,
Internet-based brands.
3.
How new Technology Shifts the Nature of the
Discussion
Most discussions of the new Internet
technology and its effects on legal publication have focussed on
the dramatic way in which it lowers entry barriers for would-be
legal publishers. Reduced entry barriers create a more competitive
marketplace, and enable self-publication by governmental bodies and
other kinds of public-sector entities. These are not the only
effects of the new technology, and Internet technology is not the
only one with which we should be concerned.
3.1 Technology Affects Production as well as
Distribution
Early commentators on
law-on-the-Net[ 24 ], and most commentators since, have been quick to point
out that Net distribution of legal information is quite inexpensive
when compared to print distribution. Given that most creators of
electronic legal information now create it using electronic means,
the incremental cost of Net distribution is very small indeed. The
emphasis on distribution is understandable given that it is the
most prominent feature in the landscape of change, but it has also
biased the discussion.
Our preoccupation with the pace at
which government has or has not made use of new technologies of
distribution[ 25 ] has distracted us from the technologies of production.
It has been almost a decade since RIA, the tax publishing branch of
Thomson, built its SGML-based TIGRE system. A book[ 26 ] that uses it
as a case study has been a standard reference for SGML implementors
for more than five years now. Yet SGML has yet to make significant
inroads into the Law Revision Counsel's office where the tax code
itself is edited and maintained. Some would argue that this
demonstrates that government simply cannot shift to new technology
as quickly as a better-funded, profit-seeking, competitive private
sector can. That may be true, but it is not foreordained. There are
many counterexamples[ 27 ] in which government has kept pace with the private
sector in adopting new publishing technologies. The real problem is
that few have yet imagined the creation and distribution of legal
text as a fully re-engineered process reaching from draftsperson
through legislature to citizen. In the US, some branches of
government have moved quite quickly to develop an Internet
presence, but relatively few have revamped the means by which they
produce the content distributed via that apparatus. Many government
organizations have been paving over cowpaths, accelerating and
widening distribution of a product that is still produced by
relatively inefficient means. This is a classic example of
incrementalism at work where reengineering is needed[ 28 ]. It says
nothing about the ultimate capacity of government as a
publisher.
3.2 By Increasing Access, New Technology
Explodes the Meaning of 'public'
In 1995, it was still possible to
make the assertion that most use of published law products was made
by lawyers[ 29 ]. That may no longer be so, if it ever was, and the
distinctions that made such a claim possible are breaking down. It
was true then, and probably remains true now, that most law
books are in the hands of lawyers. But there have always been
countless ways in which citizens have used legal information
encountered in other texts and contexts. In the past, the texts
consisted largely of glosses, guides, and handbooks - secondary
sources constructed for the benefit of the average citizen, like
income-tax self-help guides, or regulatory manuals prepared by
trade associations for their members. The Web at once puts all
those scattered sources into one space, and offers the possibility
of linking those secondary sources to primary material that many
people wish to see for themselves. That interest is elastic, and
price sensitive, but it is there nonetheless and it is huge. Often,
it is not interest in a legal-information product as large and
lumpy as a book, but instead in some paragraph or section or
smaller granule that is especially important to the searcher.
Often, too, it is professional - but the profession is not
lawyering. It is, instead, a profession bound up with law in some
less direct but nonetheless fundamental way - that of (e.g.) a
health-care administrator, or pension plan manager, or police
officer, or inventor[ 30 ].
Two notions proceed from this.
First, our definition of 'public access' to law has implicitly but
dramatically changed. We must now imagine an expanded public
seeking smaller and more relevant granules of information, and
seeking it via the Internet. Second, increased granularity, a
diversity of specialized interests, and a vastly expanded audience,
taken together , strongly imply a need for constellations of niche
legal information providers. Let us consider these ideas in
turn.
One could outline the changing
nature of public access succinctly by saying that government can no
longer discharge its public-access responsibility by insisting on
the delivery of a few free law books to a few libraries. Current
contracts between state government in the US and private legal
publishers actually do contain public access provisions, and at one
time they probably seemed reasonable. One from New York State, a
state with over 18 million residents, reads:
6. Said contract shall require the
contractor to furnish the state library with fifty-eight copies of
the court of appeals and appellate division reports and three
copies of the miscellaneous reports, and also to furnish copies of
each of said publications as follows: One of each to the clerk of
each county, for the use of the county; one of each to the attorney
general, for the use of his office; one of each to the state
comptroller, for the use of his office; one of each to the clerk of
the court of appeals, for the use of that court, and one of each to
each judge or justice of a court of record, for the use of his
office; and one of each to the various public law libraries in the
state, and the expense of delivery thereof shall be borne by the
state.[ 31 ]
As the libraries mentioned here are
not public libraries, but public law libraries; it is not
hard to guess who the likely users of this 'public' access were
thought to be. And with the percentage of American households with
Internet access reaching roughly 37%[ 32 ], and nearly
100% of public schools and libraries connected, it is clear that
the Internet is a better venue for public access anyway. One might
also adduce other advantages: law on the Internet is more
accessible than 'book law' intellectually as well as physically,
offering a familiar interface and more colloquial forms of
organization. One can only imagine how private legal publishers
would react to a requirement that they provide free access to law
via a web site.
A legal information product is in
fact a cross product - the intersection of a particular
primary source with a particular audience. This is not just a
matter of creating secondary sources for niche audiences, as
lawyers do when they produce client newsletters, practice guides,
or CLE materials. Marc Galanter writes that law 'usually works not
by exercise of force but by information transfer, by communication
of what's expected, what forbidden, what allowable, what are the
consequences of acting in certain ways'.[ 33 ] Like any
other communication system, primary legal sources can be rendered
more or less effective by structuring and presenting them
differently for different audiences.
Publishing for such niche markets is
an activity that is both profitable for private sector concerns and
a matter of necessity for public bodies that have an explicit or
implicit mandate to serve audiences with special needs and
perspectives. Unsubtle examples include language translation and
specialized presentation for the physically disabled. Other less
obvious needs exist, as well. Agencies routinely rearrange
statutory material into structures and sequences more useful to
field workers or program administrators[ 34 ]. Professional
associations, trade groups, and lobbying organizations build legal
guides intended for niche markets in a particular industry or
demographic slice, such as the elderly. In the private sector, the
fact that publishers must provide products for a range of media and
audiences - law in different packages - is often cited as a major
competitive reason to adopt markup technologies such as SGML and
XML[ 35 ]
that facilitate reaggregation of legal information into new
publications. They are not the only organizations with reason to do
this.
The major points to be made here are
two. First, the vastly expanded notion of 'public' that is implied
when the means of public access is the Internet is not a simple
expansion of numbers of readers. It is a combinatorial explosion of
niche audiences for legal information. It is difficult if not
impossible to service the needs of such a diversity of diversities
without reliance on the private sector. They cannot be cut out of
the picture.[ 36 ] At the same time, it would be a mistake to assume that
servicing of niche legal-information markets is an activity that is
the exclusive concern of the private sector. Public
creators of legal information often service niches directly, and
must be as mindful of the diversity of audiences that they
serve.[ 37 ]
4.
What are the 'competing' Models?
The competing centralist and
distributed models represented by the Australasian Legal
Information Institute and its American elder brother have arisen
from very different circumstances that more than anything else have
determined their characteristics. The critical differences between
the two countries are differences of scale and history. America has
a good many more jurisdictions and a baroque system of courts and
legislatures, and has experienced almost total domination of law
publishing by the private sector. Australia's legal and government
communities are much smaller, and the private sector has not had a
chokehold on publishing. For these reasons, Australia is a place
where it is much more practical to talk about a centralized public
legal information system operating outside of government, and to
take the political and institutional steps necessary to set it up.
In the United States, the notion of a centralized operation is not
merely daunting but probably impossible outside the private
sector.
As a result, two different visions
of the public legal-information regime have arisen. AustLII acts as
a kind of comprehensive, centralized, sophisticated service bureau
for official bodies interested in publishing legal information, and
enjoys close, quasi-official relationships with those whose
information it publishes[ 38 ]. By contrast,
the LII is non-comprehensive, has no official relationship with any
government body or agency, and receives no public funding except
indirectly through our parent school. We operate three major
flagship collections (the decisions of the US Supreme Court, the
United States Code, and the decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals) as examples of what it is possible to do with legal
information, but we do not aim for comprehensiveness of any kind.
Instead, we aspire to be a center for applied research that will
serve as an example to a wide variety of self-publication efforts
in the United States and elsewhere. We imagine that a comprehensive
public legal information regime will be an aggregation of different
low- or no-cost providers acting under a variety of arrangements,
principally self-publication[ 39 ], and
achieving interoperability through common standards and practices.
If pressed, we would probably advocate the formation of something
like a W3C[ 40 ] for law, a consortium that could develop and
promulgate interoperability standards, but we would not imagine
that it would take on responsibility for comprehensive publication
at any level, including service as a comprehensive
portal.
At this point in the proceedings, it
would be tempting to save a great deal of trouble and effort for
both author and reader by pointing out that a global distributed
model can contain any number of localized centers of concentration.
We could then declare that synthesis has occurred at a higher level
of abstraction, and adjourn. Unfortunately that would do even less
to illuminate the public policy issues than any further scribblings
by the author are likely to. Nevertheless, as the discussion
unfolds, it may be useful to bear in mind that there are ways for
the two visions to coexist, either at different scales or as
successors in time, an approach I shall say more about
later.
5. A
Pause
With background behind us, let us
now do a little stocktaking. We need to consider our central
problem - the ideal structure for public legal information services
- along a series of dimensions rather than as a simple choice
between centralized and distributed models. For in reality we have
a series of binary choices to make, leading us down a variety of
potential paths. A useful way to categorize different sets of
alternatives might be
-
Public-sector versus private
sector
-
Publication by government versus
publication by others, be they private- or public-sector actors.
-
Publication by centralized publisher
versus self-publication by creators, with no consideration of
whether the centralized publisher is public, academic, or
private.
Obviously one can produce some odd
and contradictory results by combining these three sets of
alternatives willy-nilly - there is no such thing as a
private-sector, government-run, self-publication operation, for
instance[ 41 ].
But a look at some prominent examples suggests that in fact we
should look at all three dimensions if we are to accurately
describe many existing operations. For instance, the US Government
Printing Office is a centralized, public-sector operation run by
government; AustLII is a centralized, public-sector operation that
is not. The loose consortium that publishes the opinions of the US
Courts of Appeal is both public- and private-sector, with elements
of self-publication that are within government, elements of
self-publication undertaken by arrangement with academic
institutions outside government, and elements like FindLaw that are
private-sector actors espousing public-sector ideology, all linked
in a distributed system.
One can imagine other dualities
having to do with funding sources or technology. One might also
make a practically infinite number of distinctions based on price
point, though this would be a tortuous analysis unless we were to
restrict ourselves to three points that we could define as 'wholly
free', 'cost-recovery', and 'what the market will bear'[ 42 ]. Let us,
however, abolish such complexity at a stroke by declaring that we
will be concerned with services that are priced at or below cost,
as they would likely be in a public-access regime, and that we will
limit ourselves to Internet based technologies[ 43 ]. For the
moment, it is enough to consider the three major choice-points
listed above.
6.
Public vs. Private Considered Generally
Most of the discussion that treats
the question of public versus private responsibility for legal
information publishing ends up recommending some form of
coexistence. Neither public nor private means can by themselves
answer every demand that exists for legal information. The debate
is not really about whether public-sector information ought to
exist to the exclusion of private services, or whether
private-sector services can answer all public needs, but where the
dividing line should be set between the two. Curiously, most of the
arguments on this point end up being normative; there is little as
yet in the way of empirical evidence or economic theory that would
favor placing the dividing line in one particular place or another.
Here are some arguments that have been made in the past:
6.1 Legal Information Serves only Lawyers;
Forcing the Public to Bear the Cost is Unfair
Several years' experience with legal
information on the Internet permits us to more readily see this
argument as the nonsense that it always was. To be fair, it seemed
a lot more reasonable when we had only print and commercial online
services to consider. In 1995, it was quite possible to get hold of
the wrong end of the binoculars and argue, as one commentator did,
that because nobody but lawyers made use of law books or of
Westlaw, it was unfair to expect the public to pay for such a
service:
...Any government effort to
distribute free or low-cost legal information will benefit lawyers
more than anyone else. By far, the greatest use of legal
information is made by lawyers in various guises, largely to make
money. If the government does expend significant resources to
create an entirely new legal database, the greatest beneficiaries
will be the for-profit legal community...One would have to be
incredibly na?ve to think that such a program will end up really
being designed for the average citizen. Subsidizing the practice of
law is hardly an attractive goal for public spending at this
time[ 44 ].
On the whole one would prefer
naivete to the disingenuousness of this argument, which willfully
ignores two aspects of the market for public legal information.
First, the non-lawyer market was and is extremely price-sensitive,
and flew under the radar of WESTLAW and LEXIS largely because it
was unwilling to pay LEXIS and WESTLAW prices. Before the existence
of less costly published law sources, it was a difficult market to
detect or evaluate (and there is still much to be done on that
score). Second, it was a market that chose not to employ the
professional means and methods of legal research either because it
had no access to them or because it did not know how to apply them.
Instead, it found other means to pursue its informational needs,
largely through secondary sources and through public libraries. It
is unusual to see (e.g.) someone with a question about the changes
in the practical limits on their activities as a police officer
that flow from a recent Supreme Court decision wandering the stacks
of a law library[ 45 ]. It is almost inconceivable that such a person would
use a traditional commercial electronic service at full price. From
the perspective of conventional research systems encountered in law
libraries these people were invisible[ 46 ]. However, to
deny that they exist is to deny that anyone ever bought a
tax-preparation aid or a book on making a will, consulted the local
building code, or read about an appellate court decision affecting
(say) the limits on their behavior in the workplace.
6.2 Private-Sector Publication Deprecates
Service to Unprofitable Audiences
The idea here is a simple one: if it
is profit that motivates legal publishers to publish, then law that
turns a profit will be published first. A look at existing services
will show that for the most part this proposition is true. The law
that is available from commercial publishers is largely the law
employed in the service of deep pockets. By way of illustration one
might contrast the level of publishing activity surrounding the law
governing mergers and acquisitions with that of the law of
veteran's benefits. The first is complicated but highly profitable;
the latter is insanely complicated and distinctly unprofitable,
since lawyer fees are capped.
In this sense law publishing as a
communications system resembles others in which there is a
public-policy interest in universal service, such as postal or
telephone service. The market will not act in such a way as to
provide universal access to law; it has to be legislated. Drafting
practical legislation on this point would be a daunting task; the
notion of universal or public legal information service begs the
question, 'What level of value is to be provided for free?[
47 ] At the moment
we have little idea of where we should set the level of value-added
in a universal, public system.
6.3 Free Public Information does not add the
Value Demanded by Niche Markets
Information provided by a universal,
public service can never add value in all the different ways that
niche markets might expect. This has always been true to a degree,
as witness the variety of specialty legal publications serving
different varieties of legal practice. It is even more the case now
that the dramatically larger audience available on the Internet has
revealed niche markets that were previously unreachable as such,
and as notions of 'mass customization' increasingly dominate
consumer expectations generally[ 48 ]. In practical terms this plays out as
an issue of scalability. It is made more acute by the fact that
niche legal information products crucially depend on added
editorial value that is always expensive to provide and often the
product not of general legal expertise but of specialized knowledge
in a field identified with the target audience, such as accounting,
finance, or engineering. It is not to be expected that freely
available public sources could supply nearly the quality of niche
product that the private sector could.
6.4 Extensive Public-Sector Information
Unfairly Competes with Private-Sector
Entrepreneurship
The 'unfair competition' card is
usually the first one played in any debate over the relative value
of public and private regimes. I have saved it for last because,
like some other propositions we discuss here, it turns on the level
of value being added by the public source. A dump truck full of
free legal information published on paper cannot compete with even
the most primitive electronic source offered for sale at any
remotely rational price. At the other end of the spectrum, a
private source that adds costly features offering only marginal
improvements in functionality will not last long in an open
market[ 49 ].
These are examples at the extremes; things become a lot less clear
as we choose examples of public and private systems that are closer
to one another in the value they add to the same dataset. As yet,
there is no country that has grappled with detailed questions of
how much added value the public has the right to expect from a free
system. AustLII, the LII, CRDP, and others who are focussed on
technical innovation are at least implicitly asserting their right
to add as much value as innovation permits in the hope of forcing
commercial systems to still higher levels[ 50 ]. This is good
insofar as it provides leadership, but it falls far short of being
a public-policy determination that would establish useful
guidelines for content creators.
As Perritt points out in the context
of GIS data[ 51 ], this debate does not end with asking whether
government will itself be a competitor or not. Once government
realizes that it has the ability to control competition by
making decisions about what resources it will offer for free, and
by choosing who it will allow to add value to its creations, other
considerations take over. There is a temptation to restrict access
in order to increase revenue flow to government; value-adders will
pay dearly for exclusivity (and, by contrast, nothing if they feel
that a competing public source is pre-empting their market). At
another extreme, government can eliminate all competition and thus
effectively limit knowledge of its activities. Thus, issues of
exclusivity and censorship flow directly from competitive
considerations.
6.4.1 Non-Competition and Deadlock: The US
Code
Often, too, our perception of
whether competition is 'fair' or 'unfair' is accidental: it depends
on whether it was the private or public sector that first made a
service available. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the
current systems surrounding the publication of the US Code. There
are at least four electronic versions available. The United States
Government Printing Office offers one that is anywhere from 12 to
24 months out of date, depending on the title[ 52 ]. The version
offered by the LII is derived from the GPO version, and hence is
equally out of date but more readily navigable because of better
hypertext functionality. By contrast, electronic editions offered
by private publishers are completely current. They are kept so by
large teams of editors. This is not an inexpensive effort and one
imagines that the cost is, ultimately, passed back to the
consumer.
This situation presents a number of
issues. First, one might ask whether or not citizens are entitled
to the same level of service as lawyers and government officials -
particularly as we contemplate a service where currency is
important and large numbers of the governed are affected. Second,
there is the issue of duplicated effort and efficiency. Would it
not make sense to have government provide an up-to-date version,
and save the private sector acquisition and updating costs that are
incurred by every downstream publisher? Yet I am quite sure that if
government were to begin providing an up-to-date version this would
be seen as undercutting the market for private versions in an
undesirable way, and would be quite controversial. Government
initially offered too low a level of added value in the public
version; perhaps such snapshots or consolidations were all that was
possible at the time. It will, however, be very difficult to change
matters because the private sector has developed products that go
the next logical step in adding value, and can complain that
competitive processes would be unfairly undercut by the release of
a more capable public product. Most would argue that government
should go ahead and do what it should have done in the first place
by making an up-to-date version available and thus placing the
burden on the private sector to find new levels of value to add.
Such an outcome is desirable, but it would take considerable time
and effort to achieve. Resistance to change would be high and it
would take time to resolve the issue of competition. For practical
purposes the situation is one of deadlock.
Again, there is nothing to argue
conclusively for public information services over private ones or
vice versa. The need for universal service provides a raison
d'etre for public versions, since it is unlikely that the
private sector will adequately service unprofitable niches. The
need for relatively deep layers of added value to serve
professional and specialized markets, as well as some arguments
having to do with government control of information, argue that
private-sector services are needed too. What is more difficult is
to decide how the two ought to coexist. If we make mistakes in
setting the appropriate level of value in public versions those
mistakes will be hard to undo. If the level of value is set too
high, it will stifle private-sector services at birth; if too low,
it will be hard to attain more reasonable levels of public service
without controversy over unfair competition. It might not be all
that difficult to answer questions about what the public is
entitled to were we actually to consider the needs of the public.
Unfortunately, to the extent that there is any real public-policy
debate in this area at all, it is taking place between lawyers,
legislators, and specialists most of whom have an outdated,
incomplete, and artificially polarized picture of what the public
does with legal information.
7.
Should Government Publish its own Works?
My own opinion is that government
has a responsibility to electronically publish its own creations,
be they judicial opinions, legislation, or regulations. It is
simply an obligation to inform citizens of the rules by which they
will be governed. Many commentators maintain that there is nothing
that constrains government to carry out that function itself, that
government is not a particularly skilful or conscientious
publisher, and that there is much in the historical record to
demonstrate this lack of competence. While the historical record
speaks for itself, it does not determine what will happen in the
future, and there is much that argues for government
self-publication. Let us look at some of the arguments arrayed on
both sides.
7.1 Factors Ostensibly Arguing Against
Government as its own Publisher
7.1.1 Currency
Most of those who judge the creators
of legal information incompetent to publish their own work base
their attacks on problems with currency of information. Their
central claim is that any process of dissemination undertaken by
government is inevitably slower than one accelerated by market
forces. Historically, this may well have been true[ 53 ], but at this
point one has the impression that these arguments are being made by
rote and with only cursory examination of the present state of
affairs. Government has been slow in the past, but in some places
it is not now, and there is no guarantee that private industry is
any faster. Indeed, recent experience in the United States shows
that government operations with universal-service mandates can
provide highly efficient and effective service[ 54 ], especially
when goaded by similar operations in the private sector.
The Supreme
Court
Consider the following:
Competition for profits has produced
quality. Anyone wanting a simple example of what happens when the
market is not at work need only compare the United States Reports,
the officially produced version of United States Supreme Court
decisions, with privately published reporters covering the same
cases. The United States Reports is compiled by a Court-appointed
reporter and published by the Government Printing Office. It is a
well-produced set of reports that provides readers with Supreme
Court decisions one or two years after they have been handed down
by the Court and long after they have been published in the private
reporters. Whereas a government-subsidized system can live with
that sort of egregious delay, private publishers responding to
market demands and seeking profits cannot. Who would subscribe to
such a set unless forced?[ 55 ]
Berring tries here to sketch as
inevitable something that is merely accidental, as an examination
of the Court's current electronic-publication practice reveals. In
fact the most current source of decisions from the Court
is the Court itself, which releases its opinions through the
electronic service known as Project Hermes simultaneously with
their delivery from the bench. To be sure, these are bench
opinions, subject to editing before their appearance in the
official reports, but they are good enough for most people who have
a real need for currency. If they were anything less then it would
simply be unconscionable for the Court to release them. Indeed the
electronic avatars of the private-sector entities that Berring
admires so much obtain their electronic versions of the opinions
from the Court by this means - and are two to four hours slower in
placing them online than the LII, a non-profit provider. Creators
of legal information are not ineluctably slow in placing their
information online. They can lead the pack. And in some ways it
makes little sense to use past performance in print media as an
indicator of future performance in the electronic venue[ 56 ].
The United States Code,
Again
Legislation presents disseminators
with a more difficult problem that judicial opinions do. It is far
more expensive to keep current; it undergoes continual revision and
periodic consolidation, whereas judicial opinions stabilize in
official form relatively quickly. And usually more is at stake. As
a rule, legislatures speak to more parties more powerfully than
courts do; judicial decisions that directly affect more than those
immediately involved are comparatively rare, whereas with
legislation the situation is reversed. Legislation has the larger
audience by far.
Our earlier discussion of the US
Code mentioned four means of electronic access, two of which are
freely available and poorly updated, standing in sharp contrast to
a set of for-profit systems that are well-updated and expensive. In
the context of timeliness, it is worth noting that governments
elsewhere are doing much better than the American Federal
Government, both at the state level in the United States[ 57 ] and
elsewhere[ 58 ]. Untimely delivery by government is not some
inevitable result of self-publication-by-bureaucracy. Instead, it
is a process-engineering problem demanding solution in its own
right[ 59 ]. To
'solve' the problem by handing it to a third party, public or
private, is simply an incrementalist, Band-Aid solution that
removes responsibility from a place where it belongs: with the
people creating the information. Government can provide timely
information if it wants to, and if it is made clear that abdicating
responsibility to third parties is no longer an option.
7.1.2 Plant, Equipment, and
Expertise
Part of the problem is that there
was a long period where such an abdication of responsibility was
the only practical alternative, given the constraints of print.
Early legal-publishing operations were almost always turned over to
private printers. In the UK this was at least partly a matter of
patronage; in the United States, government could not afford to
operate the printing plant and distribution facilities needed even
in Colonial times. Often a contract for printing the laws was not
seen as a boon; printers complained that the activity was simply
unprofitable, and had to be coerced:
It was left to individual enterprise
to carry this important object into effect; and as the undertaking
would be attended with considerable expense, and interruption of
other business, without any prospect of private advantage; no
professional gentleman, for a period of a few years, appeared
willing to make the requisite sacrifice[ 60 ]
In time, of course, legal publishing
came to be hugely profitable[ 61 ], and given
the industrial technology of print it remained efficient to place
publishing operations outside of government in a well-capitalized
private sector. Until recently, computerized research systems were
no different - the creation of centralized mainframe systems and of
the access systems that would permit lawyers to reach them were if
anything more capital-intensive than the creation of a printing
plant. In this respect the early electronic systems held no seeds
of change - it still made sense to develop capital-intensive
electronic publishing systems in the private sector. Thus in
matters of industrial organization centralized electronic systems
were little different from their print predecessors. As a
distributed system, the Internet presents the first real challenge
to the print-oriented mindset that says that legal publishing can
only take place in a centralized system. Legal publishing is now
something that government can practically do on its own[ 62 ].
7.2 Factors Arguing for Self-Publication by
Government
7.2.1 Publishing as an (Unwitting) Interpreter of
Law
Some consumer concerns about the
reliability of legal information are closely related to questions
about whether or not the artifacts of publishing can act in ways
that affect interpretation of the law. Librarians writing about
headnoting and indexing systems have long realized that systems
that organize caselaw, such as the West key numbering system, also
serve to pigeonhole decisions in ways that may obscure their
meaning or usefulness.[ 63 ] In retrospect it seems fairly obvious that these
editorially-constructed secondary sources, like any system of
organization, have always had the power to miscategorize, or to
categorize in ways that lose accuracy and relevance with time and
with an evolving understanding of the meaning (or more properly
meanings) of a particular case or statute. Insofar as full-text
search bypasses such categorizations these arguments need not
detain us. The points I want to pursue here are tied more closely
to publication of primary sources, and to our overarching question
of whether it is better for the creators of legal information to do
their own publishing, or not. We can take it as given that courts
and legislatures are in a better position to clarify what they
themselves were trying to say than publishers are. The question,
then, is whether the act of publication creates any interpretive
effects, and if so what the consequences might be.
Punctuation
The strongly-worded disclaimers
placed at the beginning of electronic legal documents provide
compelling evidence that courts see the potential for difficult
consequences to flow from inaccuracies. Probing into the history of
cases revolving on concrete punctuation errors yields a less clear
picture; at times courts have considered punctuation an 'official'
part of decisions, and at times they have not.[ 64 ] Nevertheless,
interpretation can sometimes turn on a comma[ 65 ]. The aim of a
publication system should be simply to avoid the need for courts to
consider such questions; we are not concerned so much about what
the law has said about the issue of simple publishing errors as we
are with avoiding occasions on which we might find out. Such
frolics are costly, and perhaps unnecessary. The question, then, is
who is more vested in avoiding errors - a court or legislature
publishing its own work, or a third party?
Errors that omit, replace, or add a
character are clumsy and obvious - more so than errors of
paragraphing and indentation, errors that affect the way in which
we perceive the text to be structured, or errors based on the
application of logical meaning through typography or tagging. These
latter are particularly important to consider as we undergo a
fundamental shift in markup technologies. In a sense, the fuzzy way
in which essentially presentational markup schemes like traditional
typography and HTML bind logical meaning to the appearance of a
text is a kind of circuit breaker. It makes it possible to deny
well after the fact of publication that the appearance of
the text has any inherent relationship to its
meaning [ 66 ]. On the other hand, technologies that bind
logical meaning to markup more tightly, such as XML and SGML, raise
real questions about who is to be entrusted to do the markup. To be
sure most markup schemes will be fairly general[ 67 ] and most
likely confined to fairly incontestable metadata like the name of
the author of an opinion or the date of enactment of a statute. No
matter how much law students might wish for it, it is not likely
that we will ever see a judicial opinion containing tags like
<PAYATTENTION> or <DICTUM class="IMPORTANT"
duration="ETERNAL">, even from a court wanting to lend
weight to its own statements. It is possible to get into more
subtle difficulties, however.
Whitespace and
Structure
Even casual reading of the United
States Code (and many other statutes) reveals numerous examples in
which the layout of text on a page is closely related to the
meaning of a statute. Typically these take the form of an
introductory catchline, followed a list of specifics that pertain
to it, followed by a paragraph providing further detail that
modifies all or part of the preceding list of specifics. A look at
27 USC 203 as it appears on the LII web site[ 68 ] shows the
following (sic):
(c) It shall be unlawful, except
pursuant to a basic permit issued under this subchapter by the
Secretary of the Treasury -
(1) to engage in the business of
purchasing for resale at wholesale distilled spirits, wine, or malt
beverages; or
(2) for any person so engaged to
receive or to sell, offer or deliver for sale, contract to sell, or
ship, in interstate or foreign commerce, directly or indirectly or
through an affiliate, distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages so
purchased. This subsection shall take effect July 1,
1936.
This section shall not apply to any
agency of a State or political subdivision thereof or any officer
or employee of any such agency, and no such agency or officer or
employee shall be required to obtain a basic permit under this
subchapter.
As the text appears on our Web site,
it is not instantly clear whether the paragraph break that is
implied between '1936' and the words 'this section' separates a
paragraph that is applicable to item 2 only, as would be implied by
the fact that it is indented to the same level as (2), or whether
it applies to both (1) and (2), as would appear to be the case if
it were indented at the same level as the leading catchline for
(c). And while the word 'section' would appear to tie it to (c), it
is not at all clear that that is so, particularly if the
indentation is off. In fact, this entire discussion could be
rendered completely incomprehensible to the reader if the final,
printed format of the block quotation above is not as I am seeing
it now (struggles with my word processor as I created it leave me
thinking that that is a strong possibility). Consultation with the
original text before it passed through our formatting software
indicates that the current layout is, in fact, an error.
An X-Rated
Divertimento
Errors like this produce real
effects. When a producer of pornographic films starring a
then-underage Traci Lords was prosecuted under 18 USC 2252 - the
item on the LII Web site that is most frequently linked to, never
mind by whom[ 69 ] -- punctuation and layout were important factors. The
majority opinion of the Supreme Court in United States v.
X-Citement Video , 513 US 64 (1994), states:
The critical determination which we
must make is whether the term 'knowingly' in subsections (1) and
(2) modifies the phrase 'the use of a minor' in subsections (1)(A)
and (2)(A). The most natural grammatical reading, adopted by the
Ninth Circuit, suggests that the term 'knowingly' modifies only the
surrounding verbs: transports, ships, receives, distributes, or
reproduces. Under this construction, the word 'knowingly' would not
modify the elements of the minority of the performers, or the
sexually explicit nature of the material, because they are set
forth in independent clauses separated by interruptive punctuation.
But we do not think this is the end of the matter?[ 70 ]
What, we wonder, renders those
clauses independent if not whitespace and punctuation, and who
would be responsible for errors in interruptive punctuation, if not
the publisher? Our concern here is not so much with the particular
legal interpretation of publishing artifacts -- indeed, the opinion
goes on to imply that concerns about punctuation and layout are
trumped by considerations of meaning and effect[ 71 ]. What is
important is that we realize that legal questions can turn on
relatively subtle questions of textual markup and layout, so that
mistakes by publishers creates the potential for costly litigation.
It is the cost of determination rather than the outcome that is
most critical to us as we think about future systems. Courts,
legislatures, and agencies themselves have better reason to be wary
of potential mistakes than third parties do, no matter whether
those third parties are public or private. Creators are simply more
averse to the consequences of error. As we pointed out in the
section on reliability above, this is not a question of who is more
careless, but of who has better incentive to correct those errors
that will inevitably occur and the power to do so directly and
quickly.
8.
Third-Party vs. Self-Publication
Subtly different from the issue of
whether government is competent to publish at all is the question
of whether each agency within government ought to publish its own
works, or whether publication activities ought to be concentrated
in a single entity.
8.1 Reliability Concerns Favor
Self-Publication
Third-party commercial publishers
are often held up as models of reliability, especially when they
are compared to third-party operations on the Internet. As we have
already learned, this is often more a matter of strong brand
identification than anything else. In retrospect, it is
unsurprising that legal professionals would want some proof that
third-party operations having no official relationship with the
creators of legal content and no existing brand name would provide
accurate content. Over time these suspicions have eased. It is
important to remember that they probably never applied to
operations like GPO Access that are, in fact, directly operated by
government. An informal and hasty survey of public-library web
sites, for instance, shows that most favor 'official' government
sites in their lists of public information resources, even when
third-party sites offer greater functionality and hugely improved
response. And the 'horse's mouth' argument is persuasive: who is a
more reliable provider of government information than the
government itself?
Also, direct feedback from
information consumers offers an efficient means for creators to
improve information quality at source. Inaccuracies and errors can
and do creep in at all stages of the publication process. The more
quickly these can be corrected, and the closer to the ultimate
source the correction occurs, the lower the ultimate cost of the
error[ 72 ].
Experience teaches us that a user community acts in powerful ways
through the immediate feedback mechanisms provided by the Net; that
power can be efficiently harnessed to correct errors near the
source, but only if the source is reachable.
8.2 Gains of Third Party Centralization
Depend on the Level of Value Added Before Transfer, and are
Self-Limiting
Arguments in favor of a centralized
publishing regime rest on questions of standardization,
reliability, and efficiency. These three strands of argument share
the presumption that a central publishing entity could use a set of
common, internal tools and standards for information handling and
storage, ultimately resulting in presentation of the information to
the public in some uniform, standardized way. Thus, when we talk
about centralization, we imagine that the centralized, third-party
publisher can wrestle a diversity of incoming information streams,
each presumably with its own idiosyncratic format, into a
standardized product that is available to an audience that wants
the benefits of common functionality. This activity is imagined to
be efficient because the group involved is able to spread the costs
of technology and of developing technological expertise across
information streams produced by many creators, whereas without them
each creator would have to develop publishing expertise on its own.
Other presumed virtues include standardization, which speaks for
itself, and reliability, which we suppose in this context to be a
matter of placing all of one's eggs in one basket, the better to
watch it.
'Standardization' is a simple label
for what is really a complex bundle of practical problems for
publishers generally and for electronic publishers in
particular[ 73 ]. Different
information creators may use different electronic file formats for
their information, such as different word-processing programs,
plain ASCII, HTML, or a database format. Some formats are less
readily converted than others; the most familiar example of this is
the Adobe Acrobat/PDF format, which is extremely difficult to
convert to other formats but remains quite faithful in appearance
to printed versions.[ 74 ] But transformation of a creator's work into something
that conforms to a set of standards is not merely a matter of
electronically transforming one file format into another. There are
issues of editorial conformance involved that go beyond the
typographic to the structure of the documents themselves. To
reliably convert a judicial opinion, for example, we must be able
to reliably (and preferably automatically) determine what the names
of the parties are, what the date of decision is, who the author
is, where headings, major and minor sectional divisions fall, and
so on. We do this not only for typographic purposes but so that we
may appropriately tag metadata in our standardized version, extract
text features for special treatment by a search engines and
indexing software, cite it, and so on. Because courts and
legislatures vary in the way they format materials, so must our
text-conversion-and-conformance software vary from court to court,
legislature to legislature, and agency to agency. Because the
techniques on which such software depends are fundamentally matters
of sophisticated pattern recognition, rather like a souped-up
version of a word-processing search and replace function,
conversion software tends to be very difficult to generalize beyond
a single corpus[ 75 ].
Experience at the LII illustrates
this point, though at times we rather wish it didn't. We are now on
our third generation of software that does conversion for each of
three flagship collections we maintain, including the opinions of
the US Supreme Court, the United States Code, and the New York
Court of Appeals - three times three or nine packages in all,
written in the last five to seven years. Part of the reason that we
change the software from time to time is that we want added
functionality. But it has been uncontrollable change in the formats
used by creators that has most urgently compelled us to develop
successive versions. Courts and legislatures make improvements and
changes too, and we must adapt our mechanisms to them when they do.
Typically this involves extensive recoding and an awkward period of
revision and debugging as we discover hidden variations in the new
formats and new complexities that we did not encounter in whatever
test data we had when we began coding. Retrospective projects are
even more difficult. Like Schliemann digging in the ruins of Troy,
we typically find that past history comes in layers. We see not one
but several document structures that change from time to time to
suit the whims of reporters of decisions, clerks of court,
legislative publishing and printing systems, and other ephemeral
actors. My aim here is not to catalog the gripes of a third-party
publisher so much as it is to point out that, as with all encoding
projects, there is much that needs to be encoded whose appearance
and structure varies both from creator to creator and from year to
year. In the world of conversion and standardization, this kind of
diversity equals cost.[ 76 ]
Cost, in turn, affects the scale at
which a centralized third party can operate. Each new,
non-standardized corpus that the publisher takes on represents
significant short- and long-term conversion costs. How tempting,
then, to insist that all newcomers meet some sort of input data
standard that will make the conversion job both easier and less
expensive. In fact, this is what organizations like AustLII
do[ 77 ],
and I envy them their ability to do it. In the United States, where
there are many jurisdictions and a tradition of judicial
independence that at times could be better described as judicial
contrariness[ 78 ], we do not enjoy such a happy state of cooperation
with creators.
There are two morals to the story.
First, there are intensely practical reasons why a centralized,
third party approach may not scale well; it is expensive to convert
diverse income streams into a common format and then into equally
diverse products. Obviously, that suggests that the approach works
better when the number of creators to be serviced is more limited,
where an only-a-few-sizes-fit-all approach is appropriate, or where
the inevitably-better-funded private sector is at work. More
importantly, centralized, public-sector, third-party publishing
operations with resource limits can only scale up to a certain
point before they must compel a structure that is fundamentally
indistinguishable from self-publication by creators. This is so
because third-party publishers must insist on increasing levels of
standardization in the data they are given in order to maintain
operations as the scale and complexity of their input streams
increase out of proportion to their resources. Ultimately the
extent to which the input standard being sent by the creators so
closely reflects the practical needs of the output product that the
creators might just as well be publishing the material
directly.
This is not bad in itself. There is
a useful time dimension at work. Even if things reach the state I
have just described the creator will have bought itself some time
and possibly some technological development and transfer by using
the third party publisher as a kind of buffer against change. As we
shall see later this sounds (and can work) much more like a process
in which the third party educates the creating legislature, court,
or agency and leads it through a process of technology transfer.
This may well be a result that is less efficient in the short run
(there is duplication of technological effort of the kind we
remarked earlier in this section). On the other hand, the long term
cost is lower because of other efficiencies inherent in
self-publication, and because quality is increased.
But suppose that we artificially
limit either the complexity of inputs or the diversity of products
to be created in such a way that resources are not an issue, and we
are never forced to compel standardization by creators. We will
make resources available to a public third-party publisher at some
reasonable level that meets a fixed level of need on the part of
both the upstream creators and the downstream consumers. This sort
of steady-state approach has a certain appeal, but it is balanced
on a knife edge, and it closely resembles what we know already as
government printing operations - externalized into the academic
sector, perhaps, but still operating with a relatively fixed budget
provided (we imagine) by government. First, it is unlikely that
such a steady-state operation would be funded over the long term if
it remained outside of government. Government would argue that it
needed better control over the operation in order to guarantee its
quality, and would then set it up as it were in-house. But even
assuming that some solution sited outside government were
adopted, much would depend on where our 'reasonable level' of added
value is set. If it is too low, the public standard will be
increasingly irrelevant as the private sector moves to fill needs
that the public standard does not meet. As a result, the central
publisher will be de-funded and will spiral into nothingness as it
more and more fails to meet expectations. Or it will protect itself
from defunding by becoming more and more a service bureau designed
to meet the needs of funding sources - for example, the
legislature[ 79 ]. If the 'reasonable level' is set too high, the
operation will ultimately be accused of interfering with the
private sector or of acting exactly like it - and it will then be
defunded as a sop to the private sector[ 80 ]. I believe
that publishing operations that are incorporated into legislatures,
courts, and agencies would stand a better chance of avoiding these
scenarios, if only because they are strongly identified with
creators and can point at a public mission.
8.3 Centralized Publication Diminishes
Incentives for Improvement in the Process of Drafting and
Creation
Let us return for a moment to the
question of technological efficiency and centralization. We have
already pointed out that a good part of the appeal of a centralized
operation is that it concentrates the need for technological savvy
and equipment in one place. This presumably means that individual
courts and legislatures need not underwrite the continual expense
of developing and maintaining technological expertise; the work at
the cutting edge will be undertaken by the central operation and
shared by everyone. Remember, however, that the third-party,
centralized operation is only concerned with a part of the process:
the part that distributes finalized (or mostly-finalized) rulings,
statutes, or regulations from the creator to the public. They are
not concerned with the processes of drafting or deliberation, and
in fact handing over publication responsibilities to a third party
at least partially disconnects those processes from that of
publication. At worst, casting of an outside party in the role of
innovator removes all incentive for innovation within the creating
body. This is substantially the situation we have now in the United
States, where reliance on private sector publishers for all aspects
of publishing for many years removed most of the incentive to
improve the electronic or print systems run by government
itself[ 81 ].
8.4 What is the Best Environment for
Innovation?
Some would argue that this
over-reliance on the private sector happens not because government
and other creators of legal information have abdicated
responsibility for innovation but because large, bureaucratic
organizations are incapable of it. There is a perception that the
private sector is nimbler and better able to seize technological
advantage[ 82 ]. Both theoretical and empirical work in industrial
organization would paint a rather different picture:
A bit of monopoly power in the form
of structural concentration is conducive to invention and
innovation, particularly when advances in the relevant knowledge
base occur slowly. But very high concentration has a favorable
effect only in rare cases, and more often it is likely to retard
progress by restricting the number of independent sources of
initiative...Likewise, it seems important that barriers to new
entry be kept at modest levels, and that established industry
members be exposed continually to the threat of entry by
technically audacious newcomers...What is needed for rapid
technical progress is a subtle blend of competition and monopoly,
with more emphasis in general on the former than on the latter, and
with the role of monopolistic elements diminishing when rich
technological opportunities exist[ 83 ].
While words like 'industrial' and
'competition' would seem to flag this as an argument that applies
only to private-sector actors, it can equally well be applied to
public-sector entities in a very commonsensical way. There is
nothing that constrains 'independent sources of initiative' to the
private sector. And while it may at first seem odd to think of
government agencies as being in competition, there is reason to
believe that forces strongly resembling competition can be at work
as government bodies strive to communicate whatever they imagine
their message to be. Legislatures like voters to see what they are
up to. Agencies want to be seen as relevant and customer-oriented.
Courts, particularly courts of first impression, want their work to
be seen and to be respected. All are involved to some degree in
competition for public resources. And local governments compete
with one another: consider, for example, the jurisdiction that
wants to use relaxed regulation as an incentive for private
industry to locate there, as opposed to a neighboring jurisdiction.
Individual American states often do this using relaxed tax or
environmental regimes as their incentives; some have made minor
industries out of particular parts of their law, as Delaware has
with its requirements for incorporation. Very often this is
reflected in their web sites, and held up as an example of red-tape
elimination or government streamlining[ 84 ].
8.5 Distributed Models Depend Crucially on a
Painful Process of Standards Development
Thus far, the arguments arrayed on
both sides seem to favor a distributed model - if there were but
infinite time to develop it. In order to have a distributed model
that supports common interfaces and capabilities we need to
formulate workable standards. This is challenging to say the least,
and the author yields to no-one in saying that it is a difficult
process riddled with extraneous political concerns, vulnerable to
the manipulations of vendors and others seeking advantage, and
often characterized by pointless hairsplitting. Unfortunately, it
is also necessary, and it is important that it include a broad
international community.
One might argue, as many have over
the years in other contexts, that a de facto standard
provided by one or another industry leader would do as well as one
arrived at through a relatively open and representative
process[ 85 ]. To
be sure, there must always be leaders and to the extent that there
are leaders any open process will take on some of their biases -
witness the dominance of English as the language of the Internet
and as an underlying assumption of most search-engine technology,
or of the United States in the domain-naming scheme. But it is a
key realization of organizations like the W3C that organizations
that formulate broad standards must also be as inclusive as
possible[ 86 ].
Inclusive processes are necessarily slow ones, and that in turn
becomes the disadvantage of a standards-based distributed system.
It is hard to get a given level of functionality from it as quickly
as one might with a centrally administered one. Acceptance of the
standard ultimately depends on the availability of standards-based
applications that users actually want, and these may be slow in
coming.[ 87 ] In
a world where technology changes rapidly, and where public bodies
are already making decisions about what to do, this may be a
critical disadvantage.
9.
What can we do, Practically?
The multifaceted discussion that has
led us to this point is far from dispositive. Here are the two
halves of the onion:
-
On the one hand, there is good
reason to believe that a standards-based distributed system would
be superior to a centralized one. In complicated venues like the
United States, it may be the only one that will answer the problem.
Indeed, as more and more localized creators of legal information
(like municipalities) come online, it may be the only one that
would answer the problem in any venue, as almost all are
complex once local law is taken into consideration.
-
On the other hand, such a system is
undesirable because it is impossibly slow to implement and because
a centralized system can perhaps for a time be more efficient and
less costly. In the rapidly-shifting world of the Internet,
slow-to-implement may mean never-to-be-implemented.
But these are not strict
alternatives, and thinking about time points the way toward our
conclusion. Most of the disadvantages of a centralized mechanism
show up in the longer term and in an environment of complexity. For
that reason it is well adapted to be a short-term solution. It can
provide both proof-of-concept and a rallying point that will create
the political will necessary for longer-term efforts. It can buy
time for standards development. Longer-term efforts should be aimed
at creating a decentralized model, because it enjoys better
scalability and certain quality advantages, as well as holding
government to an important responsibility it owes the public. Thus,
the two models are not competitors but
successors-in-time.
What do short-term and long-term
mean, practically speaking, and how would we know when to make the
change from one model to another? The critical factors involved in
making that decision are, I think, set out in the discussion of
self-limiting technical processes above, conditioned somewhat by
the availability of technical expertise to creators. At the point
where the standardization requirements that the centralized public
system imposes on a creator become as onerous as self-publication,
it is probably past time for that creator to stand on its own two
feet as a publisher. How far it is past time is a good question.
The ideal point for abandonment by the central operation will
probably differ in every case as a product of workloads, available
expertise, size of the corpus being transferred, and so on. It is
also the case that the centralized operation can accelerate its
abandonment of creators to their own devices as the independent
creator community grows and becomes a source of mutual support. It
will not be easy to determine the point at which independence
should be granted, but it must be done, and it must be planned for
from the beginning.
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