United Kingdom VAT & Duties Tribunals (Excise) Decisions

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Cite as: [2003] UKVAT(Excise) E00421, [2003] UKVAT(Excise) E421

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Golobiewska v Customs and Excise [2003] UKVAT(Excise) E00421 (20 May 2003)

E00421

EXCISE – Restoration Refusal – Owner of car lending to a friend – Owner not present at the seizure – Primary facts in dispute – Determination by Tribunal on whether the friend used the vehicle for smuggling – Found he did – Whether the owner was aware that the friend borrowed the car for smuggling – Found she was – Whether the car was adapted for smuggling – Found it was – Proportionality of the refusal to restore considered – Decision maker on review considering the reasonableness of the original decision – Held he should have considered its correctness – Review decision unreasonable for that and other reasons in relation to findings of primary fact – Appeal allowed – Further review directed in the light of the Decision

LONDON TRIBUNAL CENTRE

AGNIESKA GOLOBIEWSKA Appellant

- and -

THE COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE Respondents

Tribunal: MR JOHN WALTERS, QC (Chairman)

MR JOHN N BROWN, CBE, FCA, ATII

Sitting in public in London on 14 and 15 February 2002 and 17 and 18 February 2003

Miss R J Calder of Counsel, and Ms E McCue, for the Appellant

Hugh McKay, of Counsel, instructed by the Solicitor for the Customs and Excise, for the Respondents

DECISION

Mrs. Agnieszka Golebiewska (to whom we refer as "the Appellant") appeals against the Commissioners' decision on a review under section 15, Finance Act 1994, not to offer to her the restoration of a seized Mercedes motor car. The decision appealed against is contained in a letter dated 16^th May 2000 sent by the Review Officer, Mr. Paul Arthur Devlin (who gave evidence before us), to AZ Fowler & Associates, Solicitors, of Warsaw, Poland, acting for the Appellant.

The appeal was heard on 14^th and 15^th February 2002 (when the Appellant was represented by Ms. Elizabeth McCue) and on 17^th and 18^th February 2003 (when she was represented by Miss Calder of Counsel, assisted by Ms. McCue). The Commissioners were represented throughout by Counsel, Mr. Hugh McKay. There was a directions hearing in private on 20^th September 2002.

We allowed Mrs. McCue to act as interpreter into and from Polish in the proceedings (Mr. McKay having agreed to this) and she took the interpreter's oath.

Undisputed facts

The essential undisputed facts are as follows:

The Appellant was the owner of the seized vehicle. On 27^th January 2000, the vehicle was stopped by Customs officers on arrival in the UK at Eastern Docks, Dover. The driver was a Mr. Piotr Terlecki (Mr. Terlecki), described by the Appellant as her friend. Mr. Terlecki's adult nephew, Lukasz Ambrozik was the only passenger.

Customs officers carried out a search. In the car they found a large number of cigarettes of Russian origin. These had been carried in both men's luggage and in different parts of the vehicle, including a space which had been created by substantially reducing in size (by a process of horizontal cutting) the vehicle's petrol tank, which was situated behind the back seat of the vehicle and in front of the boot area. This space was separated from the boot area by a steel wall (intact) and from the passenger area of the vehicle by a steel panel with a hole in it which gave access to the space, once the back of the rear seat had been removed.

The vehicle had been converted to run on liquid petroleum gas ("LPG") and a cylinder of LPG was fitted in its steel cradle and firmly secured in the boot area. The conversion of the vehicle to LPG had enabled the size of the petrol tank to be reduced because, although some petrol had to be carried after the conversion, the volume required was very substantially reduced.

The Customs seized the cigarettes found, and the vehicle, as liable to forfeiture under section 139 of the Customs and Excise Management Act ("CEMA")

Mr. Terlecki was arrested and charged with being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent attempt at evasion of excise duty contrary to section 170(2) of CEMA. The Schedule prepared for the purposes of the prosecution stated that 19,940 King Size filter cigarettes had been imported and £5,853.85 revenue had been evaded. Mr. Terlecki pleaded guilty to this charge before the Dover Magistrates on 28^th January 2000 and was sentenced by them to a term of imprisonment (4 months). The Memorandum produced by the Clerk to the Magistrates' Court states that the reason for the sentence was "the amount of duty evaded and the effect this has on economy and local traders".

The Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in London, by Ms. Anna Czapiewska-Brabander, wrote to HM Customs and Excise in Dover on 2^nd February 2000 asking for information about the vehicle, stating that it was the Appellant's car which had been lent to Mr. Terlecki and referring to his arrest (about which the Customs had informed the Polish Embassy in London by letter date-stamped 27^th January 2000).

Mr. Terlecki had also sent a letter (in Polish), dated 31^st January 2000 from HM Prison Canterbury to the Customs in which he stated (according to the English translation obtained by the Customs) that the vehicle "had been converted to gas and the space designated for the second gas bottle was empty and this is where [he] hid the cigarettes without the knowledge of the owner of the car. The car owner is [the Appellant] and she has already been informed by telephone about the whereabouts of her car". The letter asked for the vehicle and its contents to be returned to the Appellant.

A copy of a fax date-stamped 14^th February 2000 from the Excise Verification Team at Priory Court, Dover to the Polish Consulate in London, was produced by Ms. McCue at the hearing. It referred to a fax of the same date (14^th February 2000) having been received and the unidentified sender stated "if I remember correctly, I have spoken to the owners of this vehicle before, and informed them that the vehicle is not being offered for restoration".

The Appellant (accompanied by a gentleman) called at the Customs' offices at Priory Court, Dover on the afternoon of 17^th February 2000. The Appellant asked for the vehicle to be returned to her and was told that it had been seized by the Customs and would not be offered for restoration.

The following day (18^th February 2000) the Customs' decision not to restore the vehicle was communicated to Ms. Czapiewska-Brabander, of the Polish Consulate in London, by a letter dated 18^th February 2000 sent by Mr. Philip Thomas (Team Leader, Excise Verification Team), who gave evidence before us. We refer to this letter as the "decision letter".

In the decision letter, Mr. Thomas referred to the receipt from Mr. Terlecki of a letter in Polish which required translation. (He stated in evidence that he believed that was the letter dated 31^st January 2000 referred to in paragraph 10 above.) He also referred to the Appellant's "personal appearance at our office in Dover". He rehearsed the facts of Mr. Terlecki's conviction for a smuggling offence involving the use of the vehicle and his subsequent imprisonment. He stated that "the vehicle was adapted for smuggling by cutting down the petrol tank to a fraction of its proper size and the consequent space created was used to conceal a large quantity of excisable goods" and that section 88 of CEMA applied to the case and provided the relevant authority to seize the vehicle.

He informed Ms. Czapiewska-Brabander that if the Appellant wished to challenge the legality of the seizure she could do so within 30 days of 27^th January 2000 (leaving 9 days after the date of the decision letter) stating that if that was her chosen course of action he would at her request instigate condemnation proceedings which would involve a hearing before the Dover Magistrates. He advised that an alternative procedure open to the Appellant was to seek restoration of the vehicle and that he had taken the correspondence and the Appellant's appearance as a request for restoration of the vehicle to the Appellant.

He went on to give his decision to recommend that the vehicle should not be offered for restoration, citing the need to protect the revenue and legitimate trade in the UK by deterring and detecting fraud and other irregularities and encouraging compliance with procedures established to control movements of excise goods. He stated that the normal policy in these circumstances (i.e. circumstances where the Customs asserted that a vehicle had been adapted for smuggling and that s.88 of CEMA applied) was to refuse to restore seized goods and that there were no exceptional circumstances in this case which would justify a departure from this policy.

He concluded by advising Ms. Czapiewska-Brabander that if she wished to appeal against the decision she should write to the Review Officer at Priory Court, informing her that all reviews are impartially carried out by the Review Officer and that she had 45 days from the date of the decision letter to request a review. He enclosed Notice 900 giving information on Customs and Excise appeals.

By a letter dated 20^th March, 2000 ("the appeal letter") to the Review Officer, sent from the Warsaw offices of AZ Fowler & Associates Law Firm, the Appellant appealed against the decision of the Excise Verification Team contained in the decision letter and requested a review. The stated grounds of appeal were chiefly that the adaptation to the petrol tank was not for the purposes of smuggling (as had been alleged in the decision letter) but instead for the purposes of "the change of the vehicle's propulsive fuel from petrol into gas", which had been carried out solely in order to achieve economy, gas being much cheaper than petrol in Poland. It was asserted that there was "no cause-connection" between the changes of the vehicle's tank and the smuggling of goods in the space so created.

Six enclosures were sent with the appeal letter. They were

(1) a power of attorney under Polish law given by the Appellant to AZ Fowler & Partners Law Firm to act in the recovery of the vehicle;

(2) a certificate issued by "Stako", the manufacturer of the LPG tank, to the effect that it was manufactured in accordance with applicable regulations and including a warranty of the tank;

(3) a certificate issued by EKO-GAZ of Warsaw, a member of the AUTOGAS section of the Polish Liquefied Gas Organization, stating that the LOVATO gas (LPG) installation into the Appellant's vehicle was in good technical order and complied with the requirements of the Institute of Vehicle Transportation in Warsaw and the manufacturer;

(4) a certificate issued by the City and Commune Office in Ozarow Mazowiecki, Transportation Section, to the effect that the vehicle is the property of the Appellant;

(5) an "Agreement on the Establishment of Registered Pledge" dated November 16^th 1999 whereby the Appellant (as Pledger) acknowledged a credit given to her by the Pledgee, a bank called Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci – Bank Panstwowy, in the amount of 62,417 zlotys, and pledged as security the vehicle (stated to have a total value of 90,000 zlotys), the property and use of the vehicle remaining with the Appellant; and

(6) a certificate issued by "Compensa" Insurance Company to the effect that the Appellant had taken out a fully comprehensive automobile insurance policy with that company covering the period November 15^th 1999 to November 14^th 2000 and that until February 29^th 2000 "[the Appellant] has been accident free and no claim for damages has been reported".

Document (1) listed above was originally in English. Documents (2) to (6) inclusive were originally in Polish but certified English translations of them were sent together with copies of the Polish originals.

AZ Fowler & Associates Law Firm sent to the Review Officer copies of two further documents under cover of a letter dated 19^th April, 2000. These documents also were originally in Polish, but certified English translations of them were sent together with copies of the Polish originals. They were:

(1) the opinion of an expert, Marek Jarczewski, given on the headed paper of the Association of Experts in Matters of Automobile Engineering and Road Traffic of Poland. The opinion was given on 11^th April 2000 and covered the basic rules and requirements relating to the installation of LPG in motor vehicles in Poland. The parts of the opinion which emerged at the hearing as being particularly relevant were the statement that the applicable regulations permitted the use of both permanently installed petrol tanks and LPG gas bottles at the same time; the statement that the installation of more than one LPG tank has been permitted by the regulations and that such an installation is referred to in "the European Norm EN 12797 (probably already in force – the draft was submitted for further discussion in 1997)"; and the statement that "due to the additional weight of installed gas tanks it is necessary to provide in certain motor vehicles smaller tanks for liquid fuel".

(2) a Guarantee Card issued by EKO-GAZ relating to the LPG installation relating to the vehicle and carried out on 8^th January 2000.

The Review Officer, Mr. Devlin, confirmed the contested decision not to restore the vehicle in the letter dated 16^th May 2000 to which we have referred at paragraph 1 above (the "review letter"). He acknowledged the appeal letter and the letter dated 19^th April 2000 and summarised the arguments put on the Appellant's behalf. He also reviewed the applicable legislation and stated that his own function as Reviewing Officer was to "determine whether or not the contested decision [given in the decision letter] was one which a reasonable body of Commissioners could not have reached".

The Review Officer's reasons can be summarised as (1) the vehicle was used by Mr. Terlecki for smuggling; (2) the Appellant is a business associate of Mr. Terlecki; (3) the purpose of the change to the petrol tank was to release space for smuggling; (4) the Commissioners' policy is not to restore a vehicle seized pursuant to section 88 CEMA.

This Tribunal's Jurisdiction

An appeal lies to this Tribunal with respect to the decision by the Commissioners on the review under section 15, Finance Act 1994 – that is to say, the decision communicated by the review letter (section 16(1)(a) Finance Act 1994).

That decision is a decision on the review of a decision "as to an ancillary matter" (section 16(8) Finance Act 1994). The original decision not to restore, communicated in the decision letter referred to at paragraph 14 above is the relevant decision "as to an ancillary matter", being a decision of the description specified in paragraph 2(1)(r), Schedule 5, Finance Act 1994, viz a decision "under section 152(b) [CEMA] as to whether or not anything forfeited or seized under the customs and excise Acts is to be restored to any person or as to the conditions subject to which any such thing is so restored".

Our jurisdiction on this appeal is set out in section 16(4) Finance Act 1994, that is to say our powers are:

"… confined to a power, where [we] are satisfied that the Commissioners or some other person making [the decision as to the ancillary matter or the decision on the review of that decision] could not reasonably have arrived at it, to do one or more of the following, that is to say–

(a) to direct that the decision, so far as it remains in force, is to cease to have effect from such time as [we] may direct;

(b) to require the Commissioners to conduct, in accordance with [our] direction .. , a further review of the original decision; and

(c) in the case of a decision which has already been acted on or taken effect and cannot be remedied by a further review, to declare the decision to have been unreasonable and to give directions to the Commissioners as to the steps to be taken for securing that repetitions of the unreasonableness do not occur when comparable circumstances arise in future."

The background against which we must exercise our jurisdiction has been set by the Court of Appeal in Lindsay v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2002] 3 All ER 118, in particular by Lord Phillips MR at paragraph [40] where he said:

"However, the principal issue before the tribunal was whether the commissioners' decision not to restore Mr. Lindsay's car to him was one that they 'could not reasonably have arrived at' – within the meaning of those words in section 16(4) of the 1994 Act. Since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998, there can be no doubt that if the commissioners are to arrive reasonably at a decision, their decision must comply with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (as set out in Sch. 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998). Quite apart from this, the commissioners will not arrive reasonably at a decision if they take into account irrelevant matters, or fail to take into account all relevant matters (see Customs and Excise Comrs v J.H. Corbitt (Numismatists) Ltd [1980] 2 All ER 72 at 80, [1981] AC 22 at 60, per Lord Lane)."

We were told at the hearing that the vehicle had in fact been sold by the Commissioners (on 6^th July 2001) and so its restoration to the Appellant is an impossibility. However it was not suggested by either side that this fact impaired or impacted on our jurisdiction. We were also told that the Commissioners' policy is to offer a compensatory payment in a case where a decision not to offer a vehicle for restoration is found on an appeal to have been unreasonable and a declaration is made under section 16(4)(c), Finance Act 1994, and there is no appeal from the Tribunal's decision by the Commissioners.

Disputed Facts

Against this background, the Tribunal must find facts as follows:

(a) Whether or not Mr. Terlecki used the vehicle for smuggling; and

(b) If so, whether or not Mr. Terlecki borrowed the car for a purpose being or including a purpose of using it for smuggling; and

(c) If so, whether or not the Appellant was aware that Mr. Terlecki borrowed the car for such a purpose; and

(d) Whether or not the purpose of the change to the petrol tank was to release space for smuggling; and

(e) If so, whether or not the Appellant was aware that such was the purpose of the change to the petrol tank.

(a) Whether or not Mr. Terlecki used the vehicle for smuggling: In evidence before the Tribunal, Mr. Terlecki denied that he was smuggling the cigarettes. He said that he would have paid the duty on them if he had been asked to do so, but the Tribunal was not convinced by his explanation that he would have contacted a friend in Poland to transfer the necessary £5,853.85 to a bank nominated by the Commissioners. He said in his Witness Statement that the cigarettes were a "thank-you present for my friend who was so kind to let me, my wife and my child his flat to stay during winter holidays, which I planned to have in London". It was established in cross-examination that the price paid for the cigarettes (6,000 zlotys) would have amounted to almost a month's earnings for Mr. Terlecki at the time, and Mr. Terlecki was only able to give minimal information about his friend, by the name of Raphael. The cartons (sleeves) in which the individual packets of cigarettes had been packed were found by the Customs officers separately wrapped and hidden behind a plastic partition in the engine bay of the car.

We note that Mr. Terlecki pleaded guilty to the charge of being knowingly concerned in a fraudulent attempt at evasion of excise duty contrary to section 170(2) of CEMA, on 28^th January 2000 at Dover Magistrates Court (although he indicates in his Witness Statement that this was done as part of a plan to reduce the severity of the eventual sentence). He was in the event sentenced to a term of imprisonment and did not appeal against conviction or sentence. On 31^st January 2000 he wrote a letter (in Polish) from H.M. Prison, Canterbury (a copy and translation of which was before the Tribunal) in which he again admitted that "a certain number of cigarettes which I was intending to bring in without paying customs duty were found".

We are satisfied that on the basis that it is open to this Tribunal to find facts on this point (which it may not be, in view of the fact that the same issue was before the Dover Magistrates Court) Mr. Terlecki did indeed use the vehicle for smuggling. Furthermore we find on the balance of probabilities that he had no intention of paying the duty and that he intended to sell the cigarettes in the United Kingdom rather than give them as a thank-you present to Raphael.

That being our finding on issue (a), we proceed to consider issue (b): whether or not Mr. Terlecki borrowed the car for a purpose being or including a purpose of using it for smuggling.

Mr. Terlecki's evidence was that he did not borrow the car for such a purpose, but we find that he did.

The next issue (c) is whether or not the Appellant was aware that Mr. Terlecki borrowed the car for such a purpose. In her evidence, the Appellant said that she did not know about the cigarettes, which Mr. Terlecki brought into the United Kingdom. She had made one journey in the car to the United Kingdom before the journey on which the car was seized. That earlier journey had been in December 1999. On that occasion she, Mr. Terlecki and another friend of Mr. Terlecki (a Mr. Geniek) had been in the car. The car had been stopped by Customs. She had known Mr. Terlecki about 5 years. Although Mr. Terlecki had described the Appellant in questioning on 27^th January 2000 as "my ladyfriend", she said in evidence that their friendship was due to the fact that Mr. Terlecki was the business partner of a friend's husband. After the seizure of the car and cigarettes and the imprisonment of Mr. Terlecki, the Appellant made two journeys to England to try to recover the car. On the second of these, as she states in her Witness Statement "on 28^th March 2000 I was permitted to take Peter [Mr. Terlecki] from HMP Elmley" to a meeting with Customs officers at Dover.

The conversion of the car to LPG was something which the Appellant decided to have done on Mr. Terlecki's advice, and they were both involved in commissioning the works involved. As a result of the evidence, we are left with no clear idea of why the Appellant let Mr. Terlecki take the car back to England (less than two months after the original journey and at a time when the conversion to LPG was only half complete). She said in evidence that she needed the car for her business (as a beautician or manicure artist). Mr. Terlecki said that the Appellant "knew that I was going on a short trip, as she told me that as she was going to attend a funeral, she would need the car and I would not have the car for any length of time". However, the Appellant's evidence was that she attended the funeral on 28^th Januray 2000, the day after the seizure of the car at Dover on the morning of 27^th January 2000. We conclude on the basis of the evidence that the Appellant and Mr. Terlecki were at the material time on terms of close friendship. On the balance of probabilities we conclude that the Appellant was aware that Mr. Terlecki borrowed the car to use it for smuggling (either as his main, or a subsidiary, purpose).

The fourth issue (d) is: whether or not the purpose of the change to the petrol tank was to release space for smuggling. This is strongly denied by the Appellant. Her evidence is that the change to the petrol tank was a consequence of the conversion to LPG, and that the conversion was carried out for reasons of economy, because LPG is much cheaper in Poland than petrol. The Commissioners' case can be put simply by quoting evidence given by the officer who made the original decision, Mr. Thomas. He said: "I see it as black and white: if it is adapted and used for smuggling, it is liable to forfeiture". The Commissioners rely strongly on the fact that the change to the petrol tank released a large concealed space between the back seat and the boot of the car, in which Mr. Terlecki concealed cigarettes which he attempted to smuggle.

The Appellant produced evidence that the installation of LPG into motor cars such as the vehicle in issue was a standard and recognised procedure. In particular, there is evidence in the form of the opinion of the expert, Marek Jarczewski, given on the headed paper of the Association of Experts in Matters of Automobile Engineering and Road Traffic of Poland, to the effect that the installation of more than one tank of LPG is permitted by the applicable regulations and that "due to the additional weight of installed gas tanks, it is necessary to provide in certain motor vehicles smaller tanks for liquid fuel". The first installation (of one 90 litre LPG tank) was carried out on 4^th January 2000 without any plans, but resulted in the LPG tank being placed diagonally across the boot space, which was very inconvenient for the Appellant. The Appellant told us that she did not realise that the LPG cylinder was going to be so big or its position so impractical. The fitting of the cylinder diagonally across the boot space was the fitter's decision and, she supposed, done because it was the easiest course for the fitter to adopt. The petrol tank was then reduced in size by 70% by a horizontal cutting, and the Appellant and Mr. Terlecki made a plan for the removal of the 90 litre LPG tank and the installation of two LPG tanks (one of 70 litres and one of 40 litres) in a configuration which would use up some of the space released by the cutting down of the petrol tank and release more of the boot space occupied by the 90 litre tank. This plan was in evidence before us. It was not put into effect. Before it could be put into effect, Mr. Terlecki took the car with the 90 litre LPG tank installed in the boot and the cut down petrol tank to England, where it was seized. The cutting down of the tank was carried out in an unworkmanlike fashion.

Another important factual matter, which we must mention, concerns the hole created in the panel behind the back seat, giving access to the space created by the cutting down of the petrol tank. Mr. Terlecki's evidence was that this was a hole made by Mercedes (the manufacturer of the car) to permit the carriage of skis. It had another purpose, to permit easy access to the petrol gauge sensor in the tank. The panel is covered by a plastic partition, which is removable. However it had, according to the photographs taken after the review decision was made (on 16^th May 2000), been roughly cut through. We received evidence in the form of a statement provided for the Appellant apparently by DaimlerChrysler Automotive Polska (in Polish with an English translation) on 21^st February 2002 – that is after the first stage of the hearing of this appeal – in the following terms:

"[the vehicle in question, which is identified] has not been factory equipped with a skisack. However all vehicles of W140 series of types have been factory adapted for fitting additional accessories (factory made hole in the rear seat, stopped with a plastic cap) such as a sack for skis transportation … If the skisack has not been factory fitted then in a case of its fitting outside the assembly belt it is necessary to replace the standard fuel tank (of 100 litres capacity) with appropriately shaped 90-litre tank (having recess in its upper part making possible to insert skis). Simultaneously we inform that the above said stopped hole in the rear seat back is not visible after lifting up the boot lid, it is intercepted by the fuel tank (it regards the 100-litre capacity standard tank) and the upholsterer lining. In case of fitting a 90-litre version tank and appropriate lining (including cut-out) the hole is visible …"

Mr. McKay for the Commissioners did not object to our receiving this statement in evidence.

We conclude on this issue that the Appellant's purpose in commissioning the conversion of the car to run on LPG gas was not to release space for smuggling, but to achieve the economic advantages of LPG fuelling. That is why she agreed to the installation of the first LPG cylinder. We accept her evidence that she was unhappy with the positioning of the first LPG cylinder and intended the further change, in accordance with the planned configuration, so that there should be two LPG cylinders installed. She agreed to the reduction in the size of the petrol tank in order to accommodate the installation of the two LPG cylinders. In our judgment the hole was made through the rear panel to give access to the space created by the cutting down of the petrol tank, by Mr. Terlecki and without the Appellant's knowledge. We also conclude that Mr. Terlecki did this for the purposes of smuggling. That is to say, in our judgment Mr. Terlecki borrowed the car in the state it was in (when the conversion to LPG was only half completed) in order to smuggle cigarettes into the United Kingdom and of his own initiative he made the hole through the panel to facilitate the smuggling.

As to the final factual issue we have identified, namely, (e) whether or not the Appellant was aware that the purpose of the change to the petrol tank was to release space for smuggling, it will be seen from what we have said above that we have concluded that such was not her purpose.

Provisions of CEMA in issue

Section 141(1) of CEMA provides relevantly as follows:

"(a) any … vehicle, … which has been used for the carriage, handling, deposit or concealment of the thing so liable to forfeiture, either at a time when it was so liable or for the purposes of the commission of the offence for which it later became so liable; and

(b) any other thing mixed, packed or found with the thing so liable, shall also be liable to forfeiture."

Section 88 of CEMA provides relevantly as follows:

"where … (c) a vehicle is or has been within the limits of any port … while constructed, adapted, altered or fitted in any manner for the purpose of concealing goods, that … vehicle shall be liable to forfeiture,"

Section 152 of CEMA provides relevantly as follows:

"The Commissioners may, as they see fit: … (b) restore, subject to such conditions (if any) as they think proper, any thing forfeited or seized under the customs and excise Acts."