19043
VAT ASSESSMENT – whether to best judgment
CIVIL EVASION PENALTY – s.60 VAT Act 1994
LONDON TRIBUNAL CENTRE
MOHAMMED ALAL UDDIN and ABDUL BARI Appellants
trading as Ringmer Tandoori Restaurant
- and -
THE COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE Respondents
Tribunal: Peter H Lawson (Chairman)
Mr J G Robinson
Sitting in public in London on 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th April 2004 and 8th February 2005
Eamon McNicholas, Counsel, for the Appellant
Jeremy Hyam, Counsel, for the Respondents
(i) The facts and matters set out in the preceding paragraph, and
(ii) The Appellants are partners and responsible for the VAT affairs of the restaurant.
(a) An assessment of VAT in the sum of £49,402 raised on 11 March 1998 for periods 00 to 31 December 1997;
(b) A Civil Evasion penalty in the sum of £44,459 notified to the Appellants on 27 March 1998 in the form of a schedule referring to periods 12/97 (6 ¼ years).
(i) The assessment that is referred to above is defective in that it does not show the start and end date of a section of the assessment rendering the entire assessment void.
(ii) The Appellants do the business of an Indian Restaurant where the main object is to sell curry. Sale of drinks is incidental to its main business forming anything between 20% to 25% of its total sales.
(iii) The Appellants give away occasional drinks to promote business.
(iv) The employees of the restaurant are of Indian origin who are firstly well known for their hospitality and secondly in order to augment their meagre wages of £80 to £100 per week sometimes give away free drinks to get good tips from the customers.
(v) Members of staff (of Indian origin) are not well experienced in serving drinks. Because of inexperience they waste perhaps more than what is considered to be average wastage.
(vi) The Commissioners visited this trader on 2 March 1993 when they concluded that "traders estimation of figures proved credible ... was able to verify that bills obtained from colleagues had been entered and accounted for satisfactorily".
(vii) In other visits on 10 November 1994 and 15 March 1995 the officers write "the sales figure on the annual accounts in line with declared outputs ... I/T reclaimed in line with S.R. purchases and expenses. Achieved m/up according to accounts 105.64 appears credible".
(viii) We believe that this time over the officers did not exercise their best judgement in this matter and observations that they relied on do not appear to be credible.
(ix) We further believe as the whole concept of Value Added Tax is based on documentation, any calculations based on observation and tests meal purchased should be supported by sales slips that the Appellant will invariably supply to customers, if requested. In this matter the officers did not produce any evidence (sales slips) to the Appellant to back up their claim of non-inclusion of their purchases in Appellants takings.
(x) The Appellants therefore contend that the assessment asking them to pay without properly mentioning the period covered by the assessment and when the assessment is based on arbitrary claim on non-inclusion of bills is unrealistic, unreasonable and against natural justice.
(xi) Calculations that we submitted to Customs and Excise are based on facts and should be accepted.
(xii) In view of an appeal before the Tribunal (Han and Yau) which questions whether Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights applies to some penalty appeals we are not putting forward our defence to penalty section of the appeal.
(i) the assessment was properly notified by letter dated 10 March 1998 and the enclosures which, together with the computer generated document dated 11 March, formed the full notification of the assessments, and
(ii) there was no confusion over the calculation of the assessment or that it was a quarter by quarter analysis.
(i) Name of taxpayer
(ii) The amount of tax due
(iii) The reason for the assessment
(iv) The period of time to which it relates.
(i) an assessment addressed to the partnership in the name of the firm and sent by post to the partnership's last or usual place of business (s.45(3) of the VAT Act); or
(ii) notice may be given to a partner who habitually acts in the partnership business; and the notice concerns any matter relating to partnership affairs; or
(iii) a copy of the assessment being sent by post to each of the partners, or persons regarded as partners, at their last or usual addresses.
(i) the assessment was validly notified on the partnership;
(ii) by s.45(4) any notice, whether of assessment or otherwise which is addressed to a partnership by the name in which it is registered by virtue of sub-section 1 and is served in accordance with the Act, is to be treated for the purposes of the Act as served on the partnership and accordingly, where sub-section 45(3) applies, as served also on the former partners;
(iii) s.45(4) is specifically stated to be without prejudice to s.16 of the Partnership Act 1890 (notice to acting partner to be notice to the firm); in other words, and insofar as notice was not properly served on the firm, notice to an acting partner in the firm should be treated as notice to the firm.
(iv) there is no procedural, or other reason, why the assessment should not be upheld in full.
(i) the facts and matters set out in paragraph 9 of the Statement of Case
(ii) the Appellants' position in the business, i.e. partners who are responsible for the VAT affairs of the business. Mr Uddin signs the majority of the VAT returns, totals the daily bills, completes a large number of the bills themselves, and enters the sales transactions in the cash book from which the accountant prepares the VAT returns. In the case of the 5 February observation, it was Mr Uddin who signed all the receipts.
(iii) no explanation has been given for the discrepancies.
(iv) no evidence produced by the Appellants demonstrates that the figures relied upon by the Commissioners for the purpose of the assessment are not to best judgement. Such evidence as has been produced, e.g. the mark-up exercise, is unreliable, and simply incredible when set against the observed discrepancies and suppression. Indeed the Appellants seemed to abandon any reliance on the mark-up exercise in the course of the hearing.
(i) The assessment was valid and was validly notified to the partnership.
(ii) Mr McNicholas referred to the omission in the assessment of the inputs necessary to produce the extra outputs which the Commissioners claim to be due, the most important one being input VAT on drink. We find that there is no evidence to suggest that the extra outputs would have been produced by the sole purchase of drinks; therefore we cannot consider the related inputs.
(iii) There was also a fifth observation undertaken on Saturday 8 February 1997 which was omitted from the Customs suppression calculations because there were no lengthy observations and there was only one test purchase, which took a few minutes. Mr McNicholas also said that 5 February should be taken into account at a nil figure or included in the suppression weighting calculations. This day was not supported by Officer Thew's evidence and Mr McNicholas submitted that it is not satisfactory or just in a penalty case for Customs to lead incomplete evidence to the traders' detriment and, therefore, in fairness this day should be excluded. We disagree because we consider that Mr Thew's witness statement was evidence on which we can rely as it was supported by Mr West at the Tribunal hearing.
(iv) Further, Mr McNicholas pointed out that Customs have left in their calculations a number and value of the Officers' test meals which would artificially inflate the several years in which the test days are extrapolated. He suggested a broad brush approach, being an under-estimate rather than an over-estimate by reducing the suppression rate from 38.7% to 36.77%. This is an allowance of 5%.
(v) Next, Mr McNicholas stated that dishonesty is denied and the Customs case is at its best significantly flawed and no safe basis for a penalty. Having regard to the rate of suppression, which was 38.70%, we cannot accept Mr McNicholas's suggestion that there was no dishonesty and that the Customs case was at its best "significantly flawed" and no safe basis for a penalty. Our view and decision is that there was a clear basis for finding dishonesty in this case, and that the penalty imposed was fully justified.
LON/98/0624