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Mike Kiernans Beer Tent Co Ltd (t/a Fish & Duck) v Customs & Excise [2003] UKVAT V18310 (09 September 2003)

COSTS – Company appearing by director – Successful appellant claiming costs in respect of time spent by director and director's wife in preparation and conduct of appeal – No legal qualification – Whether entitled to such costs – No – Application dismissed to that extent

LONDON TRIBUNAL CENTRE

MIKE KIERNAN'S BEER TENT CO LTD Applicant

T/A FISH AND DUCK

- and -

THE COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE Respondents

Tribunal: ANGUS NICOL (Chairman)

MRS E R ADAMS FCA, ATTI

Sitting in public in London on 30 May 2003

Mike Kiernan, director, for the Applicant

Valentina Sloane, counsel, instructed by the Solicitor for the Customs and Excise, for the Respondents

© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2003

REASONS FOR DIRECTION ON COSTS

The Appellant in this case was Mike Kiernan's Beer Tent Co Ltd, which traded under the name Fish and Duck from premises at Holt Fen, Little Thetford, near Ely. The premises, which were spectacular and very attractive, were situated at the junction of two waterways. The principal trade was as a public house. The director of the Appellant company was Mike Kiernan ("Mr Kiernan"). His wife, Sue Kiernan, carried on a catering business of which she was sole proprietrix in the same premises as the Fish and Duck public house. The Appellant company also ran a marina, known as Fish and Duck Marina Company Ltd, at the same premises. The appeal was against an assessment to VAT on the basis that all three businesses should be considered to be a single business. The Commissioners issued a notice under paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 1 to the Value Added Tax Act 1994 directing that all three businesses should, with effect from 1 November 1998 be treated as a single business, and registered for VAT as such.

The Appellant appealed against that decision. The appeal was, for various reasons, spread over a considerable time, with hearings on 2 April, 16 and 17 July, and 29 and 30 October 2001. Some of the adjournments were for the purpose of allowing Mr Kiernan, who represented his company, to produce further evidence. The Tribunal allowed the appeal, on the ground that, taking all the evidence into consideration, the decision to serve the notice of direction was not reasonable in the Wednesbury sense. The Commissioners had, before the hearing, conceded that the marina was a separate business. At the end of the hearing, the decision having been reserved, Mr Kiernan made an application in general terms for his costs if his appeal should succeed. The Tribunal gave liberty to both parties to apply as to costs. We heard the Appellant's application for costs on 30 May 2003.

The application for costs

The Appellant put in a claim for costs in a total sum of £108,640. At the date of the hearing the Commissioners had made a provisional payment of £3,305. The Appellant's claim was made up as follows:

Mr Kiernan's time: 1,872 hours at £50 an hour £93,600

Mrs Kiernan's time (absolute minimum of

120 hours @ £50 an hour, £6,000

Accountant's fees £4,250

P Cudworth (accountant, attendance at

Fish and Duck, £800

Telephone, fax, stationery £850

Train fares (14 trips) £700

Hotels (3 people, 8 nights) £1,120

Sustenance (10 days) £600

Replacement staff and baby-sitters £690

Petrol £30

Total £108,640

Of that claim, the Commissioners paid £2,000 of the accountant's fees, £75 of the telephone, fax and stationery, £500 of the train fares, £500 of the hotel bills, £200 towards sustenance, and the £30 claimed for petrol. Mr John Quesnel, head of the Costs and Fees Unit of Customs and Excise, wrote to Mr Kiernan on 6 November 2002, conceding that reasonable costs should follow the event, and giving his views as to why the greater part of the claim should not be paid:

"You represented the company in your capacity as a Director of the company. The Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975 does not apply to the costs of proceedings before the VAT Tribunal. The effect of this is that your entitlement to costs is restricted to reasonable out of pocket expenses by way of disbursement. Your entitlement to costs does not extend to the time spent by you as a Director of the company in preparation for the proceedings before the Tribunal. I enclose copies of the Court of Appeal decision in Nader (trading as Try Us) and the VAT Tribunal decisions in the appeals of Broadway Video (Wholesale) Limited, Rupert Page Developments Limited and Oliver's of Hull Limited in support of this.

I will therefore make no contribution towards your preparation costs of £93,600. Similarly, I am of the opinion that Mrs Kiernan's claim of £6,000 is not recoverable before the Tribunal. In the event of an application for costs being made to the Tribunal, I should say that the number of hours claimed by you and Mrs Kiernan (total 1,992) is grossly excessive. I am also of the opinion that an hourly rate of £50 per hour for both you and Mrs Kiernan is also excessive."

Mr Quesnel then set out the remainder of the Appellant's claim, totalling £9,040, and continued:

"You have provided no documentation in support of these expenses and it is extremely difficult to assess the reasonableness of the Accountant's fees in the absence of a detailed analysis showing by whom the work was performed, the charging rate, the nature of the work undertaken and the dates upon which the work was carried out. Moreover, I suspect part of these charges includes VAT. VAT is not an item of costs where you are entitled to recover the VAT on expenses as an input."

Mr Quesnel went on to say that he required a detailed analysis of the telephone, fax and stationery expenses, a breakdown of the train fares for each trip, and copy receipts for the hotel accommodation, the £1,120 being an interim contribution until receipts were forthcoming. Finally, Mr Quesnel said that costs in respect of stress and strain were not recoverable.

The Appellant's submissions

Mr Kiernan said that his schedule of costs was correct, though there should be a further £16,000 for hours spent on the case and further fax and telephone expenses. He said that the Appellant could not afford legal fees at some £200 an hour, and therefore he had to represent his company. He said that he had had records of his expenses. He had also had the misfortune to suffer serious matrimonial difficulties, which had led to litigation and an injunction being granted against him. He had been obliged to leave the premises, and his wife had thrown away all his records. This, he said, had occurred at some time in about January 2003, when his wife had obtained an order against him for breach of an injunction. Mr Kiernan addressed each of the items in his schedule of costs.

The first item was the claim for £93,600 for 1,872 hours work in preparation for the appeal. He said that he had started working on it from the first visit of the Customs officers, when Mr Kitchingham had said that he was going to lump all three of the businesses together. He had spent time looking up the law and legal precedents, all of which had to be done outside pub hours. He said that he had probably spent £1,000 on taking advice from solicitors. This went on for months. As a result of this work and research, the Marina company was taken out of the direction. As to his charging of £50 an hour, he submitted that that was reasonable, considering that the average quotation from solicitors was between £180 and £200 an hour. Since he had conducted his appeal himself the Commissioners were getting away lightly at £50 an hour. He said that he had billed the Appellant company, but all the bills had been thrown away.

Mr Kiernan said that the same observations were applicable in the case of the work done by his wife on the appeal. He considered that she had done a minimum of 120 hours, probably considerably more. Again, £50 an hour was reasonable.

As to the accountant's fees, Mr Kiernan said that he had sent a bill of costs to Mr Quesnel. The accountant faxed a copy of his bills of costs to the Tribunal during the hearing, and these were later produced. There were two of these, both dated 18 November 2002, from McGregors Corporate of Litchurch Lane, Derby. The first was for "HM Customs and Excise correspondence and preparation notes in respect of Tribunal hearing", the total fees being £4,250, of which £275 had been billed on account, and £695 of VAT. The second was for VAT Tribunal costs of £720 and disbursements (train fare) of £80, and VAT of £105.

The attendance of Mr Cudworth was, in fact, not at the Fish and Duck, Mr Kiernan said, but at the Tribunal. That was the second of the two fee notes from the accountant.

All the particulars of the telephone, fax and stationery expenses had been thrown away, and Mr Kiernan was unable now to give any particulars. But he submitted that £3 a week for 25 weeks was far too low. It had been necessary to telephone his accountants, solicitors, and Customs during the time leading up to the appeal.

As to the train fares, they related to attendance by Mr Kiernan, Mrs Kiernan, and the accountant. Bearing in mind that the accountant had charged £80 in respect of train fares, and his recollection of the train fares, Mr Kiernan conceded that £500 was reasonable.

The hotel expenses were for eight nights for a single person; on some of the occasions Mr and Mrs Kiernan had been staying and on others Mr Kiernan alone. They had stayed, he said, at the Metropole Hotel, very near the Tribunal, and had been charged £125 a night for a single room.

As to sustenance, this was an estimated figure, Mr Kiernan said. Everything was so expensive in London that it was probably a low estimate. At home, at the Fish and Duck, he would be paying cost price for food.

The figure for replacement staff and baby-sitters was probably a low estimate. Mr Kiernan and his wife both had to be replaced when they were absent at the hearing of the appeal, and someone had to look after the children.

The petrol expenses had been conceded by the Commissioners. But Mr Kiernan said that there was one item that had been missed out, and that was £8.90 for his taxi from St Pancras to the Tribunal for this costs hearing.

The Commissioners' submissions

Miss Sloane provided the Tribunal with a useful skeleton argument. She started with the statement of principle to be found in Nader v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1993] STC 806, CA, that a successful litigant in person can only recover disbursements that he has actually made, in other words, out-of-pocket expenses: see also Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 QB 27, 35. If he is to recover his costs before the Tribunal, the Appellant must shew that the law as to costs before the VAT Tribunal is different from the normal law. The Value Added Tax Tribunals Rules 1986 should have been, but were not, amended to take account of the replacement in April 1999 of the Rules of the Supreme Court by the Civil procedure Rules 1999, which provide for the assessment of costs instead of taxation. Costs in the Tribunal are to be determined in accordance with Parts 43 to 48: see TDG (UK) Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (2002) (Decision No E0385), Broomco (1984) Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (2000) (Decision No C123), Dave v Customs and Excise Commissioners (2001) (Decision No E182). There is a statutory exception to the rule provided by the Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975 which permits recovery of sums in respect of work done and expenses and losses incurred by a litigant in person in or in connexion with proceedings. However, that Act does not apply to proceedings in the VAT Tribunal: see Nader (supra), Broadway Video (Wholesale) Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (1994) (Decision No 11935), and Oliver's of Hull Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (2002) (a direction by the Tribunal). The costs recoverable before the Tribunal are therefore confined to those ordinarily recoverable at common law: see also Customs and Excise Commissioners v Ross [1990] STC 353, Rupert Page Developments Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (1993) (Decision No 9823), and Refrigeration Spares (Manchester) Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (No 2) (2002) (Decision No 17852).

The fact that it was Mr Kiernan, as a director, who represented the Appellant did not make any difference. The sum claimed for preparation did not represent a sum actually paid by the Appellant to Mr Kiernan, and even had it done so it would not have been a sum paid in respect of professional expert advice or representation: see also Buckland v Watts (supra), Broadway Video (supra), Jonathan Alexander Ltd v Proctor [1996] 1 WLR 518, Alpha International Coal Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (1993) (Decision No 11441). Costs claimed in respect of work done prior to service of a notice of appeal are allowable only if there is a "real and immediate connection between the work done and the appeal to the Tribunal"; it is not enough that an appeal may intelligently be anticipated: see Broadway Video. It followed from the statement of principle in Nader that a claim for compensation in respect of stress and strain was not allowable.

As to the specific items of costs claimed, Miss Sloane submitted (as was set out in a schedule produced by the Commissioners), in addition on the costs for preparation, that the amount claimed was grossly excessive and no particulars were given, nor was there any suggestion that any of the amount claimed represented income foregone by the Appellant, Mr Kiernan, and, a fortiori, Mrs Kiernan (who was not an officer of the Appellant company) by reason of conducting the appeal. It was conceded that in principle payments to the Appellant's accountant could be recovered, but, until the arrival of the two bills of costs during the hearing, there had been no detailed analysis produced. Nothing could be recovered in respect of VAT on the accountant's fees. No details were given relating to expenses on telephone, fax, and stationery, nor in respect of train fares or, until Mr Kiernan's evidence, hotel expenses, nor was any supporting documentation produced. But in view of Mr Kiernan's evidence, (though it was not accepted that the accountant had stayed overnight, since he would have billed for it) the Commissioners would accept hotel expenses to the extent of £125 for eight single rooms, a total of £1,000. No particulars were given as to expenses on sustenance, nor any allowance made for food that would have been consumed in any event. The Commissioners had paid £20 a day, and that was a reasonable figure. No costs were recoverable in respect of replacement staff or baby-sitter on any event. That was compensation, not legal costs. But the Appellant had given no particulars nor provided any evidence.

Miss Sloane referred to G A Boyd Building Services Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (1992) (Decision No 9788), in which the Tribunal decided that there was nothing to prevent the Tribunal awarding to an Appellant limited company the costs of a director's time in preparing for an appeal, and that an amount of £35 an hour was reasonable. Miss Sloane submitted that that case had been wrongly decided, particularly in the light of Jonathan Alexander Ltd v Proctor (supra). She contended that a body corporate cannot be a litigant in person and therefore could not benefit, even if it were available before the Tribunal, from the statutory exception provided by the Litigants in Person Act. It followed that the ordinary common law position prevailed, that a lay person cannot recover the expenses of preparation. In Jonathan Alexander the Court of Appeal held unequivocally that no right existed enabling a company to claim costs in respect of a legally unqualified representative. Therefore, she contended, the Appellant's costs of preparation in the present case must be disallowed.

The Appellant's reply

Mr Kiernan contended that this whole case was the product of the Commissioners' incompetence. They were still writing to him getting his name wrong, and had addressed him by 15 different names. Mrs Kiernan had been wrongly registered for VAT, which the Commissioners had eventually recognised and had deregistered her. That was one reason why this case took so long. Although he had no letters after his name, Mr Kiernan said, in the licensed trade he was an expert, and that expertise was relevant in the appeal and in his dealings with Customs. He had put in a bill to the company, though the company had not paid it. If he had not appeared for the Appellant Customs would have been collecting VAT wrongly: there should be some recompense for that. He repeated that £50 an hour was reasonable, and said that the hours spent on preparation were probably more than those claimed. The figure for telephone, fax and stationery was ridiculous: Customs offered £15 a year over five years. He had still been working on the case whilst waiting for the decision. He said that he could not have attended the Tribunal without someone looking after the children (when he and his wife were in attendance), and someone had to run the Fish and Duck in his absence and had to be paid to do so. He said that he had been right to appeal, that the appeal had been properly conducted, and that he had won it. Why, he asked, should he suffer financially for the Customs' ineptitude? It was against natural justice to say that a man may not represent himself.

Conclusions

The principle dispute in this application is whether or not the Appellant, a company, which appeared by its sole director at the hearing of the appeal as well as at the hearing of the application for costs, is entitled to costs in respect of the work done in preparation for and in conducting the appeal by that director. We are grateful to Miss Sloane for her helpful analysis of the statute and case law on this subject.

Nader was an appeal by the Commissioners from the High Court which had allowed the Appellant's appeal from a taxing master's disallowance of the costs in respect of time spent in the conduct of the appeal as a litigant in person. Farquharson LJ said, at page 808h,

"The second category relates to profit costs. In other words, instead of receiving only his out-of-pocket expenses, he claims he was entitled to the costs that were necessary in the preparation and conduct of his appeal, specifically for the employment of his staff in preparing for the hearing as necessary. In other words, the kind of costs that would normally be granted to a solicitor in the preparation and conduct of a trial."

His Lordship continued at page 809b:

"I should deal first with the Commissioners' appeal. Historically, there has always been a rule that the successful litigant in person could only recover the disbursements by way of costs that he actually made, that is, out-of-pocket expenses. He was not entitled to recover the costs of the preparation or the conduct of the trial, costs which might be described as 'profit costs' or 'professional costs'. Moreover, this only applied to the lay litigant in person. If the litigant was a solicitor, acting on his own behalf, he could recover his profit costs. The explanation of this practice concerning litigants in person is given by Danckwerts LJ in the case of Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 QB 27 at 35 where he said in relation to Mr Buckland, who was himself a litigant in person:

'The charges which have been disallowed by the judges who have dealt with the matter so far consist in large part of charges for which Mr Buckland has claimed to be compensated, consisting of the expenditure of very considerable time by him in the preparation of the documents in the case which he conducted against Mr Watts. This seems to me to be a measure of principle in that respect, and it seems to me that the principle is well settled that though a solicitor who acts in person for himself can claim to be remunerated for his professional services in so far as they are not rendered unnecessary or impossible - as, for instance, with regard to consultations with himself and that kind of thing - and such costs are recoverable by the solicitor, in the case of a layman who is not a skilled legal person he can only recover his out-of-pocket expenses.'

I also refer to the Judgment of Sir Gordon Willmer (at 37-38) to the same effect. That being the conventional position with regard to litigants in person, it follows that if Dr Nader is to succeed on the present appeal, he must show that the law concerning costs to be awarded by value added tax tribunals is different and comes in a separate category."

Farquharson LJ then referred to rule 29(1) of the Value Added Tax Tribunals Rules 1986 and to the judgement of Simon Brown J in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Ross [1990] STC 353, 356, in which he said,

"I have no doubt at all that under rule 29 the power of tribunals to award costs is confined to sums which were recoverable at common law. That power was wholly unaffected by the 1975 Act and that position in turn remains wholly unaffected by rule 29(2)'s reference to RSC Ord 62."

Farquharson LJ adopted that view, and said,

"For my part, I would support the construction of these rules favoured by Simon Brown J. I arrive at that conclusion because the 1975 Act does not apply to proceedings before the value added tax tribunal itself. To say that rule 29 or RSC Ord 62, r 18, is a sufficient basis to alter the common law rules relating to costs is to rewrite the statute so as to include value added tax tribunals."

And at page 812g, Farquharson LJ held that the taxing master had come to the correct conclusion in excluding profit costs of a litigant in person on taxation. Accordingly he allowed the Commissioners' appeal.

The Tribunal has held, in Broomco and Dave, that references in rule 29(1)(b) and (2) to taxation of costs must now be taken as references to assessment of costs in accordance with CPR 1999 Part 44.3. In Nader, at page 810, Farquharson LJ held that

"the relevant law governing the assessment of costs in this context is the same whether the costs are determined by the tribunal or by the taxing master."

The Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975 ("the 1975 Act") appears to provide a statutory exception to the common law rule, and to allow the recovery of sums by way of costs in respect of work done and expenses and losses incurred by a litigant in person in connection with proceedings. However, that provision has no application in this case, since the provisions of the Act do not apply to the VAT Tribunal, nor has an order been made by the Lord Chancellor that the Act shall apply to the Tribunal.

The Appellant's contention is that the Appellant company should recover costs in respect of the time spent on the preparation for and conduct of the appeal by its director He bases this claim on the undoubted fact that, in the absence of professional representation, which the Appellant could not afford, it was obliged to appear by its director, who was obliged to spend a considerable time preparing his case and conducting it. On the face of it, that does not sound an unreasonable proposition. The Tribunal in Boyd clearly thought so. Miss Sloane contends that Boyd was wrongly decided, and cited Jonathan Alexander in support of that contention. In Jonathan Alexander, Peter Gibson LJ, having reviewed the statutory provisions relating to costs in the Supreme Court Act 1981 and in the 1975 Act, continued at page 524:

"There is, therefore, no provision of the rules that would enable the plaintiff, who was not, and did not employ, a solicitor, to recover costs. That is consistent with the meaning traditionally attributed to 'costs'. In London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872 (a case in which it was held that a solicitor who was made a party to an action and defended it successfully, was entitled to the same costs as if he had employed a solicitor) Bowen LJ, at page 876, pointed out that costs are the creation of statute. He went on to refer to the passage in Co. Inst. Pt II at page 288, as affording a key to the true view of the law of costs:

'Here is express mention made but of the costs of his write, but it extendeth to all the legal cost of the suit, but not to the costs and expenses of his travel and loss of time, and therefore "costages" cometh of the verb "conster", and that again of the verb "constare", for these "costages" must "constare" to the court to be legal costs and expenses.'

Bowen LJ continued, at page 877:

'What does Lord Coke mean by these words? His meaning seems to be that only legal costs which the court can measure are to be allowed, and that such legal costs are to be treated as expenses necessarily arising from the litigation and necessarily caused by the course which it takes. Professional skill and labour are recognised and can be measured by the law; private expenditure of labour and trouble by a laymen cannot be measured.'

These remarks were approved and applied by this court in Buckland v Watts [1970] 1 QB 27.

The enactment of the Act of 1975 was intended to enable the court to provide that a litigant in person, who would otherwise not obtain an award of costs for his work, could recover. As was said by Lloyd J in Hart v Aga Khan Foundation (UK) [1984] 1 WLR 994, 997:

'The whole object of an award for costs is to indemnify the successful party to a greater or lesser extent against costs which he has in fact incurred. He cannot recover costs which he has not incurred. To this general principle Parliament has provided a limited exception in the case of a litigant in person.'

Peter Gibson LJ then went on to consider the 1975 Act, and also the position where a company acts by a director. Having pointed out that the nature of a company is that its actions and decisions have to be taken by natural persons, his Lordship continued, on page 525,

"When a company authorises a director to act and appear for it in court proceedings, and the court allows the director to act and appear, the company acts and appears by the director.

The crucial question is whether it can be said of the company so acting and appearing that it is a litigant in person for the purposes of the Act of 1975. Mr Dyer [for the Plaintiff] would answer that question in the affirmative. In agreement with Mr Lord [for the Defendant], I would unhesitatingly answer that question in the negative."

Peter Gibson LJ went on to hold that it was "highly improbable that without any indication that Parliament intended the term 'litigant in person' to apply to a company, the Act of 1975 applied to a company represented by a director."

Buxton J, in the same case, having held that section 51(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 "does not displace in any particular case the rule that allowable costs are, and are limited to, remuneration for the exercise of professional legal skill", and he referred to Buckland v Watts and to London Scottish. He continued:

"It was that rule that required the passing of the Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975 to make specific provision for the remuneration of litigants in person. However, this part of the appellant's argument does not rely on the Act of 1975, but on a general right to claim costs in respect of a (legally) unqualified representative. No such right exists."

That case was decided some three years after Boyd. It is clear that it is contrary to the Tribunal's decision in Boyd, though not with the expressions of Hirst and Peter Gibson LJJ, that it seemed unjust that a successful party should be prevented from recovering costs if it were a company acting by a director, whereas an individual could under the 1975 Act. However, in the present case, that Act has no application. This Tribunal is also bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, we come to the conclusion that the Appellant cannot recover the costs claimed by it in respect of the hours spent by Mr Kiernan and his wife in preparing for and conducting the appeal. We should add, that even if the Appellant were able to recover costs on that basis, there was no evidence before the Tribunal upon which any realistic assessment of such costs could have been made. The application is therefore dismissed so far as the first two items are concerned. Mr Kiernan said more than once that such records as he had relating to the various heads of costs had been thrown away by his wife in or about January 2003. However he did not, or could not, explain why those records had not been produced to the Commissioners in November 2002 or earlier.

As to the third and fourth items, relating to the accountant's fees, the application is allowed (and was conceded by the Commissioners) to the extent of the accountants two bills less the amount charged in each for VAT. As to the fifth item, telephone, fax and stationery, the sum claimed was very high, and there was no evidence to support it. However, we consider that the award should be slightly increased, and we therefore direct that the amount be increased to £105, based upon £30 a year for three and a half years. The train fares were conceded by the Appellant at £500. The hotel bills were conceded by the Commissioners at £1,000. We consider that the amount of £200 paid in respect of sustenance is reasonable, in view of the want of evidence and the fact that Mr Kiernan and his wife would have been obliged to eat in any event. We considered that the claim for costs in respect of replacement staff, but not for baby-sitters, was a necessary expense of the litigation. (Baby-sitters could not be an expense incurred by the Appellant company.) It was obvious that if Mr Kiernan was not there to run the public house, then someone else would have to be paid for doing so. Mr Kiernan said that he thought that the figure claimed was a low estimate. We consider that a reasonable sum would be £600. The sum of £30 for petrol was conceded.

Accordingly, with the exception of those matters mentioned in paragraph 29 above, this application is dismissed. We consider that the proper order for costs in this case is that there be no order as to costs, on the basis that while the Appellant has achieved a measure of success the Commissioners fought off the principal element of the application. However, if either party wishes to be heard on costs, we give liberty to apply for that purpose to each party. Any such application should be made not later than 30 days after the date of release of this Direction.

AND THIS TRIBUNAL DIRECTS

that the Commissioners do pay to the Appellant the sum of £4,180.00 in addition to the amount of costs of £3,305 already paid, made up as follows:

Accountant's fees £3,050

Hotel expenses £500

Telephone, fax etc £30

Replacement staff £600

that the said sum be paid to the Appellant within 30 days after the date of release of this Direction

that there be no order as to costs, subject to both parties being at liberty to apply as to costs within 30 days after the date of release of this Direction

ANGUS NICOL

CHAIRMAN

RELEASED:

LON/99/0328