18164
Registration – compulsory registration – liability to register under the Act – failure of trader to register and failure to permit access to records as not registered.
EDINBURGH TRIBUNAL CENTRE
THOMAS H DYER Appellant
- and -
Tribunal: (Chairman) S P Riddell, MA, LLB, WS
(Member) Ian M P Condie, CA
for the Appellants Philip Simpson, Advocate
for the Respondents Miss Gillian Carty, Shepherd & Wedderburn, WS
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2003.
The disputed decision is the decision of the Respondents compulsorily to register the Appellant for the purposes of Value Added Tax ("VAT") under VAT registration number 774 7579 68 with effect from 1 October 1996. The Appellant was duly notified of the decision by letter dated 28 June 2001.
At all material times for the purposes of this appeal the Appellant carried on business as an insolvency practitioner at various addresses in and around Dundee, including premises at 10 Douglas Street, Dundee, DD1 5AJ. He also carried on business as a racehorse trainer.
The Appellant was registered for VAT with effect from 16 March 1993 to 30 August 1996 under registration number 607 6702 42. The Appellant was de-registered, pursuant to his written request dated 30 August 1996 in which the Appellant notified the Respondents that he had ceased trading.
Thereafter the Appellant was compulsorily registered for VAT with effect from 1 October 1996 under registration number 774 7579 68 and it is the decision of the Respondents to effect this registration which is the subject of this appeal.
The Tribunal finds in fact:-
- 1 the Appellant's VAT treatment of interim payments for insolvency work;
- 2 the Appellant's outstanding VAT return for the period from 1 June 1996 to 31 August 1996; and
- 3 whether the Appellant's deregistration had been correctly effected.
"I refer to my letter to you dated 04/06/01.
In said letter I requested that you contact me in order to arrange access for me to the records of your business so that I might determine whether a liability to be registered for VAT is ongoing. I also advised that as the turnover of the business in the 12 months ending 31/08/96 exceeded the threshold for VAT registration then in force, registration for VAT was required from 01/10/96. As I have received no response to my letter I am forwarding your papers to our Registration Section with a request to effect registration for VAT with effect from 01/10/96. You will receive correspondence from them in this respect in due course".
The Appellant's grounds of appeal, as appearing from his Notice of Appeal dated 14th September 2001, were:-
"(1) That the decision is wrong in law.
(2) That the decision is a breach of the Human Rights Act.
(3) That the facts show that VAT registration is not required."
By Direction dated 11 March 2003, the Appellant was required to submit Further and Better Particulars of the first two grounds of appeal. The Appellant did so, and indicated that he no longer insisted on ground (2). At the same time he maintained that as registration was based on the proposition that he started making taxable supplies on 31 August 1996 and the decision was taken to register him for VAT with effect from 1 October 1996, the appeal must also be determined on the basis of the Act as in force at those times.
In the Appellant's Further and Better Particulars, his argument "That the decision is wrong in law" was amplified as follows:-
4. The relevant parts of paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 provide:
'(1) Subject to sub-paragraphs (3) to (7) below, a person who makes taxable supplies but is not registered under this Act becomes liable to be registered under this Schedule-
(a) at the end of any month, if the value of his taxable supplies in the period of one year then ending has exceeded £47,000; or
(b) ….
(3) A person does not become liable to be registered by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(a) … if the Commissioners are satisfied that the value of his taxable supplies in the period of one year beginning at the time which, apart from this sub-paragraph, he would become liable to be registered will not exceed £45,000.
(4) In determining the value of a person's supplies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(a) …, supplies made at a time when he was previously registered under this Act shall be disregarded if-
(a) his registration was cancelled otherwise than under paragraph 13(3) below, paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 2 or paragraph 6(3) of Schedule 3, and
(b) the Commissioners are satisfied that before his registration was cancelled he had given them all the information they needed in order to determine whether to cancel the registration …
(6) A person shall not cease to be liable to be registered under this Schedule except in accordance with paragraph 2(5), 3 or 4 below'.
5.In so far as relevant, paragraph 3 provides:
'A person who has become liable to be registered under this Schedule shall cease to be so liable at any time if the Commissioners are satisfied in relation to that time that he-
(a) has ceased to make taxable supplies; …'
6.Paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 provides:
'(1) A person who becomes liable to be registered by virtue of paragraph 1(1)(a) above shall notify the Commissioners of the liability within 30 days of the end of the relevant month.
(2) The Commissioners shall register any such person (whether or not he so notifies them) with effect from the end of the month following the relevant month or from such earlier date as may be agreed between them and him.
(3) In this paragraph "the relevant month", in relation to a person who becomes liable to be registered by virtue of paragraph 1(1)(a) above, means the month at the end of which he becomes liable to be so registered'.
7. It is submitted that the decision to register the Appellant is wrong in law because:
(a) during the relevant time, he was not making taxable supplies. Any supplies of professional services the Appellant made were made otherwise than for consideration (see, for example, R3/6 though this relates to a later time in any event). Reference is made to section 5(2)(a) of the Act. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 was therefore not applicable;
(b) on the facts available to the Commissioners as of the time at which, according to the Commissioners, the Appellant became liable to be registered, they ought to have been satisfied that the value of the Appellant's taxable supplies in the period of one year beginning at that time would not exceed £45,000. Reference is made to R3/1 and to Gray (trading as William Gray & Son) v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2000] STC 880. Esto the Commissioners are entitled to take into account information they consider ought to have been disclosed by the time the Appellant is alleged to have become liable to be registered, any additional information would also have indicated that the Appellant's taxable supplies in the period of one year beginning at that time would not exceed £45,000;
(c) paragraph 1(4) of Schedule 1 to the Act applies, with the effect that the Appellant's supplies during the period of his previous registration (which ended on 1 September 1996) are to be disregarded in determining the value of the Appellant's supplies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1). There was therefore no basis at all for the proposition that the Appellant's taxable supplies in the period of one year to 31 August 1996 exceeded £47,000;
(d) the Appellant's previous registration was not cancelled until 1 September 1996 (R3/2, R3/4 and R3/15). Up to and including that date, he was registered under the Act. He therefore did not fall within paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1 until 2 September 1996. Accordingly, even if he were liable to be registered pursuant to paragraph 1(1), the time at which he became so liable was the end of September 1996. The Commissioners were therefore required to register him from the end of October 1996 (paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 1). The consequence is that the Appellant ought to have been registered as of 1 November 1996. Reference is made to Henderson and another (trading as Tony's Fish and Chip Shop) v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2001] STC 47. However, the Appellant was actually registered from 1 October 1996 (R9/3). This is clearly an error of law.
Miss Carty invited the Tribunal to uphold the decision contained in Mrs Cain's letter of 28 June 2001 and to refuse the Appeal. She also referred to paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 of the Act and pointed out that liability for VAT depended on the value of taxable supplies – a question of fact. Even if the value of the supplies made at a time when the trader was previously registered was to be disregarded when the registration was eligible to the cancelled under sub-paragraph 1(4)(a) of Schedule 1 of the Act, the trader still had to satisfy the Commissioners under sub-paragraph 1(4)(b) that he had given them all the information they needed to determine whether to cancel the registration. As Mrs Cain had made clear in her letter of 28 June 2001, as the turnover of the business in the 12 months ending 31/08/96 exceeded the threshold for VAT registration then in force, registration for VAT was required from 01/10/96. The figure of £341,000 appearing as turnover on the compulsory Registration form produced (A10) was taken from the Appellant's VAT returns in his previous registration. The Respondents did not have any other information on which to proceed – it was reasonable for the Respondent's Officers to proceed on that basis as they were entitled to do.
Mr Simpson's reference to the case of Gray (trading as William Gray & Son) v the Commissioners [2000] STC 880 concerned the point at which the information available to the Commissioners is considered and the situation if some information is not taken into account. Miss Carty argued that it related to a situation under Schedule 1, para 1(3) of the Act where a trader wished to apply for exemption – a different situation from that which had arisen in the present case when the test to be applied was whether it was reasonable to proceed on the basis of the factors taken into account. She claimed that the case had no relevance to the present situation.
Miss Carty argued that both Mrs Cain and her colleague, Mrs Calder, had given evidence as to the level of obstruction presented by the Appellant and this was supported by the correspondence produced. They did not have full access to his accounts and in the circumstances the denial of access made their decision reasonable.
There were two particular factors which influenced the Tribunal in its decision – Firstly, there was the content of the Appellant's Income Tax returns referred to in paragraph 12 above, which directly contradicted the Appellant's claim that he had ceased to be in business on 30 August 1996. In these, his business turnover was stated to be £183,801 for the period from 1 May 1996 to April 1997, and if this had all fallen into the period to 30 August 1996 when the Appellant claimed to have ceased, this was at significant variance with his declared sales for VAT purposes, which in the quarter ended 31 May 1996, were just £49,357. No VAT return appeared to have been recorded as having been received by the Respondents for the period from 1 June 1996 to the date of initial de-registration, and no reconciliation of business turnover as shown on the Appellant's tax return as against declared sales for VAT purposes was offered by the Appellant. Secondly, the consistent refusal of the Appellant to allow the Respondents access to his records and accounts gave the impression that the Appellant had something to hide from the Respondents. The other matters referred to in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 above were more debatable in the question of whether or not they fell into the category of "supplies" as defined by section 5(2)(a) of the Act, but cumulatively they did not assist in persuading the Tribunal that the Appellant should not have been registered under the Act at the relevant time.
The Tribunal agreed that the lack of access to the Appellant's records and accounts was significant. If access was denied as in the present case, it was impossible for the Respondents to carry out their statutory duties in any way other than that adopted here – it was reasonable for the Respondents to proceed on the basis of statistics relating to previous supplies.
Moreover, the Act repeatedly provides, both in Schedule 1 and elsewhere, that it is one essential condition that "the Commissioners are satisfied" before any change takes place. Obviously, if the Commissioners are repeatedly denied access to an individual's records and accounts, they are unlikely to be "satisfied". In particular, in his argument based on paragraph 1 of Schedule 1, Mr Simpson seemed to ignore the existence of the word "and" between sub-paragraph (a) and sub-paragraph (b) of Schedule 1, paragraph 1(4) of the Act.
It was appropriate that when the deregistration was withdrawn and the registration under number 607 6702 42 erroneously effected, steps were taken to correct and regularise the situation by registration under number 774 7579 69. The Commissioners were clearly entitled to make the change and the timetable set out in Mrs Cain's letter of 28 June 2001 appears to the Tribunal to comply with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 of the Act. Moreover, once the registration under number 774 7579 68 took place the provisions of Schedule 11, paragraph 7 of the Act came into play.
The appeal accordingly fails. The parties were agreed that expenses should follow success as regards the Hearing on 7 April and 6 May 2003. The Tribunal finds the Respondents entitled to their expenses as agreed or as taxed by the Auditor of the Court of Session in respect of the Hearing on those days.
It was drawn to the attention of the Tribunal that all questions of expenses relating to the postponement of the Hearing on 22 March 2002 were reserved and it was felt that such could be resolved by written submissions. Accordingly the parties are directed to make written submissions on the subject within 28 days of the publication of this Decision.
EDN/01/154