UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER)

UT Neutral citation number: [2015] UKUT 0043 (LC)

UTLC Case Number: ACQ/101/2013                                                                                       

                                                                             

                         TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 2007

 

COMPENSATION – LIMITATION – whether acquiring authority estopped from relying on limitation defence by continuation of negotiations and advance payment made after expiry of limitation period – section 9, Limitation Act 1980 – notice of reference dismissed

 

 

                               IN THE MATTER OF A NOTICE OF REFERENCE

 

 

BETWEEN                                         MR SHIAD KHAN                                         Claimant

 

                                                                           and

 

                         TYNE & WEAR PASSENGER TRANSPORT EXECUTIVE   Acquiring     T/A NEXUS                                                        Authority

 

 

 

Re: building’s and open land at

Lisburn Terrace

Sunderland,

SR4 6PT

 

                                       Before: Martin Rodger QC, Deputy President

                                                                               

Sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, London WC2A 2LL

on 6 January 2015

The Claimant in person

Jeremy Pike, instructed by Ward Hadaway, for the acquiring authority

 

 

© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2015

 

 

The following cases are referred to in this decision:

Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Limited v Texas Commerce International Bank Limited [1982] 1 QB 84

Bhattacharjee v Blackburn with Darwin Borough Council ACQ/10/1999

Bridgestart Properties Limited v London Underground Limited [2004] EWCA Civ 793

Hillingdon London Borough Council v ARC Limited [1999] Ch 139

London Borough of Hillingdon v ARC Limited (No.2) [2001] CP Rep 33 (CA)

Super Chem Products Limited v American Life and General Insurance Company Limited [2004] UKPC 2

 

 

 

 

Introduction

1.             By virtue of section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 a claim to recover compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land by a body having compulsory purchase powers must be brought within six years from the date on which the claimant’s cause of action accrued.

2.             On 3 July 2000 the Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive (“the acquiring authority”) entered and took possession of a strip of land at Lisburn Terrace, Sunderland, on which stood three garages, all forming part of a yard occupied by the claimant, Mr Khan, for his car breaking and scrap metal business.  The acquiring authority’s entry and taking of the land was under powers conferred by the Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport (Sunderland) Order 1998 in connection with the extension of the Tyne & Wear Metro.

3.             On 24 July 2013, more than thirteen years after the entry onto his land, the claimant referred a claim for compensation to the Tribunal.  The acquiring authority responded to the notice of reference by relying on section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1980. 

4.             In anticipation of a limitation defence the claimant’s statement of case, settled by counsel, had included the following:

          “13. It is the case that from 2000 and in particular throughout 2008, 2009 and into 2010 the acquiring authority and the claimant conducted negotiations and discussions as to the claimant’s claim for compensation both before and after the expiry of the limitation period in 2008. … Those negotiations continued upon a common understanding that the claimant had a valid claim for compensation to be agreed (or in the absence of an agreement) to be determined by reference to the Lands Tribunal.  It would be unconscionable for the acquiring authority now to rely on section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980.

          14. Further or in the alternative the acquiring authority after the expiry of the limitation period continued until August 2011 to discuss the claimant’s claim for compensation on the basis that it was and remained a valid claim.  The acquiring authority also encouraged the claimant to commission work from surveyors to agree the compensation payable to him.  Such continued negotiation and discussion amounted to a representation that the acquiring authority would not rely upon section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980.  In reliance upon such representation and to the acquiring authority’s knowledge the claimant altered his position by instructing new surveyors and solicitors (namely AB Property Consultants and Richard Reed Solicitors) and by making a reference of its claim to the Lands Tribunal until 2013.

          15. Further or alternatively the acquiring authority has by its aforesaid conduct after the expiry of the limitation period waived its claim to rely upon section 9 of the Limitation Act in relation to the Claimant’s claim for compensation.”

5.             On 12 May 2014 the Tribunal directed that it be determined whether the claimant was no longer entitled to compensation for the land taken on 3 July 2000, or whether the claimant’s entitlement to compensation had been preserved up to the date on which the reference was made to the Tribunal by reason of an estoppel binding on the acquiring authority.  The Tribunal offered to determine that issue on the basis of the documents and the parties’ written representations only, but the solicitors then acting for the claimant requested that the Tribunal hold an oral hearing.

6.             At the hearing the claimant represented himself, with the assistance of his daughter, Ms Sonia Chowdhury.  The acquiring authority was represented by Jeremy Pike of counsel.  I am grateful to all three for their assistance and in particular to Mr Khan and Ms Chowdhury for the moderate and dignified manner in which they presented their case.

Estoppel

7.             The legal principles relevant to the determination of the preliminary issue are well established.  The right to compensation for the compulsory purchase of an interest in land arises under the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 at the date of entry by the acquiring authority onto that land.  In Hillingdon London Borough Council v ARC Limited [1999] Ch 139 the Court of Appeal determined that, for the purpose of section 9, Limitation Act 1980, a cause of action for compensation (i.e. the right to bring a claim) arises on the date of entry and expires six years later. Prior to that decision it had been generally understood to be the law that limitation did not apply to a reference to the Tribunal to determine compensation on compulsory acquisition.   

8.             It is not disputed by the claimant that, but for the issue of estoppel raised in his statement of case, the limitation period applicable to his claim for compensation expired on 3 July 2006.

9.             The estoppel on which the claimant relies is first said to be based on a convention or understanding between the parties that he would be entitled to compensation notwithstanding the lapse of time since the acquiring authority’s entry on the land.  The elements of an estoppel by convention were described by Lord Denning MR in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Limited v Texas Commerce International Bank Limited [1982] 1QB 84 at 122:

          “When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption (either of fact or of law, and whether due to misrepresentation or mistake, makes no difference), on which they have conducted the dealings between them, neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.”

10.         In London Borough of Hillingdon v ARC Limited (No.2) [2001] CP Rep 33 (CA) at paragraphs [60] to [64] the Court of Appeal considered the application of the doctrine of estoppel by convention to a claim in which the limitation period had expired during negotiations between the parties, and a defence of limitation was relied on by an acquiring authority in answer to a claim for compensation following the compulsory acquisition of land belonging to ARC.  For a party to resist a defence of limitation by relying on an estoppel it had to show that a shared assumption had existed and been communicated between the parties that “limitation was not a defence to be relied on” and that that assumption provided the basis on which their negotiations had proceeded after the expiry of the limitation period.  An assumption which, though common to the parties, was not communicated between them would not be sufficient to establish an estoppel.  Moreover, the effect of such a shared assumption need not be permanent and any estoppel founded on it could be brought to an end by the giving of reasonable notice that the acquiring authority intended to rely on a limitation defence.  Thereafter it would not be unconscionable for an acquiring authority to rely on such a defence if, after notice of its intention to do so, proceedings were not commenced within a reasonable time.  In the context of that case (the facts of which were similar to those in the present case) the Court of Appeal suggested that a reasonable time might be measured in weeks rather than in days, but not in months.

11.         In Hillingdon (No.2) the Court of Appeal also made reference (at [66]) to an alternative form of estoppel, promissory estoppel, which in this case is relied on by Mr Khan in paragraph 14 of his statement of case.  In order to rebut a limitation defence on the basis of a promissory estoppel it would be necessary for a claimant to satisfy the court that there had been some clear and unequivocal representation by the acquiring authority that the claimant’s claim was a valid one and in addition that the acquiring authority would not rely on any statutory limitation in defence.

12.         Hillingdon (No.2) was cited with approval by the Privy Counsel in Super Chem Products Limited v American Life and General Insurance Company Limited [2004] UKPC 2 at [23] in support of the proposition that:

          “The mere fact that a party has continued to negotiate with the other party about the claim after the limitation period had expired, without anything being agreed about what happens if the negotiations break down cannot give rise to a waiver or estoppel.”

13.         Finally, in Bridgestart Properties Limited v London Underground Limited [2004] EWCA Civ 793 the Court of Appeal considered once again the circumstances in which an acquiring authority exercising compulsory purchase powers may be estopped from relying on a limitation defence to a claim for injurious affection to land.  At [19] Keen LJ said this:

          “I am in no doubt that the mere fact that considerable negotiations took place between the parties about a claim for settlement damage both before and after the limitation period expired does not of itself create any estoppel preventing [the acquiring authority] from relying on such a defence.  That was the very situation which obtained in Hillingdon (No.2) where at a date some four years after the claim had (unbeknown to the parties) become statute-barred, the acquiring authority had written to the land owner requesting further particulars of its claim.  Yet no estoppel was found to have arisen.  It may often be that an authority is prepared to continue negotiations in the hope of reaching an amicable settlement on the amount of compensation but without abandoning a limitation defence if negotiations break down.”

14.         In both Hillingdon (No.2) and Bridgestart the acquiring authority had been unaware, while the negotiations continued, that it was entitled to rely on a limitation defence, and only appreciated the possibility of such a defence after negotiations had proved unsuccessful.  The facts of this case are somewhat different.

The Facts

15.         Mr Khan is a sole trader, trading under the name Lisburn Autos, in the business of car breaking.  From as early as August 1995 he had been aware that the Tyne & Wear Metro might be extended to Sunderland along a route that would include part of his yard at Lisburn Terrace.  At that time the yard comprised one acre of land on part of which, immediately adjoining the intended route of the Metro extension, stood a range of single-storey open-fronted brick buildings used for the storage of parts and materials for Mr Khan’s business.

16.         On 30 January 2000 the acquiring authority served notice to treat and a notice of entry on Mr Khan in respect of part of the yard including the buildings.  It is clear from the documents that I have seen, and as he emphasised in his witness statement and oral evidence, that Mr Khan co-operated fully with the acquiring authority’s requests for access to the land.  He re-organised the vehicles and other items on the land to provide temporary access to facilitate the erection of a wall along the new boundary, and he patiently tolerated accidents and incursions onto what remained of his yard.  It had been Mr Khan’s understanding, based on the information provided to him by the acquiring authority, that the works on his land and the boundary with the Metro route would be completed within six months; in fact they appear to have taken almost three years. 

17.         Disruption caused by the acquisition of his land and buildings and the works to separate the yard from the new Metro route resulted in loss to Mr Khan for which he was entitled to compensation. 

18.         It is a significant feature of the history of this case that, for prolonged periods, Mr Khan has been without professional representation.  Between March 1996 and about February 2002 he was represented by Frederick R Walker, solicitor.  In November 2003 George Mills, solicitors, were briefly instructed on his behalf.  Between January 2004 and a date later in 2004 which is not clear, Mr Khan was represented by James Doran, solicitor.  Finally in April 2011 Mr Khan instructed Richard Reed, solicitors, but they ceased to act for him in June 2014.  During the same period Mr Khan instructed or attempted to instruct at least five different valuers to act for him.  Nonetheless, from 2004 until April 2011, included in the period up to the expiry of the limitation period on 3 July 2006, Mr Khan was without professional assistance.  Mr Khan was urged repeatedly by the acquiring authority to appoint a surveyor to assist him in calculating the amount of compensation to which he was entitled but, despite considerable efforts on his part and for reasons which were not the responsibility of the acquiring authority, he did not succeed in doing so.

19.         The acquiring authority was willing to pay Mr Khan the sum which it considered an appropriate measure of his loss.  On 8 February 2002, in response to a request for an advance payment, a cheque for £40,500 was sent to his solicitors, representing 90% of the acquiring authority’s assessment of compensation due.  Mr Khan’s immediate response to the receipt of this payment was to refuse it.  He wrote to the acquiring authority on 15 February 2002 complaining about the surveyor then acting for him, whom he felt had betrayed him, and stating that he would take his claim for compensation to court.  He also wrote to his own solicitor refusing the payment because he considered that to accept a sum assessed by reference to the acquiring authority’s valuation of the land would weaken his position. Instead, at his request, an advance payment of £25,000 was made by the acquiring authority on 26 March 2002 under cover of a letter offering a further £15,500 without prejudice to Mr Khan’s claim.

20.         In January 2003 the acquiring authority wrote to Mr Khan asking whether he was still employing a professional advisor and reminding him that he was entitled to charge it the reasonable expenses of using such an advisor in negotiating compensation.  It was not until 13 January 2004 that Mr Doran, Mr Khan’s new solicitor, wrote to the acquiring authority.  Initially they received no reply but further contact led eventually to a meeting on 20 January 2005 at which little progress appears to have been made.  Mr Doran then dropped out of the picture and it was not until 20 March 2006 that Mr Khan wrote to the acquiring authority explaining that he was finding it difficult to find a solicitor or surveyor who would deal with his case and requesting that it pay the fees of any professional he appoint up front.

21.         From an email dated 10 April 2006 it is apparent that the acquiring authority was aware that the limitation period for the making of a reference to the Tribunal would shortly expire.  Although by the end of April 2006 the acquiring authority had satisfied itself that the limitation period would expire on 3 July 2006, it did not pass that information on to Mr Khan.  In a letter to Mr Khan dated 11 April 2006 the acquiring authority urged him to appoint professional advisers and offered to make a further payment on account of £10,000. 

22.         The sixth anniversary of the acquiring authority’s entry onto Mr Khan’s land passed on 3 July 2006 without him having made any further contact or having accepted the offer of funds which would have enabled him to instruct professional advisers.  An email dated 17 October 2006 between the acquiring authority and its own surveyor confirmed the surveyor’s advice that Mr Khan was now out of time for a reference to the Lands Tribunal.

23.         On 16 January 2007 Mr Khan wrote once again informing the acquiring authority that he was struggling to find any surveyor locally who was willing to deal with his case and indicating a willingness to accept £15,500 (the balance of the sum he had refused 5 years earlier) as a further interim payment without prejudice to the final settlement of his claim.  In its reply of 9 February 2007 the acquiring authority forwarded a cheque for £15,500 “being an advance payment towards the purchase of land but without prejudice to the final settlement.”  Once again it encouraged Mr Khan to engage the services of a professional advisor.

24.         Not having heard further from Mr Khan, the acquiring authority wrote to him on 9 June 2008 emphasising its wish to bring the matter to a conclusion and offering a further £25,000 in full and final settlement of his claims relating to the land.  Nothing was heard from Mr Khan for more than a year but on 30 June 2009 the acquiring authority wrote repeating its offer and indicating that if it did not receive a response it would close its file.  On 19 July 2009 Mr Khan responded, rejecting the proposed settlement of £25,000 and stating that he was busy quantifying the settlement he expected to receive which would be supported by evidence and would be provided within the next two months.  The acquiring authority acknowledged his letter and undertook to respond to such evidence within six weeks of its receipt indicating whether an increased offer of settlement would be made.

25.         The evidence subsequently provided by Mr Khan was a letter dated 26 August 2009 from his accountants listing the turnover and net profit he had achieved in his business in each of the ten years ending on 31 July 2007.  In a further letter of 15 September 2009 Mr Khan provided evidence that the cost of re-building the garages which had stood on his land was £98,000; he also provided an estimate of the value of the land taken.

26.         The acquiring authority responded to Mr Khan’s evidence on 29 October 2009 making an increased offer of a further £45,000 in full and final settlement of all claims relating to the land and to Mr Khan’s business.  The offer was expressed to remain open for acceptance for a period of six weeks, after which it would be withdrawn.

27.         On 3 December 2009 Mr Khan asked for a breakdown of the total sum of £85,500 (including the advance payments) which the acquiring authority was offering as compensation and on 21 December 2009 the acquiring authority provided a rough breakdown valuing the land at £45,000, with an additional £20,000 for the buildings and £20,500 for loss of profits.

28.         On 12 January 2010 the acquiring authority extended its previous final offer for a further three weeks but nothing was heard from Mr Khan until 1 March 2010 when he wrote protesting the imposition of a deadline and stating that he would be in touch soon.  In response the acquiring authority wrote on 18 March 2010 stating that it had assumed the matter had been closed when it heard nothing from Mr Khan in February but, exceptionally and in an effort to resolve the claim, that it was willing for Mr Khan’s advisors to contact its valuer for an explanation of its final offer.  Contrary to the position previously communicated, that offer would remain on the table for the time being, but the acquiring authority wished to conclude matters by the end of May 2010.

29.         Early in April 2010 Mr Khan had a meeting with a chartered surveyor to discuss his claim but on 16 April the surveyor recommended that he seek specialist advice from a firm of solicitors.  On 18 April 2010 Mr Khan informed the acquiring authority that he continued to seek the assistance of a surveyor but that it was now unrealistic to expect settlement to be achieved by the end of May.  No further communication passed between the parties for almost a further twelve months until, on 8 April 2011, Richard Reed, solicitors, wrote to the acquiring authority stating that they had been instructed on behalf of Mr Khan and were reviewing the papers.

30.         On 31 May 2011 Richard Reed sought confirmation that the acquiring authority would be responsible for the payment of Mr Khan’s legal fees and the costs of instructing a surveyor but on 1 June 2011 the acquiring authority responded stating that it was not prepared to make any such payment.  Richard Reed write on three occasions in the following months asking for documents and threatening that, should agreement not be reached, Mr Khan would be left with no other alternative but to refer the matter to the Tribunal.  On 4 August 2011 the acquiring authority wrote in unequivocal terms in response to Richard Reed’s requests:

          “In your letter dated 8 April 2011 you indicated that you were reviewing the file of papers in this matter.  A full review would have indicated that your client is out of time for issuing a Lands Tribunal claim.  The last offer made by Nexus to your client was on 9 June 2008 and our file closed in June 2009.  Nexus has no offer to make to your client and that being the case no doubt you will provide your client with advice as to his legal position.”

31.         Mr Khan explained in his evidence that the advice he had received from Richard Reed, solicitors, which is reflected in a letter from that firm to the acquiring authority on 30 September 2011, was that the interim payment received by Mr Khan in February 2007 was an acknowledgement that further money was due to him and that by virtue of section 29 of the Limitation Act 1980 the limitation period of six years had begun again.  Thus, it was said, Mr Khan had until 9 February 2013 within which to bring a claim to the Lands Tribunal.

32.         In his evidence Mr Khan informed me that once he became aware of the acquiring authority’s letter to Richard Reed of 4 August 2011 (which he had at about that time) he appreciated that the acquiring authority was no longer willing to pay compensation.  He nonetheless believed, on the basis of advice provided to him by his own solicitor, that he was entitled to pursue his claim at any time until 9 February 2013. 

33.         By a letter dated 3 October 2011 the acquiring authority informed Richard Reed, solicitors that it did not accept that the limitation period had started to run again in February 2007 and did not intend to re-open its file.  No further progress was made between the parties.  Despite the proposition advanced by Richard Reed in correspondence, no reference was made to the Tribunal before 9 February 2013.  It was not until 24 July 2013 that a notice of reference was finally lodged.

34.         In his evidence and submissions Mr Khan acknowledged that there had been no discussion between the parties concerning the issue of limitation.  He had been wholly unaware that a claim for compensation ought to be brought within six years of the date of entry onto his land and he complained that the acquiring authority ought to have informed him of that fact.  He had cooperated fully with the acquiring authority when it had required his assistance in clearing his land, and he considered that, in recognition of that cooperation, such a significant deadline should have been pointed out to him when it was known that he had no professional representation. 

35.         Mr Khan also acknowledged, as I have already recorded, that he was aware after August 2011 of the acquiring authority’s position on the limitation issue but considered, on the basis of the advice of his own solicitors, that he was nonetheless still entitled to compensation for a period of six years after the date on which the last advance payment had been made.

36.         Although there had been a few meetings to discuss the extent of the land to be taken and the work which was to be undertaken by the acquiring authority, no other meeting took place between Mr Khan and representatives of the acquiring authority to discuss compensation until the single unproductive meeting in January 2005.  Although there is mention in his witness statement of further conversations on the telephone, Mr Khan did not suggest to me that anything of significance in relation to the issue now under consideration was discussed.

Discussion and Conclusion

37.         I am satisfied that Mr Khan believed at all times until August 2011 that both he and the acquiring authority intended that he should receive compensation for the loss he had sustained.  I am also satisfied that the acquiring authority was aware after 3 July 2006 that Mr Khan had lost his entitlement to compensation as of right because of the expiry of the limitation period.  Nothing was said to Mr Khan to alert him to the impending expiry of the limitation period but, equally, nothing was said to him to suggest specifically that the acquiring authority would not rely on a defence of limitation if the negotiations between the parties failed to reach a successful conclusion. 

38.         Although I appreciate that Mr Khan does not agree, I do not think that the acquiring authority’s conduct can be regarded as harsh or opportunistic.  At all stages it urged Mr Khan to obtain professional advice.  Despite being aware of the availability of the limitation defence, it was prepared to make a payment of up to £85,500 in full and final settlement of all of claims for compensation as late as May 2010, almost four years after the expiry of the limitation period.  Its willingness to ensure that Mr Khan received fair compensation is reflected in the second advance payment made in February 2007, after the expiry of the limitation period.    The most that can be said against the acquiring authority’s conduct is that it has not been prepared to make any payment of compensation greater than the sum which it was advised was appropriate, and that its patience has not proved limitless.  In response to Mr Khan’s statement of claim, which seeks the sum of £391,000 plus professional fees and interest, it has finally resorted to reliance on section 9 of the Limitation Act 1980.

39.         In my judgment the acquiring authority is entitled to succeed in its limitation defence in this case.

40.         Mr Khan’s pleaded answer to the limitation defence is put in three different ways: estoppel by convention; estoppel by representation; and finally, waiver.

41.         As to estoppel by convention, it is clear from the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Hillingdon (No.2) and Bridgestart that a shared assumption that compensation would be paid is not sufficient to defeat a defence of limitation.  What is required is a common assumption that no defence of limitation would be relied on.  The existence of that assumption must be communicated between the parties.  There was no such assumption and no such communication, in this case.  Following the clarification by the Court of Appeal in Hillingdon (No.1) that a limitation defence is applicable to a claim for compensation it seems unlikely that such a mutual assumption will rarely, if ever, be encountered again.

42.         The acquiring authority did more than just negotiate, it made advance payments to Mr Khan under section 52 of the Land Compensation Act 1973, including after the expiry of the limitation period, but the making of such payments is not inconsistent with an acquiring authority reserving the right to rely on a defence of limitation if agreement is not ultimately reached on the fair level of compensation.  An advance payment is a reflection of the acquiring authority’s assessment of the value of the claim and a reflection of its willingness to compensate the land owner for what he has lost.  The expiry of the limitation period does not affect the power of an acquiring authority to agree and pay compensation, as the Lands Tribunal (George Bartlett QC, President) pointed out in Bhattacharjee v Blackburn with Darwin Borough Council ACQ/10/1999 at paragraph 32.  It follows that neither a willingness to negotiate after the expiry of a limitation period, nor a willingness to pay compensation up to the level which the acquiring authority considers fair, can be taken to be representations that an authority will not rely on a defence of limitation, especially in response to a claim made many years after the payment.

43.         Even if the continuance of negotiations or the making of advance payments after the expiry of a limitation period might contribute to the establishment of a convention that limitation would not be relied on, such a convention would at best be temporary.  As the Court of Appeal made clear in Hillingdon (No.2) and as is the case with convention estoppels generally, either party may resile from a convention if to do so would not be unconscionable.  In some circumstances reliance on a defence of limitation might be unconscionable, especially if it was done without prior warning where there had been a common understanding that no such defence was available.  On the other hand, even where such a common understanding had existed, if a prospective claimant was later given a clear warning by an acquiring authority that his claim for compensation was liable to be defeated by limitation, the effect of a former estoppel would soon dissolve.  If no reference was then commenced within the time reasonably required for the claimant to seek advice and take corrective action it could no longer be said to be unconscionable for the acquiring authority to take advantage of the defence available to it under the general law. 

44.         In this case a period of almost two years elapsed after the dissolution of any possible convention by the acquiring authority’s letter of 4 August 2011 before the reference was made to the Tribunal.  Even if the other ingredients of an estoppel by convention were present (which none is) the delay in making the reference until 24 July 2013 would be fatal.

45.         Nor is Mr Khan’s entitlement to compensation rescued by either of the alternative ways in which his case has been pleaded.  There was no express representation that the acquiring authority would not rely on a defence of limitation if agreement was not reached by negotiation, and for the reasons already given neither the continuance of negotiations nor the making of payments could amount to such a representation.  Nor was there anything that could amount to a waiver of the right to plead a limitation defence.

46.         No reliance was placed by Mr Khan, or by counsel who drafted his statement of case, on the point originally taken by Richard Reed, solicitors, in answer to the limitation defence, namely, that by operation of section 29 of the Limitation Act 1980 the making of an advance payment in February 2007 set a new six year limitation period running.  It is therefore not necessary to deal with that contention in any detail and it is sufficient to say that section 29 does not have the suggested effect.  As a result of section 29(5) a cause of action to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim will be treated as having accrued on the date of either an acknowledgement of the claim or a payment in respect of it by the person liable or accountable for it.  A claim for compensation for the compulsory acquisition of the land is not a claim to recover a debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim within section 29(5).

47.         For these reasons I am satisfied that the acquiring authority is entitled to succeed on its limitation defence and that Mr Khan’s claim for compensation must be dismissed.

48.         This decision is final on all matters other than costs.  A letter inviting submissions on costs will be sent to the parties.

 

                                                                                   

                                                                                    Martin Rodger QC,

                                                                                    Deputy President

                                                                                    26 January 2015