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UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER) |
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UT Neutral citation number:
[2009] UKUT 129 (LC) LT Case Number: LRX/70/2008
TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT
2007 |
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LANDLORD AND TENANT – LVT
procedure – refusal to grant adjournment - not in breach of natural
justice
LEASEHOLD ENFRANCHISEMENT –
terms of transfer - application for permission – section 24 Leasehold
Reform Act 1993 – service charge outstanding – whether LVT entitled to
consider reasonableness of charge – permission
refused |
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IN THE MATTER of an
Application under Section 24 of the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban
Development Act 1993 |
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BETWEEN |
WESTLEIGH PROPERTIES LIMITED |
Claimant |
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and |
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AMANDA
CHRISTIE
FRANCIS
BOWELL
SHARON
CROWLEY
KEITH PRACY
FRANCES
PRACY |
Respondents |
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Re: Flats at 45 Finchley Road, Westcliff on Sea, Essex, SSO
8AD |
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Before: His Honour Judge Mole QC |
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Appeal by written representations |
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No cases are referred to in this
decision. |
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© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2009 |
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1 |
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DECISION |
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Introduction |
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1. This is an appeal against a
decision of the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal for the Eastern Rent
Assessment Panel dated 21st of May 2008 on an application made to it under
section 24 of the Leasehold Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993.
It has been determined, with the agreement of the parties, on the witness
statements and written representations. |
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2. A number of points were raised
in the applicant’s notice of application for permission to appeal. Those
points included (ground e.) that the allegedly limited time that had been
allowed for preparation was made much worse for the applicant when the LVT
refused to grant an adjournment to the applicant’s representative, Ms
Scott, on the day of the hearing 10th March
2008. |
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Evidence and Submissions |
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3. The LVT refused permission to appeal on the 8th April
2008. |
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4. On the 18th of August 2008 the
President of the Lands Tribunal granted permission to appeal and made the
following observations:
“There is in my view a very
strong argument that in refusing to adjourn the hearing despite knowledge
of the landlord’s representative’s travel difficulties the LVT acted in
breach of natural justice. If the appeal was successful on this ground,
which seems to me likely, the proper course would be for the matter to be
reheard by a differently constituted LVT. This issue will therefore be
dealt with at the outset, and the appellant’s statement of case and the
reply of any respondent will be confined to this ground. The other grounds
on which application is made would, however, fall for consideration if the
appellant were to be unsuccessful, but it is unnecessary to consider them
until the issue on the refusal to adjourn has been
determined.” |
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5. The Tribunal ordered that the
appeal should be dealt with under the written representations procedure.
Witness statements were lodged from Louise Bolt, the respondents’
solicitor, Lorraine Scott, a legal assistant with the applicant’s
solicitors and Amardeep Bansil, a representative of the applicant’s
managing agents. In the letter of the second of April 2009 conveying the
order the parties were told that, in the light of the witness statements
that had been filed, the President was no longer of the view that he
expressed in granting permission to appeal that the argument that the LVT
acted in breach of natural justice was very strong. |
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6. The Lands Tribunal has had
regard to all the written submissions of the parties and to the witness
statements. |
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2 |
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7. The LVT decision recorded the facts on the issue of the
adjournment as follows:
“10. On Monday 10 March 2008 the
Tribunal had the opportunity to inspect the Property, its common parts and
the gardens and grounds. The lessees of flats A.B. and C. were present.
The Respondent (landlord/reversioner) had been invited to the inspection.
At about 10:00 the respondent’s solicitor, Ms Scott notified the Tribunal
case officer that she was delayed on her journey due (to) traffic and
adverse weather conditions. Ms Scott also notified the office that the
Respondent’s witness, Mr Amardeep Bansil, who was travelling separately,
would also be late. No application to delay the start of the hearing or to
adjourn the hearing was made to the Tribunal. Mr Bansil is an employee of
BLR Property Management, the managing agents now employed by the
Respondent for the Property.
11. The
hearing started at11:05. Miss Bolt was present along with the lessees of
flats A.B. and C. Miss Bolt opened and presented the case on behalf of the
Applicants. Mr Bansil arrived at 1215. He informed the Tribunal that Ms
Scott hoped to arrive shortly. At 12:35 the Tribunal adjourned the hearing
until 13:45 both for lunch and to give further time for Ms Scott to
arrive.
12. The
hearing resumed at 13:45. Mr Bansil informed (the) Tribunal that Ms Scott
anticipated arriving within 20 minutes. Meanwhile Mr Bansil said he was
authorised to go through the service charge budget for 2007/8 and to
explain what expenditure of the Respondent had incurred to date in the
current service charge year. In the event the only expenditure was two
quarters management fees of £202.81 each [70-72]. This expenditure was not
challenged by Miss Bolt.
Ms Scott arrived at 14:00 and was briefed on the progress made
up to that time.” |
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6. The LVT amplified its reasons
on this issue in its decision on the application for permission to appeal.
It said:
“8. The Tribunal is satisfied
that the Respondent knew well what the issues were and had ample
opportunity to prepare and put forward its case. Indeed it served a
detailed witness statement in support of its case and the witness was at
the hearing. No complaint about lack of time or any application for more
time was made at the beginning of the hearing or part way through it when
the Respondent’s representative arrived.
9. The Tribunal acknowledges that
on the morning of the hearing travel was subject to adverse weather
conditions. This had been expected and warnings had been given on the
radio and TV and in newspapers over the preceding few days. Having regard
to public resources and the efficient dispatch of the Tribunal’s business
the Tribunal expects parties and their representatives to plan ahead and
(make) appropriate arrangements to travel to hearings and to be on time.
Evidently the Respondent’s representative, Ms Scott, chose to drive by car
from Oxfordshire to east Essex on a Monday morning employing a route that
included a substantial section of the M25 well known to be busy and at a
time when she would have been aware of the adverse weather conditions
likely to be experienced. In the event Ms Scott failed to allow herself
sufficient time for her journey or to use a more reliable means of
transport. |
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3 |
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10. The Tribunal was informed
that Ms Scott had called the office on her mobile to explain that she
would again be late for a hearing. No application for a delay in start
time or an adjournment was made. When Ms Scott did arrive at the hearing
there was no application for an adjournment. At the hearing the major
issue was the legal costs incurred by the respondent, which it now wanted
to pass through the service charge account. Ms Scott had every opportunity
to and did at some length address us on this issue and Mr Bansil gave
evidence on it. The Tribunal is satisfied that no procedural
irregularities occurred which affected the Respondent
adversely.” |
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7. Ms Scott says, in her witness
statement that on the morning of the 10th of March she awoke (in
Henley-on-Thames) to reports of a severe storm with high winds, fallen
trees and possible flooding. Mr Bansil spoke to her. He was also concerned
about the weather conditions. She waited until the LVT offices were open
at 9:00 and then telephoned to ask that the matter be adjourned. The case
officer phoned her back to say that the panel Chairperson had indicated
that there would be no adjournment and she was advised to attend the
hearing as soon as possible. Ms Scott set out, stopping at intervals when
the winds made her fear for the stability of her car. She says that the
journey took her about four hours. She spoke to Mr Bansil in the course of
the journey and he told her that the panel would adjourn until after
lunch. She advised him to refuse to give evidence until she arrived. When
she did arrive she did not repeat the request for the adjournment as, she
says, she was left in no doubt that the LVT intended to deal with the
matter that day. When she arrived she noted that the solicitor for the
Respondents had already made representations and that Mr Bansil had been
questioned by both the LVT and the Respondent’s
solicitor. |
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8. Mr Bansil confirms his
reluctance to set out on the journey; nonetheless he made the journey by
train and arrived not long after the hearing started. He says that
although he initially refused to answer questions, in line with Ms Scott’s
advice, it was evident the Panel was anxious to proceed and so he answered
questions within the scope of his witness statement. |
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9. Miss Bolt notes that the
hearing had been listed to start at 11 a.m., with the site visit at 10
a.m. Both she and the Panel had managed to be present in good time
although some had also had a long journey. She recollects that the Panel
indicated that they hoped to hear the case in the morning and give a
determination in the afternoon because they had noted that this matter had
been going on for some time. However they appreciated that Ms Scott was
likely to be late and agreed to adjourn the hearing until 11:30. Mr Bansil
arrived at about that time. The Tribunal therefore decided to start the
hearing, as he could listen on behalf of the respondent to Miss Bolt’s
submissions. Miss Bolt denies that she questioned Mr Bansil. She made
submissions from 11:30 until 12:30 at which time the Panel decided to
break for lunch in the expectation that Ms Scott would be present by 2
p.m. In fact Ms Scott arrived at 14:15 and the hearing restarted. Ms Bolt
observes that Ms Scott made submissions that lasted until approximately
17:15. |
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10. I note that there are some
differences of recollection between the witnesses but they do not seem to
me to be significant. The general position is sufficiently
clear. |
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4 |
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Conclusions |
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11. I remind myself that the
question is not whether I would have exercised my discretion differently
if I had been sitting on the LVT: it is whether the way the LVT exercised
its discretion deprived the Landlord of a fair trial. It is for the LVT to
make its own procedural decisions, in the exercise of its discretion, in
the light of all the circumstances in front of it at the time, including
the length of time that the case has already taken. The LVT is entitled to
be robust in its decisions and unsympathetic to what it may regard as
avoidable delays. The Lands Tribunal will be reluctant to interfere with
the exercise of the LVT’s discretion unless it is satisfied that the
conduct of the LVT is contrary to natural justice in the sense that it has
denied one of the parties a fair trial by, for example, not giving that
party a fair chance to deal with important issues. |
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12. The LVT said that having
regard to public resources and the efficient dispatch of its business it
expected parties and their representatives to plan ahead, make appropriate
travel arrangements and to be on time. I strongly agree with that
approach. Professional advocates ought to know that to be on time they may
have to allow plenty of time for difficult travel and this may mean an
early start or an overnight stay, particularly if trouble is forecast. The
LVT was right to note that this was a comparatively longstanding matter
and to conclude that it would determine the case on 10th March
if it possibly could. In my judgement the way the LVT dealt with the
question of Ms Scott’s lateness was pragmatic, fair and even generous,
notwithstanding the difficult conditions of that Monday morning. It is of
significance that once she had arrived at the LVT, Ms Scott made no
application for an adjournment and did not suggest that she was unable to
deal with the issues. Indeed the Grounds of Appeal chiefly complain about
the tight timetable the LVT had imposed before the hearing rather than of
any real difficulties caused by Ms Scott not being present for the whole
proceedings. In the event Ms Scott had three hours or so to make
submissions and it was not suggested that was not
enough. |
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13. In my judgement, once the
full circumstances are understood, it is clear that what the LVT did was
entirely open to it in the exercise of its discretion and the proper
management of its business. Indeed, I consider that the decision the LVT
made was plainly the right one. There was no breach of the rules of
natural justice. The appeal on this ground is dismissed.
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION |
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14. As the
President foreshadowed, it now falls to be considered whether the other
potential grounds of appeal should be granted permission to
appeal.
15. The first
issue is whether the LVT had the jurisdiction to determine the
“reasonableness of service charges” under section 24 of the Leasehold
Reform Housing and Urban Development Act 1993. It was a condition of the
transfer that arrears of service charges should be settled prior to
completion of the transfer. It was not suggested that such a provision, in
itself, was unreasonable. The applicant accepts that the LVT had the power
to determine “the cash accounts which substantiated such arrears figures”.
But the applicant wished to contend that the reasonableness of those
charges could only be challenged by an application under section 27A of
the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. The applicant says that this point was
raised in e-mails before the hearing and it |
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5 |
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16. The main point on the claimed
service charge concerns that element that represents the costs of court
proceedings against one of the leaseholders for arrears of charges. Those
arrears amounted to £3,625. The costs of the proceedings were £7,732. The
facts were not entirely clear to the LVT but it seemed to them that there
was a County Court claim, met by a counterclaim. At a case management
hearing on the 13th of January 2006 a settlement was reached. Counsel and
a solicitor represented the applicant landlord. The defendant Pracys were
unrepresented. The Court made a consent order but the LVT was not provided
with a copy. That settlement dealt with the money outstanding but said
nothing as to costs. The LVT found (in paragraph 44)
that |
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“Ordinarily the costs would be
raised and dealt with expressly as one of the terms of settlement of
litigation even if that be that there shall be no order as to costs or
that the parties agreed to bear their own costs;
At all material times prior to 13
January 2006 it was the Respondent’s intention to recover its legal costs
from the Pracys and not to put the costs through the service
charge;
At the negotiations at court on
13 January 2006 the Respondent was represented by a solicitor and by
counsel; the Pracys were not legally represented;
It is inconceivable that either
the Respondent’s solicitor or counsel would have overlooked the question
of costs as a component of the settlement so that if the question of costs
was not addressed in the negotiations it was deliberately not addressed by
the Respondent;
The settlement of the proceedings
was intended to be a clean break settlement so that in the absence of any
express provisions as to costs it is to be inferred or implied that the
parties intended that each party should be responsible for its own
costs;
At the time of settlement the
Respondent intended that it would not pursue the Pracys for costs; it
would not put the costs through the service charge and that it would bear
its own costs;
At some later point and following
discussions between the respondent and BLR the Respondent changed its mind
and sought to put the costs through the service charge;
In August 2005 when Miss Bowell’s
query was answered the litigation against the Pracys was in full swing and
the Respondent would have been aware of the legal fees; the fact that such
fees was not raised reinforces our finding that at that time the
respondent was not intending to put the legal fees through the service
charge;
In January 2006 when Mrs
Crowley’s query was answered the legal proceedings had just been settled
and the Respondent would have known that a substantial bill was imminent.
The fact that legal fees was not mentioned further reinforces
our |
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6 |
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17. The LVT dealt with that
matter by first considering whether the lease, properly construed,
provided for the recovery as a service charge of legal fees incurred in
connection with proceedings brought against the lessee alleged to be in
arrears. However, I shall approach the matter in a different
order. |
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18. I consider that the findings
of the LVT in paragraph 44 were findings it was entitled to reach on the
somewhat limited material before it. In particular the LVT was entitled to
infer that in those circumstances where litigation that had incurred
substantial costs was settled between the parties with no mention of
costs, the party that had incurred the costs being represented by both
counsel and a solicitor and the party that might be liable to pay them not
being represented at all, the agreement was that each party should bear
its own costs. To my mind, if the Pracys had appreciated that it might be
suggested that the settlement would expose them to a liability for costs
that amounted to more than double the total claim for arrears, they would
have been unlikely to settle. The LVT was also entitled to infer and find
that, having forgone the opportunity to claim its costs from the Pracys,
the respondent landlord decided that it would not put the costs through
the service charge. It seems to me that there would be a powerful case on
behalf of the ‘innocent’ leaseholders that it would be quite unreasonable
for the landlord, apparently without expressing any reason why it should
do so, to forego the opportunity to collect the costs from the leaseholder
that had caused them to be incurred. Equally, the Pracys themselves might
have had good reason to challenge as unreasonable a manoeuvre that caused
them to settle on the basis that each party would bear their own costs,
only to find that a quarter of the landlord’s costs came round again as
part of a service charge. |
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19. Those findings of fact were
legitimate inferences about the intentions of the Applicant landlord. They
lead inexorably to the conclusion that it would be unreasonable for the
applicant landlord to claim those costs as part of the service charge but
they are not the sort of judgments about reasonableness that would
normally fall under section 27A. It was sensible and within the LVTs
jurisdiction under section 24 to deal with the matter as it
did. |
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20. Those findings of fact made
by the LVT are unassailable and dispose of the point. However, if it were
necessary to do so I would go further and say that the LVT directed itself
carefully on the law at paragraphs 22 to 33 and was entitled to construe
the lease as it did for the reasons it gave in paragraphs 45 to 47, none
of which disclose any error of law. |
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21. As for the other two very
short issues concerning the accounts, the first is disposed of by the
observation that the LVT simply preferred the evidence of Ms Christie,
which it was perfectly entitled to do. On the second point, the LVT
accepted the argument of the Applicant landlord that the sums in question
remained due and payable by the Pracys. |
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7 |
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22. There is nothing in any of
the other matters that raises a point of law. The LVT explained why it
declined to make an order for costs in favour of the Applicant landlord.
That was a rational exercise of its discretion. |
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23. Permission to appeal on the remaining grounds is therefore
refused.
Dated 14 July 2009
His Honour Judge Mole QC |
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8 |
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