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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) >> EH v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) (Claims and payments : jurisdiction) [2014] UKUT 256 (AAC) (06 May 2014)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/AAC/2014/256.html
Cite as: [2014] UKUT 256 (AAC)
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EH v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) (Claims and payments : jurisdiction) [2014] UKUT 256 (AAC) (06 May 2014)

    IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL                                                     Appeal No: CE/2084/2013

    ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER

     

    Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Gray

     

    The decision of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the appeal.

     

    The decision of the Nottingham Tribunal dated 29 November 2013 is not in error of law.  The decision stands.   

     

     

     

    REASONS FOR DECISION

     

     

    The background

     

    1. In this case the appellant had upon an initial work capability assessment (WCA) made on 11/8/11, been placed in the work related activity group (WRAG). She appealed that decision (the initial appeal), but on 28/10/11 prior to the appeal being heard the decision was revised under regulation 3 (4A) Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999 and she was placed by the Secretary of State into the support group. That revision decision was more favourable to the appellant then the original decision, and therefore lapsed the initial appeal under section 9(6) Social Security Act 1998.
    2. The revision decision of 28/10/11 indicated that the appellant would once again be subject to the assessment process, and gave a date for that to occur, 26/11/11. That was a period of just less than one month from the revision decision, although it should be noted that the effect of the decision, which examined the appellant’s circumstances as they would have been at the date of the original decision, backdated her entry into the support group to the effective date of the decision made on 11/8/11.
    3. The appellant’s representative purported to appeal against the reassessment date on the basis that this was a determination embodied in the decision as revised on 28/10/11, which could be challenged on appeal.
    4. The FTT decided on 29/11/12 that it had no jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The document issued was in fact a headed Directions Notice, but it was clearly a decision, and upon application for a statement of reasons the district tribunal judge said that the summary decision notice was to stand as the statement of reasons.
    5. I granted permission to appeal on 16 December 2013 and made directions for the filing of further submissions which are now to hand. 
    6. No party has requested an oral hearing.  I am in a position to make a decision upon the papers.  The submissions of the parties are clear and oral submissions or evidence will not assist me.  

     

     

    The position of the Secretary of State

     

    1.  The Secretary of State does not support the appeal. He asserts that the FTT had no jurisdiction over the appeal. I am invited to strike out the appeal to the Upper Tribunal. 
    2. Put shortly the Secretary of State’s submissions are that under section 12 of the Social Security Act 1998 a right of appeal attaches to a “prescribed decision or a prescribed determination embodied in or necessary to a decision”.  The case of CIB/2338/2000, a decision of Mr Commissioner Jacobs (as he then was) is cited, in particular paragraphs 22 to 25, which deal with the nature of a determination, and its distinction from a decision. The learned Commissioner spoke of the nature of a determination being that it was a building block of a decision. A decision would be the result of combining perhaps a number of determinations. Appealable decisions were in, what he called the “new jargon” outcome decisions. He expressed the meaning of that, which was not a term of art, as referring to decisions that have an impact on the claimant’s pocket, that is to say that they directly affected the money that they received, or might in the future receive. The determinations upon which a decision was based affect this, but not directly. The effect is only when the determination is incorporated into an outcome decision.
    3. The Secretary of State contends that the review date is neither part of the determination in respect of the limited capability for work or work-related activity, nor is it a separate determination made at the same time.  It is not incumbent on the Secretary of State to set a review date, and the tenor of the submission is that although a date may be stated, it is for information only, not part of the decision, and therefore does not carry a right of appeal.

     

     

    The position of the appellant

     

    1. The appellant through her representative contends that the reassessment date is in fact a building block of the work capability decision, or ought to be treated as one.  She says that it would be an artificial distinction to state that the prognosis which is included in the decision, and made on the same evidence, is not part of the decision. She accepts that the date set out in the decision notice does not stop the Secretary of State from deciding to reassess that person from an earlier date should they wish to do so, provided that this is outside the three-month period set out in the legislation. She interprets Judge Jacobs’ decision differently, emphasising his view that under the then new decision-making procedure of the Social Security Act 1998, there was a “clear theme uniting most of the decisions that are appealable”.  She submits that the reassessment date can have an impact on a person’s money because benefit can be totally stopped under regulations 22 and 23 of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 if they fail to provide relevant information or attend a relevant medical examination. She says that the reassessment date is therefore part of the outcome of the work capability assessment decision.

     

    My conclusions

     

    1.  I do not accept the contentions put forward on behalf of the appellant. There is no obligation on the Secretary of State to put forward a date of reassessment at the time that the decision is made, and if he does he is entitled to change it. If the date were part of the outcome decision that decision itself would fail and require revision or supersession if that change were then made. That position has not been contended for.
    2. I quite accept that these matters are of importance for the person receiving the decision, and, of course, I accept that the process may be stressful for many, but that of itself cannot change the status of the reassessment date.  The recent Three Judge Panel dealing with the potentially disproportionate effect of the process on claimants with mental health problems,  DM-v-SSWP [ 2013] UKUT 0260 (AAC), which was in part approved by the Court of Appeal, cannot be authority for that proposition.
    3. What the representative’s submission is really asking me to do is to agree that because there have been problems regarding the administration of the work capability assessment, which have caused delay in the hearing of appeals, and because that will inevitably be stressful for many people (litigation of any sort is) an appeal on this issue should be permitted.  She points to what is known as the “revolving door” aspect of ESA, and feels that the continual reassessments contribute to that. 
    4. Whether or not that is so (and I am not sure that I agree with her, the primary reason in my experience for the revolving door syndrome being fresh claims made six months after an adverse decision) it is no part of my function to extend rights of appeal beyond what the legislation permits.
    5. The decision of Judge Jacobs is clear and I concur with it; it is the outcome decision which is capable of being appealed, and the mere setting of a frankly provisional date for reassessment based upon the view of the health care professional cannot attract a right of appeal.
    6. I have been asked by the Secretary of State to strike this appeal out for want of jurisdiction.  I decline to do so. The FTT made a decision which, under section 11 (5) Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 1997 is not an excluded decision, and it is therefore appealable to the Upper Tribunal.  Where a right of appeal exists it is generally preferable to deal with the substantive appeal upon the merits rather than using a procedural approach. 
    7. The decision of the FTT that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal was correct in law and it stands.

     

     

    Signed on the original on                                 Upper Tribunal Judge Gray

     17 June 2014

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