DECISION OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
(ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER)
The DECISION of the Upper Tribunal is to dismiss the appeal by the Appellant (“the father”).
The decision of the Birmingham First-tier Tribunal dated 28 March 2012 under file reference SC024/11/04128 does not involve an error on a point of law. The tribunal’s decision therefore stands.
This decision is given under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1. The issue at the heart of this appeal before the Upper Tribunal is this: where a non-resident parent (in this case the father), as a result of a court order, can only exercise contact with his child through supervised contact at a contact centre, and has to pay a fee to have such supervised contact, can he include those costs in his application for a variation of his child support liability based on contact costs?
2. The short answer to that question is no, for the reasons that follow. The law, as it stands, makes no provision for any such allowance. Whether that is fair and just in the wider context of the family justice system may be a matter for legitimate debate. Later in this decision I suggest that the Secretary of State should review the current legal position, but I express no view as to what change(s), if any, should be made. However, I also recommend that the Child Support Agency should correct its internal guidance, which is at best ambiguous and at worst misleading. First, however, I must summarise the context to this appeal.
3. In doing so I should emphasise that I have considerable sympathy for the predicament the father finds himself in. I am acutely conscious that I will not have heard all the relevant facts. That said, the father appears to deserve credit for going to some lengths to maintain contact with his daughter. He has also argued his case clearly and well, but the law is against him.
The background to the present case
4. The background to this appeal is complicated. Inevitably there are disagreements between the parents as to some of the facts. However, they need not be rehearsed in detail here. For present purposes, the following summary will suffice. I refer to the Appellant as the father, the First Respondent as the Agency and the Second Respondent as the mother.
5. The father lives in Lancashire. The mother and their daughter (who was born in September 2009) live in the West Midlands. On a date which is unknown, but appears to have been in the autumn of 2010, the county court made an order for the father to have weekly supervised contact with his daughter at a contact centre. Around the same time, on 15 September 2010 the father was convicted by the magistrates’ court of battery against the mother.
6. On 27 January 2011 an Agency decision-maker decided that the father was liable to pay £45 a week in child support as from 29 September 2010. On 16 March 2011 that decision was revised, but only to change the effective date to 22 September 2010. In making that maintenance calculation, the decision maker allowed a variation in respect of the father’s contact costs, which were offset against his net income. These were assessed at being £128.06 a week (£88.12 in contact centre charges and £39.94 in travel (petrol)), or £113.06 after deduction of the £15 threshold.
7. The mother lodged an appeal against this maintenance calculation. As well as taking issue with the frequency of the father’s contact visits, she argued that she too incurred travel costs, namely taxi costs in bringing their daughter to the contact centre and that these had not been taken into account.
8. On 27 January 2012 the First-tier Tribunal (District Tribunal Judge (DTJ) Wall) adjourned the mother’s appeal hearing with various directions. DTJ Wall, having noted the allowance that had been made for contact centre costs, remarked that “it would appear that this allowance is outside the scope of the regulations and hence unlawful”. She suggested that the parents seek independent advice and that all parties address the issue at the next hearing. That was a proper inquisitorial approach which respected the requirements of natural justice and a fair hearing.
9. On 28 March 2012, at a further hearing, DTJ Wall allowed the mother’s appeal. In her Decision Notice she assessed the father’s travel costs as £44.60 a week but ruled that “the costs of the contact centre are not allowable within regulation 10.” In her full Statement of Reasons she added:
“[24] Contact Centre fees are not specified within regulation 10(1) and therefore cannot be taken into account as special expenses. The Tribunal does not have discretion to make additions to the list in the regulation.”
10. Reading the statement of reasons as a whole, it was implicit in her decision (and as was made explicit by her subsequent refusal of permission to appeal) that DTJ Wall found, in particular, that that the contact centre fees were not “minor incidental costs” within regulation 10(1)(f).
11. On 14 May 2013 I held an oral hearing in Birmingham of the father’s renewed application for permission to appeal. The father attended, as did Mr Stephen Cooper on behalf of the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. The mother did not attend, and did not need to attend, at that stage. On 20 May 2013 I gave the father permission to appeal, in part on the basis that there appeared to be a mis-match between the relevant legislation and the Agency’s guidance.
The relevant legislation
12. Regulation 10 of the Child Support (Variations) Regulations 2000 (SI 2001/156) makes provision for allowable contact costs on a variation application. Only the first two paragraphs of regulation 10 are relevant to this appeal:
“Special expenses—contact costs
10.—(1) Subject to the following paragraphs of this regulation, and to regulation 15, the following costs incurred or reasonably expected to be incurred by the non-resident parent, whether in respect of himself or the qualifying child or both, for the purpose of maintaining contact with that child, shall constitute expenses for the purposes of paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 4B to the Act—
(a) the cost of purchasing a ticket for travel;
(b) the cost of purchasing fuel where travel is by a vehicle which is not carrying fare-paying passengers;
(c) the taxi fare for a journey or part of a journey where the Secretary of State is satisfied that the disability or long-term illness of the non-resident parent or the qualifying child makes it impracticable for any other form of transport to be used for that journey or part of that journey;
(d) the cost of car hire where the cost of the journey would be less in total than it would be if public transport or taxis or a combination of both were used;
(e) where the Secretary of State considers a return journey on the same day is impracticable, or the established or intended pattern of contact with the child includes contact over two or more consecutive days, the cost of the non-resident parent's, or, as the case may be, the child's, accommodation for the number of nights the Secretary of State considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case; and
(f) any minor incidental costs such as tolls or fees payable for the use of a particular road or bridge incurred in connection with such travel, including breakfast where it is included as part of the accommodation cost referred to in sub-paragraph (e).
(2) The costs to which paragraph (1) applies include the cost of a person to travel with the non-resident parent or the qualifying child, if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the presence of another person on the journey, or part of the journey, is necessary including, but not limited to, where it is necessary because of the young age of the qualifying child or the disability or long-term illness of the non-resident parent or that child.”
The Child Support Agency’s internal guidance
13. The Agency’s internal guidance (Contact Costs, Procedural Release 159, 24 Jun 2013), apparently only available on its intranet, purports to summarise and explain regulation 10 for the benefit of Agency decision makers. It begins by stating that “unacceptable expenses include the cost of” e.g. telephone calls, taking children out and maintaining a vehicle. It then states that contact costs can be broken down into two main categories, namely travel expenses and accommodation costs. It gives various examples of travel costs drawn from regulation 10(1)(a)-(d) and (f), listed as a series of bullet points. It also includes the following passage:
“• the cost of an escort
The cost of an escort may be considered where the Secretary of State is satisfied that a supervisory presence is necessary.
For example, an escort may be required because of the young age of the QC(s) [qualifying child/ren] or where the NRP’s state of health dictates that they cannot reasonably travel alone. However the presence of an escort is not limited to the examples stated. It is also possible that supervision is the only acceptable form of contact due to a court decision.”
14. The father wrote to the Agency after the FTT’s decision. On 28 September 2012 a Customer Review Manager for the Agency replied, correctly pointing out that the Agency could not change the FTT’s decision unless notified by the Upper Tribunal to do so. However, the letter also stated that the case worker in question had “correctly followed the Child Support Agency guidance and procedures”, which she paraphrased as follows: “The cost of an escort may be considered where the Secretary of State is satisfied that a supervisory presence is necessary. For example, it is possible that supervision is the only form of contact due to a court order decision.” The Customer Review Manager added that as using the contact centre was the requirement of a court order in this case then regulation 10(2) had been properly applied by the case worker.
The proceedings before the Upper Tribunal
15. All parties have made written submissions, which I have considered. Ms Jennie Tarver has made a written submission on behalf of the Secretary of State, opposing the appeal. The father has developed his arguments further and the mother resists his appeal. There is no need for a further oral hearing and none has been requested.
The parties’ submissions and the Upper Tribunal’s analysis
16. In essence, the father’s appeal is based on the following arguments: (1) that contact centre costs are “minor incidental costs” within regulation 10(1)(f); (2) that, in any event, the examples of contact costs given in regulation 10(1) are not exhaustive; (3) that, if not otherwise included, his contact centre costs fall within regulation 10(2), as provided for by the Agency’s guidance; and (4) that the FTT’s decision and the Agency’s actions had, as he put it, “adversely affected my parenting role”.
(1) Are contact centre costs “minor incidental costs” within regulation 10(1)(f)?
17. The father’s argument is that there is no defined list of incidental costs: “the legislation refers to some examples like fees, tolls or breakfast etc – but there is not a complete list or any suggested amounts.” He further argues that as there is no real common link between toll fees, breakfast or car parking fees, there does not need to be any link between those types of of expenditure and contact centre fees.
18. Ms Tarver, supported by the mother, argues that the link between the allowable costs is one of “their relative magnitudes”. She points out that the contact centre fee for a 2-hour visit was in the order of £90 a week. Even if it might be “incidental” in nature, it was not “minor” when compared to the cost of e.g. car parking, tolls and breakfast.
19. In my view regulation 10(1)(f) has to be read in its proper statutory context. In particular, it has to be read against the background of the preceding heads of the sub-paragraph. Regulation 10(1)(a)-(d) all refer to different types of travel cost, subject to various conditions (namely a ticket, fuel, taxi fare or car hire). Regulation 10(1)(f) concerns overnight accommodation costs, but only where a return journey is impracticable or inappropriate – so travel is a precondition for such costs to be allowed. Regulation 10(1)(f)’s reference to “minor incidental costs” has to be interpreted in that light. So the “minor incidental costs” must be travel-related.
20. This reading is reinforced by the drafting itself, which refers to the examples of such “minor incidental costs” as being “incurred in connection with such travel”. Thus the phrase “incurred in connection with such travel” governs the “minor incidental costs”, not the illustrations that happen to be given (road or bridge tolls and fees). Putting the point another way, the expression “such travel” is referring back to the various modes of travel set out in the preceding sub-paragraphs (1)(a) to (e), not to going on particular roads or bridges.
21. It follows that contact centre costs are not strictly “incidental” within the meaning of regulation 10(1)(f). In the father’s case the fees he had to pay were certainly essential for him to exercise contact under the court order – but they were not “incidental” to his travel expenses. The point may be put by way of an alternative scenario. Say the father lived round the corner from the contact centre and that he walked there every Saturday to exercise court-ordered supervised contact. In that situation he would have no travel costs at all. He could hardly then claim for the cost of contact centre charges as “minor incidental costs” by way of an adjunct to travel costs that he had never incurred.
22. Part of the father’s argument is that there is nothing to connect the examples given in regulation 10(1)(f). However, the analysis above shows that the common link between road tolls and breakfast costs is that they are both incidental to the previously listed categories of travel expenditure. The specific (if generic) examples given in regulation 10(1)(f) mean that the rule expressly covers e.g. the fee payable on the M6 toll road or the charge levied for using the Dartford Crossing. The reference to “any minor incidental costs such as” those then mentioned is sufficient to include analogous expenses, e.g. the modest charge payable on the Sandbanks ferry across the entrance to Poole harbour (see CCS/2816/2004 at paragraph XX, now £3.50 each way). On the other hand a much more expensive ferry crossing, as is common between some of the Scottish islands, would presumably fall within regulation 10(1)(a) as a ticket for travel.
23. The cost of a car parking ticket, although not specifically mentioned in regulation 10(1)(f), is likewise covered by that sub-paragraph as it is both minor and incidental and related to the function of travelling. This was the approach taken by Mr Commissioner (now Judge) Turnbull on the meaning of the equivalent phrase when used under the departures scheme (see R(CS) 5/08 at paragraphs 13 and 14). Although that decision was given in relation to travel-to-work costs, the wording of the departures rules for commuting costs and contact costs is on all fours with regulation 10(1)(f) under the variations scheme (see Child Support Departure Direction and Consequential Amendments Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2907), regulations 13(1) and 14(1)).
24. I also agree with Ms Tarver and the mother that the father’s contact centre costs are not “minor”. Ultimately what is “minor” is a question of fact and degree. However, the contact centre charge that the father had to pay each week was approximately twice his fuel costs in travelling from Lancashire to Birmingham. Even if the fee was, on its proper construction, an “incidental” cost, which I conclude it is not, an argument that £90 a week is a “minor” cost in this context has no prospects of success.
(2) Are the examples of contact costs given in regulation 10(1) not exhaustive?
25. The father’s next argument is that the list of allowable expenses in regulation 10(1) is not exhaustive. The FTT, however, concluded that it had no discretion in the matter. That approach is supported by Ms Tarver and the mother.
26. The statutory basis for regulation 10(1) is paragraph 2 of Schedule 4B to the Child Support Act 1991, as inserted by the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000 (section 6 and Schedule 2). Paragraph 2 enables a non-resident parent to apply for a variation for “special expenses”, being “expenses which fall within a prescribed description of expenses” (paragraph 2(2)). In particular, paragraph 2(3)(a) provides that:
“(3) In prescribing descriptions of expenses for the purposes of this paragraph, the Secretary of State may, in particular, make provision with respect to –
(a) costs incurred by a non-resident parent in maintaining contact with the child, or with any of the children, with respect to whom the application for a maintenance calculation has been made...”
27. That enabling power gives the Secretary of State a very broad discretion. He might have exercised that discretion to include a wide range of contact-related costs incurred by non-resident parents (although not by parents with care, as the mother points out), e.g. legal costs, theme park entry charges, cinema admission fees, meals at McDonalds, etc. However, the Secretary of State has not used this power so liberally. Instead, regulation 10(1) confines the scope of a variation to “the following costs incurred or reasonably expected to be incurred ... for the purpose of maintaining contact with that child.” The “following costs” are those listed in regulation 10(1)(a)-(f) and they “shall constitute expenses for the purposes of paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 4B to the Act”. There is no residual “get out” or “sweeping up” clause which allows the non-resident parent e.g. to claim “any other expenses which are wholly, exclusively and necessarily incurred with the purpose of maintaining contact”. In those circumstances, the only possible reading of regulation 10(1) is that sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) constitute a complete and exhaustive list of the allowable heads of expense.
28. The father also sought to argue that contact costs could be included in his variation application as they do not appear in the list of “unacceptable expenses” in the Agency’s internal guidance. This argument will not run for two reasons. First, the examples given in the guidance are just that, examples. It is not a definitive list of exclusions. Second, that document is simply guidance, or the Agency’s gloss on the law, and not the law itself, which takes us to the next ground of appeal.
29. The father understandably feels that he has been misled by the Agency. He regards himself as caught between conflicting interpretations of the legislation, with the Agency making a decision on one basis and persisting with that interpretation even when the FTT decided the matter the other way.
30. Ms Tarver’s submission, again supported by the mother, is that even if the contact centre supervision charge falls within regulation 10(2), it falls outside the scope of regulation 10(1) for the reasons set out above (see paragraphs 17-28).
31. It is axiomatic that the father’s liability is governed by the law, and not by the Agency’s interpretation of the law. Regulation 10(2) begins “The costs to which paragraph (1) applies include ...”. Given that, on its natural reading, paragraph 10(1) does not include contact centre charges, the question then is whether the wording of regulation 10(2) (see paragraph 12 above) is sufficient to extend its meaning to cover such costs. However, all that regulation 10(2) does is to provide a carefully circumscribed extension to include “the cost of a person to travel with the non-resident parent or the qualifying child”, subject to certain conditions. Again, this is fundamentally a travel-related cost.
32. Thus regulation 10(2) expressly provides that those travel-related costs must relate to the necessity for “the presence of another person on the journey, or part of the journey” (emphasis added). In other words, provision is made for either a companion for the non-resident parent or a chaperone for the child. It will be recalled that the opening words of regulation 10(1) confine its scope to “the following costs incurred or reasonably expected to be incurred by the non-resident parent, whether in respect of himself or the qualifying child or both, for the purpose of maintaining contact with that child”. So it may be that the non-resident parent simply cannot travel but pays the expenses for the child to visit him – hence the example given of a chaperone if the child is too young to travel alone.
33. Regulation 10(2) does not use the term “escort”, which appears in the Agency’s guidance (paragraph 13 above), but that is a useful expression in that it covers both a travelling companion for the parent and a chaperone for the child. An “escort” in this sense, as with a “prison escort”, is by definition a person who has to accompany another person on a journey for some reason. The legislation gives as illustrations for the need for such an escort “the young age of the qualifying child or the disability or long-term illness of the non-resident parent or that child”. However, these examples of where “the presence of another person on the journey ... is necessary” are stated as “including, but not limited to” these situations. So there may be other situations. For example, the child may be the one travelling, and in principle be old enough to travel alone, but might not be a native English speaker and lack sufficient fluency.
34. However, what is not permissible is to extend the scope of regulation 10(2) to include costs associated with the necessary presence of another person not on the journey, but rather as a static presence whilst contact is actually being exercised (e.g. a social worker or similar who provides supervision at a contact centre). It is entirely possible that supervised contact is the only type of contact allowed, as here, due to a court order. But as the mother argues, regulation 10(1)(f) covers contact costs incurred in travelling up to and including the end of travelling (e.g. car parking). The supervising social worker is simply not on the journey – he or she is at the destination, when contact is exercised.
35. It follows that the Agency’s guidance is misleading, and I suggest needs to be re-drafted, as it fails to read regulation 10(2) as a whole. The examples given in the legislation may be non-exhaustive, but I stress that whatever the circumstances they must give rise to the necessity for “the presence of another person on the journey”. Part of the problem lies in the Agency’s summary of regulation 10, which is in these terms:
“Contact Costs
The contact cost ground covers expenses incurred by the NRP for keeping in touch with the QC when the expenses are acceptable and reasonable and do not cover a period already taken into account under a shared care allowance.”
36. This is phrased far too widely to do justice to the narrow terms of regulation 10. A busy case worker might be forgiven for thinking that the ground covers a far wider category of expenses. This summary needs the addition of a phrase such as “only travel-related” or “only travel or certain accommodation” after “covers” and before “expenses”. The passage cited at paragraph 13 above also needs redrafting in accordance with the principles set out above. There may be other literature which the Agency produces for external audiences which needs adjusting accordingly.
(4) Did the FTT’s decision and the Agency’s actions adversely affect the father’s parenting role?
37. The father’s case was that both the FTT’s decision and the Agency’s actions had adversely affected his role as a parent. In particular, he says that as a result of the FTT’s decision he has had to reduce his visits from weekly to fortnightly because of the financial consequences.
38. He also said that the FTT should have had regard to the welfare of the child. The tribunal’s decision to take away the allowance given by the Agency for the contact centre charges certainly made it more difficult (in the sense of expensive) for him to exercise contact. Certainly, where a discretionary power falls to be exercised, the decision-maker must consider the welfare of the relevant child or children (see Child Support Act 1991, section 2). However, as the FTT correctly identified, the legislation here did not give it any such discretion. It follows that section 2 does not apply.
39. Although the father did not put this point in quite these terms, it seemed to me he was really making a human rights challenge. As I noted when giving permission to appeal, he was saying that the exercise of contact with his daughter was being made more difficult and that amounted to a breach of his right to family life. I noted that this argument had been raised unsuccessfully in the departures case of R (on the application of Qazi) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] EWHC 1331 (Admin), also reported as R(CS) 5/04), where it had failed on the proportionality point. However, since then we have had a further decade of human rights case law.
40. On further reflection, I am satisfied that I can deal with the human rights point quite shortly. In Qazi Charles J. proceeded (at paragraph 45) on the assumption that both Article 8 (the right to family life) and Article 1 of the First Protocol (the right to property) of the European Convention of Human Rights were engaged. Those matters were in effect conceded by counsel for the Secretary of State (at paragraph 41) for the purposes of argument in that case. The position now is very different.
41. In particular, the House of Lords has since held that the statutory child support scheme does not come within the ambit of either Article 8 or Article 1 of the First Protocol (see M v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] UKHL 11, [2006] 2 AC 91). As a matter of precedent I am bound by that decision. The relevant authorities have recently been fully examined by Judge Levenson in TD v Secretary of State (CMEC) & HLD [2013] UKUT 282 (AAC) and it would be futile for me to rehearse those arguments here. In those circumstances the human rights challenge does not get off the ground. The FTT’s decision did not involve any breach of the Human Rights Act 1998.
42. The father also argues that the Agency’s actions have hindered his parenting role. I can understand his sense of grievance. First, the Agency said one thing and made an allowance for the contact centre charges on his variation application. Second, the FTT held to the contrary, and the effect of the Agency’s consequential re-calculation was that he was left with an unexpected level of arrears going back for a year or so. Third, the Agency’s Complaint Review Manager wrote and told him that the Agency was right all along but that nothing could be done about it until the Upper Tribunal’s decision.
43. Understandably, the letter from the Agency’s Complaint Review Manager left the father confused. Like the Agency’s internal guidance, it did not properly reflect the true legal position. I accept that insofar as some of the arrears are concerned, it is likely that the father would not be in this position if the Agency had got it right in the first place. This may be a matter which he wishes to take up by way of a complaint of maladministration, first with the Independent Case Examiner for the Agency and, if necessary, with the Ombudsman.
Conclusion
44. I therefore conclude that where, by virtue of a court order, a non-resident parent can only exercise contact with his child through supervised contact at a contact centre, and has to pay a fee to have such supervised contact, he cannot include those costs in his application for a variation of his child support maintenance calculation based on contact costs under regulation 10.
45. It follows that DTJ Wall came to the correct decision and the father’s appeal is dismissed. For the reasons explained above, the Upper Tribunal dismisses the father’s appeal (Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, section 11). The decision of the First-tier Tribunal therefore stands.
Recommendations
46. The Child Support Agency should review, and where appropriate redraft, its internal guidance (along with any associated “public-facing” guidance) on the scope of regulation 10 of the Child Support (Variations) Regulations 2000.
47. The Secretary of State may wish to review whether regulation 10 as currently drafted properly catches all appropriate contact costs. There is arguably a distinction to be drawn between “costs incurred by a non-resident parent in maintaining contact with the child” (Child Support Act 1991, Schedule 4B, paragraph 2(3)(a), emphasis added) and costs incurred purely or simply in the exercise of such contact. The contact centre charge is this case was not an optional extra – the father had to pay it to be able even to exercise contact.
48. In this context I note that, had the father’s contact expenses been found to be “unreasonably high” under regulation 15(2) (which has not been suggested), then a lower amount could have been substituted by the Agency. However, by virtue of regulation 15(3), any such lower amount
“shall not be so low as to make it impossible, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, for contact between the non-resident parent and the qualifying child to be maintained at the frequency specified in any court order made in respect of the non-resident parent and that child where the non-resident parent is maintaining contact at that frequency.”
However, that protection only applies in the situation where there has been a prior finding that the expenses were unreasonably high. It does not apply in the situation where the limits within regulation 10 may have a similar effect.
49. On the hand, the legal system has traditionally taken the view that child support is payable irrespective of the terms on which contact is undertaken. The question of whether the child support system should recognise contact centre charges as an allowable “special expense” may well involve wider family justice considerations that are not necessarily all the responsibility of the Department for Work and Pensions. It would certainly not be right for me to express a view as to whether such costs should be allowable.
A coda
50. The court order for supervised contact at a contact centre in this case was apparently made following an allegation of domestic violence. The papers which are before me are not complete and do not show whether the family courts ever actually made any findings of fact on that matter. As noted above, the father was convicted of battery in September 2010 by the magistrates’ court (see paragraph 5 above). However, that is not the end of the matter.
51. The father appealed that conviction. He has produced a copy of the transcript of the hearing before the Crown Court on 29 July 2011. The father’s appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed. The Recorder, giving the reasons for the judgment of himself and the justices, described the mother’s reliability as a witness as “undermined because she had exaggerated... In many ways, she was an unsatisfactory witness”. However, the Crown Court’s judgment was by no means a complete vindication of the father. The Court decided, on the balance of probabilities, that the father had struck the mother “in some way” in the course of the incident. But they could not be “sure”, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt, because “the evidence of the complainant was far too unsatisfactory”.
52. In conclusion, the Crown Court accepted that it was “entirely possible” that it was the mother who was being abusive and that the father was trying to restrain her. It was also “entirely possible”, the Court acknowledged, that he was trying to calm her and had indeed “hit her across the face once or more times to quell her hysteria”. Given these uncertainties, the Crown Court had to allow the appeal.
53. That evidence may or may not persuade a family court, working to a different standard of proof (the balance of probabilities) and with different evidential rules. The father now says that he cannot afford to go back to the family court to get the supervision condition attached to the contact order removed. However, he has acted in person throughout these proceedings and has made his points well. The family courts are increasingly used to parents acting in person as well. In any event, ideally the parents will now be able to move forward and resolve contact arrangements for their daughter’s benefit.
Signed on the original Nicholas Wikeley
on 10 September 2013 Judge of the Upper Tribunal