Decision
of the Upper Tribunal
(Administrative Appeals Chamber)
This decision is given under section 11 of the Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:
The decisions of the First-tier Tribunal, made on 22
December 2010 and 2 February 2011 against the decisions of the Information
Commissioner identified in paragraph 2 below, did not involve the making of an
error on a point of law.
Reasons
for Decision
A.
the issue
1.
Mr B was made a vexatious litigant on 8 December 2003 by order under
section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (as the Supreme Court Act 1981 is now
known). The only issue that arises in this case, at this stage, is the preliminary
issue whether:
(i) Mr B needs the permission of
the High Court to bring these proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal and
the Upper Tribunal; and (ii) if he does, whether the Upper Tribunal has power
to give permission under section 25 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement
Act 2007.
My answer to (i) is yes and to (ii) is no.
B.
the background
2.
Mr B lodged appeals with the First-tier Tribunal against the following
four decisions of the Information Commissioner:
·
EA/2010/0196 in respect of FS50232752 on 12 August 2009. The
complaint is at pages 417-422 and the decision notice is at pages 167-173.
·
EA/2010/0197 in respect of FS50246906 on 24 August 2009. There is
no copy of the complaint, but the decision notice is at pages 370-380.
·
EA/2011/0013 in respect of FS50155868 on 25 March 2009. There is
no copy of the complaint, but there is a note of a telephone call at page 425.
The decision notice is at pages 381-393.
·
EA/2011/0014 in respect of FS50105213 on 23 October 2006. This
seems to be the correct date, although other dates have been used. The
complaint is at pages 410-416 and the decision notice is at pages 394-400.
3.
Judge Angel struck out the appeals for lack of permission, being out of
time and having no reasonable prospect of success (pages 14-17 and 45-46).
4.
Judge McKenna gave Mr B permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal
(pages 94-97). Her grant of permission also carries other First-tier Tribunal
numbers: EA/2011/0038, 0039 and 0040. These relate to cases in which Mr B was
attempting to appeal in respect of decisions that did not relate to him.
C.
the parties
5.
Mr B is the only appellant.
6.
An appeal to the Upper Tribunal is governed by section 11 of the
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Section 11(2) provides that ‘Any
party to a case has a right of appeal’. It follows that only a person who
was a party before the First-tier Tribunal may appeal against that tribunal’s
decision. An appeal to the First-tier Tribunal is governed by section 57 of the
Freedom of Information Act 2000. Section 57(1) provides that ‘the complainant
or the public authority may appeal’. The complainant is the person who applied
to the Information Commissioner for a decision under section 50 of the 2000
Act. It follows that the identity of the complainant is central to the right of
appeal both to the First-tier Tribunal and to the Upper Tribunal. It is
unfortunate that the Commissioner’s office procedures do not allow that person
to be readily identified in all cases. I have decided that Mr B was the only
complainant in each case. The Commissioner has provided copies of the original
complaints in two of the cases and they are made only by Mr B. In a third case,
Mr B is shown on the decision notice as the complainant. And in the fourth
case, it is the recollection of the officer handling the case that the
complainant was made by Mr B. On that evidence, I have decided that Mr B was
the only complainant in all the cases.
7.
Mrs B is not a party, although Mr B has tried to present her as one. As
I have explained, she was not a party to the proceedings before the First-tier
Tribunal. She is, therefore, not automatically a party. The Upper Tribunal has
power to add Mrs B as a party under rule 9 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper
Tribunal) Rules 2008. I refuse to do so. She was not a complainant to the
Information Commissioner. She did not therefore have a right of appeal to the
First-tier Tribunal. Nor does she have a right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
There is nothing to show that she has taken any active interest or part in
either the complaints to the Commissioner or the appeal to the First-tier
Tribunal. Adding her would merely complicate proceedings by raising the issue
whether she was acting independently or as an agent or servant of Mr B.
8.
The Information Commissioner is a respondent. The Information
Commissioner was a respondent before the First-tier Tribunal and is therefore a
respondent before the Upper Tribunal.
9.
I directed that the persons from whom Mr B requested information be
asked whether they wish to become parties to these proceedings. None did.
10.
I invited the Attorney-General to become a party to these proceedings in
order to make submissions (orally or in writing) on the scope of a vexatious
litigant order under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The background
against which I made that invitation was this. The Attorney-General is
responsible for applications that a person be made a vexatious litigant. Mr B
had refused my suggestion of seeking assistance from the Free Representation
Unit. (I have subsequently been told that that Unit is unable to provide
representation for information rights cases.) The Information Commissioner
would not have a direct interest in the scope of a vexatious litigant order. Certainly,
the Commissioner would not have an interest in this issue beyond the
information rights jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory
Chamber) and the Upper Tribunal.
11.
After the Attorney-General declined to participate, the Information
Commissioner applied to be removed as a party. I refused that application:
The Information Commissioner has
applied for me to vary my direction to remove the need for him to be represented.
I refuse that application also. I appreciate the Commissioner’s point of view.
I have approached the application in two stages. First, I consider it essential
to hold an oral hearing. If I do not and decide the case on documents alone, Mr
B will have the right to renew his application before a different judge at an
oral hearing. Given that he is regarded as a vexatious litigant, I prefer to
hold an oral hearing at this stage. It will, of course, be an oral hearing if
listed as such, even if neither party attends. Second, I consider it essential
for the Information Commissioner to be represented. This case raises an issue
that affects a significant number of cases before the First-tier Tribunal both
in its information jurisdiction and other jurisdictions. The Attorney-General
has refused to argue the issue to assist the Upper Tribunal. Mr B is unlikely
to be able to assist. That leaves only the Commissioner. No doubt the
Commissioner will consider, quite fairly, that he should not bear the burden of
arguing this issue for the benefit of others. However, the Upper Tribunal is
entitled to assistance and the issue is one that is likely to benefit from
discussion rather than reading a written submission from one party.
That left the Information Commissioner to bear the burden of
arguing the preliminary issue and I directed that he do so at the oral hearing.
I am grateful for his assistance and ask those who represent him to convey my
thanks to him.
D.
Mr B’s judicial review application
12.
I mention for completeness that the documents sent to the Upper Tribunal
by Mr B contained applications for permission to apply for judicial review. I
directed that they be registered (under reference JR/1397/2011) and
then, in view of their subject matter, I ordered that they be transferred to
the High Court. I explained why:
1. The Upper Tribunal only
has the function of deciding an application for permission to apply for
judicial review if the four conditions specified in section 18 of the 2007 Act
are satisfied. If those conditions are not satisfied, the tribunal must by
order transfer the case to the High Court.
2. Condition 3 is that the
case must come within a class specified in a direction given in accordance with
Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The relevant
direction is the Lord Chief Justice’s Practice Direction (Upper Tribunal:
Judicial Review Jurisdiction). That direction specifies two classes of
case: ‘(a) any decision of the First-tier Tribunal on an appeal made in the
exercise of a right conferred by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme in
compliance with section 5(1) of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995
(appeals against decisions on review); and (b) any decision of the First-tier
Tribunal made under Tribunal Procedure Rules or section 9 of the 2007 Act where
there is no right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal and that decision is not an
excluded decision within paragraph (b), (c), or (f) of section 11(5) of the
2007 Act.’
3. It is difficult to
understand precisely what decisions the appellants wish to challenge and why. I
am, however, satisfied that the matters are not covered by the Lord Chief
Justice’s Practice Direction. I must therefore order that they be transferred
to the High Court. The Upper Tribunal no longer has any jurisdiction in respect
of these applications. Any correspondence must be directed to the office of the
Administrative Court.
13.
I do not know the progress of those applications. It is a matter for
that Court whether: (i) to give Mr Bhamjee permission to bring those
proceedings under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981; (ii) Mrs Bhamjee is
being used by her husband as his agent in an attempt to avoid the vexatious
litigant order; and (iii) to decide the applications or to transfer them to the
Upper Tribunal.
E.
The oral hearing
14.
I directed an oral hearing of the appeal. It was held before me on 12
September 2011. Mr B attended and spoke on his own behalf. The Information
Commissioner provided a skeleton argument written by Richard Bailey, the
Commissioner’s solicitor. The Commissioner was represented at the hearing by Mr
Robin Hopkins of counsel. I am grateful to Mr B, Mr Bailey and Mr Hopkins for
their arguments.
F.
section 42 of the senior courts act 1981
15.
The current version of section 42 reads:
42 Restriction of vexatious
legal proceedings
(1) If, on an application
made by the Attorney General under this section, the High Court is satisfied
that any person has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable
ground—
(a) instituted
vexatious civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or any inferior court,
and whether against the same person or against different persons; or
(b) made
vexatious applications in any civil proceedings, whether in the High Court or
any inferior court, and whether instituted by him or another, or
(c) instituted
vexatious prosecutions (whether against the same person or different persons),
the court may, after hearing
that person or giving him an opportunity of being heard, make a civil
proceedings order, a criminal proceedings order or an all proceedings order.
(1A) In this section—
“civil proceedings order” means
an order that—
(a) no
civil proceedings shall without the leave of the High Court be instituted in
any court by the person against whom the order is made;
(b) any
civil proceedings instituted by him in any court before the making of the order
shall not be continued by him without the leave of the High Court; and
(c) no
application (other than one for leave under this section) shall be made by him,
in any civil proceedings instituted in any court by any person, without the
leave of the High Court;
“criminal proceedings order”
means an order that—
(a) no
information shall be laid before a justice of the peace by the person against
whom the order is made without the leave of the High Court; and
(b) no
application for leave to prefer a bill of indictment shall be made by him
without the leave of the High Court; and
“all proceedings order” means an
order which has the combined effect of the two other orders.
(2) An order under
subsection (1) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a
specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.
(3) Leave for the
institution or continuance of, or for the making of an application in, any civil
proceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in
force under subsection (1) shall not be given unless the High Court is
satisfied that the proceedings or application are not an abuse of the process
of the court in question and that there are reasonable grounds for the
proceedings or application.
(3A) Leave for the laying of an
information or for an application for leave to prefer a bill of indictment by a
person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under subsection (1) shall
not be given unless the High Court is satisfied that the institution of the
prosecution is not an abuse of the criminal process and that there are
reasonable grounds for the institution of the prosecution by the applicant.
(4) No appeal shall lie from
a decision of the High Court refusing leave [required by virtue of this section.
(5) A copy of any order made
under subsection (1) shall be published in the London Gazette.
G.
are the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, in their information
rights jurisdiction at least, courts?
16.
Yes, they are.
17.
Mr Hopkins relied on the decision and reasoning of Davis J in Re
Terence Patrick Ewing [2002] EWHC 3169 (QB). Mr Hopkins made some general
submissions and then presented his argument around Davis J’s summary in paragraph
40 of his judgment. It is convenient to take the same approach in order to explain
why I accept his argument.
18.
Mr B argued that this case did not apply on the ground that Mr Ewing had
a criminal conviction whereas Mr B did not. I reject that argument, because the
difference does not in any way affect the issue in principle or the reasoning
of Davis J.
19.
I note, although Mr Hopkins did not refer to it, that Laws LJ refused Mr
Ewing permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal in Ewing v The
Security Service [2003] EWCA Civ 581.
General submissions
20.
Whether or not a body is a court is a matter of substance and is not
dictated by the label applied to it. The fact that the First-tier Tribunal and
the Upper Tribunal are designated as tribunals is not conclusive of their
proper classification for the purposes of section 42.
21.
As a matter of principle, the law distinguishes between a body
exercising a judicial function and one exercising an administrative one. That
is the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v
BBC [1981] AC 303. Their Lordships expressed themselves differently, but
that is the overall effect of their reasoning. The case was a contempt case,
but it has been taken as of general application, subject of course to the
particular legislative context.
22.
Mr Hopkins argued that the difference between judicial and administrative
bodies was that the former applied the law while the latter did not. He gave as
an example of the latter a body that was essentially concerned with issues of
fact. I am not sure that I would necessarily accept that. I would have drawn
the distinction according to whether the body was operating as part of the
executive and applying policy. But the precise boundary does not matter, as
under section 58(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 the First-tier
Tribunal has to decide if the decision of the Information Commissioner was in
accordance with law. That clearly puts it on the judicial side of the line,
wherever it may be drawn. And the same is true of the overwhelming majority of
the jurisdictions of the First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal.
23.
I expressed my concern that I had to take account of the full range of
the First-tier Tribunal’s functions and not just the information rights
jurisdiction. The scope of section 42 is defined by reference to the body, not
by reference to the powers it exercises or the duties it performs in a
particular case. It requires a classification of the nature of the body, not
the nature of the proceedings in any particular case. The First-tier Tribunal
and the Upper Tribunal are single bodies, divided for convenience into separate
chambers. Could they be courts for some cases but not for others? Here I came
up against the limits of Mr Hopkins’ instructions. Although willing to be as
helpful as he could, the Information Commissioner had no interest in the proper
classification of either the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal as a
whole, only its information rights jurisdiction. I do not criticise him for
that. I do though note the consequence of not having the Attorney-General as a
party to take a wider perspective.
24.
As a matter of authority, Ewing concerned a vexatious litigant
and held that the Information Tribunal, whose functions have been transferred
to the First-tier Tribunal, was a court. Employment tribunals have also been
accepted as inferior courts for this purpose: Attorney General v Douglas (No 2) [2006] EWHC 1982 (Admin). See also Laws LJ in Ewing v The Security
Service at [20].
Paragraph 40.1
25.
This reads:
40.1 The establishment and
constitution of the Information Tribunal, as prescribed by Parliament, requires
a chairman appointed by the Lord Chancellor and members who are legally
qualified. In practice, indeed, as I gather, all three member of such Tribunal
may — as in the present case — have had significant judicial experience:
invariably, at least one will.
26.
The establishment and constitution of the First-tier Tribunal is also
prescribed by Parliament under the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007
and the Practice Statements of the Senior President. Unlike Ewing, the
tribunal will not be composed of three senior lawyers. Depending on the issue, the
First-tier Tribunal may consist of a single judge or a judge sitting with
specialist members. The Upper Tribunal may consist of one or more judges with
or without members, depending on the nature of the case and the issues raised.
Davis J’s use of ‘may’ in his second sentence indicates that he did not regard
an exclusively legal composition as an essential feature. Indeed, the
employment tribunal is now accepted as a court for this purpose, although it
too may be composed of a judge and members.
Paragraph 40.2
27.
This reads:
40.2 It is, in my view, of
central importance to see just what it is that the Information Tribunal's
functions and powers under s.28 are. The function
is, on an appeal under s.28(4), to determine
“applying the principles applied by the court on an application for judicial
review” whether the Minister did not have reasonable grounds for issuing the
certificate. If it does so determine, the Tribunal may “quash” the certificate.
That language makes clear that, in effect, the Tribunal is exercising (in a way
analogous to the Administrative Court) judicial review functions and powers:
that connotes judicial, not administrative, functions and powers.
28.
The Upper Tribunal does have judicial review powers and is designated as
a superior court of record under section 3(5) of the Tribunals, Courts and
Enforcement Act 2007. The judicial review provision has now been repealed and
does not apply to the First-tier Tribunal. However, as I have said the duty of
the tribunal is to decide whether the decision under appeal was in accordance
with the law and, on appeal, the issue for the is whether that tribunal made an
error of law (section 12(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007).
Powers equivalent to judicial review were a feature in Ewing but not an
essential characteristic of a court. It is not a feature of all the ordinary
courts and the employment tribunal have no such powers, although those are all
courts for vexatious litigant purposes.
Paragraph 40.3
29.
This reads:
40.3 A consideration of Schedule 6 and of the
2000 Rules leads also to that conclusion. The Rules, for example, confer a list
of powers (including as to amendment; disclosure of documents; the summoning of
witnesses; conduct of proceedings and of hearings; costs; and so on) which are
typical judicial powers: compare Peach Grey & Co. v Sommers.
30.
The First-tier Tribunal operates under the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (SI No 1976) and
the Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper Tribunal operates under the
Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (SI No 2698). These are
essentially similar in content and structure to the rules of procedure that
apply to all chambers of both the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal.
They consist of a common core of rules that govern: the overriding objective
and the duty to co-operate; alternative dispute resolution; delegation to
staff; case management powers; powers to give directions; failure to comply
with rules and directions; striking out and barring participation;
identification of parties; costs; representatives; calculating time; sending
and delivery of documents; use of documents and information; controlling
evidence and submissions; summoning witnesses and production of documents;
withdrawal; lead cases; and staying decisions. Of these, only the rules about costs
vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. There then follow rules
governing hearings and the giving of decisions and reasons. These vary
considerably between chambers in order to make appropriate provision for
particular jurisdictions. The rules end with common provisions governing:
correction of slips, setting aside for procedural error; review; and permission
to appeal. All of those rules find equivalents in the rules that apply in the
High Court and County Court. In terms of characteristics, the tribunal rules of
procedure contain what is to be expected of the rules governing the proceedings
before a judicial body.
Paragraph 40.4
31.
This reads:
40.4 To conclude from all this
that the Information Tribunal is a court is not inconsistent with the
observations, taken overall, of Viscount Dilhorne in the BBC case; and
is consistent, in my judgment, with the observations of Lord Fraser and Lord
Scarman. Further, if the ultimate test is one of impression, as Lord
Edmund-Davies suggests, then all I would say is that, based on all the
foregoing, my clear impression is that the Information Tribunal, acting under s.28, is a court.
32.
As to the BBC case, the general tenor of the analysis and
conclusions in that case is consistent with the classification of the
First-tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal as courts.
33.
As to the issue of impression, Mr Hopkins argued that this was a check
on the conclusions reached following the analysis of the other factors. I do
not accept that. The judge said that the proper classification was ultimately a
matter of impression. The other matters are merely factors that help to inform
the analysis that underlie that impression.
34.
There is a considerable difference between the Ewing case and
this one. That case concerned a tribunal consisting entirely of eminent, senior
lawyers who had to apply judicial review criteria to an issue of national
security. That certainly looks very like a court. However, that does not mean
that that is the proper model to apply. Many courts would not meet those
criteria. The Information Tribunal as considered by Davis J was very much at one
extreme of the spectrum of the range of courts. I have taken account of the
wide range of cases that come before the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper
Tribunal both across their chambers and specifically in their information right
jurisdiction. My overall impression on both counts is that these tribunals are
courts for the present purposes. They are, generally although not exclusively, bodies
that have to interpret and apply the law to the cases before them, for the
purposes of which they have procedural powers that are similar to those
possessed by the ordinary courts, albeit adjusted to the particular needs of
tribunals.
H.
does the Upper Tribunal have power to give permission?
35.
No, it does not.
36.
This issue turns on the scope of section 25 of the Tribunals, Courts and
Enforcement Act 2007:
25 Supplementary powers of
Upper Tribunal
(1) In relation to the
matters mentioned in subsection (2), the Upper Tribunal—
(a) has,
in England and Wales or in Northern Ireland, the same powers, rights,
privileges and authority as the High Court, and
(b) has,
in Scotland, the same powers, rights, privileges and authority as the Court of
Session.
(2) The matters are—
(a) the attendance and
examination of witnesses,
(b) the production and
inspection of documents, and
(c) all other matters
incidental to the Upper Tribunal’s functions.
(3) Subsection (1) shall not
be taken—
(a) to limit any power to
make Tribunal Procedure Rules;
(b) to
be limited by anything in Tribunal Procedure Rules other than an express
limitation.
(4) A power, right,
privilege or authority conferred in a territory by subsection (1) is available
for purposes of proceedings in the Upper Tribunal that take place outside that
territory (as well as for purposes of proceedings in the tribunal that take
place within that territory).
Section 25(2)(a) and (b) do not apply, so the he issue is
whether section 25(2)(c) applied. In other words, is the grant of permission to
a vexatious litigant to bring proceedings a matter incidental to the Upper
Tribunal’s functions? My answer is: no. This is why.
37.
First, this provision cannot override express statutory provisions that
confer powers on the High Court. The Act made numerous amendments to other
legislation and authorised the extensive amendments in the Tribunals, Courts
and Enforcement Act 2007 (Transitional and Consequential Provisions) Order 2008
(SI No 2683) and the Transfer of Tribunal Functions Order 2008 (SI No 2833). It
is inconceivable that, in that context, this general provision could have the
effect of overriding statutory provisions that are expressly limited to the
High Court.
38.
Second, the provision only applies to matters incidental to the Upper
Tribunal’s functions. I was not referred to any authorities on the meaning of
‘incidental’. Ultimately words acquire their meaning from their context. The
word is suggestive of something that is of subordinate or secondary importance.
In section 25(2)(c), that indicates something that is subordinate or secondary
to the functions of the Upper Tribunal. Adopting that approach, permission for
a vexatious litigant is more than incidental. It is an essential prerequisite
to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction in respect of that person. So
important a matter, especially one going to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, is not
appropriately described as incidental.
I.
Mr B’s arguments
39.
I have dealt with Mr B’s argument on section 25 of the Tribunals, Courts
and Enforcement Act 2007. I now summarise his other arguments at the oral
hearing and explain why I reject them.
40.
Mr B argued that the order making him a vexatious litigant was obtained
by fraud and, as such, of no force or effect. I reject that argument. Nothing
that he said, in so far as I could follow his reasoning, persuaded me that
there had been any fraud involved.
41.
Mr B argued that he had been told to appeal by Dobbs J in R (B) v
Information Commissioner’s Office and the London Borough of Newham [2010]
EWHC 2540 (Admin) (pages 49-56). I do not accept that. Those were judicial
review proceedings. What Dobbs J decided was this. Mr B, as a vexatious
litigant, required permission to commence proceedings for judicial review,
which he had been refused. Dobbs J was only concerned with Mrs B and decided
that she was not entitled to apply for judicial review as she could appeal to
the tribunal. As Mrs B was not a vexatious litigant, that was (with respect)
correct. What Dobbs J did not say was that Mr B had the right to appeal without
first obtaining the permission of the High Court. That issue did not arise
before her.
42.
Mr B argued that his wife was really the person who requested the
information and applied to the Information Commissioner. I have already
explained why I do not accept that Mrs B is a party to this appeal. Even if she
were, it would be necessary to consider whether she was acting independently or
as Mr B’s servant or agent. If the latter, Mr B would still require the
permission of the High Court. In view of my decision on Mrs B’s status, that
issue does not arise. If it did, I would have to bear in mind the comments of
Dobbs J at [17]: ‘it is readily apparent that Mr B has been using his wife to
seek to circumvent the civil restraint order made against him.’
43.
Mr B applied for me to make a declaration. I asked him to tell me the
terms, but he did not particularise what he wanted. His concerns seemed to
relate back to Zambia and 1964. In any event, I do not have power to give a
declaration in this case. The Upper Tribunal’s power is conferred by section 15
of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and that section is limited
to applications for judicial review. As these are not judicial review
proceedings, but an appeal, I have no power to give a declaration.
44.
Mr B argued that these proceedings were criminal and, as such, outside
the terms of the order against him. His argument required me to accept that in
his past dealings he had encountered the offences of perjury and official
misconduct in public office, which needed to be investigated with the
assistance of the Director of Public Prosecutions. He relied on numerous
statutory references to show that I had power to consolidate and transfer
proceedings in various other courts, thereby bringing all matters before me and
rendering the whole proceedings criminal. I reject this argument. These
proceedings are free standing and they are plainly civil. There is no criminal
element in them. Mr B recognised that; otherwise, he would not have needed to
exercise his ingenuity to bring all the proceedings before me. The Upper
Tribunal, like all tribunals, has only the powers conferred upon it by statute
and, as I have explained in my analysis of section 25, the Upper Tribunal does
not have the extensive powers required as a foundation for Mr B’s argument.
45.
Mr B asked me to award him costs, but there is no basis on which I could
properly make an order in his favour.
J.
The effect of my decision
46.
I have decided the preliminary issue against Mr B. The First-tier
Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with any aspect of his appeals unless and
until he obtained permission of the High Court.
|
Signed on original
on 13 September 2011
|
Edward Jacobs
Upper Tribunal Judge
|
