UK Social Security and Child Support Commissioners' Decisions

[2001] UKSSCSC CI_4421_2000 (04 July 2001)

THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONERS
Commissioner's Case No: CI/4421/2000
SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS ACT 1992 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACT 1992 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 1998 APPEAL FROM DECISION OF AN APPEAL TRIBUNAL ON A QUESTION OF LAW DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER MR COMMISSIONER JACOBS


 


Decision:

1. My decision is as follows. It is given under section 14(8)(b) of the Social Security Act 1998.
2. 1. The decision of the Whittington House appeal tribunal, held on 21^st January 2000, is erroneous in point of law.
3. 2. I set it aside and remit the case to a differently constituted appeal tribunal.
4. 3. I direct that appeal tribunal to conduct a complete rehearing of the issues that arise for decision. In particular, the tribunal must answer these questions.

Did the accident on 9^th September 1990 result in a loss of faculty?

What was it?

What disabilities resulted from that it?

Was there was another effective cause of any of those disabilities (applying if necessary regulation 11 of the Social Security (General Benefit) Regulations 1982)?

For what period did/will the disablement continue?

Is the assessment final or provisional?

As regards a medical examination, it is for the appeal tribunal to decide whether one would be useful. The claimant is not obliged to submit to one, although if he refuses he will limit the information available to the tribunal in making its decision.

Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal

5. I grant leave to the claimant to appeal against my decision to the Court of Appeal.

The appeal to the Commissioner

6. This is an appeal to a Commissioner against the decision of the appeal tribunal brought by the claimant with the leave of the tribunal's chairman. The Secretary of State does not support the appeal.
7. As the claimant raised a human rights issue, I directed an oral hearing of the appeal jointly with CIS/5741/1999, in which the claimant raised the same issue. The hearing was held before me in London on 28^th June 2001. The claimant attended and was represented by Mr S Cox of counsel, instructed by the Child Poverty Action Group. The Secretary of State was represented by Mr D Forsdick of counsel, instructed by the Office of the Solicitor to the Department of Work and Pensions. I am grateful to both counsel for their arguments.

The history of the case

8. The claimant suffered an accident on 9^th September 1990. He claimed disablement benefit in respect of that accident and was referred to an adjudicating medical authority for an assessment of his disablement. As that assessment was set aside and the claimant's disablement was reassessed, I need only refer to the reassessment.
9. On reassessment, the adjudicating medical authority identified the injury that resulted from the accident as 'Soft tissue injury to R shoulder and neck causing symptoms to develop in previously asymptomatic cervical spondylosis'. The resulting loss of faculty was 'Reduced and painful movement of R shoulder and neck.' The examining doctor assessed the claimant's disablement at 10%, consisting of 5% each for the neck and shoulder. The assessment was final for the inclusive period from 23^rd December 1990 and 22^nd December 1992. In summary, the doctor's opinion was that by the end of the period of the assessment, the claimant would have been as disablement as he was even if the accident had not occurred.
10. The claimant appealed against that decision to an appeal tribunal. At the hearing, the claimant gave evidence and was examined by the Consultant panel members. The tribunal assessed the claimant's disablement at 10% for the inclusive period from 23^rd December 1990 to 23^rd December 1992 and at 5% for life from and including 24^th December 1992. After an introductory paragraph, the full statement of the tribunal's decision reads:

Clinical Findings

Right shoulder lower than left shoulder. Some restriction in all movements of cervical spine, and crepitus. Supinator biceps and triceps reflexes all normal. No inversion of supinator reflex. Considerably overweight. Large fatty lump over thoracic spine. Apart from these, the Tribunal accepts the A.M.A. findings.

Reasons

[The claimant] indicated the site of the original injury as towards the lateral end of the right clavicle. Given the clinical findings set out above, the Tribunal considered that there was a minor degree of continuing disability arising from the 1990 accident, and accordingly revised the A.M.A. Decision as indicated in the TAS/DN/DIS [i.e. the decision notice] completed at the oral hearing.

Was the tribunal's decision erroneous in law?

11. Yes, it was.
12. It would be unkind to list all the deficiencies in this decision. Three will suffice:
13. 1. The accident occurred in September 1990. The claimant was examined by the adjudicating medical authority in May 1999 and by the appeal tribunal in January 2000. The tribunal should have explained how clinical findings made so long after the events related to the claimant's disablement from 1990 onwards.
14. 2. The claimant attributed his disablement to pain. The clinical findings by themselves do not show whether or not the claimant experiences pain and, if he does, its impact on his activities. The tribunal should have explained how it dealt with the evidence of pain.
15. 3. The tribunal should have explained how it dealt with the claimant's arguments about causation.

The independence of the appeal tribunal – my jurisdiction

16. In both cases considered at the oral hearing, the claimant raised the issue whether the appeal tribunal created by the Social Security Act 1998 was independent under the Convention right in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
17. The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force on 2^nd October 2000. As the hearings in this case and in CIS/5741/1999 took place before that date, I cannot apply that Act to those hearings, because it does not apply retrospectively. I explained why in detail in CIS/1077 and 6608/1999, paragraph 165, relying on the comprehensive code on retrospectivity in section 22(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The same conclusion was reached independently by Mr Commissioner Lloyd-Davies in CG/2356/2000. That conclusion has recently been confirmed by the Scottish Tribunal of Commissioners in CSDLA/1019/1999, paragraph 67. I respectfully agree with that Tribunal that the recent comments to the contrary by the Court of Appeal were obiter and do not apply to my jurisdiction.
18. However, the claimant put a different argument. In essence, his point was this: the Commissioner cannot remit the case for rehearing, because the appeal tribunal that rehears it will not be independent. He developed his argument in writing at length. Mr Cox presented a much narrower argument on independence at the oral hearing; it is that argument that I deal with. He also argued that as the appeal tribunal was not independent, I should decide the case myself and not remit it for rehearing.
19. A Commissioner's jurisdiction is statutory. As I have decided that the tribunal's decision was erroneous in law, my duty and powers are governed by section 14(8) of the Social Security Act 1998. My duty is to set the decision aside. The tribunal did not make adequate findings of fact. So, I have two powers. I could refer the case to a tribunal with directions for its determination: see section 14(8)(b). Or, I could make fresh or further findings and give the decision I consider appropriate in the light of them: see section 14(8)(a)(ii). The latter power only arises if I consider it 'expedient'.
20. So, I have to ask myself this question: do I consider it expedient to make fresh or further findings of fact and to give my own decision? I have answered that question on the assumption that the appeal tribunal that reheard this case would not be independent.
21. First, I answer the question applying the normal British principles of interpretation. On those principles, I agree with Mr Forsdick. 'Expedient' is an ordinary word of the English language. It is not used in section 14(8)(a)(ii) in a special sense. So, I do not have to interpret it; I only have to apply it. See the speech of Lord Reid in the House of Lords in Cozens v Brutus [1972] 2 All England Law Reports 1297 at page 1299. Words in use are always set in a context that governs or gives shade to their meaning. A Commissioner's jurisdiction is primarily concerned with errors of law. The jurisdiction to found an appeal depends on there being an arguable case that the tribunal's decision is erroneous in law. It is only if that is shown, that the power given by section 14(8)(a)(ii) arises. And then in its terms it is available only in a particular class of case. If I were to use the power in this case for the reason advanced by Mr Cox, Commissioners would have to use it in every case. That would convert a power that arises only in a defined class of case into a duty that applies in every case. I cannot, on normal principles of interpretation, consider it expedient to give my own decision on the ground that the tribunal to which the case is remitted will not be independent.
22. Second, I consider whether section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires me to give a broader interpretation to section 14(8)(a)(ii) and to give a different answer to my question.
23. A Commissioner is a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998: section 6(3). As such, I am under a duty not to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right: section 6(1). However, I am relieved of that duty if primary legislation prevents me from complying with it. Section 3(1) provides the standard by which primary legislation has to be interpreted in order to determine whether it prevents me from complying with that duty.
24. Mr Cox argued that it was necessary to interpret 'expedient' sufficiently broadly to allow me to give my own decision rather than to remit the case for rehearing. He argued that this was necessary in order to comply with my duty under section 6 of the Human Rights Act. Mr Forsdick argued in reply that section 3(1) did not confer power to interpret section 14(8)(a)(ii) of the Social Security Act 1998 in isolation from the context in which the normal British principles of interpretation had to be applied.
25. The higher courts are still working out the limits to the new interpretative principle laid down by section 3(1). As far as I know, the broadest approach is that set out in the speech of Lord Steyn in the House of Lords in R v A [2001] 3 All England Law Reports 1, paragraph 44:

'In accordance with the will of Parliament as reflected in s 3 it will sometimes be necessary to adopt an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained. The techniques to be used will not only involve the reading down of express language in a statute but also the implication of provisions. A declaration of incompatibility is a measure of last resort. It must be avoided unless it is plainly impossible to do so.'

26. At this stage in the developing jurisprudence, probably the safest approach is to treat section 3(1) itself as the only authoritative guide to interpretation of legislation in order to avoid violation of a Convention right and to use Lord Steyn's remarks as indicating the broadest extent to which that provision may be applied. Taking that approach, the answer to the question I have posed for myself is that it is not expedient to give my own decision in this case. I have reached that conclusion for the following reasons; they operate individually and cumulatively.
27. First, section 3(1) authorises a broad approach to the interpretation of legislation. However, even on Lord Steyn's view, there are limits. On Mr Cox's argument, the division of responsibility between the appeal tribunal and the Commissioners would be subverted. Instead of the appeal tribunal being the main fact-finding body with the Commissioners only exercising that power in a limited class of case, the appeal tribunal would become an effectively redundant stage before the case came before a Commissioner who would be obliged to give a decision without remitting the case for rehearing.
28. Second, section 3(1) authorises a departure from the normal principles of interpretation, but it does not authorise the context to be disregarded completely. I agree with Mr Forsdick on that point. The context limits section 14(8)(a)(ii) to a restricted class of case; it cannot be extended to the generality of cases.
29. Third, before the section 3(1) approach can be taken, the question arises: what legislation has to be interpreted so as to avoid a violation of a Convention right? That raises the issue of focus. Mr Cox's argument isolated section 14 and my duty under section 6 as the focus. Mr Forsdick argument adopted a wider focus. I agree with Mr Forsdick. The real problem does not lie with section 14. The source of the problem lies with the structure of the appeal tribunal. If legislation gives rise to a possible violation, it is the legislation governing the appeal tribunal that has to be interpreted under section 3(1). The closer the connection between a provision and the legislation that may be in violation of a Convention right, the greater the justification for stretching its meaning in order to avoid a violation. Section 14(8)(a)(ii) is too far removed from the defective legislation to justify its meaning being stretched as far as Mr Cox's argument requires.
30. Fourth, if the appeal tribunal that rehears this case is not independent, it will not be because I have remitted the case for rehearing. I have not directed that the appeal tribunal must not be independent. If the appeal tribunal will not be independent, that can be tested in advance by judicial review or an action under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. If the appeal tribunal that rehears the case is not independent, that can be the subject of an appeal on error of law to the Commissioner.

CIS/5741/1999

31. Mr Cox asked me to make clear whether my reasoning in CI/4421/2000 depended on the nature of the benefit or the issues that arose for decision.
32. There are differences between the two cases that were the subject of the oral hearing. In CI/4421/2000 the claimant raised an issue of medical causation: did the accident cause the claimant's cervical spondylosis? The appeal tribunal dealing with this case will have as one of its members a Consultant medically qualified panel member. That is obviously a strong point in favour of it not being expedient for a Commissioner to give a decision.
33. I have decided to give my own decision in CIS/5741/1999. However, that is not because of a human rights issue. It is because two factors combine to make it expedient for me to give a decision: the nature of the issues and the fact that the claimant now has expert representation to help him.

The independence of the appeal tribunal – is it independent?

34. In view of my conclusion on jurisdiction, it is not necessary to answer this question. However, out of courtesy to the arguments I have heard and to the claimant's detailed written argument, I make some brief comments.
35. I have been involved with social security adjudication for 13 years as a chairman of tribunals and as a Commissioner. I have no doubt that the panel members who rehear this case will act entirely independently of the Secretary of State. I agree with Mr Cox and Mr Forsdick that the issue is whether there is an objective cause to doubt that independence and to undermine the confidence of fair-minded members of the public in the independence of the judicial tribunal. That raises the question: what does the member of the public know? The answer was given by Mr Justice Lindsay in the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Link v Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and Industry (23^rd March 2001) at the end of paragraph 28:

'We shall for the time being therefore ascribe to our construct, the fair-minded and informed observer, only such information as could be acquired by a persistent, even dogged, inquirer as a member of the public and not such information as would take him out of that class – the public – whose confidence in the administration of justice was being sought to be preserved.'

I agree that that is the correct test.

36. Mr Cox argued that the appeal tribunal was not independent because of the lack of a guarantee that sittings were allocated equally between panel members according to their availability, especially in the case of allocations following cancellations. There was an objective concern that the allocation would reflect the Secretary of State's legitimate interests that were not consistent with an independent judicial system. Like Mr Forsdick, I was surprised at the narrowness of the argument. If that was all that anyone had to worry about, there would be no reason to doubt the independence of the appeal tribunal.
37. Mr Forsdick concentrated on the features which have been listed as relevant in the domestic and European authorities on independence. Those authorities must, of course, be read in the context of the particular bodies with which the cases were concerned. I put it to Mr Forsdick that he was listing the ingredients of the appeal tribunal without the E numbers. He replied that the ingredients he had listed would outweigh the effect of the E numbers and establish confidence in the appeal tribunal's independence.
38. Just for the record, the E numbers that I referred to were the various ways in which the Secretary of State would or might become involved in an appeal. Some are matters of practice, all of which could be stopped as soon as alternative arrangements could be put in place: for example, an appeal has to be lodged with the local office of what is now the Department of Work and Pensions rather than at the office of the tribunal. Others are provisions in the Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999, that might be held to be unauthorised by statute: for example, the different provisions for the running of time in regulation 2 and the clerk's power to postpone a hearing under regulation 51. Finally, there are provisions of statute, which might not be susceptible to a saving interpretation under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: for example, the power in section 26 of the Social Security Act 1998 for the Secretary of State to dictate to an appeal tribunal (and a Commissioner) the decision to be given on an appeal and the power of the Secretary of State to make the procedure regulations for the appeal tribunal (sections 16(1) and 79). Taken together, those factors form a strong case that the appeal tribunal might appear not to be independent from the Secretary of State.
39. On the day after the hearing, I received a letter from the President of the Appeals Service, containing answers to questions set out in a letter from the Office of the Solicitor to the Department of Work and Pensions. I am grateful to the President for the information he sent me. However, as it related to the independence of the appeal tribunal rather than my jurisdiction, it was not relevant in view of the way that I have decided this case. The Commissioners' office will sent to the parties a copy of the letter and the questions on request.

Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal

40. At the oral hearing, Mr Cox said that he would apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal if I remitted the case to an appeal tribunal.
41. Leave to appeal is governed by regulation 33 of the Social Security Commissioners (Procedure) Regulations 1999. I have power under regulation 5(2)(a) to abridge time limits and on general principle to waive the need for a written application. I do both and grant leave.
42. Even under the reduced scope of my discretion to grant leave following the decision of the Court of Appeal in Cooke v Secretary of State for Social Security [2001] EWCA Civ 734, the nature of the issue raised by Mr Cox merits the attention of the Court of Appeal.
43. Mr Cox's application and my grant of leave are both inchoate until the issue of this decision, but they will then take effect.

Signed on original

Edward Jacobs Commissioner 4th July 2001