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Nessa v. Chief Adjudication Officer & Anor [1999] UKSSCSC CIS_2326_1995 (21 October 1999)

R(IS) 2/00

(Nessa v. Chief Adjudication Officer and Anor.)

Mr. J. Mesher CIS/2326/1995

HL (Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Clyde and Lord Hutton)

Person from abroad - whether "habitual residence" can commence from the date of arrival in the United Kingdom

The claimant, a widow then aged 55, arrived in the United Kingdom on 22 August 1994. Previously she had lived all her life in Bangladesh although her late husband had lived in the United Kingdom at one time. She possessed a right of abode in the United Kingdom and stated that she intended to settle here. Her late husband's brother and his family lived in the United Kingdom and she was staying with them pending finding permanent accommodation. She claimed income support with effect from 26th August but the claim was disallowed by the adjudication officer on the grounds that she was not habitually resident in the United Kingdom and so was a "person from abroad" as defined in regulation 21(3) of the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 17 of Schedule 7 to the Regulations, her applicable amount was nil.

The claimant appealed against this decision and the appeal was allowed by a social security appeal tribunal who found that "...the appellant is habitually resident as on the date of arrival in the United Kingdom and entitled to income support therefrom". The adjudication officer appealed to the Commissioner who allowed the appeal on the grounds that, for a person to be habitually resident in a new country, an appreciable period of residence in the country must have been shown as well as a settled intention to reside there. The Commissioner ordered that the case be remitted to a new tribunal for further enquiry into the facts.

On appeal by the claimant, the Court of Appeal (Morritt LJ and Sir Christopher Staughton, Thorpe LJ dissenting) upheld the Commissioner's decision. The judgments of the Court of Appeal can be found at [1998] 2 All ER 728. The claimant appealed to the House of Lords.

Held, unanimously dismissing the appeal, that:

as a matter of ordinary language, a person is not habitually resident in a country unless he has taken up residence and lived there for a period. There is no reason to suppose that Parliament intended any different meaning when using the expression in the Income Support regulations;

a person coming to the United Kingdom for the first time and expressing an intention to settle here cannot be accepted as habitually resident until he can show residence in fact for a period which shows that the residence has become habitual and will or is likely to continue to be habitual. It is a question of fact to be determined on the circumstances of each case whether and when habitual residence has been established. The requisite period is not a fixed one and may in an appropriate case be short;

the position of someone coming to the United Kingdom other than for the first time is different. In some cases the adjudication officer might be satisfied that the person concerned is resuming an habitual residence previously had.

The House of Lords confirmed the order remitting the case to a new tribunal.

DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER

The adjudication officer's appeal is allowed. The decision of the Whittington House East social security appeal tribunal dated 6 December 1994 is erroneous in point of law, for the reasons given below, and I set it aside. The appeal is referred to a differently constituted social security appeal tribunal for determination in accordance with the directions given in paragraph 32 below (Social Security Administration Act 1992, section 23(7)(b)).

The background

The claimant, who was then aged 55, arrived in the United Kingdom on 22 August 1994. She had previously lived for all her life in Bangladesh. Her husband had lived and worked in the United Kingdom from 1962 until his death in 1975. She made a claim for income support on 6 September 1994. Following an interview with an officer at the local office of the Department of Social Security on 14 September 1994, the adjudication officer on the same date decided that the claimant was not entitled to income support because she was not habitually resident in the United Kingdom.

On 1 August 1994 an addition had been made to the definition of "person from abroad" in regulation 21(3) of the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 (the Income Support Regulations) which applies to new claims from that date onwards:

"'person from abroad'also means a claimant who is not habitually resident in the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, but for this purpose, no claimant shall be treated as not habitually resident in the United Kingdom who is:

(a) a worker for the purposes of Council Regulations (EEC) No. 1612/68 or (EEC) No. 1251/70 or a person with a right to reside in the United Kingdom pursuant to Council Directive No. 68/360/EEC or No. 73/148/EEC; or

(b) a refugee within the definition in Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28th July 1951, as extended by Article 1(2) of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31st January 1967; or

(c) a person who has been granted exceptional leave to remain in the United Kingdom by the Secretary of State."

By virtue of paragraph 17 of Schedule 7 to the Income Support Regulations the applicable amount of a person from abroad who is a single claimant (as in this case) is nil. The effect is thus that a single claimant who fails the habitual residence test in any week cannot be entitled to income support for that week. Claimants who come within any of sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) need not show that they actually satisfy the test, but it is plain that none of those sub-paragraphs apply in the present case.

According to the summary of facts in the adjudication officer's written submission to the appeal tribunal, the interview had established that the claimant had the right of abode in the United Kingdom, but that her three children had not yet received permission to join her and remained in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh she had lived in her father-in-law's home with her own children and her husband's other wife and her children. She had no income there and was supported by her father-in-law. On his death, the house had been left to one of his sons. In London the claimant was staying with her brother-in-law and his family.

The claimant appealed against the adjudication officer's decision. Her solicitors put forward several further factors for consideration in the letter of appeal dated 14 October 1994, including the following. The claimant's intention on coming to the United Kingdom was to settle here and she still intended to remain. She believed she had the right to make the United Kingdom her home because of her immigration status. Although she had the right of abode it took her some time in Bangladesh to arrange for her immigration. She intended to apply to the local authority for assistance in obtaining permanent housing. She had registered with a local GP. The claimant had applied for visas for her children to come to the United Kingdom with her, but was told that DNA tests would be necessary when she arrived. She had never wished to be permanently separated from her children, who were keen to join her. In Bangladesh, the claimant had lived in her father-in-law's house in overcrowded conditions, had had no job and no bank account or property or business interests there. She brought all her belongings, mainly clothing, with her to the United Kingdom and travelled on a one-way ticket. The claimant was currently being supported by her brother-in-law and his family. It seemed natural to her and to him that as she approached her later years she should come to the United Kingdom where she could receive the emotional support of her late husband's brother.

The appeal tribunal's decision

The appeal was heard on 6 December 1994. The claimant attended the hearing with an interpreter and was represented by her solicitors. Additional evidence was given that the claimant had three adult children, and that she had had the necessary DNA test to enable a decision to be made whether to admit them to the United Kingdom or not. The adjudication officer's representative referred to Commissioners' decisions R(U) 7/85 and R(U) 4/86, and submitted that the claimant's intentions and centre of interests were particularly relevant. The written submission on form AT2 had also mentioned the reasons for coming to the United Kingdom, the claimant's employment record and her residence abroad, and suggested that, taking the everyday meaning of "habitually resident", the claimant did not qualify. The claimant's representative apparently submitted that any person who is ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom is thereby habitually resident and that the test of ordinary residence was laid down by the House of Lords in R v Barnet London Borough Council, ex parte Shah [1983] 2 AC 309. There Lord Scarman cited the following statement by Lord Sumner in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Lysaght [1928] AC 234, at 243:

"I think the converse to 'ordinarily' is 'extraordinarily' and that part of the regular order of a man's life, adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes, is not 'extraordinary'."

It was said that the claimant had adopted residence in the United Kingdom voluntarily and for settled purposes.

The appeal tribunal allowed the claimant's appeal. It recorded the following in the box for findings of fact:

"The Tribunal finds upon the evidence that the appellant is HABITUALLY resident as on the date of arrival in the United Kingdom and entitled to income support therefrom."

It recorded the following in the box for reasons for decision:

"The Tribunal accepts the evidence of the appellant in that she decided in Bangladesh to be habitually resident in the United Kingdom. She made of her own volition the necessary arrangements regarding her immigration status in the United Kingdom. That her centre of interest is in the United Kingdom and she is here for no other purpose than to be habitually resident here. The Tribunal had regard to the case law and Commissioners' decision."

It was also recorded that one member only agreed with the result when pointed to Lord Sumner's decision.

Subsequent proceedings and submissions

The appeal tribunal chairman granted the adjudication officer leave to appeal to the Commissioner. I need not detail all the written submissions on that appeal as there was an exceptionally comprehensive oral hearing of this appeal and two associated appeals. The adjudication officer was represented at the hearing by Mr. Nicholas Paines of counsel. The claimant was represented by Mr. Richard Drabble QC and Miss Natalie Lieven of counsel.

Many of the submissions concerned Re J (A Minor) (Abduction) [1990] 2 AC 562. That was a case on the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The child J was born in December 1987 in Western Australia to a mother and father who had both been born in England, but had lived in Australia for several years. On 21 March 1990 the mother took J with her to England, having decided to return permanently. On 12 April 1990 a judge in Western Australia declared J's removal illegal and gave the father sole custody of J. The father then applied to the English court for the return of J to Australia under the terms of the Convention. The issue was whether the mother's retention of J in England after the father acquired custody rights by the order of 12 April 1990 was wrongful. Under article 3 of the Convention the answer depended on whether J was habitually resident in Western Australia immediately before the continued retention of J became a breach of the rights given by the order of 12 April 1990, not whether by that date J had become habitually resident in England. Lord Brandon, with whose speech the other four members of the court agreed, held that the mother and J ceased to be habitually resident in Western Australia on 21 March 1990, on leaving with a settled intention not to continue habitual residence there. Lord Brandon made a number of what he called preliminary points, at [1990] 2 AC 578-9:

"The first point is that the expression 'habitually resident,' as used in article 3 of the Convention, is nowhere defined. It follows, I think, that the expression is not to be treated as a term of art with some special meaning, but is rather to be understood according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the two words which it contains. The second point is that the question whether a person is or is not habitually resident in a specified country is a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the circumstances of any particular case. The third point is that there is a significant difference between a person ceasing to be habitually resident in country A, and his subsequently becoming habitually resident in country B. A person may cease to be habitually resident in country A in a single day if he or she leaves it with a settled intention not to return to it but to take up long-term residence in country B instead. Such a person cannot, however, become habitually resident in country B in a single day. An appreciable period of time and a settled intention will be necessary to enable him or her to become so. During that appreciable period of time the person will have ceased to be habitually resident in country A but not yet have become habitually resident in country B."

Mr. Paines submitted in essence that the appeal tribunal erred in law in applying the test in Shah, which related to ordinary residence. In relation to the test of habitual residence, the proper approach was laid down in Re J, applied by the Commissioner in the context of regulation 21(3) in CIS/1067/1995. That approach requires that before a person acquires habitual residence in a country an "appreciable period" of residence must be shown, in addition to a settled purpose. Mr. Paines accepted that that point was not necessary to the decision in Re J, but stressed the unanimity of the House of Lords and that the test had been accepted by the Court of Appeal in Re M (Minors) [1993] 1 FLR 495. He also submitted that the Re J approach to was plainly in accord with the ordinary and natural meaning of habitual residence. A habit takes time in being formed and it would do violence to language to say that a person is habitually resident here five minutes after arrival. As the result of applying the wrong legal test, the appeal tribunal failed to consider and make findings on all the factors relevant to habitual residence.

Mr. Drabble submitted that the appeal tribunal did not need to go beyond asking itself whether the claimant had a settled purpose of residing in the United Kingdom. The meaning of habitual residence was the same as that of ordinary residence and both could be established on the first day of residence. He submitted that the Commissioner in CIS/1067/1995 erred in holding that Re J required there to be an appreciable period of actual residence before habitual residence was established. He referred to a number of cases prior to Re J as showing that there was no sensible distinction between ordinary residence and habitual residence. In Kapur v Kapur [1984] FLR 920 (Bush J) and V v B (A Minor) (Abduction) [1991] 1 FLR 266 (Sir Stephen Brown P) that was said expressly. In Shah, the word "habitually" was used several times as indicating the quality of residence which amounted to ordinary residence. Macrae v Macrae [1949] P 397 (Court of Appeal) and Lewis v Lewis [1956] 1 All ER 375 (Willmer J) showed that ordinary residence can be established on the first day of residence, a result supported by the facts of Shah. None of those cases were cited to the House of Lords in Re J (although the Court of Appeal had mentioned Kapur) and there was no argument from counsel about any differences between the concepts of habitual residence and ordinary residence. That was because the acquisition of habitual residence was not in issue, only its abandonment. Therefore, said Mr. Drabble, Lord Brandon's third point in the passage quoted in paragraph 9 above was not necessary to the decision and, despite the agreement of the other Law Lords, should not be followed. He said in the ordinary use of language the phrase "habitually resident" did not point to there having to be some past period of residence, but could be shown by taking up residence as a matter of habit, on an unequivocal change of base.

Of the cases after Re J Mr. Drabble said that there had been no case in which a failure to show an appreciable period of residence had been decisive in a conclusion that a person was not habitually resident in a particular state. He referred in particular to Re F (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1992] 1 FLR 548 and Re M (Minors) [1993] 1 FLR 495, both decisions of the Court of Appeal. In Re F, Butler-Sloss LJ set out Lord Brandon's test and said, at [1992] 1 FLR 555:

"The judge was entitled to make the finding that the family did intend to emigrate from the UK and settle in Australia. With that settled intention, a month can be, as I believe it to be in this case, an appreciable period of time. Looking realistically at the position of A [the child involved], by the time he left Sydney on 10 July 1991 [when the father flew back to England with A], he had been resident in Australia for the substantial period of nearly 3 months."

Mr. Drabble said that if matters came down to an odd month the "appreciable period" test added very little, if anything, to what was required for ordinary residence.

Re M was not a Convention case, but was about the jurisdiction to make orders under section 8 of the Family Law Act 1986. The parents, who were not married, separated. The mother therefore had sole parental responsibility for them. She agreed that the children, then aged seven and six, should live with their paternal grandparents in Scotland for at least a year. The children went there in September 1991. On 4 July 1992 they went to the mother in Oxford for what was intended to be a two-week holiday. She decided not to return the children and on 23 July 1992 filed applications for residence and prohibited steps orders. The English court would have jurisdiction if at that date the children were either habitually resident in England and Wales or were present in England and Wales and not habitually resident in any other part of the United Kingdom. Balcombe LJ deduced four propositions about habitual residence from the cases. The first was that "habitual" or "ordinary" residence had the meaning given in Shah and the third was Lord Brandon's point on appreciable period. On the facts Balcombe LJ found that:

"From September 1991 until some time after 4 July 1992 but at the latest 13 July 1992 the children were habitually resident in Scotland. Their physical presence in Scotland was for the settled purpose of living with their grandparents, and attending school, for at least a year, and was with the agreement of the mother who alone had parental responsibility for them. It seems to me quite artificial to say that in those circumstances the children remained habitually resident in England and Wales."

On the basis of his third proposition he had grave doubts that the children had regained a habitual residence in England by 23 July 1992, but did not have to come to a final opinion because they clearly lost their habitual residence in Scotland when their mother determined that they should live elsewhere, so that jurisdiction was conferred by their presence in England. Hoffmann LJ would have had had less doubt that the children were habitually resident in England by 23 July 1992. By that date their presence in England, which had been merely transient, had taken on the quality of residence. They immediately became habitually resident because of their mother's decision where they were to live. Hoffmann LJ said:

"In a case like Re J ... in which mother and child arrive in a new country together and have to find a settled home, it may be that although they have lost their old residence, it is necessary for some time to keep an open mind on whether their new residence is habitual. But where a child comes into a home which is undoubtedly the habitual residence of the parent or other person to be responsible for his care and the intention of the parent or parents with parental responsibility is that the child's stay should not be merely transient or temporary, I do not see why the child's residence should not forthwith be treated as habitual."

Mr. Drabble submitted that Balcombe LJ's first proposition, which appeared to equate the tests of habitual and ordinary residence, was inconsistent with the argument for the adjudication officer in the present case. He also submitted that Hoffmann LJ's evidential approach left open the possibility that outside the special case of children the circumstances could show that a new residence was habitual immediately.

I have left out much of the supporting detail in the above arguments, not because I found that detail unhelpful, but because of the view that I have taken of the authorities. I shall mention several other points made in argument in explaining my decision.

Issues of law

I start of course from the position that, in accordance with R(I)12/75, I should follow the legal principles for which CIS/1067/1995 stands unless satisfied that they are wrong. The facts of CIS/1067/1995 were peculiar and it is hard to understand how the case ever got as far as a Commissioner. The claimant was born and lived all her life until 1992 in what is now Myanmar. She opted for British nationality in 1962. In 1992 she separated from her husband and children. She had had considerable problems in pursuing employment in Myanmar because of her nationality. She came to the United Kingdom in June 1992 to look for work. She obtained work in July 1992 which continued until May 1994 when she was made redundant. She then claimed income support. In July 1994 her husband was thought to be terminally ill and, being of the Roman Catholic faith, the claimant felt it necessary to return to Myanmar to arrange the last rites for him. She left the United Kingdom on 20 July 1994. Her husband turned out not to be as ill as had been feared. She returned to the United Kingdom on 20 August 1994. One might have thought that it was plain that the claimant had on any footing become habitually resident in the United Kingdom before 20 July 1994 and that her absence from that date was for a temporary purpose which did not indicate any abandonment of that habitual residence. Nevertheless, both the adjudication officer and the appeal tribunal held that she was not habitually resident, based on her continuing family ties in Myanmar. Therefore, it was necessary for the Commissioner to consider the general meaning of habitual residence in reversing the appeal tribunal's decision. Although on the facts the result would have been the same whether or not the appreciable period approach was adopted, the Commissioner's carefully considered views demand respect. However, I have taken a fresh view of the issues in the light of the detailed arguments made in this and associated cases in which the appreciable period point is central.

It seems to me that when in August 1994 the test of habitual residence was introduced into the income support scheme the intention was to use the same legal concept as was already in use in a number of other contexts. That much at least I take from the July 1994 report (Cm. 2609) of the Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) on the proposal to make the amending regulations and from the Department of Social Security's explanatory notes on the proposal. I am satisfied that there is nothing in the statutory context of the Income Support Regulations or in any other material which I am able to consider to suggest that the words should be given any special meaning other than their ordinary and natural meaning. I agree with the similar views expressed in paragraph 20 of CIS/1067/1995. I therefore gain no assistance from the attempts in various places in the SSAC Report to explain what habitual residence meant, what factors might or might not be relevant in applying the concept, and what the differences might or might not be from the concept of ordinary residence (which was suggested by the SSAC as a better-understood concept in British social security law). The meaning of habitual residence must be sought in the authorities themselves rather than official attempts to describe that meaning. I do not read the decision of a Child Support Commissioner in CCS/7395/1995 as suggesting that the concept of habitual residence has a different meaning in different statutory contexts, but merely that different factors might have greater or lesser significance in different circumstances.

Re J

The prime authority on the ordinary and natural meaning of habitual residence is the speech of Lord Brandon in Re J. It would be idle for me to enter into a debate about whether Lord Brandon's third point on appreciable period was or was not obiter or was or was not justified on an analysis of the earlier authority on ordinary residence. Reference to the very considerable number of family law cases after Re J (and not merely to the decisions cited to me) shows an entirely consistent adoption of all of Lord Brandon's points without the slightest whisper of a suggestion that what he said about appreciable period might be dubious on the sorts of grounds put forward by Mr. Drabble. I mention the following decisions of the Court of Appeal in addition to those cited to me: Re S (A Minor) (Abduction) (Joint Custody) [1991] 2 FLR 1, Re R (Wardship: Child Abduction) [1992] 2 FLR 481, Re N (Child Abduction: Habitual Residence) [1993] 2 FLR 124, F v S (Wardship) [1993] 2 FLR 686 and Re M (A Minor) (Habitual Residence), The Times 3 January 1996. I mention also the following first instance decisions: Re B (Minors) (Abduction) (No 2) [1993] 1 FLR 993 (where in the course of an influential survey of the cases up to Re F Waite J describes habitual residence as a much simpler concept than that of domicile, depending solely upon showing a settled purpose continued for an appreciable time), A v A (Child Abduction) [1993] 2 FLR 225, Re O (A Minor) (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [1993] 2 FLR 594, Re B (Child Abduction) [1994] 2 FLR 915, Re V (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [1995] 2 FLR 992 and Re A (Minors) (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [1996] 1 WLR 25, [1996] 1 FLR 1 (where Cazalet J says that the "well-established" meaning of habitual residence appears in the speech of Lord Brandon). In the face of that authority, the only possible conclusion at the level of the Commissioner is to adopt the whole of the passage from Lord Brandon's speech in Re J which I have set out in paragraph 9 above.

I hesitated slightly over a decision of the Court of Session in Cameron v Cameron 1996 Scots Law Times 306, where the headnote appeared to suggest a different approach, that to acquire a new habitual residence it is sufficient if there is an intention to reside in a place for an appreciable period. I wondered if I needed to give the parties an opportunity to make further submissions about the decision. However, on close examination, it is clear that the Lord Justice Clerk, giving the opinion of the court, was referring in the relevant passage only to the settled purpose part of the Re J test. The husband and wife concerned finally separated in autumn 1994 and it was formally agreed that two of their children (then aged six and four) would go to live with the husband in France, where he owned a house. The children lived with him there from January 1995 and entered the local school. The children came to England with the husband on a family visit in April 1995. After a period of access by the wife, she did not return them, but took them to her home in Scotland. The question was where the children were habitually resident when the wife refused to return them. It was argued for the wife that in the light of Re J three months' residence in France was not sufficient show that the children were habitually resident there. The Court of Session held that, in view of the agreement and the children's actual residence, they had clearly become habitually and normally resident in France by April 1995. The Lord Justice Clerk said that there is no minimum period which is necessary to establish the acquisition of a new habitual residence, but referred to periods of three months held sufficient in Re S and two months in V v B. He continued:

"In order to establish a new habitual residence, it is not necessary to show that when the child moved to the new country there was any intention to reside there permanently. Nor need there be any intention to reside there indefinitely. It is sufficient if there is an intention to reside there for an appreciable period. In Moran v Moran Lord Prosser pointed out that habitual residence might well be for a limited period, and we agree that that is so."

Although there is, with respect to the Lord Justice Clerk, some confusion in the use of language following that passage, there is no doubt that the passage itself was concerned with what is a sufficiently settled purpose of residence. It does not suggest that there is no need to show some appreciable period of actual residence. In those circumstances, Cameron v Cameron raises no points which were not covered in the oral hearing.

Consequently, my conclusion is that the Commissioner in CIS/1067/1995 was right to hold, following Re J, that for a person to be habitually resident in a new country an appreciable period of residence in the country must have been shown as well as a settled intention to reside there.

I do not necessarily agree with all the supporting reasoning in that decision. For instance, it seems to me that the language of Lord Scarman in Shah, cited in paragraphs 23 and 24 of CIS/1067/1995 does not support a conclusion that for the purposes of applying the ordinary residence test evidence of past residence on an established and settled basis is always necessary. The language seems to me to go no further than showing that in a case where evidence of past residence is available the settled purpose put forward must be tested against the actualities. But I do in particular agree that it sits more easily with the ordinary use of language to say that some time must elapse before residence becomes habitual. A habit takes time to become established.

Di Paolo

I also agree that there is no inconsistency between the approach in Re J and what was said by the European Court of Justice in Di Paolo v Office National de l'Emploi (Case 76/76) [1977] ECR 315. I would go a little further. In my view great caution is necessary when using Di Paolo to illuminate the meaning of habitual residence. The decision was concerned with the very particular context of Article 71(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71, which exceptionally applies to the unemployed who resided in a Member State other than the State in which they were employed and allows unemployment benefits to be claimed from the State of residence (residence in Regulation 1408/71 being defined as habitual residence). The ECJ took the view that the exception from the principle that liability should rest with the State of last employment had to be interpreted strictly. Accordingly, its ruling in paragraph 1 of the operative part was as follows:

"The concept of the Member State where the worker resides, appearing in Article 71(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation No. 1408/71, must be limited to the State where the worker, although occupied in another Member State, continues habitually to reside and where the habitual centre of his interests is also situated."

It seems clear that the ECJ there was using the concept of the centre of interests as an additional narrowing of the scope which would have been given to Article 71(1)(b)(ii) if the concept of habitual residence had been used alone. With great respect to the Commissioner concerned, I consider that the suggestion in paragraph 12 of R(U) 7/85 that under Di Paolo a person is habitually resident where he has his habitual centre of interests is at the least an over-simplification. The location of a person's centre of interests may be one relevant factor in determining habitual residence, but there is no principle of Community law that the two concepts are synonymous. In addition, the factors particularly mentioned in Di Paolo, such as the nature of a person's occupation, the importance of stable employment and the reasons which led the person to move to work in another Member State, are particularly related to the circumstances of that case, of a person moving to work in another Member State from the Member State where her family lived. As the Commissioner stated in paragraph 25 of CIS/1067/1995, the ECJ was not suggesting that the factors mentioned were the only ones to be taken into account or that the general approach to habitual residence should be other than a factual and practical one taking into account all the individual's circumstances.

There are two other aspects of the decision in CIS/1067/1995 which I need to deal with specifically. These are the examples given by the Commissioner in paragraph 28 of the sorts of periods which might amount to appreciable periods in different circumstances and the question of "viability".

Appreciable period

On the first point, Mr. Paines stressed that the Commissioner in CIS/1067/1995 did not intend his use of examples to undermine the fundamental principle that each case has to determined on its individual circumstances according to the good sense and judgment of the adjudicating authority. He submitted there was no suggestion that three months' residence was any kind of normal minimum period or that there was any magic period at all. I see of course the reasons why the Commissioner in CIS/1067/1995 wished to give some practical guidance to appeal tribunals and adjudication officers. However, I think that the danger of the examples being read as periods normally to be adopted or as minimum periods is such that they should not be relied on. The Court of Appeal has recently emphasised Lord Brandon's second point in Re J that the question whether a person is or is not habitually resident in a country is a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the circumstances of the particular case (Re M (A Minor) (Habitual Residence), The Times 3 January 1996). The possible variety of circumstances is so great that I do not think that any particular periods should be mentioned as amounting to an appreciable period except in relation to actual cases which arise for decision. I agree with the approach of the Court of Session in Cameron v Cameron that there is no minimum period which is necessary to establish the acquisition of a new habitual residence. The question in each individual case must be whether, in all the circumstances, including the settledness of the person's intentions as to residence, the residence has continued for a sufficient period for it to be said to be habitual.

Even Lord Brandon's statement that a person cannot become habitually resident in a new country in a single day must be considered in its context, of a sharp-edged leaving of the country of existing habitual residence with the intention to take up long-term residence in another country. Leaving aside what may be the special case of children subject to parental control of the place of residence, I take two examples to show the importance of context and considering the entire circumstances. The first comes from the facts of one of the family law cases, Re V (Abduction: Habitual Residence) [1995] 2 FLR 992. The parent concerned in that case had had homes in both the United Kingdom and Greece for several years and lived for part of each year in the United Kingdom and for part in Greece. Douglas Brown J held that the continuity of residence in both countries was sufficient to meet the test of habitual residence. Because the Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction would not work easily if a person was habitually resident in more than one country, the judge held for those purposes that when present in the United Kingdom the parent was habitually resident solely in the United Kingdom and when present in Greece was habitually resident solely in Greece. That necessarily involved the conclusion that on the first day of any residence in the United Kingdom, having immediately before been habitually resident in Greece, the parent was habitually resident in the United Kingdom. It may well be that outside the particular context of the Convention a person in the circumstances of Re V would be said to be simultaneously habitually resident in the United Kingdom and Greece. There seems no reason why, if habitual residence is essentially a factual concept, that should not be so, especially as it is clearly accepted that a person may be ordinarily resident in more than one country simultaneously. Fortunately, I do not have to decide that issue in the present case.

My second example is based on one used by Mr. Drabble in argument. He posed the case of an United Kingdom national who had worked and made a life abroad so that habitual residence in the United Kingdom had been lost. On reaching retirement age in the overseas employment the person returned to the United Kingdom, having given up all overseas ties, to live out retirement in the United Kingdom. Mr. Drabble used that example to support his argument that there could not possibly be a rule of law which, where there had been an unequivocal change of base, precluded a finding that the person was habitually resident in the United Kingdom on the first day of residence here. I have rejected Mr. Drabble's argument of law against the appreciable period test. If there is a sharp-edged change of residence, then the case falls within Lord Brandon's statement. However, the change might in reality be far from sharp-edged. If the hypothetical expatriate, before leaving the overseas base, had spent periods of time in the United Kingdom, had sought out and bought a property to live in in retirement, had furnished it for occupation, opened local bank or building society accounts, joined local organisations, made arrangements to register with a doctor etc, the position would be very different. I do not see any reason why Lord Brandon's appreciable period needs to be continuous or why periods which occur while the person is still habitually resident in another country cannot be relevant. However, I think that such periods could only be relevant where they are connected with the settled intention which is said to underpin the subsequent habitual residence. Thus, in the case of the hypothetical expatriate, mere holidays or visits to relatives in the United Kingdom would not be relevant. But visits to the United Kingdom for the purpose of setting up the new base for life in retirement, which as temporary absences would not undermine the habitual residence abroad, could count as part of the appreciable period to be taken into account when subsequently the actual retirement occurs and the person makes the break with the overseas habitual residence.

As all examples must be used with great caution, so must my two examples. All I seek to draw from them are the suggestions that not all cases will be ones where there is a sharp-edged change of residence from a country of habitual residence to a new country, that habitual residence in one country does not necessarily preclude simultaneous habitual residence in another country and that periods prior to the date of the latest arrival in the United Kingdom may be relevant in assessing what is an appreciable period under the Re J principle.

Viability

For similar reasons to those expressed in paragraph 24 above, I consider that paragraphs 28 and 29 of CIS/1067/1995 should not be read as imposing an additional condition that only residence of a viable nature, in the sense of viable in the absence of resort to income support or public assistance, is relevant to the Re J test. Mr. Drabble sharply criticised the Commissioner's approach in those paragraphs as fundamentally misconceived, circular in reasoning, unsupported by authority and contrary to the policy revealed in the August 1994 amendments. It seems to me that the touchstone is that habitual residence is essentially a factual concept to be determined by an unfettered consideration of all relevant circumstances. On that basis, the viability or otherwise of a person's residence here, either generally or with or without assistance from public funds, is one relevant factor among others, to be given the appropriate weight according to the circumstances. It may in particular be relevant in assessing whether a person's intentions as to residence are truly settled. But in that context I consider that the Court of Session in Cameron v Cameron was right to say that the settled intention necessary under Re J is an intention to reside here for an appreciable period. That echoes Lord Scarman's statement in Shah, at [1983] 2 AC 344, that the settled purpose necessary for the acquisition of ordinary residence may be for a limited period, providing that it has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.

The date of assessment

There is one final general legal issue which I should deal with. That is the effect of the date on which the question about habitual residence is asked and the period about which it is asked. An adjudication officer making the initial decision on a claim for income support will need to consider the position from the date of claim down to the date of the decision. If satisfied that the claimant is not habitually resident in one of the relevant countries for any part of that period, and so within the definition of "person from abroad" in regulation 21(3) of the Income Support Regulations, the claimant's applicable amount is nil. Therefore, even if all the normal conditions of entitlement under section 124(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 are satisfied, no amount of income support can be awarded. If the claimant appeals against an adverse initial decision by an adjudication officer, when the case comes before an appeal tribunal some months later, the appeal tribunal must consider the position from the date of claim down to the date of the appeal tribunal's decision. That principle is undoubtedly established by several decisions of Tribunals of Commissioners and was applied to the habitual residence context in CIS/11481/1995. The appeal tribunal must therefore seek and consider evidence about the circumstances throughout that period. Within that period doubts about whether an intention to reside was settled might have resolved and an appreciable period of residence (whatever that might be in the light of all the circumstances) might have elapsed, so that it could no longer be shown that the claimant was not habitually resident. So much is clear, but can such a finding have an effect on the position as at the date of claim?

There was some discussion of this question at the oral hearing. An argument could be made that, once residence has endured for sufficient time for it to be established that residence has become habitual, that shows that the quality of the residence from the outset has been habitual. I do not think that any such argument can be admitted when habitual residence means what Re J, CIS/1067/1995 and the present decision say it does. Residence only changes its quality at the point at which it becomes habitual. However, it may be in some circumstances that subsequent conduct can act as confirmation of a claimant's stated intentions if it is consistent with those intentions, and help to show that those intentions were settled from the outset. There is a similar principle in the law of domicile (see Ross v Ellison (or Ross) [1930] AC 1).

The decision on the appeal

It follows from the above conclusions of law that the appeal tribunal of 6 December 1994 erred in law. It is evident that it considered only whether the claimant had adopted residence in the United Kingdom voluntarily and for settled purposes and did not ask whether there had been an appreciable period of residence. It also erred in finding that the claimant was actually entitled to income support without having dealt with all the conditions of entitlement. There is no alternative to referring the appeal to a differently constituted social security appeal tribunal for determination. Although there was some evidence before the appeal tribunal of 6 December 1994 about what the claimant had done between the date of claim and 6 December 1994, for instance the registration with a GP and the taking of DNA tests, I am not in a position to make the necessary findings of fact to give a decision.

Directions to the new appeal tribunal

There must be a complete rehearing of the appeal on the evidence presented and submissions made to the new appeal tribunal. The period in issue on the appeal will run from the date of claim, 6 September 1994, down to the date of the rehearing, unless something has happened to terminate the running of the open-ended claim. The new appeal tribunal must consider in relation to all the weeks in the period in issue in which the claimant was physically present in the Great Britain whether it is satisfied that the claimant is not habitually resident in the United Kingdom. For all the weeks in which the new appeal tribunal is satisfied that that is so, no amount of income support can be awarded. For all the weeks in which the new appeal tribunal is not so satisfied, it must consider whether the conditions of entitlement are satisfied and what amount of income support, if any, should be awarded. In doing so, it must apply the legal approach set out above. In brief, the Commissioner's decision CIS/1067/1995 should be followed subject to the qualifications set out in paragraphs 24 and 28 above. There are no rules of thumb about what sort of periods would be appreciable periods in different circumstances. The new appeal tribunal may legitimately look at the periods adopted in the family law cases, bearing in mind that in cases on the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction a child will not have the protection of the Convention if it does not have a habitual residence somewhere.

Date: 6 June 1996 (signed) Mr. J. Mesher Commissioner

The claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal which upheld the Commissioner's decision. The claimant appealed to the House of Lords. The decision of the House of Lords follows.

DECISION OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS

Mr. R. Drabble QC and Miss N. Lieven (instructed by Messrs. T.V. Edwards, London E1 4TP) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.

Mr. N. Paines QC (instructed by Solicitor of DSS, London WC2A 2LS) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY:

My Lords,

At the relevant time a person in Great Britain was entitled to income support (which is a non-contributory benefit) if he was 18 or over, had no income or an income not exceeding the applicable amount and was not engaged in remunerative work (section 124 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992). By the Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 (SI 1987 No. 1967), Schedule 7, paragraph 17, subject to exceptions, for "a person from abroad who is a single claimant" the applicable amount is "nil."

A "person from abroad" included a "claimant who is not habitually resident in the United Kingdom . . . " again subject to exceptions for persons from the European Union, for refugees and for persons granted exceptional leave to remain: regulation 21(3) of the (Income Support (General) Regulations 1987 as amended by the Income-related Benefits Schemes (Miscellaneous Amendments) No. 3 Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No. 1807).

Mrs. Nessa arrived at Heathrow on 22 August 1994. She was then aged 55 and she had lived all her life in Bangladesh. Her husband, Mr. Mobarak Ali, had lived in the United Kingdom from 1962 until he died in 1975 and when she arrived here, Mrs. Nessa had a right of abode. In Bangladesh, she had lived in the house of her husband's father with her husband's other wife and the children of both wives. On arrival she planned to live at the home of her husband's brother in England. Her three children, all adults, wanted to come to join her.

She applied for income support. Her application form was dated 2 September 1994, but the claim was treated as made on 26 August 1994, that being the first date of her unemployment benefit claim. The adjudication officer decided on 14 September that she was "not habitually resident in the United Kingdom," his reason being: "Customer has never lived in the UK Husband died in UK 1.5.75. All other family ties and home in Bangladesh."

That decision was communicated to her by letter dated 16 September 1994. She appealed to the Social Security Appeal Tribunal. The tribunal received evidence that she had applied for her three children to come to live here and she had had a DNA test. She had brought all her belongings (mainly it seems clothes) with her and came on a one-way ticket.

In its decision dated 6 December 1994, but notified to the parties on 30 March 1995, the tribunal:

"accepts the evidence of the appellant in that she decided in Bangladesh to be habitually resident in the United Kingdom. She made of her own volition the necessary arrangements regarding her immigration status in the United Kingdom. That her centre of interest is in the United Kingdom and she is here for no other purpose than to be habitually resident here."

Accordingly:

"the Tribunal finds upon the evidence that the appellant is HABITUALLY resident in the United Kingdom as on the date of arrival in the United Kingdom and entitled to Income Support therefrom."

Despite subsequent proceedings, she has received financial support since that time.

The adjudication officer appealed to the Social Security Commissioner who, on 6 June 1996, allowed the appeal on the basis that the tribunal had "considered only whether the claimant had adopted residence in the United Kingdom voluntarily and for settled purposes and did not ask whether there had been an appreciable period of residence." The Commissioner ordered a re-hearing before a different tribunal. He said that although there was some evidence before the tribunal of 6 December 1994 about what the claimant had done between the date of the claim and 6 December 1994, "for instance, the registration with a GP and the taking of DNA tests," he could not make the necessary findings. The new tribunal:

"must consider in relation to all the weeks in issue in which the claimant was physically present in Great Britain whether it is satisfied that the claimant is not [sic] habitually resident in the United Kingdom."

By judgment given on 5 February 1998, the Court of Appeal (Morritt, LJ and Sir Christopher Staughton, Thorpe, LJ dissenting) [1998] 2 All ER 728 dismissed the appeal on the basis that to be resident habitually, a person had to be in the United Kingdom for an appreciable period of time.

The tribunal thus decided that the appellant was "habitually resident" as on the date of arrival; she had to prove no more than, and she did prove that, she came voluntarily and for settled purposes. The starting point for this conclusion is what was said by Viscount Sumner in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Lysaght [1928] AC 234, 243:

"I think the converse to 'ordinarily' is 'extraordinarily' and that part of the regular order of a man's life, adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes, is not 'extraordinary.'"

It is said that "ordinarily resident" and "habitually resident" have the same meaning. It follows that for habitual, as for ordinary, residence, voluntary residence with a settled purpose is enough. If this is right, it is perfectly possible for habitual residence to be acquired on the first day.

The counter-argument is that voluntariness and settled purpose are not enough. In order to be "habitual," residence must both be established and have continued for a period sufficient for it to be said as a matter of ordinary language that the individual has the habit of residing in the United Kingdom. The case relied on here is In re J. (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1990] 2 AC 562. The question there, however, was whether the child had ceased to be habitually resident in Western Australia when his mother took him away with the settled intention of living in England. Thus the issue was not whether he had acquired an habitual residence in England.

In the Court of Appeal, Lord Donaldson, MR said at p. 571F-G:

"I think it is a very interesting question whether J. and his mother could establish habitual residence in this country as at the moment when they arrived in this country in circumstances in which they had every intention of staying here indefinitely and of settling here.

But I do not think, with respect to the argument, that that is the point. The question is: did J.'s habitual residence in Australia, which certainly existed up to 21 March, continue thereafter? It may take time, I do not say it does, to establish habitual residence, but I cannot see that it takes any time to terminate it".

(See also Re M. [1993], 1 FLR 495, where a similar question was left open).

In his speech in the House In In re J, Lord Brandon said, at p. 578:

"In considering this issue it seems to me to be helpful to deal first with a number of preliminary points. The first point is that the expression 'habitually resident,' as used in article 3 of the Convention, is nowhere defined. It follows, I think, that the expression is not to be treated as a term of art with some special meaning, but is rather to be understood according to the ordinary and natural meaning of the two words which it contains. The second point is that the question whether a person is or is not habitually resident in a specified country is a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the circumstances of any particular case. The third point is that there is a significant difference between a person ceasing to be habitually resident in country A, and his subsequently becoming habitually resident in country B. A person may cease to be habitually resident in country A in a single day if he or she leaves it with a settled intention not to return to it but to take up long-term residence in country B instead. Such a person cannot, however, become habitually resident in country B in a single day. An appreciable period of time and a settled intention will be necessary to enable him or her to become so. During that appreciable period of time the person will have ceased to be habitually resident in country A but not yet have become habitually resident in country B. The fourth point is that, where a child of J.'s age is in the sole lawful custody of the mother, his situation with regard to habitual residence will necessarily be the same as hers."

It is common ground, and I agree, that the reference to "an appreciable period of time" being needed to establish habitual residence was obiter. In the present case, the question whether any or an appreciable period of time is needed to establish "habitual residence" is the key issue.

There is an overlap between the meaning of "ordinary" and "habitual" residence and one is sometimes defined in terms of the other. Thus in Reg. v. Barnett London Borough Council, Ex parte Shah [1983] 2 AC 309 at p. 342D, Lord Scarman said:

"I agree with Lord Denning, MR that in their natural and ordinary meaning, the words [ordinarily resident] mean 'that the person must be habitually and normally resident here, apart from temporary or occasional absences of long or short duration.' The significance of the adverb 'habitually' is that it recalls two necessary features mentioned by Viscount Sumner in Lysaght's case, namely residence adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes."

See also Kapur v. Kapur [1984] FLR 920 and V. v. B. (A Minor) (Abduction) [1991] 1 FLR 177, where the two words were regarded as almost meaning the same thing.

I am not satisfied, but it is unnecessary to decide, that they are always synonymous. Each may take a shade of meaning from the context and the object and purpose of the legislation. But there is a common core of meaning which makes it relevant to consider what has been said in cases dealing with both ordinary and habitual residence.

Viscount Sumner's speech in Lysaght's case [1928] AC 234 has already been referred to. In Levene v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1928] AC 217, 225, Viscount Cave, LC said:

"The expression 'ordinary residence' is found in the Income Tax Act 1806 and occurs again and again in the later Income Tax Acts, where it is contrasted with the usual or occasional or temporary residence; and I think that it connotes residence in a place with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary absences."

In Macrae v. Macrae [1949] P. 397 where the issue was whether justices had jurisdiction under the Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) Acts 1895 to 1925, Somerville, LJ said at p. 403

"Ordinary residence can be changed in a day. A man is ordinarily resident in one place up till a particular day: he then cuts the connection he has with that place - in this case he left his wife, in another case he might have disposed of his house or anyhow left it and made arrangements to make his home somewhere else. Where there are indications that the place to which he moves is the place which he intends to make his home for at any rate an indefinite period, then as from that date in my opinion he is ordinarily resident at the place to which he has gone."

In Lewis v. Lewis [1956] 1 WLR 200, Willmer, J applied that statement and held that a wife returning to live in England after a period living in Australia, resumed her ordinary residence when she began her voyage by sea back to England.

In Ex parte Shah [1983] 2 AC 309, 343G-H, Lord Scarman said:

"Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the statutory framework or the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning, I unhesitatingly subscribe to the view that 'ordinarily resident' refers to a man's abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being, whether of short or of long duration."

He said further at p. 344F:

"The ordinary and natural meaning of the words supplies [a simple test]. For if there be proved a regular, habitual mode of life in a particular place, the continuity of which has persisted despite temporary absences, ordinary residence is established provided only it is adopted voluntarily and for a settled purpose."

With the guidance of these cases it seems to me plain that as a matter of ordinary language a person is not habitually resident in any country unless he has taken up residence and lived there for a period. There may be cases where for the purposes of making particular legislation effective (as for founding jurisdiction), it is necessary that a person should be habitually or ordinarily resident in some state at any one time. In other words, there cannot be a gap. Whether that is so does not have to be decided here. It seems to me, however, that whilst of course realising that some people seeking to come here may need immediate financial assistance, it is not necessary to the working of this particular legislation that the ordinary meanings of the word should be set aside in order that there is no gap between habitual residence in one state and habitual residence in another state.

If Parliament had intended that a person seeking to enter the United Kingdom or such a person declaring his intention to settle here is to have income support on arrival, it could have said so. It seems to me impossible to accept the argument at one time advanced that a person who has never been here before who says on landing, "I intend to settle in the United Kingdom" and who is fully believed is automatically a person who is habitually resident here. Nor is it enough to say I am going to live at X or with Y. He must show residence in fact for a period which shows that the residence has become "habitual" and, as I see it, will or is likely to continue to be habitual.

I do not consider that when he spoke of residence for an appreciable period, Lord Brandon meant more than this. It is a question of fact to be decided on the date where the determination has to be made on the circumstances of each case whether and when that habitual residence had been established. Bringing possessions, doing everything necessary to establish residence before coming, having a right of abode, seeking to bring family, "durable ties" with the country of residence or intended residence, and many other factors have to be taken into account.

The requisite period is not a fixed period. It may be longer where there are doubts. It may be short (as the House accepted in In re S. (A Minor) (Custody: Habitual Residence) [1998] AC 750, my speech at p. 763A; and Re F. (A Minor) (Child Abduction) [1994] FLR 548, 555 where Butler-Sloss, LJ "A month can be . . . an appreciable period of time.")

There may indeed be special cases where the person concerned is not coming here for the first time, but is resuming an habitual residence previously had ( Lewis v. Lewis. [1956] 1 WLR 200 : Swaddling v. Adjudication Officer, (Case C-90/97) ECJ Judgment 25 February 1999 (unreported)). On such facts the Adjudication Officer may or of course may not be satisfied that the previous habitual residence has been resumed. This position is quite different from that of someone coming to the United Kingdom for the first time.

In my opinion, the Tribunal was wrong in law in considering only the voluntariness of her presence and her intention to reside. The Commissioner and the majority in the Court of Appeal were right in law to say that the facts must be investigated to see whether there was a residence which could be accepted as "habitual." I agree with the Commissioner that there were factors pointing to habitual residence having been established, even by the date of the tribunal hearing or as I see it, even earlier, but it would be wrong for your Lordships to determine this matter. The Commissioner's Order remitting the enquiry to the tribunal was in my view entirely appropriate.

I would accordingly dismiss the appeal.

LORD STEYN:

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons he has given I would also dismiss the appeal.

LORD HOPE OF CRAIGHEAD:

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech which has been prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons which he gives I, too, would dismiss the appeal.

THE LORD CLYDE:

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech which has been prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons which he gives I, too, would dismiss the appeal.

THE LORD HUTTON:

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech which has been prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Slynn of Hadley. For the reasons which he gives I, too, would dismiss the appeal.