Spc00643
Social Security Contributions (Transfer of Functions etc.) Act 1999 section 8, Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 section 313; non-compete agreement; liability to pay secondary contributions; Share purchase agreement; Service Agreement; whether sum paid as consideration in Non Compete-Agreement fell within section 313; yes; appeal dismissed
THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONERS
KENT FOODS LTD Appellant
- and –
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY'S REVENUE & CUSTOMS Respondents
Special Commissioner: J GORDON REID QC, F.C.I.Arb
Sitting in Edinburgh on 30 and 31 August 2007
David Small instructed by Harper Macleod, for the Appellant
Roderick Thompson instructed by HM Revenue and Customs, for the Respondents
Introduction
This is an appeal against the decision of the Respondents dated 19th September 2005 that the Appellants are liable to pay secondary contributions of £60,250 for the period 6th April 2000 to 5th April 2002. Liability is said to be in respect of payments made under a non-compete agreement within the meaning of section 313 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988. There is no dispute on quantum.
A Hearing took place at Edinburgh on 30th and 31st August 2007. The Appellants were represented by David Small, Advocate, instructed by Harper Macleod, solicitors, Edinburgh. He led the evidence of Ian Dalglish, managing director of the Appellants, Professor Robert Rennie, a partner of Harper Macleod and Professor of Conveyancing at Glasgow University, and Francis McCrossin, a retired partner of Messrs Wyllie & Bissett, Chartered Accountants, Glasgow. The Respondents were represented by Roderick N Thomson, advocate, instructed by Eric Brown of their Solicitors' Office, Edinburgh. The Respondents led no evidence. Parties lodged a Statement of Agreed Facts and a Joint bundle of Productions. There was no dispute as to the authenticity of these productions or (where appropriate) their transmission and receipt. Counsel produced written summaries which they amplified in the course of their closing submissions. Finally, I should record that in attendance for the Appellants was an employee of Messrs Harper Macleod who, I understand, took shorthand notes of the whole proceedings. These notes have not, so far as I am aware, been transcribed. The accuracy of the notes, should they be extended, is not a matter of agreement.
Statutory Background
Section 1 of the 1992 Act outlines broadly how National Insurance and the National Health Service is to be funded, namely by contributions payable by earners, employers and others. Contributions are divided into classes which include primary Class 1 Contributions and secondary Class 1 Contributions. There are various categories of earners. By section 3(1) (a), earnings include any remuneration or profit derived from an employment. Section 4 provides that certain payments are to be treated as remuneration derived from an employed earner's employment. Thus, section 4(4) provides inter alia that:-
"For the purposes of section 3 above, there shall be treated as remuneration derived from an employed earner's employment-
……………
(b) any sum paid (or treated as paid) to or for the benefit of the earner which is chargeable to tax by virtue of section 313 of the 1988 Act(taxation of consideration for certain restrictive undertakings).
By section 6(4), secondary Class 1 Contributions are the liability of the secondary contributor. By section 7(1)(a), secondary contributor is, in the case of an earner employed under a contract of service, the employer of that earner.
Section 313 of the 1988 Act provides inter alia as follows-
313 Taxation of consideration for certain restrictive undertakings
(1) Where an individual who holds, has held, or is about to hold, an office or employment gives in connection with his holding that office or employment an undertaking (whether absolute or qualified, and whether legally valid or not) the tenor or effect of which is to restrict him as to his conduct or activities, any sum to which this section applies shall be treated as an emolument of the office or employment, and accordingly shall be chargeable to tax under Schedule E, for the year of assessment in which it is paid.
(2) This section applies to any sum which-
(a) is paid in respect of the giving of the undertaking or its total or partial fulfilment, either to the individual or to any other person; and
(b) would not, apart from this section, fall to be treated as an emolument of the office or employment"
Section 73 of the Finance Act 1988 provides that any sum to which section 313 applied, and which was paid or treated as paid by a person carrying on a trade, may be deducted as an expense in computing the profits of that trade.
Facts
The Statement of Agreed Facts referred to above is in the following terms:-
From the evidence and the agreed documents, I make the following additional findings of fact:-
Submissions
Both counsel proposed that certain additional facts be found. Neither took significant issue with the other's proposals. I have, with some modification, incorporated, the thrust of their suggested findings of fact in the additional facts set forth above.
Mr Small submitted that the Non-Compete Agreement said nothing about employment. The restrictive covenant provisions in the Non-Compete Agreement and the Service Agreement, while containing similarities, were materially different in some respects. He produced a table, which I append to this Decision, outlining these differences. Mr Thomson did not dispute the accuracy of its contents. Mr Small submitted that there were reasons why Ellis & Everard might consider the Non-Compete Agreement to be of value. It effectively allowed them to sack Mr Dalglish for any reason. The courts were also more likely to uphold restrictive covenants given on disposal of a business (Nordenfelt v The Maxi Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunitions Co Ltd 1894 AC 535, Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxelby 1916 1 AC 688).
On the question of statutory construction, Mr Small submitted that the proper interpretation of Section 313(1) of the 1988 Act was the crux.. He referred to Beak v Robson 1943 AC 352, Vaughan-Neil v IRC 1979 STC 644 and RCI v Woods 2004 STC 315 which he analysed in detail. It was the giving of the undertaking and not the undertaking itself which had to be connected to the holding of the office or employment. That connection must be a real one. This was a question of fact to be answered by examining all the circumstances. Mr Dalglish did not give the undertakings in the Non-Compete Agreement in connection with his present or future holding of employment with the Appellants because (i) the Non-Compete Agreement does not mention his employment, (ii) the other party to the Non-Compete Agreement was not his employer but the purchaser of his shares, (iii) the undertakings in the Non-Compete Agreement were given in connection with the share sale, (iv) the restrictive undertakings in the Service Agreement were given in connection with his employment with the Appellants for which nothing was paid, (v) Mr Dalglish's remuneration was not affected by the attribution of £0.5m to the Non-Compete Agreement, (vi) the original consideration for the shares was reduced by the amount of the consideration for the Non-Compete Agreement moreover, the Non-Compete Agreement consideration was payable with interest to his estate with interest should he die prematurely, (vii) the fact that Mrs Dalglish was not a party to the Non-Compete Agreement is irrelevant because she was not involved in the business and because she would have been a party to the Non-Compete Agreement but for Mr McCrossin's misunderstanding about "loyalty bonuses", and (viii) the Non-Compete Agreement undertakings all related to the business of the Appellants; Ellis & Everard planned to discontinue that business and employ Mr Dalglish in Fiske.
Furthermore, Mr Dalglish did not give the undertaking in the Non-Compete Agreement in connection with his past employment with the Appellants because (i) he gave the undertakings in connection with the sale of his shares; he did not give them in connection with any employment in a commercially significant sense; he would not have become employed by Ellis & Everard unless they bought his company (ii) in section 313, "holding" implies the connection must be with the status of employment - taking it up, varying its terms, terminating it; and not the work carried out while in employment or the experience gained while employed or with people met whilst employed, otherwise section 313 becomes too wide and absurd consequences follow.
Mr Thomson, for the Respondents, submitted that on the facts, the reference to the sum of £500,000 as a loyalty bonus reflected the understanding of Mr Dalglish and Mr McCrossin that the payment was thus linked to the former's continued involvement with the Appellants as an employee and the protection afforded to Ellis & Everard by the restrictive covenants to be granted. The use of that phrase gave the flavour to what was at the heart of this part of the transaction. The Appellants' advisers at the time saw no distinction between the restrictive covenants in the three principal documents. If the payment of £500,000 was truly in consideration of shares, then it would have been split between Mr & Mrs Dalglish. The two payments of £250,000 were not treated as capital by Ellis & Everard (UK Holdings) Ltd. The facts established that the undertaking given in the Non-Compete Agreement was connected with Mr Dalglish's holding of the employment with the Appellants. The undertaking in the Non-Compete Agreement was given in order to protect the value of the shares being acquired.
He submitted that the appeal could be decided in the Respondents' favour by considering the three principal documents (and possibly the back letter) together, especially Clause 20 of the Service Agreement. On that basis alone, the requisite connection was established and the Appellants must fail. When one adds the surrounding circumstances the connection is even stronger. He submitted that the Appellants have had real difficulty in analysing the transaction in a way that avoids the connection with Mr Dalglish's employment with the Appellants. The appeal was originally based on the assertion that Mr Dalglish was not employed by the Appellants; then the assertion was that the £500,000 was additional consideration for the shares; in correspondence it was suggested that the documents did not reflect the agreement reached.
It can be accepted, Mr Thomson argued, that the Non-Compete Agreement is connected with the share purchase but the legislation did not require that the sole connection be with the employment. It was not surprising that the Service Agreement did not contain the provisions relating to the payment of £500,000. For the first two years and nine months after the share acquisition Mr Dalglish was restricted in his activities by both the Service Agreement and the Non-Compete Agreement. The Appellants' argument amounts to saying that the payment of £500,000 is for additional restrictions in the Non-Compete Agreement.
Mr Thomson also relied upon clause 20 of the Service Agreement which acknowledges the connection between the Service Agreement and the Non-Compete Agreement. The whole purpose of the Non-Compete Agreement was, as at the completion date, to provide protection to the purchasers against Mr Dalglish setting up on his own and using his business skills and connections which he currently possessed in competition with them. The connection with employment which Mr Dalglish has held within the meaning of section 313 is thus established.
There was also a clear link to continued or future employment; the use of the phrase loyalty bonus establishes that, as does an examination of the principal documents as a package deal. The word holding should not be given the restricted meaning proposed by the Appellants.
He referred to Vaughan-Neil and submitted that a low level of connection was sufficient. In connection with should be construed widely. He adopted the Crown argument in that case as to the approach to statutory construction.
Discussion
In my opinion, the starting point is the proposition that a taxpayer is free to structure his commercial arrangements as he sees fit. Tax consequences may or may not flow from these arrangements. It is obvious that some commercial transactions may be genuinely structured in a variety of ways so as to avoid or mitigate any consequent tax liability. Conversely, with hindsight, it can sometimes be seen that a commercial arrangement has been structured in a way which leads to a tax liability which, by the adoption of different commercial structure, could have been avoided or mitigated. I leave aside all questions of anti-avoidance schemes, sham or artificial transactions inserted purely to attempt to avoid tax. This appeal is not about such arrangements.
The starting point on the facts is therefore the arrangements that were carried into effect in December 1999. The evidence as to how the negotiations led to the execution of the various documents in their final form is therefore not relevant to their proper construction or to an analysis of what the commercial structure was. The commercial structure and the commercial reality of the transaction are to be found primarily in the Share Purchase Agreement, the Service Agreement, the Non-Compete Agreement and the Back Letter.
In case I am wrong about this approach, I have made detailed findings of fact reflecting the evidence relating to the background to the share acquisition and the negotiation of the terms of these documents. The picture painted by the evidence and background documents was not entirely clear in places and it has not been easy to establish a precise chronology of events, and in particular the various exchange and revision of drafts. However, I have been able to make findings of how at least, in general terms, the negotiations proceeded. An examination of these facts and circumstances does not lead me to any different conclusion.
I found all witnesses to be generally credible and reliable. Neither counsel suggested otherwise. The findings of fact constitute my attempt to piece together the main strands of the chronology of events spoken to by the various witnesses from their own particular perspective. As for the Non-Compete Agreement itself, although the documents and evidence are not entirely clear, it seems that the first draft of the Non-Compete Agreement was received by Professor Rennie on or about 3rd December 1999. It was discussed at the meeting on 6th December, revised on the 7th and returned to Hammond & Suddards by letter dated 9th December [Production 28 and 30].
I agree with Mr Thomson's broad submission that the commercial arrangements should be considered as a whole. Essentially the transaction is in two parts. Ellis & Everard (describing them generally) acquire the shares and the exclusive services of an expert in the food distribution business; Mr & Mrs Dalglish receive the purchase price. Mr Dalglish secures his employment at the specified salary for a specified minimum period and agrees to certain restraints on his business activities for which he receives £500,000. Mr Dalglish's business skill and success were probably the main attraction to Ellis & Everard and more important than the relatively few assets held by the Appellants. Mr Dalglish modestly demurred to such a suggestion in cross-examination, but it seems to me, on the evidence, to be a point well made.
The various aspects of the transaction are all linked or connected one to the other. It was a package tied together and wrapped up by the execution of the various documents in December 1999. The sum of £500,000 was as much part of the overall arrangement as the salary of £70,000. The overall transaction remained much the same as envisaged from a relatively early stage. However, at the end of the day it came to be structured differently. The transfer of a portion of the purchase price to the Non-Compete Agreement could have been £500 instead of £500,000. The £500,000 cannot, in the light of the terms of the documents, be regarded as part of the share price.
In my view, there was plainly a connection between the holding of Mr Dalglish's employment past, present and future with the Appellants and the giving of the undertakings contained in the Non-Compete Agreement. He was an expert in the food distribution industry, had good business connections and ran a profitable business. He had been and continued to be the "key man". He was about to enter into a service contract with the Appellants. The giving of the undertakings in the Non-Compete Agreement which restricted his business conduct and activities was certainly connected with the share purchase but it was also plainly connected with the employment he held and the new arrangements he was about to take up. The transaction would not have come to pass had Mr Dalglish been unwilling to enter into the Service Contract and/or the Non-Compete Agreement. Each restrained Mr Dalglish's activities. The Non-Compete Agreement had immediate effect whereas the Service Agreement would only bite following termination of employment. The connection between the giving of the undertaking and the holding of the employment can hardly be said to be de minimis. That the giving of the undertaking is also connected with something else is of no moment. The statutory phrase in connection with is wide in scope. It does not say exclusively or solely in connection with. Clause 20 of the Service Agreement simply reflects the reality of the situation.
There is nothing in the authorities cited to me which compels me to reach a different conclusion. In Beak, the taxpayer entered into a five year service contract, employing him as manager and director of a company, which contained a restrictive covenant. The consideration for the restraint was £7,000 which was assessed under Schedule E. In a very short speech, Viscount, Simon's analysis was that the obligations of service and remuneration were entirely separate from the restrictive covenant and the consideration therefor; he founded on the facts that the covenant would only come into effect on termination of the employment; the sum was not therefore profit from his office as director. Unlike the restrictive covenant in Beak, the Non-Compete Agreement here has effect while the Service Agreement was running (or at least its first three years). The decision in Beak is really only of interest as it led to the passing of anti-avoidance legislation, originally section 26 of the Finance Act 1950 and now section 313 of the 1988 Act.
In RCI, following the termination of a service agreement, a director entered into a severance agreement containing various restrictive covenants to endure for one year. Under the Severance Agreement the former director was to receive two large payments; the former director elected under that agreement to extend the period of restraint by a further two years for which he became entitled to a further three payments. It was conceded that the first two payments and held by the Special Commissioner and by Lightman J on appeal, that the remaining three payments fell within the scope of section 313(1). The anti-avoidance legislation imposed no restriction on the type of "connection"; thus any connection which was not de minimis would suffice (page 333f paragraph 26, page 334e paragraph 30). The language of section 313 was apt to embrace both on-going and extinct relationships (ibid). Thus a real connection with the termination of the holding sufficed (page 334g paragraph 31). On the facts there was also a sufficient connection with the individual's past status as an employee or director. Among the factors establishing that connection was the fact that the undertakings given all related to the business of RCI or its associated companies, which was the business in which the individual was employed.
In Vaughan_Neil, a distinguished barrister, a leading expert in planning law, was invited to take up part-time employment with a limited company. This necessarily involved giving up practice at the Bar. As an inducement he was offered and accepted the sum of £40,000. He entered into a deed containing a service agreement which narrated that the sum was an inducement to give up the status of a practising barrister and all that entailed. The barrister's assessment to tax was upheld by the Special Commissioner. Oliver J allowed an appeal, holding that the connection had to be between the actual or prospective holding of the office and the giving of the undertaking. In analysing the relevant facts and circumstances, which went beyond merely construing the documents, to identify the "reality" of what the payment was for or in respect of, he concluded that the covenant to cease practise at the Bar was merely a statement of a necessary and inevitable consequence of entering into a service agreement. The undertakings caught by the statutory provision did not embrace the simple undertaking of the very duties inherent in and inseparable from the employment itself. The point was acknowledged to be a narrow one. The facts are distinguishable but the approach to the problem of causal connection shows that it is legitimate, at least in some cases, to examine facts and circumstances beyond the four corners of the relevant documents in order to identify what in reality the payment was for. Such an analysis in the present appeal, if anything reinforces the existence of the connection required for liability to be established.
On may speculate as to why restraints on Mr Dalglish's activities were to be found in both the Service Agreement and the Non-Compete Agreement. Belt and Braces is perhaps the obvious answer, although the provisions are not identical; rather, they overlapped or were capable of overlapping to some extent. While it is true, as Mr Small pointed out, that Mr Dalglish's employment is not mentioned in the Non-Compete Agreement and the other party to the Non-Compete Agreement is not his employer, that does not mean that there is no connection for the purposes of section 313. Here, the Non-Compete Agreement, or more correctly the giving of the undertakings contained in that agreement was connected with both sale of the shares and the employment of Mr Dalglish, which he had held in the past as "key man" in the Appellants' business and the employment he was about to hold under the Service Agreement, which in reality created continuity of his role in the Appellants even although the underlying ownership of the Appellants was being transferred to Ellis& Everard. Whether one takes a narrow or broad view of the meaning of holding the connection remains.
Result
I find that Mr Dalgish gave, in connection with the employment he held or was about to hold with the Appellants, undertakings in the Non-Compete Agreement the tenor or effect of which was to restrict him as to his conduct or activities all within the meaning of section 313 of the 1988 Act. Sums totalling £500,000 were paid in respect of the giving of those undertakings. These sums were chargeable to tax under Schedule E. By virtue of Section 4 of the 1992 Act, these payments fell to be treated as remuneration derived from an employed earner's employment for the purposes of section 3 of that Act. Those payments are subject to national insurance contributions including secondary Class 1 contributions. Liability for secondary Class 1 contributions falls on the secondary contributor, namely the Appellants, by virtue of sections 6 and 7 of the 1992 Act.
In these circumstances, the Respondent's decision dated 19th September 2005 [Production 1] is well founded. The appeal against that decision is dismissed.
Appellants' comparison between Service Agreement and Non-Compete Agreement
Service Contract Prod 5 | Non-Compete Agreement (Prod 6) |
Duration. Clause 2.1 - effectively 2 yrs 3m for employment contract. Clause 14 - 9 months after termination of employment contract. |
Duration Clause 3.1 - 3 years. |
Application. As noted below, clauses refer to other Group companies with whom IMD has had contact. |
Application Generally, Company only. |
Cl 4.2; during employment with KFL not to have any other job/business interests without permission of the board provided ok to hold up to 5% of quoted co's UK or overseas. Cl14.1; Not to be involved in Sc/Eng/NI in any business in competition with Group Co for which IMD has worked in last 12 mths |
Cl 3.1(a) - not to be involved in any business of food distribution, sale or marketing in competition with the business of the Co in Eng, W, Sc, NI, Eire, Ch Is or IoM provided ok to hold up to 3% of certain UK quoted co's. (Geographical difference) |
Cl 14.1.5 - approx equivalent (tho' could be re any Group Co if IMD had contact with the employee). | Cl 3(1)(b) - not to solicit any person employed by the Co at Completion in sales/commercial capacity |
No equivalent. | Cl 3.1(c) - not to employ anyone who as at completion was employed in certain capacities by the Co |
Cl 14.1.2 - approx equivalent (tho' could be customer of any Group Co with whom IMD has had contact in last 12 m) |
Cl 3.1(d) - not to solicit custom from anyone who has been a customer of the Co in 12 m pre completion |
Cl 14.1.3 - not to deal with any person who is a customer of the Co/Group and with whom IMD has dealt in last 12m |
No exact equivalent |
No equivalent. | Cl 3.1 (e) - not to accept orders from any person who has been a customer of the Co in the 12m pre-Completion. |
Cl 14.1.4 - approx equivalent (tho' could be customer of any Group Co with whom IMD has had contact in last 12 m) |
Cl 3.1(f) - not to interfere with supplies to Co from suppliers to Co in last 12 m |
Cl 21 - Scots Law applies | Clause 6 - English law applies |
SC