LORD BRIGGS: (with whom
Lady Hale, Lord Sumption, Lord Carnwath and Lord Hodge agree)
Introduction
1.
Traders who wish to appeal against assessments to Value Added Tax
(“VAT”) in the United Kingdom are required, by section 84 of the Value Added
Tax Act 1994, first to pay or deposit the tax notified by the assessment with
HMRC, unless they can demonstrate that to do so would cause them to suffer hardship.
Otherwise, their appeal will not be entertained. This “pay-first” requirement
is a feature of the procedural regime for appealing assessments to a number of
other types of tax, including Insurance Premium Tax, Landfill Tax, Climate
Change Levy and Aggregates Levy. But it is not a condition for appealing
assessments to Income Tax, Capital Gains Tax (“CGT”), Corporation Tax or Stamp
Duty Land Tax (“SDLT”).
2.
VAT is, in the UK and elsewhere in the European Union, regulated by the
provisions of EU Directives, currently of VAT Directive 2006/112. An appeal
against an assessment to VAT is therefore a claim based on EU law. All the
other taxes and levies referred to above are regulated by domestic law, so that
appeals against assessments to any of them are based on domestic law.
3.
The appellant Totel Ltd (“Totel”) seeks to appeal a number of
assessments to VAT but has been unable to demonstrate that a requirement to pay
or deposit the tax in dispute would cause it hardship. But Totel claims that
the requirement to pay or deposit the disputed tax as a condition for its
appeals being entertained offends against the EU law principle of equivalence.
In outline, this principle requires that the procedural rules of member states
applicable to claims based on EU law are not less favourable than those
governing similar domestic claims. It is submitted that appeals against
assessment to Income Tax, CGT and SDLT are claims which are similar to appeals
against assessment to VAT and that, because a VAT appeal is subjected to the
pay-first requirement whereas those other appeals are not, then the UK’s
procedural rules for VAT appeals are less favourable than those governing
similar domestic claims.
4.
In the course of a convoluted but irrelevant procedural history Totel
first raised its challenge based upon the principle of equivalence when
(successfully) seeking permission to appeal from the Upper Tribunal (Tax and
Chancery Chamber) to the Court of Appeal. In December 2016 the Court of Appeal
rejected that challenge on two grounds. Logically the first (although the
second to be dealt with in the leading judgment of Arden LJ) was that none of
the domestic taxes (Income Tax, CGT and SDLT) relied upon by Totel were true
comparators with VAT for the purpose of the application of the principle of
equivalence. The second ground was that, even if they were, there were other
domestic taxes (namely those described in para 1 above) which subjected appeals
against assessments to the same pay-first requirement, so that it could not be
said that EU-derived VAT appeals had been picked out for the worst procedural
treatment. Accordingly, what is commonly called the “no most favourable
treatment proviso” (“the Proviso”) applied so as to prevent infringement of the
principle of equivalence.
5.
In this court Totel challenges both those conclusions of the Court of
Appeal. For their part, HMRC challenge (for the first time) the underlying
assumption that, when viewed in the round, the procedure for appeals against
tax assessments is rendered less favourable to the taxpayer by the imposition
of the pay-first requirement in relation to only some of them.
6.
The principle of equivalence and its qualifying Proviso are creatures of
the jurisprudence of the CJEU (and its predecessors), and take effect within
the general context that it is for each member state to establish its own
national procedures for the vindication of rights conferred by EU law: see EDIS
v Ministero delle Finanze (Case C-231/96, [1998] EUECJ C-231/96) at paras 19 and 34 of the
judgment. Further, it has been repeatedly stated by the CJEU that it is for the
courts of each member state to determine whether its national procedures for
claims based on EU law fall foul of the principle of equivalence, both by
identifying what if any procedures for domestic law claims are true comparators
for that purpose, and in order to decide whether the procedure for the EU law
claim is less favourable than that available in relation to a truly comparable
domestic claim. This is because the national court is best placed, from its
experience and supervision of those national procedures, to carry out the
requisite analysis: see Palmisani v Istituto
Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (Case
C-261/95) at para 38, and Levez v TH Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd (Case
C-326/96) [1999] ICR 521, para 43.
The search for a true comparator
7.
The principle of equivalence works hand in hand with the principle of
effectiveness. That principle imposes a purely qualitative
test, which invalidates a national procedure if it renders the enforcement of a
right conferred by EU law either virtually impossible or excessively difficult.
By contrast, the principle of equivalence is essentially comparative. The
identification of one or more similar procedures for the enforcement of claims
arising in domestic law is an essential pre-requisite for its operation. If
there is no true comparator, then the principle of equivalence can have no
operation at all: see the Palmisani case, at para 39. The
identification of one or more true comparators is therefore the essential first
step in any examination of an assertion that the principle of equivalence has
been infringed.
8.
Plainly, the question whether any, and if so which, procedures for the
pursuit of domestic law claims are to be regarded as true comparators with a
procedure relating to an EU law claim will depend critically upon the level of
generality at which the process of comparison is conducted. Is it sufficient
that both claims are tax appeals, or (as Totel submits) appeals against the
assessment of tax, or that they must both be made to the same tribunal? Or is
it necessary to conduct some more granular analysis of the different claims,
and the economic structures in which they arise? Or is there some simple
yardstick which would prevent claims from being truly comparable, such as, in
the present case, the difference between claims arising out of the assessment
of liability to direct and indirect taxes, (as HMRC submits)? Decisions of the
CJEU provide considerable assistance in identifying the correct approach to
this task, although the guidance to be gained from some of them is not always
that which springs from an over- simplistic analysis of particular phraseology.
9.
First, the question whether any proposed domestic claim is a true
comparator with an EU law claim is context-specific. As Lord Neuberger put it
in Revenue and Customs Comrs v Stringer [2009] UKHL 31; [2009] ICR 985
at para 88:
“It seems to me that the question
of similarity, in the context of the principle of equivalence, has to be considered
by reference to the context in which the principle is being invoked.”
This proposition was not in dispute between counsel, and it
is therefore unnecessary to cite decisions of the CJEU in support of it,
although most of those to which reference is made below illustrate or mandate
the conduct of a context-specific enquiry.
10.
The domestic court must focus on the purpose and essential
characteristics of allegedly similar claims: see the Levez case, at para
43 of the judgment:
“In order to determine whether the
principle of equivalence has been complied with in the present case the
national court - which alone has direct knowledge of the procedural rules
governing actions in the field of employment law - must consider both the
purpose and essential characteristics of allegedly similar domestic actions.”
To the same effect is para 35 of the judgment of the Grand
Chamber in Transportes Urbanos y Servicios Generales SAL v Administración del Estado (Case C-118/08, [2010] EUECJ C-118/08). In Littlewoods Retail
Ltd v Revenue and Customs Comrs (Case C-591/10) [2012] STC 1714, the Court
at para 31 used the phrase “similar purpose and cause of action”, without in my
view thereby intending to change the underlying meaning from that described in
the earlier cases.
11.
Of particular importance within the relevant context is the specific
procedural provision which is alleged to constitute less favourable treatment
of the EU law claim. This is really a matter of common sense. Differences in
the procedural rules applicable to different types of civil claim are legion,
and are frequently attributable to, or at least connected with, differences in
the underlying claim. A common example is to be found in different limitation
periods. Thus, in England and Wales, the primary limitation period for personal
injury claims is three years, whereas the primary limitation period for most
other claims is six years. There is a 20 year prescription period for property
claims in Scotland. To treat personal injury and, for example, property claims
as true comparators for the purpose of deciding whether the shorter limitation
period for personal injury claims constituted less favourable treatment would
make no sense. This is because it is no part of the purpose of the principle of
equivalence to prevent member states from applying different procedural
requirements to different types of claim, where the differences in those
procedural requirements are attributable to, or connected with, differences in
the underlying claims.
12.
Mr Michael Firth for Totel drew the court’s attention to some passages
in European authorities which, he submitted, justified addressing the
similarity question at a very high level of generality, in support of his broad
submission that all UK appeals against tax assessments are true comparators
with an appeal against a VAT assessment. He relied, for example, on the
following passage in the court’s judgment in the Transportes Urbanos
case, at para 36:
“As regards the purpose of the two
actions for damages referred to in the previous paragraph, the Court notes that
they have exactly the same purpose, namely compensation for the loss suffered
by a person harmed as a result of an act or omission of the State.”
Accordingly, he submitted, all claims against the state for
compensation for loss were, at least in principle, capably of being truly
comparable for the purposes of the principle of equivalence. Taken out of
context, that citation might appear at first sight to support Mr Firth’s
submission, but a closer analysis of that case shows that it does nothing of
the kind. The claimant complained that it had been over-charged to VAT, and its
consequential loss could be remedied if either the charge in question was
contrary to European law, or if it was contrary to the Spanish Constitution. In
the former case Spanish procedural law imposed a condition requiring prior
exhaustion of remedies, whereas it did not for the latter. The alternative
claims were held to be true comparables for the purposes of the principle of equivalence
not because they were both, viewed in the abstract, claims against the state
for compensation for loss, but because they were alternative legal bases for
claiming compensation for precisely the same loss. This is, in particular,
apparent from para 43 of the Court’s judgment. Alternative types of claim for
compensation for exactly the same loss are a common example of true
comparators: see eg Preston v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 455.
13.
For his part, Mr Jonathan Swift QC for HMRC submitted that dicta in
European and domestic authority justified a conclusion that there could never
be a true comparator with an appeal against a VAT assessment, apart from some
other assessment to VAT. In short, he submitted that VAT, and all claims
relating to it, were sui generis, with no true comparator arising from any
other type of tax. He began with the following dictum of Moses J in Marks
& Spencer plc v Comrs of Customs and Excise [1999] 1 CMLR 1152, a case
in which a limitation period for the recovery of overpaid VAT was alleged to offend
the principle of equivalence. At paras 61-62 he said:
“In my judgment no comparison can
be made with other types of tax such as income tax payable in respect of an
individual’s profits or the tax on a document imposed by stamp duty. Other
forms of indirect taxation, such as excise duty, are wholly different types of
tax.
It seems to me that the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, exemplified in EDILIZIA,
requires a comparison between the approach of a member state to the recovery of
tax charged in breach of Community rules and the recovery of the same tax
in breach of domestic rules. Any wider enquiry would invite unnecessary
argument as to whether there is a true comparison.” (My emphasis)
Referring to the principle of equivalence, he concluded:
“The principle is designed to
protect Community law rights: adequate protection is afforded by focusing upon
the way a member state deals with the same tax in a domestic as opposed to
Community context.”
14.
The difficulty with this analysis, as Mr Firth pointed out, is that (as
Mr Swift agreed) all claims to recover overpaid VAT are necessarily based on EU
law, because VAT is a tax regulated by EU law. Moses J’s analysis was approved
by the Court of Appeal in Littlewoods Ltd v Revenue & Customs Comrs (CA)
[2015] EWCA Civ 515; [2016] Ch 373, paras 133-134 in the judgment of Arden LJ.
But it appears that her analysis was based on the same concession, namely that
there could be purely domestic claims for recovery of overpaid VAT.
15.
Mr Swift obtained more persuasive assistance from Reemtsma
Cigarettenfabriken GmbH v Ministero delle Finanze (Case C-35/05)
[2007] ECR I-2452. It was alleged in that case that a provision limiting the
identity of those who could claim a VAT repayment offended against the
principle of equivalence because there was no comparable restriction in
relation to the recovery of overpaid direct tax. At paras 94 and 95 of her
opinion, Advocate General Sharpston agreed with the following submission of the
Commission:
“In general … a situation in that
(direct tax) field is unlikely to be comparable to that in the field of
VAT. In the latter it is in principle only the supplier who is in a direct
legal relationship with the tax authority. Indeed, the whole system of direct
taxation is unrelated to that of VAT. Since the principle of non-discrimination
concerns only comparable situations, it is thus not relevant here.”
16.
In its judgment, the Court adopted the more general part of the
Commission’s argument at para 45:
“In the present case, the system of
direct taxation, as a whole, is not related to the VAT system.”
Accordingly, the Court concluded that none of the EU
anti-discriminatory principles, including the principle of equivalence, were
engaged by the comparison between VAT and direct taxation.
17.
Compass Contract Services Ltd v Comrs for Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs (Case C-38/16) EU:C:2017:454 involved a comparison between
different limitation periods applicable to claims to recover overpaid VAT, and
claims to deduct input tax from VAT otherwise due, for the purposes of the
equal treatment principle. The Fourth Chamber of the CJEU concluded that, even
within the confines of the VAT regime, the two claims were not truly
comparable: see paras 36-39 of the judgment.
18.
Taken together, these authorities certainly justify the exercise of very
considerable caution by a national court when faced with the assertion that a
VAT claim should be treated as truly comparable, for the purposes of the
principle of equivalence, with a claim relating to some domestic tax, and in
particular with any direct tax. But I do not consider it necessary or
appropriate to go so far as to conclude that, for all purposes connected with
the principle of equivalence, VAT claims must be treated as sui generis, with
no possibility of there being a true comparator in a claim arising out of some
other tax. My reasons follow.
19.
First, the identification of any such general rule would run counter to
the context-specific basis upon which it is clear that the examination of
comparators for the purposes of the principle of equivalence must be conducted.
It would, in particular, rule out any analysis of the question whether the
particular procedural provision alleged to amount to less favourable treatment
had any connection with underlying differences between VAT and some different
domestic tax.
20.
Secondly, although the court’s ruling in the Reemtsma
case appears to come quite close to such a general conclusion, the
principle of equivalence lay only at the fringe of the issues there being
considered by the CJEU, with the result that, unsurprisingly, the point was
addressed with what may fairly be described as extreme brevity. The case was
mainly about the related principles of neutrality, effectiveness and
non-discrimination.
21.
Thirdly, if the Reemtsma case had established such a general rule
in 2007, namely that VAT is for this purpose sui generis, with no true
comparators, it is difficult to understand why this did not constitute a simple
solution to the question referred to the CJEU in the Littlewoods case
(Case C-591/10) [2012] STC 1714, which included the question whether the
restriction of a successful claimant to a VAT repayment to simple interest
offended the principle of equivalence, when compared with interest payable on
other types of claim for repayment of tax under domestic law. It is evident
from paras 42 to 48 of the opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak that there was
a wide range of submissions as to potential comparators, including a concession
from the UK government that, in principle, repayment claims under domestic
indirect taxation were comparable for the purposes of the principle of
equivalence, in the context of different entitlement to interest. In accordance
with the Advocate General’s advice, the Court of Justice referred the comparability
question to the UK courts. This must have been on the basis either that there
was no rule of general application for all purposes that VAT claims could in no
circumstances be treated as truly comparable with claims for repayment of domestic
tax, or that the CJEU regarded claims for restitution against the state as
falling within a separate category.
22.
Nevertheless, applying the context-specific analysis called for by the
European jurisprudence which I have described, the Court of Appeal was in my
judgment correct to conclude that none of the domestic taxes (namely Income
Tax, CGT and SDLT) proposed by Totel constituted true comparators with VAT for
the purpose of deciding whether the imposition in the VAT context of a
pay-first requirement constituted less favourable treatment contrary to the
principle of equivalence. This is because a trader seeking to appeal a VAT
assessment is typically in a significantly different position from a taxpayer
seeking to appeal an assessment to any of those other taxes, and in a manner
which is properly to be regarded as sufficiently connected with the imposition
of a pay-first requirement. In that respect my reasoning is closely aligned
with that of the Court of Appeal, as explained in para 54 of Arden LJ’s
judgment.
23.
Subject to certain exceptions to which I refer below, VAT is a tax of
which the economic burden falls upon the ultimate consumer, but which is
collected by the trader from the consumer, and accounted for by the trader to
HMRC. By contrast, taxpayers seeking to appeal an assessment to Income Tax, CGT
and SDLT are being required to pay, from their own resources, something of
which the economic burden falls on them, and which they have not collected, for
the benefit of the Revenue, from anyone else. It is therefore no less than
appropriate that traders assessed to VAT should be required (in the absence of
proof of hardship) to pay or deposit the tax in dispute, which they have, or
should have, collected, while no similar requirement is imposed upon the
taxpayers in those other, and different, contexts.
24.
I do not by reference to this connection between the pay-first requirement
and the trader’s paradigm status as a tax collector rather than a taxpayer mean
to suggest that it is a condition of the recognition of this important
difference separating VAT from other taxes that the pay-first requirement was
devised for that specific reason. The evidence before the court did not show
what, in fact, the reason was. The existence of a logical rather than causal
connection is sufficient to justify the conclusion that VAT is different from
those other taxes in this context, rather than a true comparator, regardless of
the reason for the imposition of the pay-first requirement.
25.
Mr Firth sought to challenge this distinction between VAT and those
other taxes. First, he submitted that the portrayal of the VAT registered
trader as a collector rather than a payer of tax was true only for one of the
three types of liability for VAT, the other two being acquisition from other
member states and imports from outside the EU. That is, I agree, true of those
heads of liability, but they arise only in a cross-border context, and for the
purpose of making the VAT scheme work as a whole. The paradigm remains that of
the trader who collects VAT from his customers and accounts for it to the
Revenue.
26.
Secondly, Mr Firth submitted that by no means in every case would a
trader seeking to appeal a VAT assessment already have collected the relevant
tax from his customer. The appeal might be about whether his supply was subject
to VAT, in circumstances where he had not charged VAT at all. That is, again, true
as far as it goes, but it does not significantly impact on the paradigm. More
typical are those appeals where the underlying dispute is whether the trader is
entitled to deduct from tax collected on his supplies the VAT paid by him on
his inputs.
27.
Thirdly, Mr Firth submitted that even if the VAT trader could generally
be regarded as a collector rather than payer of tax, the same was equally true
of an employer deducting and accounting for employees’ Income Tax under the
PAYE scheme so that Income Tax was, nonetheless, a true comparator with VAT. I
would, again, acknowledge that there is an element of similarity between the
two, but there are important differences. First, in circumstances of wilful
failure to deduct by the employer the employee remains liable to the Revenue
for Income Tax whereas, in the VAT context, the only recourse of HMRC is to the
trader rather than the consumer. This distinction is closely connected with the
existence of a pay-first condition for a VAT appeal but not in a PAYE context. Secondly,
the employer has not charged and received a payment from employees creating a
fund for which the employer is accountable. Thirdly, the PAYE scheme is only a
sub-set of the Income Tax scheme viewed as a whole, and lies nowhere near so
close to the essential nature of the relevant tax structure as does the
quasi-collector status of the VAT trader.
28.
Finally, it was no part of Totel’s case that, for the purposes of the
principle of equivalence, the PAYE part of the Income Tax scheme was the sole
true comparator with VAT for the purpose of testing whether the pay-first
requirement represented less favourable treatment. Rather, Totel’s case was
that, simply because all appeals against assessments to tax are made for the
same general purpose, and to the same tribunal, they could all properly be
regarded as true comparators with appeals of assessments to VAT. That requires
the similarity question to be addressed at a level of generality which is so
high as to place it outside the entirety of the relevant jurisprudence about
the principle of equivalence. It must therefore be rejected.
29.
My conclusion on this issue is sufficient to dispose of this appeal. The
issue as to the meaning and application of the Proviso has content only against
the hypothetical assumption that appeals against assessment to all kinds of
direct and indirect domestic tax are true comparators with VAT appeals, and the
unreality of that hypothesis makes it difficult to conduct a reliable analysis
of the second issue. But it has been fully argued, and it was the first plank
upon which the Court of Appeal dealt with the case. I shall therefore make some
limited observations about it although, had it been necessary to decide this
issue for the resolution of this appeal, I might have regarded it as deserving
of a reference to the CJEU. But first it is convenient to deal with the new
submission of HMRC that the imposition of the pay-first requirement does not in
any event amount to less favourable treatment.
Does the pay-first requirement amount to less favourable
treatment?
30.
This issue would arise if, contrary to my conclusion, there had been a
truly comparable domestic tax in relation to which an appeal against an
assessment was not subjected to the pay-first requirement which affects VAT
appeals. It is an issue which would therefore arise if any of Income Tax, CGT
or SDLT had been a true comparator for the purposes of the principle of
equivalence.
31.
Less favourable treatment is not, of course, established merely because
the procedure for one type of claim contains a restriction or condition which
is absent from the procedure for another type of claim. It is common to find
that different claims are subjected to a package of procedural requirements,
such that some of those affecting claim A are less favourable, but others more
favourable, than those affecting claim B. A good example is to be found in Preston
v Wolverhampton NHS Trust (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 455, illustrated in
paras 29 to 31 in the speech of Lord Slynn.
32.
In the present case, for the first time in this court, HMRC point out
that appeals against assessment to Income Tax, CGT and SDLT are subject to a
procedural regime such that the tax in dispute may still be collected pending
the outcome of the appeal, by processes of enforcement which may include the
presentation of a winding-up petition against the taxpaying company, unless the
taxpayer can obtain postponement of payment, by demonstrating that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the tax in dispute has been overcharged:
see, in relation to Income Tax, section 55 of the Taxes Management Act 1970
and, in relation to SDLT: paragraph 39 of Schedule 10 to the Finance Act 2003.
If the taxpayer faces a winding-up petition on the basis of the tax in dispute,
then it may defend that petition by showing that the amount in dispute is bona
fide disputed on substantial grounds.
33.
HMRC concedes that the same principles about postponement, and the
defence of a winding-up petition, apply also to the collection of VAT pending
an appeal: see Revenue and Customs Comrs v Changtel Solutions UK Ltd
[2015] EWCA Civ 29; [2015] 1 WLR 3911. Nonetheless Mr Swift submits that, in
practice, a trader who has obtained disapplication of the pay-first requirement
by demonstrating hardship would not thereafter be subjected to any process of
enforced collection of the disputed tax, pending the outcome of the appeal.
34.
Mr Swift’s point is not so much that the pay-first requirement in
relation to VAT is balanced out by the provisions about collection and
postponement pending appeal in relation to Income Tax, CGT and SDLT. Rather, he
submits that, looked at in the round, the two regimes have broadly the same
effect, so that the VAT regime cannot be described as less favourable.
35.
Viewed from the perspective of a trader with a good case for proving
hardship, together with a reasonable prospect of success on appeal, that might
in practice be so, although I would not accept that in no circumstances could a
tax demand be enforced against a VAT trader who had established hardship. The
two statutory tests are not the same. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a
trader who cannot demonstrate hardship, the position seems to me to be rather
different. Such a trader would have to raise and lodge the tax in dispute up
front, before commencing an appeal. By contrast a taxpayer under Income Tax,
CGT or SDLT is at liberty to initiate an appeal against an assessment, and may
or may not be faced with an application for collection by HMRC. More generally,
there is in my view no escape from the fact that the pay-first requirement is
additional to, rather than a substitute for, the regime for collection and
postponement so that, in principle, it constitutes less favourable treatment
for VAT appellants even if, in certain types of supposedly comparable cases, it
may make no difference to the outcome, in terms of the ability to prosecute an
appeal without paying the tax in dispute.
The no most favourable treatment Proviso
36.
This issue arises if the search for true comparators with the EU claim
discloses more than one comparable domestic claim with, viewed in the round,
different levels of favourableness in procedural treatment. On almost every
occasion when it has referred to the principle of equivalence the CJEU has
added the proviso that the principle does not require the EU claim to be
treated as favourably as the most favourably treated comparable domestic claim.
In the earliest of the cases cited to this court, the EDIS case, the
proviso is explained thus, at para 36:
“That principle (the principle
of equivalence) cannot, however, be interpreted as obliging a member state
to extend its most favourable rules governing recovery under national law to
all actions for repayment of charges or dues levied in breach of Community
law.”
Similar statements appear in the Levez
case at para 45, in Pontin v T-Comalux SA (Case C-63/08) [2009] ECR I-10467, at para 45, in the Transportes Urbanos case, at para 34 and in
the Littlewoods case, at para 31. But none of these cases provide any
more comprehensive explanation of how the Proviso is to be applied in practice.
This may be because its detailed operation is a matter for national courts, and
the CJEU considers that the Proviso as described above is sufficiently
self-explanatory for that purpose.
37.
The issue of interpretation of the Proviso arises in the present case on
the assumption that truly comparable domestic tax claims may include appeals
against assessment not only to domestic taxes like Income Tax, where the
procedure does not include a pay-first requirement, but also to other taxes
like Insurance Premium Tax and Landfill Tax, which do. Thus VAT claims are
treated less favourably than one or more true comparators, but equally favourably
with others. There are only two levels of differently favourable treatment on
this particular domestic spectrum of supposedly comparable claims, but it is
easy to imagine a spectrum with several levels, with treatment of the
comparable EU claim lying at the top, in the middle, or at (or below) the
bottom of that spectrum.
38.
In Revenue and Customs Comrs v Stringer [2009] ICR 985, probably
thinking of a spectrum of the latter kind, Lord Neuberger said this (obiter)
about the Proviso:
“This is therefore not a case
where it could be said that the appellants are seeking to benefit from the
‘most favourable rules’ of limitation, which I understand to mean exceptional
or unusually beneficial rules (as mentioned by the Court of Justice in Levez
v TH Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd, at para 42).”
In para 42 of the Levez case the CJEU merely
repeated the Proviso as enunciated in the EDIS case and set out above,
slightly adjusting the language to suit the facts, but without any underlying
change in meaning.
39.
In the present case Mr Swift submitted that the Proviso should be
treated as a reflection of the underlying purpose of the principle of equivalence,
namely that national procedural rules should not single out EU claims for worse
treatment, and specifically not discriminate against them by reason of their
EU, rather than national, origin. If therefore the procedure for any true
domestic comparator gave treatment to its claimant no more favourable than
given to the EU claim, then the principle of equivalence was satisfied. If in
the present case Insurance Premium Tax and Landfill Tax are true comparators,
then the treatment of VAT appeals does not infringe the principle of
equivalence.
40.
By contrast Mr Firth submitted that once any true comparator was
identified the procedure for which treated its claimants better than did the
procedure for the EU claim, then the principle of equivalence was infringed,
unless the better domestic treatment fell into that exceptional category
identified by Lord Neuberger in the Stringer case as excluded by the
Proviso. Income Tax, CGT and SDLT could not be excluded as conferring
exceptionally favourable treatment, and the fact that there were other domestic
tax appeals treated equally favourably with VAT was neither here or there. The
fact that domestic appellants in Insurance Premium Tax cases also received less
favourable treatment than Income Tax appellants did not mean that the EU based
claims by VAT registered traders were not less favourably treated. One example
of discrimination does not, so it is said, justify another.
41.
Both sides sought to squeeze out of the language of the CJEU decisions
some titbits favourable to their sharply opposing cases on this point. For
example, in the paragraph of the judgment in the EDIS case following the
statement of the Proviso (para 37) is it stated:
“Thus, Community law does not
preclude the legislation of a member state from laying down, alongside a
limitation period applicable under the ordinary law to actions between private
individuals for the recovery of sums paid but not due, special detailed rules,
which are less favourable, governing claims and legal proceedings to challenge
the imposition of charges and other levies. The position would be different
only if those detailed rules applied solely to actions based on Community law
for the repayment of such charges or levies.”
That last sentence, said Mr Swift, clearly allowed a member
state to resist an allegation of breach of the principle of equivalence if any
similar domestic procedure included a pay-first requirement.
42.
In the present case the Court of Appeal applied that dictum, at para 47,
as follows:
“The jurisprudence of the CJEU
shows that it is open to a member state to apply any available set of rules,
which are already applied to similar claims, to an EU-derived claim,
provided that an EU-derived claim is not selected for the worst treatment. No
one suggests that that is the
position here.”
43.
Mr Firth relied by contrast first upon dicta from the Levez case,
at paras 39 to 45 of the judgment. In my view, taken in context, they are
neutral on the point. The high-water mark of his citations was this passage
from the Pontin case, at para 56 of the judgment:
“If it emerges that one or more of
the actions referred to in the order for reference, or even other national remedies
that have not been put before the Court, are similar to an action for nullity
and reinstatement, it would also be for the referring court to consider whether
such actions involve more favourable procedural rules.”
The implication was, he said, that the discovery of any
comparable domestic claim with more favourable treatment that the EU claim
would offend the principle of equivalence.
44.
I do not consider that any reliable answer to this question can be found
by the minute textual analysis of the CJEU authorities. Nor was Lord
Neuberger’s instinctive conclusion about the limited meaning of the Proviso in
the Stringer case intended to be a fully reasoned or comprehensive
explanation of its full purpose and effect. I need reach no final conclusion in
this case, but would tentatively suggest the following analysis.
45.
First, the Proviso should not be regarded as some free-standing rule,
separate from the principle of equivalence. Rather it is part of the Court of
Justice’s expression of the principle of equivalence itself, directed to
explaining the standard of treatment which that principle imposes upon member states
when providing procedures for the vindication of rights based in EU law. What
is required is that the procedure should be broadly as favourable as that
available for truly comparable domestic claims, rather than the very best
available.
46.
Secondly, the Proviso is, like the principle of equivalence of which it
forms part, best understood in the light of its purpose. Although nowhere
expressly stated, I consider that HMRC were correct to submit that it is to
prevent member states from discriminating against claims based upon EU law by
affording them inferior procedural treatment from that afforded to comparable
domestic claims.
47.
On that basis I consider that the conclusion of the Court of Appeal on
this issue, set out in the passage quoted above from the judgment of Arden LJ,
is broadly correct. I would only add that this would not justify the choice of
some exceptionally tough set of procedural rules already applied to some
domestic claim for reasons particular to that type of claim. But such a claim
would be most unlikely to be a true comparator in any event.
Conclusion
48.
I would therefore dismiss this appeal, on the ground that there has not
been shown to be any true comparator among domestic claims sufficient to engage
the principle of equivalence in relation to the imposition of a pay-first
requirement upon traders seeking to appeal assessments to VAT.