[2017] UKSC 68
On appeal from: [2016] EWCA Civ 708
JUDGMENT
Mitsui & Co Ltd and others (Respondents) v Beteiligungsgesellschaft LPG Tankerflotte MBH & Co KG and another (Appellants)
before
Lord Neuberger
Lord Mance
Lord Clarke
Lord Sumption
Lord Hodge
JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
25 October 2017
Heard on 17 and 18 July 2017
Appellants Stephen Kenny QC Richard Sarll (Instructed by Stephenson Harwood LLP) |
|
Respondents Simon Croall QC Paul Toms (Instructed by Salvus Law Limited) |
LORD NEUBERGER: (with whom Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge agree)
General average and the York-Antwerp Rules
4. The Rules are introduced by a “Rule of Interpretation”, which states that:
“In the adjustment of general average the following lettered and numbered Rules shall apply to the exclusion of any Law and Practice inconsistent therewith.
Except as provided by the numbered Rules, general average shall be adjusted according to the lettered Rules.”
The seven lettered Rules are shortly expressed and are plainly intended to be of general application, whereas most of the 22 numbered Rules are lengthier, a few of them much lengthier.
“There is a general average act when, and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure.”
Rule C provides:
“Only such losses, damages or expenses which are the direct consequence of the general average act shall be allowed as general average.
Loss or damage sustained by the ship or cargo through delay, whether on the voyage or subsequently, such as demurrage, and any indirect loss whatsoever, such as loss of market, shall not be admitted as general average.”
Rule F states:
“Any extra expense incurred in place of another expense which would have been allowable as general average shall be deemed to be general average and so allowed without regard to the saving, if any, to other interests, but only up to the amount of the general average expense avoided.”
The factual background
7. On 29 January 2009 the chemical carrier MV Longchamp (“the vessel”) was transiting the Gulf of Aden on a voyage from Rafnes, Norway, to Go Dau, Vietnam, laden with a cargo of 2,728.732 metric tons of Vinyl Chloride Monomer in bulk (“the cargo”). The cargo was carried under a bill of lading dated 6 January 2009 which stated on its face that “General Average, if any, shall be settled in accordance with the York-Antwerp Rules 1974”.
8. At 06.40, seven heavily armed pirates boarded the vessel. The pirates commanded the master to alter course towards the bay of Eyl, Somalia, where she arrived and dropped anchor at 10.36 on 31 January 2009. At 14.05 on 30 January 2009 a negotiator for the pirates boarded the vessel and demanded a ransom of US$6m. The vessel’s owners (“the owners”) had meanwhile formed a crisis management team who had set a target settlement figure of US$1.5m. On 2 February 2009 an initial offer of US$373,000 was put to the pirates. Negotiations between the pirates’ negotiators and the owners’ crisis management team continued over the following seven weeks with various offers and counter-offers being made.
9. Eventually on 22 March 2009, after a negotiation period of 51 days, a ransom was agreed in the amount of US$1.85m. On 27 March 2009 the ransom sum was delivered by being dropped at sea. At 07.36 on 28 March 2009 the pirates disembarked and at 08.00 that day the vessel continued her voyage.
10. It is accepted that the US$1.85m ransom payment itself can be allowed under Rule A. It is also accepted that the costs and expenses of the negotiator in relation to the ransom, Captain Ganz, and the costs and expenses of his special advisers, NYA International, are allowable. There was a dispute about the allowability of a sum of around US$20,640 in respect of media expenses but that is no longer challenged by the cargo interests.
(1) US$75,724.80 for crew wages paid to the crew.
(2) US$70,058.70 for “high risk area bonus” paid to the crew by reason of the fact that the vessel was detained within the Gulf of Aden. These are additional wages which the crew were entitled to under their contract of employment whilst at sea within a “high risk area”.
(3) US$3,315 for crew maintenance (ie food and supplies).
(4) US$11,115.45 for bunkers consumed.
In this judgment, I shall treat the aggregate sum as being US$160,000.
The procedural history
12. The average adjuster, Mr Robin Aggersbury of Stichling Hahn Hilbrich, considered that the negotiation period expenses were allowable under Rule F on the basis that they were incurred “during a negotiation period of about 51 days” which enabled “an amount of US$4,150,000 [to be] saved in the common interest of all property owners concerned, which would otherwise have been recoverable as per Rule A”. The 51-day period to which he referred was, as explained above, from 30 January to 22 March 2009. The cargo was valued at destination at US$787,186 and the value of the vessel was assessed at US$3,947,096; so cargo interests were liable for 14.44% of the total general average expenditure. Following publication of the adjustment, the cargo interests requested and obtained a report (“the Report”) from the Advisory Committee of the Association of Average Adjusters. The Report set out the facts in considerable detail, and concluded, by a majority of four members to one, that the negotiation period expenses did not fall within Rule F.
The arguments of the parties
15. The cargo interests raise a number of points in answer to this argument, and those points (which I shall take in a slightly different order from that in which they were argued in this court or discussed by Hamblen LJ in his judgment) are as follows:
a) The ransom saved was not “allowable”.
b) The ransom saved was not “another expense”.
c) The negotiation period expenses were not incurred with the necessary intention.
d) The negotiation period expenses are not “extra expense”.
e) The negotiation period expenses would or may have been incurred anyway.
f) The negotiation period expenses are irrecoverable by virtue of Rule C or (by implication) Rule XI.
I shall consider those arguments in turn, although it is the first and second arguments which justify particular consideration partly because they are the most difficult points and partly they are issues on which my view differs from that of the Court of Appeal.
It would not have been reasonable to accept the initial ransom demand
18. In my opinion, it is not necessary to resolve this difficult issue, because I do not consider that the judge or the Court of Appeal were correct in assuming that the owners had to establish that it would have been reasonable to accept the pirates’ initial demand in order to justify the contention that the negotiation period expenses were allowable under Rule F. One does not need to examine the wording of the Rules to appreciate that the assumption made by the courts below would lead to very odd results, as explained by Hamblen LJ at [2016] Bus LR 1285, paras 62 to 64. It would mean that, if a ship-owner incurs an expense to avoid paying a reasonable sum, he can in principle recover under Rule F, whereas if he incurs expense to avoid paying an unreasonable sum (ie a larger sum), he cannot recover. The more obvious his duty to mitigate, and the greater the likely benefits of such mitigation, the less likely he would be to be able to recover. Such a state of affairs (apparently known to cognoscenti as the “Hudson conundrum”, after the writer who first described it) would be a remarkable result. Fortunately, examination of the wording of Rules A, C and F shows that it does not arise.
20. Applying that reasoning to this case, and subject to the discussion below as to the cargo interests’ other arguments, the US$160,000 falls within Rule F. The US$160,000 was incurred in order to avoid paying a US$6m ransom (or, more accurately, a ransom of around US$4m more than the ransom actually paid), and as the ransom was an allowable expense in principle, the US$160,000 therefore falls within Rule F, subject to the appellant establishing that it would have been reasonable to have paid a ransom of around US$2.4m (ie the ransom it did pay plus the US$160,000 together with the further expenses such as those paid to Captain Ganz and NYA). If the judge was even arguably entitled to reach the conclusion that paying a US$6m ransom was reasonable, it must have been reasonable to pay a ransom well under half that figure.
The reduction in ransom was not an alternative course of action
23. The notion that Rule F is only engaged in a case where the claimant achieves an “alternative course of action” in that sense was said by Hamblen LJ at [2016] Bus LR 1285, paras 38 to 40 to be supported by passages in the two leading books in English on general average. In paras F.01 and F.29, the editors of Lowndes & Rudolf, The Law of General Average and the York-Antwerp Rules, 14th ed (2013) write:
“As the name implies, substituted expenses are the expenses incurred in respect of a course of action undertaken as an alternative to - or in substitution for - the expense that would be allowable as general average.
For this rule to have any application there must have been an alternative course which, if adopted, would have involved expenditure which could properly be charged to general average.”
In Hudson & Harvey, The York-Antwerp Rules: The Principles and Practice of General Average Adjustment, 3rd ed (2010), para 11.33, there is this:
“Although Rule F is phrased in terms which refer to the incurring of the expense, its application in practice presupposes a choice between two (and sometimes more) different courses of action.”
27. There is an alternative analysis of the owners’ claim, which is that it should be treated as being for a single sum of US$2.01m, namely the US$1.85m ransom actually paid plus the US$160,000 negotiation period expenses, under Rule F on the basis that this combined sum was “extra expense incurred in place of” the US$6m originally demanded. However, I do not see how that helps the cargo interests. Logically, their argument on this basis should be that the US$1.85m is disallowable under Rule F as it was not an alternative course of action from paying the originally demanded US$6m ransom, but the negotiation period expenses are recoverable under Rule F, as they did involve an “alternative course of action” - which is precisely the opposite of the cargo interests’ actual case, and indeed a nonsensical result.
29. Given that the Rules represent an international arrangement, it is particularly inappropriate to adopt an approach to their interpretation which involves reading in any words or qualification. As already mentioned, it appears to me that, as a matter of ordinary language, Rule F applies to the negotiation period expenses for the reasons given in para 26 above. To imply some qualification such as the requirement that those expenses must have been incurred so as to achieve an “alternative course of action” appears to me to be very dangerous. In the same way as an international convention or treaty, the Rules should be interpreted by a United Kingdom court “unconstrained by technical rules of English law, or by English legal precedent, but on broad principles of general acceptation”, to quote Lord Wilberforce in James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping (UK) Ltd [1978] AC 141, 152. As Lord Hobhouse said in King v Bristow Helicopters Ltd [2002] 2 AC 628, para 148, in relation to an article in the Warsaw Convention, “it is the unadorned language of the article to which attention must be directed”.
30. Quite apart from this, the cargo interests’ second contention appears to me to lead to difficulties and potential anomalies in practice. Thus, there would be difficulties about deciding whether a particular variant was an “alternative course of action”. Towage to destination, extra costs of arranging dry-docking with cargo on board, overtime worked on repair or cargo operations (at least sometimes), and (historically) air freight instead of sea freight for spare parts were examples given by the respondents of “alternative courses of action” (mostly taken from Lowndes & Rudolf, op cit). But it is hard to see where the line is to be drawn. The difficulties about deciding whether overtime payments qualify is plain from reading Lowndes & Rudolf, op cit, para F.25; in addition, overtime payments are enhanced payments for the same work whose cost would have been recoverable under Rule A in any event. And if air freight can qualify if it is incurred instead of sea freight, it is hard to see much logic in disqualifying sea freight at a lower rate negotiated with a new party on a different type of vessel. Further, given that, on the cargo interests’ case, negotiation period expenses could not be claimed if they were incurred as a result of negotiating a reduction in the cost of repair with one shipyard, what would the position be if the negotiations were with a competing shipyard and/or in respect of a novel and different way of effecting the repairs?
32. At [2016] Bus LR 1285, para 47, Hamblen LJ suggested that there were a number of anomalies if the negotiation period expenses were allowable. First, he mentioned the difficulty of establishing that the expenses would not have been incurred even if the initial demand for US$6m ransom had been accepted. I doubt that that problem would arise in most cases where the vessel-operating costs are said to fall within Rule F, and it may well arise in some cases where it would be common ground that Rule F would apply. In any event, it is for the claimant in each case to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the delay caused by the negotiation would not have occurred if there had been no negotiation. Secondly, he said that, in a case such as this there could be no entitlement to claim vessel-operating costs as Rule F expenses until a demand had been made. I agree, but fail to see why it is an anomaly. Thirdly, Hamblen LJ pointed out that, in the absence of a demand, eg if there were simply negotiations, it might be hard to say when, or even whether, Rule F was engaged. I accept that there may be ransom cases where it is hard to determine at what precise point Rule F is engaged, but it would, I think, be a rare case where at some point early in the negotiations the pirates did not come up with a figure. Anyway, I suspect that point could apply to cases where Rule F is undoubtedly engaged. Quite apart from that, I do not accept that the fact that there may be difficulties for claimants in a few other ransom cases is a reason for holding that Rule F is not engaged in this case. More broadly, if (as appears to me to be appropriate) one views Rule F simply as entitling a claimant to claim in respect of an expense successfully incurred for the purpose of mitigating a loss, it seems to me that none of these points should give rise to concerns.
The cargo interests’ other arguments
33. The cargo interests’ third contention is that, in order to be recoverable under Rule F, the negotiation period expenses must be shown to have been consciously and intentionally incurred by the owners, and there was no evidence that the owners or their agent had consciously decided to incur those expenses in order to reduce the ransom payable to the pirates. Indeed, Hamblen LJ said at [2016] Bus LR 1285, para 43 that “it does not appear that the owners ever considered that they faced a choice” and that there was “no evidence to suggest that they ever considered choosing between paying the ransom on demand and paying a lesser sum following negotiation”. Accordingly, runs the argument, the owners cannot recover under Rule F as they never made a conscious choice between paying the US$6m ransom initially demanded by the pirates or negotiating with the pirates.
35. The cargo interests further contend that the negotiation period expenses were not “extra expense” within the meaning of that word in Rule F. This contention is based on the proposition that, in order to qualify as “extra expense”, an expense would have to be of a nature which would not normally have been incurred in response to the peril threatening the adventure. I can see no reason for giving the word “extra” such a restrictive meaning. First, it is not its natural contextual meaning, which, in my view, is simply an expense which would not otherwise have been incurred (but for the saving of the “other expense”). Secondly, such a meaning is supported by the contrast with the word “extraordinary” in Rule A. Thirdly, such a restrictive meaning lies unhappily with the French equivalent adjective, which is “supplémentaire”. I take some comfort from, but do not rely on, the fact that the word “extra” in Rule F has now been replaced, in later versions of the Rules, by the word “additional”.
36. The cargo interests’ next contention is that the delay which led to the negotiation period expenses may well have occurred even if the owners had agreed to the pirates’ initial demand of US$6m. For instance, if the owners had accepted the US$6m, the pirates may have thought that they had pitched their initial demand too low, and would have increased it, leading to further negotiations and consequent delay. That is of course a possibility. However, it is inherent in the judge’s conclusion that he considered it more likely than not that the vessel and cargo would have been released promptly if the US$6m ransom demand had been accepted and paid. That was the sort of finding (albeit an implied finding, but necessarily so, in his conclusion) with which an appellate court should be very slow to interfere. And in this case it appears to me that we should clearly not question it: it was an eminently defensible finding. It is clear that a delay of some period would be inevitable as a result of the negotiations, and it is clear that the 51 days (between the initial demand of US$6m and the final agreement at US$1.85m) was inevitable as a result of the negotiations; on the other hand, to put it at its very lowest, it is not unlikely that none of the 51 days delay would have been suffered if the US$6m demand had been met.
37. The cargo interests’ final contention is that, as Rule C excludes from general average expenditure which is an “indirect loss” including demurrage, and/or because Rule XI includes crew wages and maintenance where it applies, the claim in the present case must fail. In my opinion, there is nothing in that point. I accept that the negotiation period expenses, if consequential on a general average act, would have fallen within the exclusion in Rule C of loss sustained through delay, but I do not accept that it follows that they must therefore fall outside Rule F. Rule C applies to expenses and other sums claimed by way of general average as consequences of a general average act (as defined by Rule A). It does not apply to expenses covered by Rule F, which is concerned with sums which are expended or lost in mitigating or avoiding the sums which would otherwise be claimable as general average. By definition, sums recoverable under Rule F are not themselves allowable in general average, but are alternatives to sums which would be allowable. One can understand why, as a matter of policy, demurrage and similar indirect liabilities are not recoverable as general average, but it does not follow that such indirect liabilities should be irrecoverable if they are expended in order to mitigate what would otherwise be a larger general average claim.
Conclusion
39. For these reasons, I would allow this appeal and restore the decision of the deputy judge.
LORD SUMPTION: (with whom Lord Hodge and Lord Clarke agree)
40. I agree with the judgment of Lord Neuberger.
43. In my opinion, the appeal should be allowed.
LORD CLARKE:
LORD MANCE: (dissenting)
“Any extra expense incurred in place of another expense which would have been allowable as general average shall be deemed to be general average and so allowed without regard to the saving, if any, to other interests, but only up to the amount of the general average expense avoided.”
49. Before the deputy judge, Mr Stephen Hofmeyr QC [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 76, the focus was on point (i), whether the US$6m would, if paid, have been allowable as general average. He held that it would have been. The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge on this point. But it focused on a different aspect, whether Rule F was in principle applicable when all that had occurred was negotiation, in the event a long, rather than a short negotiation, but not an alternative course of action by which expenditure different in kind was incurred. In the Court of Appeal’s view, this was not a case of extra expense being incurred “in place of” another expense, but a case where the owners had no “real choice” or “true alternative” to pursue (per Hamblen LJ [2016] Bus LR 1285, paras 51-53) and there was “only one course of action open … namely to treat with the pirates … however long that might take” (per Sir Timothy Lloyd, para 99).
“… an alternative to, or in substitution for - what might prima facie be thought of as being the normal or standard means of dealing with a given situation.”
Hoffmann LJ went on (p 422) to leave open the question whether under Rule F “the course of conduct giving rise to the substituted expense should have fallen outside the obligations contained in the contract of affreightment” or whether it is “sufficient that the expenditure was a less usual and more [sic] expensive way by which the owner complied with his contractual obligation, eg to repair the ship”. He concluded by noting that “Lowndes & Rudolf suggest that expenditure of the latter kind could fall within the Rule”, but that Rule F “certainly contemplates that there was a practical alternative by which the adventure could have been completed”.
56. The “Hudson conundrum”, to which Lord Neuberger refers (para 18 above), does not lead to any different conclusion. In most, if not all, circumstances in which Rule F applies, there will be a prima facie or standard course of action to be taken in the face of the general average event, but the owners will, by adopting some unusual means, have arrived at an alternative solution to further the common adventure. In such cases, the other paying parties will be hard pressed to suggest that the prima facie or standard reaction would have been unreasonable. There is a parallel here with the duty to mitigate, which is not lightly to be imposed or treated as broken. The Court of Appeal ([2016] Bus LR 1285, paras 73-74) was in this respect right in my view to agree with the deputy judge’s general conclusion of principle ([2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 73, para 77) that the hypothetical other expense must be one which would have been reasonably incurred in a sense “interpreted and applied with a sufficient degree of latitude to give rule F practical effect”. In many cases, the differences between the two courses (the standard and that adopted) may not be large, and both may easily be reconciled as reasonable reactions. Rule F is also careful, by its concluding words, to recognise that the extra expense may not be less than that which would have resulted from taking the standard course. In such a case, Rule F performs the valuable function of allowing recovery up to the amount which would have been recoverable had the standard course been adopted.
“At least in one sense, no ransom payment could ever be described as ‘reasonable’. Pirates are criminals engaged in extortion and their demands are unlawful and deplorable. How can a payment extorted by pirates be described as ‘reasonable’? In my view, it cannot. The idea of a ‘reasonable ransom’ is radically misconceived and the term an oxymoron.”
That is however to look at the point from only one direction. The relevant viewpoint is that of the unfortunate victims involved in a common adventure. From their viewpoint, there must be some ransom demands to which it is reasonable and others to which it is unreasonable to respond. Even the deputy judge appeared prepared to accept that the latter would include a ransom demand well in excess of the value of the vessel and cargo.
“Even if it may be said that, by January 2009, a pattern of dealing between Somali pirates and shipowners had developed, as described by David Steel J in Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd (The Bunga Melati Dua) [2010] 2 All ER 593’ [2010] 1 Lloyd's Rep 509 at paras 19, 23, 25 and 26 (affirmed on appeal: [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 630; [2011] 1 WLR 2012), such a pattern would not remove the potential for unreasonable, irrational and illogical behaviour.”
In support, the deputy judge said that negotiation was an uncertain process and it “was not possible to state with reasonable certainty when the ransom demand was made that the amount of the ransom would inevitably be significantly reduced by the process of negotiation” (para 100). Whether or not it is “possible to state with reasonable certainty” that a negotiation will achieve significant success cannot however be the test of whether or not negotiation should reasonably be essayed. The deputy judge also derived comfort from his conclusion on this point from the consideration that “natural justice requires that all should contribute to the substituted expenses incurred” (para 103). A difficulty about this observation is that nothing in Rule F could enable cargo interests to recover any matching loss or damage that they might suffer from the delay during negotiations. The cargo was in fact perishable, even though in the event it survived the rigours it underwent without apparent deterioration. As the Court of Appeal correctly recognised in this connection (para 51), whether or not an item falls within general average depends on the proper interpretation of the York-Antwerp Rules. They represent a balanced framework, negotiated over time between all interests involved.
62. As I have already observed, the Court of Appeal’s reasoning involves a potential tension between the approaches taken to the scope of Rule F and to the issue of the reasonableness of paying the initial ransom demand. In the former context, Hamblen LJ said this [2016] Bus LR 1285, paras 43-46:
“43. Some support for the cargo interests’ approach is to be found in the evidence. Thus, it does not appear that the owners ever considered that they faced a choice. The owners’ crisis management and negotiation team were set up before any ransom demand had been made. From the outset the goal was to negotiate to obtain release of the vessel upon payment of a ransom, but in a reduced amount. There is no evidence to suggest that they ever considered choosing between paying the ransom on demand and paying a lesser sum following negotiation.
44. This is also borne out by the advisory committee’s stated experience, which is that in all Somali piracy cases the same course of action is taken, namely to negotiate and pay a reduced ransom leading to release of the vessel. Again it does not appear that there is considered to be a choice of payment on demand.
45. In my judgment this failure to recognise that there is a choice reflects the reality, which is that payment on demand is simply a different way of going about the same course of action and not a true alternative course of action. Whether or not the ransom is paid on demand there will still be a negotiation, there will still be delay, there will still be the incurring of vessel and crew running costs during the period of delay. In either case the same expenses will be incurred; the difference is only in their extent.
46. In this case, for example, there was a period of delay between the hijacking and the first ransom demand. Even if that first demand had been accepted, it does not follow that it would have been agreed. As the majority of the advisory committee state, the unprecedented acceptance of the ransom on demand may well have been ‘met by a demand from the pirates for a still higher figure’. Even if that was not the case, it would still have been necessary to negotiate and agree matters relating to place and method of payment and to the release of vessel and crew. Thus in this case it is to be noted that there was a period of six days between the agreement of the ransom and the release of the vessel.”
63. In the latter context, however, Hamblen LJ said, at paras 77-84:
“77. The cargo interests contend that the judge was wrong to conclude that payment on demand would have been reasonable and that account should have been taken (but was not) of the following matters:
(1) The established modus operandi for Somali pirates as at the date of the hijacking, namely invariably to negotiate down the amount of the ransom demanded over a period of time with little or no risk to cargo or crew.
(2) In the experience of the majority of the advisory committee, ‘the negotiation period is common in all piracy cases’ and ‘there is always a period of negotiation before a vessel is released and it is the normal means of dealing with such situations’.
(3) The minority member accepted that there was a reasonable period of ‘customary’ negotiation and that ‘clearly, the ransom amount initially demanded cannot automatically be allowed in general average’.
(4) The position adopted by the owners in their skeleton argument at trial, ‘That is not to say that paying the first-demanded ransom is ever likely in fact to be a reasonable course of action. In reality, where there is the option of entering into negotiations with pirates, it will almost always be the right thing to do’.
78. They submit that if proper regard is had to these matters it should be concluded that it would be unreasonable to pay the originally demanded ransom without even attempting to negotiate the amount of the ransom payment, contrary to the established practice, and that the judge was wrong to conclude otherwise. They further submit that payment on demand would be an ‘artificial invention’.
79. The owners do not accept that there is satisfactory evidence to establish the matters sought to be relied upon by the cargo interests, but that in any event they do not render payment of the full ransom demand unreasonable.
80. The owners accept that the evidence at that time was that Somali pirates would release a vessel upon payment of a ransom. As they point out, that being so, the sooner the ransom was paid, the quicker the vessel would be released and the vessel, cargo and crew removed from danger.
81. In my judgment, if, as stated in the Masefield case [2010] 2 All ER 593, ‘the safest, most timely and effective means to secure the release’ of a ship and crew was to pay a ransom, it follows that the most safe, timely and effective means of so doing is to pay as soon as possible. It may be that the general practice was to try to negotiate the ransom down, but that does not mean that it would be unreasonable to pay the ransom straight away so as to avert the very real danger to vessel, cargo and crew as quickly and effectively as possible. Nor can a course of action which procures such real and tangible benefits be regarded as an ‘artificial invention’.
82. Further, in my judgment the reasons given by the judge are all cogent and compelling reasons for concluding that payment of the initial ransom sum would have been reasonable.
83. Further reasons for supporting that conclusion include the following:
(1) The effect of the delay involved in seeking to negotiate a lower ransom is to keep the vessel, cargo and crew in peril, with all the risks of saying ‘no’ to pirates, who are violent, armed criminals.
(2) The vessel and cargo were under the control of the pirates. As such, there were obvious dangers should there be a storm or other peril of the sea.
(3) The owners knew that there had been a firefight during the capture of the vessel and that a crew member had been wounded.
(4) Although, as matters turned out, the pirates’ main negotiator was said to be a ‘calm, rational communicator’ who never resorted to threats or other coercive tactics, the owners had no reason to assume that.
(5) This was just one of many ‘known unknowns’ facing the owners.
84. For all these reasons I conclude that it cannot be shown that the judge was wrong to find that payment of the initial ransom demand would have been reasonable. It follows that I would dismiss the appeal on this issue.”
I note that, after the quotation from the Masefield case [2010] 2 All ER 593 in para 81 of Hamblen LJ’s judgment, the words “to pay a ransom” are not a correct citation. The actual words in the Masefield judgment were “to negotiate and subsequently pay a ransom”.
64. The cargo interests rely on the apparent acceptance both by the deputy judge ([2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 76, para 99, quoted in para 61 above) and by the Court of Appeal ([2016] Bus LR 1285, paras 43, 44, 46 and 81) of a general practice to negotiate any ransom demand down over a period. The owners object that there is no evidence justifying any such conclusion. But their own skeleton argument for the trial stated that:
“This is not to say that paying the first-demanded ransom is ever likely in fact to be a reasonable course of action. In reality, where there is the option of entering into negotiations with pirates, it will almost always be the right thing to do. But when considering the allowability in GA of the costs of the negotiation, the relevant alternative scenario to be considered is the one in which there is no negotiation possible/available.”
The last sentence reflects the owners’ then case, which relied on a suggested analogy with the reasoning of the House of Lords in The Bijela, discussed in para 58 above.
65. The trial in the present case was a Commercial Court trial on the documents. It seems clear that the deputy judge treated himself as entitled to rely on all the material before him when considering the factual position, including the statements in the Masefield case and the Report of the Advisory Committee of the Association of Average Adjusters on the present case, which he summarised at some length, while recording that it was common ground that it was not binding on the court. I see no reason to regard either the deputy judge or the Court of Appeal as having erred in this respect. David Steel J’s judgment in the Masefield case noted ([2010] 2 All ER 593, para 14) that the initial ransom demand in that case of US$2m in August 2008
“was all of a piece with the process of Somali hijacking. Fortunately the process of negotiating such a demand and making an agreed payment had invariably led to the release of all vessels involved. Against that background, I did not understand it to be controversial that the actual prospects of recovery of the cargo as at 18 September 2008 were good.”