[2025] UKPC 25
Privy Council Appeal No 0012 of 2024
JUDGMENT
Keith Rolle and another (Respondents)
v
Raymond Meadows (Appellant) (The Bahamas)
From the Court of Appeal of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas
before
Lord Sales
Lord Stephens
Lord Richards
Lady Simler
Dame Janice Pereira
JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
16 June 2025
Heard on 24 March 2025
Maurice O Glinton KC
Meryl Glinton
(Instructed by Sheridans Solicitors LLP)
Respondents
Harriet Holmes
Tanisha Tynes-Cambridge
(Instructed by Sinclair Gibson LLP and Tynes & Tynes)
(i) whether the respondents Keith Rolle and Dorothea Rolle ("the Rolles") were in adverse possession of a strip of land ("the Disputed Land") for a period of more than twelve (12) years before commencement of a claim for possession brought by the appellant Raymond Meadows ("Mr Meadows") for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1995 ("the Adverse Possession Issue");
(ii) whether restrictive covenants contained in the Rolle and Meadows conveyances operated as a contractual waiver of the accrual of rights by adverse possession under the Limitation Act ("the Waiver Issue"); and
(iii) whether the Hawksbill Creek Acts (as later referred), the Building and Sanitary Code and the Regulations for Town Planning and Development 2014 applicable to the Port Area of the city of Freeport, on Grand Bahama ("the Regulations") affect the operation of the Limitation Act ("the Acts and Regulations Issue").
The background
(1) The larger tract of land comprising 214.02 acres and known as "tract 19A" was acquired by one Joseph Pinder of Grand Bahama by a deed of conveyance dated 5 July 1982 ("the 1982 Deed"). The 1982 Deed contained restrictive covenants set out in the Second Schedule to the Deed. The Rolle Property therefore became subject to the restrictive covenants in the 1982 Deed.
(2) The Rolles proceeded to construct a six-unit commercial complex on the Rolle Property. They paved a 10ft wide roadway and erected a 6ft high wire fence on the Disputed Land. They applied for and obtained a Certificate of Occupancy from the Grand Bahama Port Authority ("the GBPA") dated 18 March 2005. At this time the land to the south of the fence was vacant.
(3) It is common ground that the Disputed Land is accessible only from the Rolle Property, is enclosed by a fence on the side of the Rolle Property and the paved roadway thereon provides access to the commercial building on the Rolle Property.
(4) Mr Meadows, by a conveyance dated 1 February 2017, purchased a parcel of land comprising approximately, 1.305 acres, also forming part of "tract 19A". ("the Meadows Property"). Accordingly, the Meadows Property is also subject to the restrictive covenants in the 1982 Deed. The Rolle Property and the Meadows Property adjoin each other. The Rolle Property's southern boundary line is the northern boundary line of the Meadows Property. The fence erected by the Rolles on the Disputed Land physically separates them.
(5) It is also common ground that the Rolle Property and the Meadows Property fall within the Port Area. The GBPA by the Hawksbill Creek, Grand Bahama (Deep Water Harbour and Industrial Area) Act 1955 ("the Principal Act"), the 1960 and the 1965 Amendment Acts to the Principal Act and the Hawksbill Creek Agreements flowing from those enactments (together called "the Hawksbill Creek Acts") give administration and control of the Port Area to the GBPA. Sawyer CJ in Commonwealth Brewery Ltd v Attorney General of the Bahamas (BSCCiv No 14 of 1997 unreported) observed, at p 11: "Considering the Hawksbill Creek Agreement as a whole, it appears ... that to the extent of the Port Area, the Government gave the Port Authority the powers which one would normally associate with Local Government authorities and thereby created a special enclave in order to encourage the development of that particular part of the Bahamas".
(6) Mr Meadows, after his purchase, had his land surveyed. That survey showed the area where the paved road and fence stood as being situate on the Meadows Property. Mr Meadows therefore formed the view that the area occupied by the paved roadway and fence was an encroachment on the Meadows Property.
(7) At a meeting on 3 March 2017, Mr Meadows informed Mr Rolle of the survey report and of the Rolles' encroachment on the Meadows Property.
(8) Mr Meadows, by his counsel, wrote to Mr Rolle on 16 May 2017, demanding that the Rolles remove the roadway and fence within 14 days, or alternately offering to rent the Disputed Land to the Rolles. Mr Rolle, by his counsel, responded on 23 May 2017, to Mr Meadows in essence stating that the Disputed Land was part of the Rolle Property on which he had built his commercial complex some 14 years prior. In a further letter to Mr Meadows on 24 May 2017, Mr Rolle enclosed a copy of his Certificate of Occupancy issued by the GBPA.
(9) A further exchange of correspondence took place between Mr Meadows and the Rolles on 30 May and 1 June 2017. Each party maintained their respective claims in respect of the Disputed Land.
(10) On 3 July 2017, Mr Meadows commenced action in the Supreme Court by Writ of Summons in which he alleged that the Rolles had trespassed on the Disputed Land (being a part of the Meadows Property) and sought, among other relief, an order for delivery up of possession by the Rolles of the Disputed Land.
(11) The Rolles, in their Defence filed on 12 July 2017, denied that they had encroached on the Meadows Property, claiming that the Disputed Land was part of the Rolle Property, and, alternatively, alleged that the claim was time barred pursuant to section 16(3) of the Limitation Act 1995 following a period of continuous adverse possession of the Disputed Land by them for upwards of 12 years prior to the issue of the Writ of Summons.
(12) The action proceeded to trial on 9 and 13 August 2019. On 29 September 2020 the trial judge, Hanna-Adderley J, in a written judgment ordered that the Rolles deliver up vacant possession of the Disputed Land, demolish and remove the erections constructed thereon and restrained the Rolles from entering upon the Disputed Land.
(13) The Rolles appealed. Mr Meadows cross appealed. The appeal was heard on 8 March and 22 April 2021. On 31 May 2021 the Court of Appeal (Barnett P, Evans and Bethell JJA) in a written judgment allowed the Rolles' appeal, setting aside the orders made at first instance, and dismissed Mr Meadows' cross appeal.
The findings of the courts below
(i) between 3 December 2003 and 18 March 2005, the Rolles had constructed a six-unit commercial building on the Rolle Property and that no earlier than 18 March 2005 had erected a 6ft high wire fence and paved a 10ft wide roadway on the Disputed Land (para 28).
(ii) the Disputed Land fell within the Meadows Property (para 29), the Rolles had unlawfully intruded on the Disputed Property and were trespassers (para 42).
(iii) the Rolles could not rely on the defence of adverse possession because:
(a) relying on the Court of Appeal's decision in Fairness Ltd v Bain et al (SCCivApp No 30 of 2015), the action was a claim in trespass and was not an action for recovery of land (para 55); and
(b) time stopped running from 3 March 2017 when Mr Meadows asserted his ownership of the Disputed Property (and not when the Writ was issued) so that sections 16(3) and 25(1) of the Limitation Act and adverse possession did not arise. The judge found further in any event that the Rolles were in actual possession of the Disputed Land on 18 March, 2005 and that time having stopped running on 3 March 2017, the Rolles' "alleged occupation falls short by 15 days (total time of actual possession 11 years and 350 days) to meet the 12-year requirement as provided by the ... the Limitation Act" (para 55).
(i) The trial judge was wrong to hold that the defence of adverse possession was not sustainable in a claim for trespass (departing from its decision in Fairness) (paras 19, 46, 51 and 52).
(ii) There was no basis to set aside the judge's finding based on the evidence she accepted that the Disputed Land fell within the Meadows Property and that the Rolles were in possession of the Disputed Property at latest on 18 March 2005 (paras 67, 70).
(iii) It is settled law that time does not stop running for the twelve-year period of limitation until a writ is issued and the meeting of 3 March 2017 could not stop time running (para 56).
(iv) But for the judge's erroneous view that the 3 March 2017 meeting stopped time from running, the Rolles were in adverse possession for the 12 years immediately preceding the issuance of Mr Meadows' Writ of Summons (para 70).
(v) The restrictive covenants contained in the Rolle and Meadows conveyances did not give rise to a contractual waiver of rights accruing by adverse possession under the Limitation Act (para 75).
(vi) The Hawksbill Creek Acts and the Regulations made thereunder by the Port Authority did not affect the operation of the Limitation Act (paras 79, 81).
The Acts and Regulations Issue
Discussion
"Again, it is difficult to see how provisions relating to regulations of a local authority could affect the law relating to adverse possession. Nothing in the Regulations even purports to relate to the law of adverse possession. The provisions in the Regulations are not peculiar to Freeport and the Port Area as suggested by the respondent [Mr Meadows]. Similar provisions regulating subdivisions may be found in the Planning and Sub-divisions Act."
At paragraph 81, the Court of Appeal went on further to say:
"... there is nothing in the Regulations which affects the operation of the provisions of the Limitations Act. If a neighbour encroaches on a neighbour's lot in a subdivision for more than 12 years, he acquires a possessory title to that part of the neighbour's lot. ..."
In the Board's view, the Court of Appeal was right to so find.
The Waiver Issue
"(2) Not to do anything on the said hereditaments [the property conveyed] which will interfere with the reasonable use and enjoyment of any adjoining property or any property in the immediate vicinity or neighbourhood of the said hereditaments and in particular not to cause any contamination or pollution of the air sea or any underground water supply in the locality.
(3) Not to erect or construct any building or structure of any kind on any part of the said hereditaments unless such building or structure shall comply with the Town Planning Regulations and the Building and Sanitary Codes ... promulgated by the said [GBPA] ..."
Discussion
"... On the respondent's [Mr Meadows'] argument any trespass is an interference with the reasonable use and enjoyment of any adjoining property. No trespasser could ever acquire a possessory title no matter how long he was trespassing and being in exclusive and undisturbed possession of the neighbouring property."
Conclusion - The Acts and Regulations Issue and Waiver Issue
The Adverse Possession Issue
"16. (3) No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiry of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to such person or, if it first accrued to some other person through whom such person claims, to that person:
Provided that, if the right of action first accrued to the Crown and the person bringing the action claims through the Crown, the action may be brought at any time before the expiry of the period during which the action could have been brought by the Crown or of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to some person other than the Crown, whichever period first expires.
...
25. (1) At the expiration of the period prescribed by this Act for any person to bring an action to recover land, the estate or interest of that person in the land shall vest in the person who is then in adverse possession of the land within the meaning of section 24."
"At common law as applied in the Bahamas, which have not adopted the English Land Registration Act, 1925, there is no such concept as an 'absolute' title. Where questions of title to land arise in litigation the court is concerned only with the relative strengths of the titles proved by the rival claimants. If party A can prove a better title than party B he is entitled to succeed notwithstanding that C may have a better title than A, if C is neither a party to the action nor a person by whose authority B is in possession or occupation of the land. It follows that as against a defendant whose entry upon the land was made as a trespasser a plaintiff who can prove any documentary title to the land is entitled to recover possession of the land unless debarred under the Real Property Limitation Act by effluxion of the 20-year period of continuous and exclusive possession by the trespasser."
The Quieting Titles Act
"...Section 17 of the [QTA] gives the court a discretion whether to dismiss the application entirely, to dismiss it and grant a certificate of title to an adverse claimant, to grant a certificate of title to the petitioner, or to grant separate certificates of title to different parts of the land to the petitioner and to one or more adverse claimants. In Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Brill [2010] NSCA 69, para 37, Fichaud J said this, speaking of the Quieting Titles Act 1989 in the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal:
'The QTA does not enable a court to create title. Rather it authorises a court to grant a certificate that reflects the title, including possessory title, to which the party is entitled by the legal principles that exist outside the QTA.'" (Emphasis added)
The lower courts' factual findings
"Considering the judgment in the round, the judge concluded that, but for her erroneous view that the 3 March 2017 meeting stopped time from running, the Appellants [the Rolles] would have been in possession for more than 12 years when the Writ was issued on 3 July 2017. That is the relevant finding." (para 70)
Conclusion