Privy Council Appeal No. 55 of 1998
Dr. Magdy Omar
Appellant v. The General Medical Council RespondentFROM
THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE
OF THE GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL
---------------
JUDGMENT OF THE LORDS OF THE JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL, Delivered the 15th February 1999 ------------------Present at the hearing:-
Lord Nicholls of BirkenheadLord Clyde
Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough
[Delivered by Lord Clyde] ------------------
1. Dr. Magdy Omar was convicted on 13th February 1996 of an
indecent assault on a female patient. The assault occurred on 2nd June 1995. On
16th June 1995 the patient had returned to see Dr. Omar and complained to him
about his conduct. The conversation was tape-recorded and in the course of it
Dr. Omar made certain admissions. Later the same day he was interviewed by the
police and again made certain admissions. These admissions were heavily relied
upon by the Crown at the trial. Dr. Omar was sentenced on 3rd May 1996 to six
months imprisonment. He appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal Criminal
Division and was subsequently refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The
matter came before the Professional Conduct Committee on 20th July 1998 and at
the conclusion of those proceedings the Committee decided in light of his
conviction to erase his name from the Register with an immediate suspension of
his registration. Dr. Omar has now appealed to Her Majesty in Council from that
decision.
2. Dr. Omar presented his case to their Lordships with clarity
and restraint. He sought to attack the Committee's decision in two respects.
Firstly, he claimed that the Committee should have looked behind his conviction
and considered new evidence; secondly, he claimed that the Committee had erred
in its decision to erase his name from the Register.
3. The Committee were empowered to direct an erasure under
section 36(1)(a) of the Medical Act 1983, where a fully registered person has
been found by them "to have been convicted in the British Isles of a
criminal offence". The Committee were satisfied that there had been such a
conviction. But Dr. Omar argued that his defence had never been fairly
represented at his trial, and that it had been misquoted in the Court of Appeal,
so that a defence had been throughout attributed to him which he had never
claimed and his true defence had never been put forward. The Court of Appeal had
mistakenly understood that his defence was to the effect that his admission of
guilt on 16th June 1995 was because his patient had become sexually aroused and
he was blaming himself for failing to keep control of the consultation. But his
defence had always been that the admissions which he made on 16th June 1995 were
false. He was innocent of any misconduct. He had not been apologising for his
behaviour, but had made the admissions, not on the basis of any direct
recollection of anything he had done, but because he had been willing to accept
that he must have acted out of character. He had assumed at the time that the
only rational explanation must be that the allegations were true, although he
had no memory of doing what was alleged. He had admitted his guilt because his
condition of mental depression at the time was such as to make him assume that
he had done something wrong, although that was in fact a misconception.
4. Their Lordships do not require to decide in this case whether
it would ever be open to the Professional Conduct Committee to go behind a
conviction which has been established before them for the purposes of section
36(1)(a) of the Medical Act 1983. Dr. Omar sought to justify the course in the
present case on the ground that the text of the judgment in the Court of Appeal
constituted new evidence. But in no sense can that judgment be so regarded. It
was not in itself evidence of the incident in question but only a consideration
of the evidence. Dr. Omar regards it as a misrepresentation of his line of
defence. That description distinguishes it from being evidence in the case. But
it also seems to their Lordships to be incorrect, because the Court of Appeal
did take up the critical question of the reliability of his admission in terms
which appear to cover the point which Dr. Omar is seeking to make. They
recognise that persons suffering from a significant depressive illness may make
unreliable admissions and they focus on the question whether Dr. Omar's
admissions were unreliable "because affected by lack of memory, failure of
concentration, confusion, feelings of guilt or worthlessness, or readiness to
accept blame without knowing what for". But after carefully reviewing the
admissions made on 16th June 1995 they conclude that it is not "within the
bounds of reasonable probability that the admissions made by the appellant to
the complainant and then to the police officer were or may have been
unreliable". It appears that the substance of the point which Dr. Omar is
concerned to advance was identified by the Court of Appeal and dealt with in
their decision. While Dr. Omar's argument was presented with considerable skill,
their Lordships are unable to accede to it.
5. Their Lordships accordingly turn to the matter of the erasure
from the Register. There are undoubtedly a number of mitigating factors in the
case which impressed themselves both on the trial judge and the Court of Appeal
in the criminal proceedings. Dr. Omar referred to the nature and brevity of the
incident, his depressive illness, and his long unblemished career. He stressed
the responsible attitude which he had taken to the situation since his
conviction. He sought to demonstrate from past records of some other cases that
erasure was neither a necessary nor an inevitable consequence of a conviction
for indecent assault.
6. But the Committee clearly took a serious view of the case and
their concern was, plainly and properly, for the maintenance of the highest
standards of practice in the public interest. Their Chairman observed that the
offence represented a "disgraceful abuse of the trust which your patient
was entitled to place in you as her doctor. It also undermines the trust which
the public places in the integrity of members of the medical profession".
Their Lordships fully recognise and respect the responsibility which the
Committee has in the assessment of the severity of cases of misconduct and in
the preservation of public confidence in medical practitioners. The Committee
will deal with each case in the light of its own particular circumstances, and
their Lordships can find no good ground for questioning the course which the
Committee considered to be appropriate in the present case.
7. For the foregoing reasons their Lordships will humbly advise
Her Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed.
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