The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Decisions

Harrilal v. The State (Trinidad and Tobago) [1999] UKPC 22 (10th May, 1999)

Ramnath Harrilal (No. 2) Appellant

v.

The State Respondent

FROM

COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL,

Delivered the 6th May 1999

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Present at the hearing:-

Lord Steyn

[Orally Delivered by Lord Steyn]

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1. In November 1998 the Privy Council heard the appeal of Ramnath Harrilal. Judgment was delivered on 2nd December 1998. The reserved judgment was given by Sir Patrick Russell. The effect of the judgment was to set aside the conviction of Harrilal of murder and to substitute a verdict of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, remitting the matter for sentence to the Court of Appeal.

 

2. Counsel now seeks a ruling on an issue which was raised before the Board at the last hearing namely the judge’s directions on intent required to sustain a charge of murder. He points out that the Board did not rule on that issue; indeed the Board expressly left it open. The Board observed:-

"Counsel for the appellant also raised some arguments relating to the judge’s directions upon intent, but their Lordships find it unnecessary to rule upon these as counsel acknowledged that the most he could seek upon any view of the case, was the substitution of a verdict of manslaughter."

 

3. Counsel for Harrilal now invites a ruling on this issue, saying that a ruling in Harrilal’s favour would assist Harrilal when the Court of Appeal considers the matter of sentence in respect of the substituted verdict of manslaughter. Their Lordships note this supposition but make no comment on it. In accordance with counsel’s wishes their Lordships are in principle content to give a ruling on this matter.

 

4. Their Lordships have reviewed the matter afresh and have taken into account all the written and oral submissions that were before the Board on the previous occasion as well as the detailed and valuable written and oral submissions since that date.

 

5. Counsel for Harrilal has submitted that the judge failed to direct the jury that if they accepted that Harrilal did not have the necessary intent because he believed the deceased to be dead when he killed her, the verdict of manslaughter was open to them. A judge’s directions of the law must be tailored to the specific circumstances of the case. Here the evidence was that Harrilal hit the deceased more than once with an iron bar causing serious bodily injuries and rendering her deeply unconscious. He said he tried to revive the woman but failed. Thinking she was dead he then cut up her body and hid the dismembered parts. In these very particular circumstances their Lordships accept the submission on behalf of the State that the judge’s directions on intent was satisfactory. In accordance with the judge’s directions it was only open to the jury to convict Harrilal of murder if they were sure that he had the intention to kill or cause serious bodily injury when he inflicted the initial blows on the deceased and throughout. This direction was correct in point of law. In these circumstances it is unnecessary to consider the interesting academic problems to which counsel for Harrilal have directed their Lordships’ attention. For these reasons their Lordships are not prepared to make the ruling requested by counsel for Harrilal.

 

6. In a written argument counsel for Harrilal also sought to renew arguments previously adduced to the effect (1) that certain photographic evidence was wrongly admitted; (2) that the omission of the word "seriously" from the direction regarding grievous bodily harm was a material misdirection; and (3) the judge’s failure to give a character direction was a material misdirection. These arguments are not open to counsel in the light of the judgment of the Board which in regard to those matters is final. In any event their Lordships considered that these arguments had not survived exploration and debate at the last hearing. The arguments were devoid of merit in the context of the present case. The order made on 2nd December 1998 remains unaltered. The application is dismissed.

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