The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Decisions

Privy Council Appeal No. 17 of 1998

Ramnath Harrilal Appellant

v.

The State Respondent

FROM

THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

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JUDGMENT OF THE LORDS OF THE JUDICIAL

COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL,

Delivered the  2nd December 1998

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Present at the hearing:-

Lord Steyn

Lord Hutton

Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough

Lord Millett

Sir Patrick Russell

  ·[Delivered by Sir Patrick Russell]

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1. The appellant, Ramnath Harrilal, was charged with the murder of Sylvia Maraj during the night of 27th/28th June 1985.  On 26th May 1988 the appellant was convicted but on 16th November 1993 the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial.  On 26th February 1996 the appellant was convicted of murder at his retrial before Jones J. and a jury.  He was sentenced to death.  On 8th April 1997 the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago dismissed the appellant’s appeal.  On 23rd February 1998 the appellant was granted special leave to appeal to their Lordships’ Board.

2. For the purposes of this judgment only the salient facts need be shortly stated.  The victim was a young woman with whom the appellant cohabited from time to time. On the evening of 27th June 1985 they were together at the appellant’s home when they quarrelled.  Eventually this led to violence, and the appellant admitted striking the victim with an iron bar, obtained from the garden shed. According to the appellant the blow or blows rendered the victim unconscious and, after an unsuccessful attempt to revive her, the appellant concluded that she was dead. He carried the victim to an outside latrine and there, using a cutlass, he dismembered the body, depositing parts of the torso and head in the latrine and other parts elsewhere.  A friend of the appellant’s arrived at the house and it was he who reported matters to the police. A pathologist examined the remains and was of the opinion that the cause of death was shock and haemorrhage due to multiple chop wounds with decapitation and dismemberment of the body.  It follows that the deceased was still alive when decapitation and dismemberment took place.  There were four contusions, three on the head and one on the forearm caused by a blunt instrument such as the iron bar, but these were not fatal injuries and the skull was intact.

3. The appellant made a statement in writing, basically admitting the above facts, save that he believed the deceased was dead before dismemberment.  He had no previous convictions of any kind.

4. At trial various defences were advanced on behalf of the appellant.  Self defence and provocation were canvassed arising out of the first episode; the appellant further contended that he lacked the requisite intention for murder.  Finally, and in the context of this appeal most importantly, it was contended that at the time of the killing the appellant was suffering from such an abnormality of mind, induced by injury, as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts in the killing - i.e. the defence of diminished responsibility.

5. In his evidence the appellant alleged that some years previously he had “got a lash on my head and … got a blackout” in consequence of an accident whilst riding his cycle.  He had been hospitalised.  Sometimes, he said “my head wants to burst”.  Hospital records did show an admission to the San Fernando Hospital of a patient named Ramnath Harrilal, but no further details were available.

6. Dr. Iqbal Ghany was called by the defence.  In 1985 he had been Chief of Staff at St. Ann’s Hospital and had interviewed the appellant on two or three occasions at the request of the prison authorities in 1986.  He was then a consultant psychiatrist.  There is no transcript of the doctor’s evidence but extracts from the notes of his evidence read:-

“I recall the accused Ramnath Harrilal.  I made findings.  He told me that he was injured in accident and that he suffered a head injury.  He was hospitalised at San Fernando Hospital for two weeks.  He said as a result of the head injury he complains of headache, dizziness, mood changes, sensitivity to light and noise and symptoms of anxiety.  I was aware at the time that the accused was charged with murder …  I found that he was suffering from a post traumatic stress disorder.  These are symptoms that come on after injury.  This injury is in relation to the head.  That is injury to the brain.  This is a syndrome developed after injury to any part of the body mainly the head.  The persons suffer from recurrent attacks of anxiety, mood changes, sensitivity to light, noise and alcohol.  Sometimes great rage attacks, poor concentration, sleep disorder, short attention span …  It is true to say that someone who is suffering from post traumatic [stress] disorder if there is a quarrel between that person and a close relative, e.g. a common law wife, it could lead to anxiety, mood change that would result in a rage attack …  I found that he was suffering from mental abnormalities that substantially impaired his functioning at that time … It was based on what he told me that I came to my conclusion …”

7. The State concedes that the doctor was contending that at the time of the killing the appellant’s mental condition was such that diminished responsibility was available as a defence.  So much for the evidence.  No other psychiatric evidence was called to rebut the evidence of Dr. Ghany nor, it seems, was any available to the State.

8. In the judgment of their Lordships the appellant was entitled, on the evidence, to have the defence of diminished responsibility fairly left for the consideration of the jury.  It was at all times a matter for them. In his summing up it is right to observe that the judge did refer the jury to all the relevant evidence in the context of diminished responsibility, but in referring to it Jones J. made some most unfortunate observations.  When dealing with provocation he said:-

“Members of the Jury the doctor conceded that his findings were based on what was told to him by the accused.  He said it was the accused who told him that he experiences certain symptoms of mood changes and anxiety.”

9. Pausing there, their Lordships would comment that almost invariably the psychiatrist has to rely upon what he is told by the accused.  The symptoms of an abnormality of mind usually present themselves in that way.  However, the judge continued:-

“It seems to me that there is no evidence that the accused was suffering from post traumatic stress disorder in this case, but it is a matter for you.”

10. This last observation was incorrect.  There was evidence.  It came from the appellant and from Dr. Ghany.  To say that there was no such evidence effectively undermined a defence that the appellant was running and was entitled to run.  Despite adding that the matter was one for the jury, the effect of the judge’s inaccurate assessment must have been at least to create a risk that the jury would not give such weight to the evidence of the appellant and the psychiatrist as their testimony was entitled to receive.  The damage done by the judge’s comments that in his view there was no evidence was irreparable and, in the opinion of their Lordships, was such as to render the rejection by the jury of the defence of diminished responsibility unsafe.

11. Counsel for the appellant also raised some arguments relating to the judge’s directions upon intent, but their Lordships find it unnecessary to rule upon these as counsel acknowledged that the most he could seek upon any view of the case, was the substitution of a verdict of manslaughter.

12. This is the course that their Lordships’ Board proposes to take.  The verdict of guilty of murder will be quashed and the sentence of death set aside.  In substitution for the verdict of murder there will be a verdict of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.  The question of sentence will be for the Court of Appeal, in the light of the substituted verdict.  The matter is remitted to the Court of Appeal for this purpose.

© CROWN COPYRIGHT as at the date of judgment.