The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Decisions

Privy Council Appeal No. 50 of 1997

 

Warren Thomas Jackson Appellant

v.

The State Respondent

 

FROM

 

THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TRINIDAD

AND TOBAGO

 

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REASONS  FOR  DECISION  OF  THE  LORDS

OF  THE  JUDICIAL  COMMITTEE  OF  THE

PRIVY  COUNCIL  OF  THE   30th  July  1998,

Delivered the 29th October 1998

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Present at the hearing:-

Lord Browne-Wilkinson

Lord Griffiths

Lord Slynn of Hadley

Lord Nolan

Sir Brian Neill

  ·[Delivered by Lord Nolan]

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1. On 30th July 1998 their Lordships announced that the appeal would be dismissed with reasons to be given later. These they now give.

 

2. On 20th July 1994 at the Second Criminal Court, Port of Spain Assizes the appellant was convicted of the murder of Carl Harris and sentenced to death by Deyalsingh J.  On 2nd May 1996 the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago (Sharma, Hamel-Smith and Hosein JJ.A.) dismissed his application for leave to appeal against that conviction.  On 3rd July 1997 he was granted special leave to appeal to their Lordships’ Board as a poor person.  At the hearing their Lordships were told by Mr. Birnbaum Q.C., representing the appellant, that the sentence of death had been commuted to a term of 75 years’ imprisonment with hard labour.

 

3. The appellant was charged that on 4th October 1990, at Manzanilla in the county of St. Andrew, he murdered Carl Harris.  It was alleged that he attacked the deceased, who was known as “Carly”, with a cutlass, inflicting two severe wounds, and also a superficial wound on the inner aspect of the right arm.  The two severe wounds were a deep chop wound on the left elbow cutting the elbow joint completely, the lower end of the arm bone and the upper ends of the forearm bones, and a deep horizontal chop wound on the back of the upper part of the neck, more on the left side, cutting the neck muscle vessels down to the twenty-second cervical vertebra and part of the spinal cord.  The deceased died from shock and haemorrhage as a result of these wounds.

 

4. The first prosecution witness at the trial before Deyalsingh J. was Ramesh Moorgan.  He said that at about 7.00 a.m. on 4th October 1990 he was cultivating his land in Manzanilla.  He was accompanied by his caretaker, Peter Diaz.  He was approached by Carl Harris, whom he had known for a year or so, and they had a conversation lasting about half an hour.  Moorgan then heard a call from the direction of his (Moorgan’s) house.  Harris went off in the direction of the call.

 

5. About five minutes later the appellant, whom Moorgan had also known for about a year, approached from that same direction and said to Moorgan “I just killed Carly.  I chop him”.

 

6. Moorgan said that the appellant had with him in one hand a bag containing some pepper sauce and seasoning which he had brought to give to Moorgan and in the other hand a bloodstained cutlass.  He put the bag down and said “I just killed Carly.  He’s interfering with my life spiritually”.  The appellant went on to say “I have nothing to explain to you.  I will explain to the judge and jury”. 

 

7. Moorgan, doubtful that the appellant was telling the truth, went with Diaz in the direction from which the appellant had come and found the deceased lying on the ground.  Moorgan observed a gaping wound at the back of the deceased’s neck, and a chop on his left hand.

 

8. Moorgan then broke the news to the deceased’s wife, and went to the Manzanilla Police Station with Diaz in order to report what had happened.  There he saw the appellant sitting on a bench.  In the presence of the appellant Moorgan told the officer in charge about the appellant telling him that he had killed Carly.  The appellant said “You tell the police that he is interfering with my life spiritual”. 

 

9. The same police officer, Junior Khan, gave evidence that the appellant had arrived at the police station earlier with a feed bag in his hand.  He said to Constable Khan “Officer, in this feed bag I have a cutlass and I just kill a man in North Manzanilla”.  Asked whom he had killed the appellant replied “Carl Harris”.  Constable Khan took the bag and saw that there was a cutlass inside.  The cutlass was about 18 to 20 inches long with a 4 to 5 inch handle.  He observed stains resembling blood on the blade.  The stains were later analysed as blood of the same group as that of the deceased.  Constable Khan then cautioned the appellant who said “Officer, I fed up with this man so I killed him”. Constable Khan detained the appellant and handed over the inquiry to Sergeant Burnett.  Sergeant Burnett later interviewed the appellant after cautioning him.  The appellant stated “Officer, that man I killed, he also accusing me of turning beast in the night.  I got fed up with he and I gave him two chops and I kill him”.  According to Sergeant Burnett, the appellant admitted that the cutlass was his.

 

10. The appellant gave evidence.  He said that he was a agriculturalist, and that on 3rd October Moorgan had asked him to bring some seasonings, cuttings and pepper sauce. On the morning of the 4th he was taking these to Moorgan when Harris approached him.  According to the appellant Harris was holding a cutlass and a freshly cut piece of wood, about four inches long and two and a half inches thick. Harris accused the appellant of turning beast in the bush, and of reporting his, Harris’s, son to the police.  He further accused the appellant of playing holier than everybody else and said it was time somebody run him from up here. He said that Harris threw a lash at him with the stick and he ducked and threw the feed bag at Harris.  Harris tried to knock it away with the cutlass but the cutlass fell from his hand.  Harris continued to throw blows at the appellant with the stick, so the appellant picked up the cutlass and swung it to try to knock the stick out of Harris’ hand.  The appellant said:-

 

“I was just swinging the cutlass a try to knock the wood out of his hand and at one point I just saw him spin and fell because I couldn’t remember that he got chopped before that.  I just see him spin and fall. …  I was trying to knock the wood out of his hand.  I saw him fell with a cut in his neck.  After that I went down and I let (sic) Ramesh - and I told him what had happened and I told them that I’m going to the police.”

 

11. The appellant claimed to have told Moorgan that Harris had attacked him with the cutlass.

 

12. Cross-examined, he said that he used to avoid Harris. They had not quarrelled but he had made reports concerning Harris’s son.  When struck with the piece of wood he had received two bruises which did not require medical attention.

 

13. He denied that he had ever been behind Harris.  He did not know that Harris had got chopped at the back and was surprised to hear evidence to that effect.  He later said that he could not remember if he had told Moorgan about Harris attacking him: he couldn’t remember everything that he said because of the state he was in.

 

14. He said that he had told the police that Harris had had the cutlass.  He denied telling either Moorgan or Constable Khan that Harris had been harassing him spiritually.  He also denied telling Sergeant Burnett that he had got fed up with Harris and had given him two chops, and denied telling the Sergeant that Harris had accused him of turning beast in the night.  He could not remember whether Harris had in fact accused him of turning beast.

 

15. The principal grounds of appeal relied upon by the appellant before their Lordships’ Board were six in number.  All six were based upon misdirections which the learned judge was said to have given in the course of his summing up to the jury.

 

16. The first related to the manner in which the judge dealt with the standard of proof required.  Particular criticism was made of a passage early in the summing up where the judge said this:-

 

“As the jury you are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the direct evidence in any case before you.

 

   Now, should you, in drawing inferences, come to a situation where you can draw two equal or substantially equal but opposing inferences on any one issue, then you must draw the inference which favours the defence.

 

   Let me repeat that.  You may have a particular issue on which you can draw inferences.  You may find yourself in a position where you can draw two equally balanced or substantially equally balanced but opposing inferences on that one issue.  If you find yourself in such a situation, you must draw the inference which favours the defence.

 

   The reason for that is very, very simple and I can tell you briefly what it is right now so you can understand the rationale of what I have just told you. As I will tell you later, the State has to satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt on every material issue is this case.  That’s the function of the State.

 

   So that if you can draw two equal or substantially equal but opposing inferences on any one issue, then the State will not have satisfied you beyond reasonable doubt on that issue and, therefore, you must draw the inference which favours the defence, since the State will have failed to satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt on that particular issue.  So that it is very simple when you understand the rationale behind it.”

 

17. The learned judge did return to the subject later, as he had said he would.  He did so on a number of occasions, both generally and in relation to specific topics.  On the first of these occasions, having reminded the jury that the law was for him, and that “your duty will be to faithfully apply the law as I direct you to the facts as you find them and come to a verdict of guilty or not guilty as the case may be”, he continued:-

 

“Moving onto another direction in law.  The State has brought the accused here before you.  The State has charged him with the offence of murder.  The burden, therefore, lies on the State to prove that he is guilty. The accused does not have to prove that he is innocent.”

 

18. Having thus dealt with the burden of proof the learned judge described the standard of proof in these terms:-

 

“So the State has to prove that the accused is guilty of the charge proffered against him and the State must do this beyond a reasonable doubt.  That is, it is for the State to establish the guilt of the accused to the extent that you are satisfied so that you feel sure of his guilt.

 

   If on all the evidence there is a reasonable doubt in your minds as to whether the offence was committed by the accused, then the State has not made out a case and it will be your duty to acquit him.  That is to return a verdict of not guilty.

 

   On the other hand, if on all the evidence you are satisfied to the extent that you feel sure that the accused has committed the offence with which he is charged, then it is equally your duty to convict him. That is to return a verdict of guilty.

 

   So to sum up this part of what I’ve just said, let me put it this way, the State has to prove that the accused is guilty of the offence with which he is charged and the State must do this beyond reasonable doubt.  That is, it is for the State to establish the guilt of the accused to the extent that you are satisfied so that you feel sure of his guilt.”

 

19. Mr. Birnbaum submitted that the first of the passages quoted above amounted to a fundamental misdirection.  It clearly suggested, argued Mr. Birnbaum, that a reasonable doubt would exist on an issue only where there was a choice between two equally balanced or substantially equally balanced but opposing inferences.  The subsequent and unexceptionable direction upon the burden and standard of proof could not correct the earlier error.

 

20. Their Lordships do not accept this submission.  Placed in its context, the judge’s direction that where there were equal but opposing inferences the jury must draw the inference which favoured the defence was clearly intended to be no more than illustrative of the fact that the scales were weighted in favour of the defendant.  The extent to which they were weighted was made perfectly clear both by the immediate context of the criticised words and by the judge’s subsequent and repeated emphasis on the required standard.

 

21. Mr. Birnbaum also complained about later passages in the summing in which the judge referred to parts of the evidence without always repeating his direction upon the standard of proof required.  But it is well settled that, provided the judge gives a clear direction as to the burden and standard of proof at an early stage in his summing up, there is no need for him to repeat it unless special circumstances so require.

 

22. Finally, on this aspect of the case, Mr. Birnbaum criticised the judge’s directions upon self-defence and provocation.  In particular, he complained that the learned judge had expressly equated being “not sure” with being “unbalanced”.  Again, the criticism has to be considered against the background of the summing up as a whole. Towards the end of his directions upon the subject of self-defence the judge said this:-

 

“The State, in other words, must negative self-defence.  Once self-defence is raised in a trial, as it has been raised in this trial, the onus shifts to the State to prove, to satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in self-defence.

 

   So your final question is; has the State satisfied us to the extent that we feel sure that the accused was not acting in self-defence?  You will, therefore, when you are considering self-defence have three scenarios.

 

   You could say, we find that the accused was acting in self-defence.  In which case that is the end of the case.  He’s clearly not guilty if he was acting in self-defence as I have directed you.

 

   You may say, no, we reject self-defence.  We do not believe he was acting in self-defence.  If you believe he was not acting in self-defence, then, of course, you go on to consider the case for the State.

 

   You may find yourself in that middle ground where you are not sure; where you are unbalanced; where you are saying, you know, he could have been acting in self-defence but we are not sure.  It may be, it may not be, that sort of situation.  Where you are in that middle ground as to not being sure whether he was acting in self-defence you must give the benefit of that doubt to the accused. You must acquit the accused.  You must find him not guilty because the State would not have negatived self-defence which was raised.  The State will not have satisfied you beyond reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defence.”

 

23. Their Lordships do not endorse the use of the word “unbalanced”.  Taken by itself it might convey to the jury, wrongly, that the scales between prosecution and defence are even.  In their context, however, the words could not possibly have been understood by the jury in that sense.  In their Lordships’ judgment the jury can have been left in no doubt of the need for them to feel sure that the accused was not acting in self-defence before they could convict him.

 

24. Turning to provocation, the judge began his direction in these terms:-

 

“Now, let me move on to another issue in this case about law which arises from the evidence, and this has to do with provocation.  I’m going to give you this direction out of an abundance of caution.  Because, you see, depending upon the facts which you find, you may come to the conclusion that the accused was provoked in law as I will now direct you.  If you find that the accused was provoked in law, then certain legal consequences flow from it.   Now, provocation serves merely to reduce murder to manslaughter.  That’s all it does.  In other words, before provocation can arise in a case, you must find the elements of murder proved.  You must find that the accused unlawfully killed the deceased, and you must find that at the time when he did so, he had an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.

 

   Provocation does not arise until the two elements of murder has been proved, so bear that in mind.  If you find that provocation has been proved to your satisfaction, then murder is reduced to manslaughter. That’s all provocation does, reduce what would have been murder to manslaughter.”

 

25. The words “if you find that provocation has been proved to your satisfaction” are plainly wrong so far as the burden and standard of proof are concerned, and not the less so because the point which the judge was making at the time was simply that provocation reduces murder to manslaughter.  But at the end of the passage dealing with provocation he gave a correct direction relating to the burden and standard of proof in similar terms to those which he had used in relation to self-defence, but not using the word “unbalanced”.

 

26. Again, their Lordships consider that the jury could have been left in no doubt about the standard of proof required.

 

27. The second ground upon which the summing up is criticised is that the possibility of Harris’s death having been caused by accident, though not raised by the defence, should have been put to the jury by the judge.  This ground was argued before the Court of Appeal.  The Court dealt with the matter shortly, saying that, on the facts, they failed to see how the issue of accident could arise and adding:-

 

“In any event, the wounds inflicted, particularly to the neck and arm, were defensive in nature and the position, extent and severity of the wounds clearly negative any suggestion of accident.”

 

28. Their Lordships agree.  Had there been only one severe wound their Lordships could envisage the possibility that it might have been inflicted in the course of the appellant’s attempts, as he said, to defend himself with the cutlass against blows from the stick.  The infliction of two severe wounds, at separate parts of the body, appears to their Lordships to rule out this possibility.  As the Court of Appeal said, had the judge put the issue to the jury there might well have been a risk of confusion in their minds.

 

29. The third ground of appeal is that the judge, it is said, misdirected the jury on the issue of self-defence by twice putting to the jury the question “did the accused believe on reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do what he did in defence of his person”?

 

30. Mr. Birnbaum correctly submitted that the reasonableness or otherwise of the appellant’s belief was irrelevant save insofar as it might bear on the question whether he genuinely held the belief claimed.  This is made clear by the decision of their Lordships’ Board in Beckford v. The Queen [1988] AC 130 at page 146G. In the circumstances of the present case, however, there was no issue as to the reasonableness of the appellant’s belief that, on his version of the facts, he had no choice but to defend himself.  His evidence was that he was the subject of a violent attack with a cutlass and a piece of wood.  As the judge had already said, in an earlier passage from the same part of his summing up:-

 

“But, of course, you must, in considering whether it is a case of reasonable self-defence, you must consider what the accused himself believed in the particular circumstances of the case we are dealing with.

 

   Because an accused person cannot be expected to weigh to a nicety the exact measures of his defensive action.  In other words, if a man is suddenly attacked with a cutlass, you don’t expect him to pause and say, well, what is reasonable to do in these circumstances?  If he does that he might get his neck chopped off.”

 

31. The learned judge continued in this vein, directing the jury to bear in mind that “you must consider what he actually believed at the time”.  Accordingly, their Lordships are unable to regard the learned judge’s reference to reasonable grounds as a material misdirection.

 

32. The fourth and fifth grounds argued by Mr. Birnbaum were, respectively, that as regards proof of intention the learned judge, when dealing with the elements of the crime of murder, wrongly directed the jury to apply the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts, and wrongly directed them on the question of motive.  The passage in the summing up which Mr. Birnbaum particularly criticised reads as follows:-

 

“There is a clear distinction between an intention to do an act and the motivation for doing the act.

 

   The law takes no account of motivation.  We are not concerned about motivation in the law of murder.  We are concerned about intention.

 

   Generally when you find yourself in a doubt, you can fall back upon the premise that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts.  If a man uses a cutlass on another person and that person dies, you can fall back on the premise that he intended to kill the person because the man’s death in the circumstances was a natural cause of his act of chopping him.

 

   Now, that is merely something to assist you.  But you must find an intention in the accused to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm to the deceased before there can be murder.”

 

33. Mr. Birnbaum placed particular emphasis on the statement that the jury could “fall back upon the premise that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts”. He reminded their Lordships of the provisions of section 8 of the English Criminal Justice Act 1967, which was passed to reverse the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290 and which, Mr. Birnbaum submitted, should now in any event be regarded as reflecting the common law both of England and of Trinidad and Tobago.  The section provides that:-

 

“A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence, -

 

(a)shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but

 

(b)shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.”

 

34. Their Lordships would accept Mr. Birnbaum’s submission about the position in law generally.  They do not accept that the learned judge’s direction fell foul of the law as reflected in section 8.  He did not suggest that the jury were bound in law to infer the relevant intention by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequences of the appellant’s actions.  He did tell the jury that they must find the relevant intention in the accused.  He had made it clear at the outset that the jury must resolve the issues in the case by reference to all of the evidence, drawing such inferences as might be proper.

 

35. That being so, it is unnecessary for their Lordships to embark upon a consideration of the House of Lords’ authorities following the enactment of section 8, to some of which Mr. Birnbaum referred.  Their Lordships would merely observe in passing that these authorities have very recently been reviewed by their Lordships’ House in R. v. Woollin (unreported).

 

36. Turning to the question of motive, Mr. Birnbaum complained of the judge’s statement, in the passage cited, that “we are not concerned about motivation in the law of murder”.  Mr. Birnbaum rightly submitted that motivation was of great importance in relation to the issues of self-defence and provocation.  But this was fully recognised by the learned judge in the much later passages in, it must be said, a long and somewhat discursive summing up, when he dealt with those issues.  He rightly reminded the jury of the appellant’s evidence about the remarks said to have been made by Harris, such as accusing the appellant of “turning beast in the night and all that sort of thing”.  Accordingly their Lordships would also reject the fourth and fifth grounds of appeal.

 

37. The sixth ground of appeal was based upon the judge’s comments about the appellant’s case as put - or, rather, not put - to the prosecution witnesses in cross-examination by his counsel, Mr. Pantor, on the one hand, and the appellant’s evidence on the other.

 

38. There were two points in particular.  The first was that the appellant’s claim in evidence to have told Moorgan (and Diaz) of his having been threatened and attacked by Harris.  This was not put to Moorgan in cross-examination.  When Mr. Mohammed, for the prosecution, intervened during the appellant’s evidence to refer to the omission Mr. Pantor replied “I have no problem”. Secondly, the appellant gave evidence of having told the police that the cutlass belonged to Carl Harris, whereas, according to the evidence of Sergeant Burnett, the appellant had said that the cutlass belonged to him, the appellant.  In his cross-examination of the appellant Mr. Mohammed observed that the point had not been put to Sergeant Burnett in cross-examination.  Mr. Pantor made no reply to the observation.

 

39. The judge commented upon the matter at some length.  He said, amongst other things:-

 

“Now, the rules of procedure require an attorney to put material things to an opposing witness to give the witness an opportunity to say yes or no or to explain.

 

   Now, is it important, is it material, for the accused to have told his attorney that the deceased attacked him and he was defending himself?

 

   No doubt since that is the defence of the accused, he would have told his attorney that, that the deceased had attacked him and he was defending himself.  If that is so, then it was the duty of Mr. Pantor to put to Moorgan that in addition to these things, didn’t he tell you that the deceased had attacked him and that he was defending himself?

 

   Perhaps Mr. Pantor forgot; perhaps the accused didn’t tell him that, but I am merely telling you what the rules of procedure require because this may turn out to be very important in your consideration.  Here was a man who just killed another person.  He comes to the very first person after the incident and merely tells him, I just killed Carly.  He’s interfering with my life spiritually.  And further on, I have nothing to explain to you.  I will explain to the judge and jury.

 

   Wouldn’t you have expected him to say in the circumstances, well, the man attacked me and I was defending myself.  But, of course, his attitude could very well have been, I don’t have to say anything.  I don’t have to tell you anything.  I will tell the judge and jury. …

 

   So these are matters for your consideration.  Of course, Mr. Pantor didn’t challenge what Moorgan says.  He didn’t put to Moorgan that the accused didn’t tell him these things, to give Moorgan a chance to say yes or no as the case may be.  So up to that point in the trial Moorgan’s evidence went in unchallenged so to speak.  But in spite of that, you will have, when you are deliberating, to look at the totality of the evidence and come to the finding of facts in the case because you have seen both sides; you have seen Moorgan; you have seen the accused; you have heard them.”

 

40. The judge then referred to the appellant’s state of mind and asked “Would he remember all the things he told Moorgan”?

 

41. Later the judge said:-

 

“On the other hand, it could be that the accused gave his attorney certain instructions, his attorney perhaps forgot to put it.  Or that he didn’t give his attorney the instructions and he came in the witness box and said something new which surprised even his attorney.  So you look at it from both sides so to speak.

 

42. Again, as I make the point, while I just mention these rules of procedure, you bear them in mind.  You do not fault people for omissions.  You do not fault an attorney because he omits to do something.  You do not fault an accused person because he may have forgotten something.  You look at the evidence which is before you and come to your finding of facts on that evidence so to speak.”

 

43. In a later passage, the learned judge commented that Sergeant Burnett had not been given an opportunity to reply to the suggestion that the appellant had told him that the cutlass belonged to Harris.

 

44. Mr. Birnbaum submitted that these comments were unfair.  Their Lordships do not accept this criticism.  The matters upon which Mr. Pantor omitted to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses were important, and the omissions had quite properly been raised by Mr. Mohammed in the presence of the jury.  In the absence of any explanation from Mr. Pantor the judge had to deal with them as best he could.  It is to be noted that at the end of the summing up the judge invited Mr. Pantor to address him further if he so wished, but the invitation was declined; and that no complaint about the judge’s comments was made in the Court of Appeal.

 

45. The appellant waived privilege in respect of communications exchanged between Mr. Birnbaum and Mr. Pantor shortly before the hearing, in an attempt by Mr. Birnbaum to discover whether the judge was wrong in speculating that the appellant might have changed his instructions to Mr. Pantor.  It can only be said that these communications failed to clarify the matter.

 

46. Finally, Mr. Birnbaum referred their Lordships to the decision of their Lordships’ Board in Crosdale v. R. [1995] 2 All E.R. 500.  In that case their Lordships’ Board had allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica on grounds which included the unfairness of comments made by the judge on discrepancies between the appellant’s evidence and the points put by his counsel to the prosecution witnesses.  The comments were very different from those in the present case.  For example, the judge had told the jury to “ask yourselves the question, why is the defence so insincere, putting one thing to the prosecution and you don’t hear anything about it again in the case? …  So you use your common sense as members of the jury and say where you find the truth lies”.  Their Lordships’ Board had, however, offered the suggestion that “many difficulties which tend to arise on appeal in regard to the way in which trial judges have summed up the case can be avoided if judges routinely adopted the practice of discussing with counsel in the absence of the jury any special directions which they have in mind and inviting counsel’s comments on such  matters”.

 

47. While respectfully endorsing that suggestion, their Lordships are unable to accept Mr. Birnbaum’s submission that this is the course which the judge should have followed in the present case.  The matter was essentially one for the judge to deal with in the exercise of his discretion.  There is no apparent reason to suppose that he would have derived any further assistance from counsel by such a discussion.

 

48. At the end of their judgment the Court of Appeal, having rejected the appellant’s submissions on the question of accident, added that if indeed there were any merit in the submissions they would have had no hesitation in applying the proviso, because no miscarriage of justice would have resulted.  Their Lordships, having carefully considered all of the points raised in this appeal, are of a like mind.  The grounds of appeal, whether taken individually or collectively, provide no support for the proposition that the conviction of the appellant was unsafe or unjust.  It is for these reasons that their Lordships dismissed the appeal.

 

© CROWN COPYRIGHT as at the date of judgment.