Privy Council Appeal No. 33 of 1996
(1) Peter John Brannigan
(2) Anthony John McCullagh and
(3) Geoffrey David Barry Appellants
v.
The Right Honourable Sir Ronald
Keith Davison Respondent
FROM
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW ZEALAND
---------------
REASONS FOR REPORT OF THE LORDS
OF THE
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY
COUNCIL,
OF THE 4TH JULY 1996, Delivered
the
14th October 1996
------------------
Present
at the hearing:-
Lord Goff of Chieveley
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle
Lord Lloyd of Berwick
Lord Nolan
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
·[Delivered
by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead]
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1. This appeal from a decision of the Court of
Appeal of New Zealand concerns the winebox inquiry, as it is known
colloquially. On 12th September 1994
Sir Ronald Davison, a former Chief Justice of New Zealand, was appointed to be
a Commission pursuant to the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908. His task was to inquire into and report on
whether the Commissioner of Inland Revenue and the Director of the Serious
Fraud Office and their staffs acted properly and competently in dealing with
the transactions referred to in papers presented to the House of
Representatives in March 1994. He was
also charged to inquire into and report on whether any changes in the criminal
or tax law should be made to protect New Zealand's tax base from the effects of
fraud, evasion and avoidance.
The
papers were presented to the House of Representatives in a winebox. They are said to have been stolen from the
European Pacific group of companies by an employee. The tabled papers are said to show that between 1987 and 1994 the
Government of the Cook Islands, in effect, sold tax credit certificates for a
fee which was only a small fraction of the amount shown as withholding tax in
the certificates issued.
2. The transactions were numerous and
complicated. Something of the flavour
can be captured by a simplified version of the Magnum transaction. This involved the payment of withholding tax
(in very round figures, $2 million) by European Pacific to the Cook Islands
Government in respect of interest paid by one European Pacific company to
another, the purchase by the Cook Islands Government of a promissory note from
a European Pacific company, and the sale of the same note by the Government to
another company in the group at a substantial loss ($1.95 million). All these dealings were part of a single,
pre-arranged scheme. Their economic
effect was to pay back almost all the tax paid.
3. The withholding tax certificate was then
presented to the New Zealand tax authorities by a company in the European
Pacific group, and used to reduce the amount of New Zealand tax otherwise
payable. The amount of the reduction
corresponded to the amount of tax shown as paid on the certificate. Thus European Pacific was better off by
$1.95 million, the Cook Islands Government was better off by $50,000, and the
New Zealand Government was worse off by $2 million.
4. There have been several legal challenges to the
conduct of the inquiry. The origin of
the present proceedings is that the appellants are caught between the
conflicting requirements of the laws of two countries, New Zealand and the Cook
Islands. On the one hand is the secrecy
legislation of the Cook Islands, especially section 227 of the International
Companies Act 1981-82. This was enacted
to promote the attractions of the Cook Islands as a tax haven. On the other hand, the appellants have been
required to give evidence to the Commission in New Zealand. The appellants are concerned that if they
give information to the Commission on what they know about the transactions,
they will thereby commit criminal offences under the law of the Cook Islands,
punishable by imprisonment. They claim
they should not be required to give evidence when this would expose them to the
risk of prosecution.
5. Each of the three appellants was employed in an
accounting or management position in the European Pacific group in the Cook
Islands at material times. In August
and September 1995 they were summoned by the Commission to attend and give evidence,
pursuant to section 4D of the Commissions of
Inquiry Act 1908. A person who is
summoned but refuses to answer a question concerning the subject of the inquiry
commits an offence under the Act. This
is subject to two qualifications. First, every witness giving evidence has the same privileges as
witnesses in courts of law: section 6. The relevant privilege in the present case is the common law privilege
against self-incrimination. Second, to
attract criminal consequences the refusal to answer must be "without
sufficient cause": section 9(1)(b). To the like effect section 13A(1)(b) provides that a member of a
Commission who is a judge or former judge of the High Court may exercise the
powers (of detention in custody) conferred by section 56B of the Judicature Act
1908 where a witness before the Commission "without offering any just
excuse" refuses to give evidence.
6. On 27th September 1995 the Commissioner ruled
that the privilege against self-incrimination did not avail the appellants, and
that they lacked sufficient cause within section 9 and just excuse within
section 13A to refuse to give evidence. In these proceedings, brought by the appellants against the
Commissioner, the appellants claimed an order setting aside this ruling and a
declaration that they should not be required to give any evidence likely to
render them liable to prosecution in the Cook Islands pursuant to that
country's secrecy legislation.
7. On 30th October the proceedings were by consent
removed to the Court of Appeal and treated as an application for judicial
review. On 16th February 1996 the Court
of Appeal by a majority, comprising Cooke P., Richardson, Henry and Thomas JJ.,
dismissed the proceedings. McKay J.
disagreed. On 4th July their Lordships
announced they would humbly advise Her Majesty that the appellants' appeal
should be dismissed with costs. Their
Lordships now give their reasons.
The privilege against self-incrimination
The circumstances in which the appellants
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination are unusual, in two
respects. The appellants seek
dispensation, not from giving evidence of their own prior criminal activities,
but from giving evidence when the very giving of the evidence to the Commission
would itself constitute a criminal offence. Secondly, the criminal offence would arise under the law of another
country. The Cook Islands is a fully
sovereign independent state.
The first of these two features cannot really
arise in isolation from the second. It
is inconceivable that the law of a country would simultaneously compel and
forbid the doing of an act: here, the giving of evidence to a commission of
inquiry. If such a clash of internal
law should ever arise, the court would have to determine which of the two
inconsistent laws prevailed.
8. It will be convenient therefore to consider the
second feature first: does the rule, or privilege, against self-incrimination
apply where the criminal offence arises under the law of another country?
9. On this there is surprisingly little
authority. The starting point is two
cases of the last century. In King
of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox (1851) 1 Sim. (NS) 301 the defendants
resisted production of documents on the ground that production would expose
them to criminal proceedings in Sicily. Lord Cranworth V.-C. rejected the contention. He held (at page 329) that the privilege had reference
exclusively to matters penal by English municipal law. His reason was that no judge could know, as a
matter of law, what would or would not be penal in a foreign country, and so no
judge could evaluate the force of the objection to answer.
In United States of America v. McRae
(1867) L.R. 4 Eq. 327 and L.R. 3 Ch.App. 79, the United States Government had
started proceedings in America to forfeit land owned by the defendant in
Alabama, on the ground that he had been a Confederate States agent. In the English proceedings the government
claimed an account of all property received by the defendant as agent for the
Confederate States during the Civil War. Page Wood V.-C., and on appeal Lord Chelmsford L.C., held that the
defendant was not bound to give discovery as this would furnish evidence
leading to the forfeiture of his property in the pending American
proceedings. The Two Sicilies
case was distinguished. In The Two
Sicilies there was insufficient evidence about the foreign law. In McRae, however, the exact nature
of the penalty was stated and the plaintiff was itself the sovereign power
which had instituted proceedings for forfeiture of property lying within its
grasp. Lord Chelmsford L.C. considered
that Lord Cranworth V.-C. had stated his proposition too broadly.
10. The only other judicial observation in England
was some years later. In In re
Atherton [1912] 2 KB 251, 255, Phillimore J. commented that historically
the self-incrimination principle had not been applied where the alleged crime
had been committed abroad.
11. In England the need for an authoritative ruling
was overtaken by Parliamentary intervention. In 1967 the Law Reform Committee addressed this question in its 16th
Report (Privilege in Civil Proceedings) (Cmnd 3472), in paragraph 11:-
"There are no recent authorities as to
whether a person may claim privilege to refuse to answer questions or to
produce documents which might incriminate him under foreign law and the two old
authorities [The Two Sicilies and McRae] are not wholly
consistent, although the latter related to discovery
only. The problem presents difficulties since, although an English judge is
qualified to decide forthwith whether a witness's objection to answering a
question on the grounds that it might incriminate him under the law of any part
of the United Kingdom is bona fide and realistic or not, it may well be
difficult for him to reach such a decision where questions of the criminal law
of foreign states are concerned. On the
whole, we think that no absolute privilege should be given against self-incrimination
under foreign law. The matter is best
left to the general discretion of the judge in the particular circumstances in
which the claim arises."
In the following year legislation laid to rest
the doubts, so far as English law was concerned. Section 14 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 provided that the
privilege applied only to criminal offences under the law of any part of the
United Kingdom and penalties provided for by such law.
12. Divergent views have also been expressed in
Australia. In Adsteam Building
Industries Pty. Ltd. v. The Queensland Cement and Lime Co. Ltd. (No. 4)
[1985] 1 Qd.R. 127 McPherson J. sitting in the Supreme Court of Queensland,
followed McRae L.R. 3 Ch.App. 79 and held that a defendant was entitled
to claim privilege against production of documents concerning shareholdings in
a Swiss company where disclosure would tend to expose the party to a penalty
under Swiss law. But in FF Seeley
Nominees Pty. Ltd. v. El Ar Initiations (UK) Ltd. (1990) 96 A.L.R. 468,
473, Zelling A.J., sitting in the Supreme Court of South Australia, very much
doubted whether the privilege exists in relation to incrimination under foreign
law.
13. The prevalent view in the United States appears
to be that the privilege does not apply to foreign law: see United States v.
(Under Seal) (1986) 794 F. 2d 920 (4th Cir), and Wigmore on Evidence 3rd
Ed. Vol. 8 (1940) (McNaughton rev. 1961), para. 2258, pages 342-346, and The
Supplement to Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 8 (1996) para. 2258, pages
877-878. Where foreign law is involved
the court decides whether compelling an answer would be unreasonable in all the
circumstances: see The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, 3rd Vol.
1 (1986), The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, pages 244-245, 321
and 341, paras. 403, 431, and 441. What
is required is a "sensitive balancing of the competing interests at
stake": see United States v. First National Bank of Chicago (1983)
699 F. 2d 341, at page 345. However,
contrary views have been expressed in some courts. For instance, in Mishima v. United States (1981) 507 F.
Supp. 131 the District Court held that a claim of Fifth Amendment protection
could be validly asserted regarding the threat of prosecution in Japan.
14. With the authorities in this unsettled state
their Lordships go back to first principles. Expressed in various ways, the chief strand of reasoning discernible in
the common law rule is the undesirability of the state compelling a person to
convict himself out of his own mouth. There is an instinctive recoil from the use of coercive power to this
end. The state should not "subject
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt": per Goldberg J. in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor (1964) 378 U.S. 52, 55. A person should not be put in a position where he is exposed to
punishment whatever he does: see Reg. v. Director of Serious Fraud Office,
Ex parte Smith [1993] A.C. 1, 32, per Lord Mustill. Members of a civilised society ought to
treat each other better than this.
15. This aspiration is so basic that it has been
incorporated as a right in many charters enshrining fundamental rights and
liberties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
article 14(3)(g), the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, sections 23(4) and 25(d). The right is expressed with varying degrees
of width, but the consistent emphasis is the benefit and protection of the
individual. That is the primary purpose of the right.
16. Seen from the point of view of the witness, the
right may be as much needed where foreign law is involved as where it is
not. The difficulty confronting the
individual may be just as acute when the feared prosecution is under the law of
another country. There is, however, a
real problem in letting this lead to the conclusion that the privilege should
apply in such a case. The privilege is
rigid and absolute. The witness has an
unqualified right. Where the privilege
applies the witness need not answer.
Unless the case falls within a statutory exception, that is the end of
the matter. There is no scope for the
court to exercise any discretion.
17. It is the unqualified nature of the right, so
valuable as a protection for the witness, which gives rise to the problem when
a foreign law element is present. If
the privilege were applicable when the risk of prosecution is under the law of
another country, the privilege would have the effect of according primacy to
foreign law in all cases. Another
country's decision on what conduct does or does not attract criminal or penal
sanctions would rebound on the domestic court. The foreign law would override the domestic court's ability to conduct
its proceedings in accordance with its own procedures and law. If an answer would tend to expose the
witness to a real risk of prosecution under a foreign law then, whatever the
nature of the activity proscribed by the foreign law,
the witness would have an absolute right to
refuse to answer the question, however important that answer might be for the
purposes of the domestic court's proceedings.
18. This surely cannot be right. Different countries have their own interests
to pursue. At times national interests
conflict. In its simple, absolute,
unqualified form the privilege, established in a domestic law setting, cannot
be extended to include foreign law without encroaching unacceptably upon the
domestic country's legitimate interest in the conduct of its own judicial
proceedings. Their Lordships
respectfully agree with the views to this effect expressed in the Court of
Appeal by Cooke P., Henry and Thomas JJ. Their Lordships' conclusion is that the common law privilege does not
run where the criminal or penal sanctions arise under a foreign law.
19. Their Lordships add two points. First, where questions of foreign
prosecution are raised during a trial it will often be impracticable to inquire
into the state of the foreign law in the course of the trial. This is not a difficulty which arises
regarding domestic law. This practical
consideration marches hand in hand with the conclusion already expressed, but
their Lordships base their decision on the ground of principle. Second, the contrast being drawn between
foreign and domestic law is the contrast between the laws of two different
countries. Special considerations may
apply in countries with a federal structure, as in Australia and the United
States, or in countries with a unitary structure but having different laws
applicable in different parts of the country, as in the United Kingdom.
20. The other unusual feature of the present case
is that the feared criminality under the laws of the Cook Islands lies not in
the previous conduct of the appellants but in the fact of their giving evidence
to the Commission on what they know of the winebox transactions. Their Lordships consider this additional
feature does not assist the appellants. Certainly, if the privilege were available to excuse the appellants from
giving evidence of prior criminal acts, one would expect the privilege to be
available equally, or more so, when to compel an answer would be to compel the
witness to commit a criminal offence. The objections to the use of the state's coercive power are as powerful
in the latter case as the former. But
when the privilege against giving self-incriminating evidence of prior conduct
is not available because of the foreign law element, the privilege likewise
cannot avail a witness where the crime under the foreign law would lie in the
fact of giving evidence. The reason,
already stated, why the privilege is not available in the former case (of prior
conduct) applies also in the latter case.
21. This approach has been adopted in Canada and
the United States. In Re. Spencer
and The Queen (1983) 145 D.L.R. (3d) 344 the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that a bank employee, subpoenaed to give evidence at a Canadian trial, could be
required to answer questions about transactions at the Bahamian branch of the
bank even if the fact of disclosure would expose him to prosecution under
Bahamian law. This was upheld on appeal
by the Supreme Court of Canada: [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings; United States v. Field
(1976) 532 F. 2d 404, a similar question arose when a witness's testimony would
violate the secrecy laws of the Cayman Islands. The Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, at pages 407-410,
carried out a balancing exercise in accordance with the Restatement principles. The court said, at page 410:-
"... this court simply cannot acquiesce in
the proposition that United States criminal investigations must be thwarted
whenever there is conflict with the interest of other states."
United States v. Frank (1974) 494 F. 2d 145 is to the like effect.
Discretion and just excuse
If the unqualified application of the privilege
to foreign law is unsatisfactory, so also is the opposite extreme. The opposite extreme is that the prospect of
prosecution under a foreign law is neither here nor there. Since the privilege does not apply to
prosecution under foreign law, the witness must always answer a relevant
question in the domestic proceedings, regardless of the nature of the crime
under the foreign law and regardless of the likely practical consequences for
the witness under that law.
22. This would be a harsh attitude. It would be a reproach to any legal
system. One would expect that a trial
judge would have a measure of discretion. It will be recalled that paragraph 11 of the Report of the Law Reform
Committee envisaged that the judge would exercise a discretion. Thus a further question arises: where the
self-incrimination privilege does not apply because the feared prosecution is
under foreign law, does the domestic court, under its inherent power to conduct
its process in a fair and reasonable manner, nevertheless have a discretion to
excuse a witness from giving self-incriminating evidence?
23. This important question need not be answered in
the present case, and their Lordships consider it better to leave the answer to
be supplied on another occasion. The
reason why the question need not be answered is that in the present case the
statutory "sufficient cause" and "just excuse" exceptions
provide ample scope for all the circumstances to be taken into account. Inherent in these two expressions, which are
synonymous in this context, is
the concept of weighing all the consequences of
the refusal to give evidence: the adverse consequences to the inquiry if the
questions are not answered, and the adverse consequences to the witness if he
is compelled to answer.
24. In his ruling of 27th September 1995 the
Commissioner expressed a different view. He ruled that the exceptions do not extend beyond the scope of the
privileges and immunities preserved by section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry
Act 1908. A witness who does not enjoy
the common law privilege against answering a question therefore lacks
sufficient cause within section 9 or just excuse within section 13A. Their Lordships agree with the Court of
Appeal that on this the Commissioner misdirected himself. The width and elasticity of the relieving
exceptions are not to be confined and restricted in this way.
Whether relief should be granted
25. The appellants submitted that the proceedings
should be remitted to the High Court to carry out the balancing exercise which
the Commissioner did not carry out. They submitted that, as matters stand, the balance is in favour of the
appellants. They have adduced evidence
on why they should not be required to answer the Commission's questions. They are citizens and residents of New
Zealand, but they have continuing commercial connections with the Cook
Islands. They are chartered
accountants. Mr. Brannigan and Mr.
McCullagh practise in a New Zealand firm which has an office in the Cook Islands. Their practice includes considerable Cook
Islands work, necessitating frequent visits there. The firm is now auditor to the Cook Islands Government. Mr. Barry does some contract work for the
European Pacific group, and this takes him to the Cook Islands from time to
time. The Cook Islands Government has
made plain its intention to enforce the Islands' secrecy legislation. The Commissioner should now file evidence
stating the topics on which information is required from the appellants, and
why. He should spell out the importance
of the information, and the steps taken to seek it elsewhere. The parties should be cross-examined on
their affidavits.
Their Lordships consider this submission is
misconceived. Parliament entrusted the
conduct of this inquiry to the Commission. It is for the Commissioner to decide which witnesses to summon, and
whose evidence is necessary. In these
proceedings the court is not exercising an appellate jurisdiction. It is exercising its supervisory, reviewing
jurisdiction. The distinction is not a
piece of empty formalism. As the
inquiry proceeds and information is gradually gathered from different sources,
the Commissioner is in a far better position than the court to assess how
important the witness's evidence may be, and to weigh that against the
proffered excuse.
26. Nor is it for the Commissioner to justify in
advance the questions or topics he proposes to pursue with the appellants. Such a course would be calculated to
stultify the inquiry, and would go beyond the protection those compelled to
give evidence are reasonably entitled to expect in an inquisitorial
investigation of this nature.
27. Matters would stand differently if there were
no grounds on which the Commissioner could reasonably conclude that the
statutory exceptions were inapplicable. That is not this case. The
Commissioner has made clear that he attaches importance to obtaining
information from the appellants. There
are ample grounds to support this view, in the positions formerly held by them
within the European Pacific group and the documentary material before the Court
of Appeal.
28. Nor would any useful purpose be served by
setting aside the Commissioner's ruling. Although the Commissioner misdirected himself on the scope of the statutory
exceptions, he also stated his view on the outcome of a weighing exercise
similar to the exercise called for under these exceptions. Thus, had he directed himself correctly, his
decision would have been the same. The
weighing exercise undertaken by the Commissioner arose out of the appellants'
secondary ground of objection before the Commissioner. The appellants contended that the principles
of foreign state compulsion afforded them a defence. This was rejected by the Commissioner. He held that the justification for compelling them to give
evidence in New Zealand was so strong that no balancing of considerations under
the foreign state compulsion principle could possibly lead to the witnesses
being allowed to refuse to give evidence. In the Court of Appeal Cooke P. regarded this conclusion as unassailable
in all the circumstances of this inquiry. Richardson and Henry JJ. also concluded that the balancing exercise
inherent in the statutory exceptions yielded an answer in favour of upholding
the Commissioner's decision. Their
Lordships agree.
29. Of course, time has passed since the
Commissioner's ruling. The inquiry has
moved on. The importance the
Commissioner attaches to obtaining information from the appellants may have
increased. It may have diminished. The subjects on which he needs further
information may have altered. There is
no reason to doubt that the Commissioner will have all this in mind when applying
the just excuse test and deciding whether it is necessary to require the appellants
to give evidence.
Miscellanea
Their Lordships add three further
observations. First, throughout their judgment their Lordships have
assumed that the
30. Cook Islands secrecy legislation has
extra-territorial effect and applies to New Zealand residents giving evidence
in New Zealand. In other words, their
Lordships have assumed in favour of the appellants' arguments that, as a matter
of interpretation of the Cook Islands statutes, the appellants would be at risk
if they gave evidence to the Commission. The respondent vigorously challenged this interpretation of the
legislation. It is not necessary for
their Lordships to express any conclusion on this point of Cook Islands law.
31. Secondly, their Lordships recognise that the
contradictory commands of different states can give rise to acute problems for
individuals. The resolution, or
alleviation, of these problems is one object of the principles of foreign state
compulsion, which have been developed particularly in the United States. For its part New Zealand has observed these
principles. The Commission has
recognised that KPMG Peat Marwick cannot reasonably be expected to produce
documents currently in the Cook Islands. Likewise their Lordships see no reason to doubt that, should occasion
arise, the courts of the Cook Islands will give proper recognition to the
validity of the compulsion exercised in this case by New Zealand law over acts
done by New Zealand residents in New Zealand.
32. Thirdly, extradition. The appellants contended that if they give evidence, quite apart
from the risk of prosecution in the Cook Islands, they will be at risk of being
extradited to the Cook Islands in accordance with New Zealand's own extradition
laws: see sections 340-347 of the Cook Islands Act 1915. Their Lordships are of the opinion that this
risk can properly be regarded as fanciful. It is frankly inconceivable that a New Zealand district judge would order the return, or even the arrest,
of a person whose sole offence was that he had done in New Zealand what New
Zealand law had compelled him to do.
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