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Information Tribunal Appeal
Number: EA/2008/0043 Information Commissioner’s Ref:
FS50081562 |
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Heard at Procession House, London, EC4
Decision
Promulgated
On 13th October 2008
3rd December
2008 |
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BEFORE
CHAIRWOMAN
Melanie
Carter
and
LAY MEMBERS
Michael Hake Andrew
Whetnall |
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Between
IAN C
FITZSIMMONS
Appellant
and
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
and
BRITISH BROADCASTING
CORPORATION
Additional Party |
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FOIA : Cost of compliance and
appropriate limit s.12; Duty to advise and assist s.16; Decision of
commissioner s.50(2)-(6)
Cases: Robert Andrew Brown v
Information Commissioner EA/2006/0088; Urmenyi v Information commissioner
EA/2006/0093; Randall v Information Commissioner
EA/2007/0004 |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043 |
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Hearing on the papers
Decision
The Tribunal upheld the Decision Notice and dismissed the
appeal.
Reasons for Decision
Introduction
1. This appeal concerns a request
for information made by Mr Ian Fitzsimmons in an email dated 5 January
2005, asking for:
“ Details of all approved
expense statements for Andrew Marr of the BBC which have been incurred by
the BBC as a result of travel, entertainment and hospitality provided to
the DCMS and ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.
Details of all approved
expense statements for Natasha Kaplinsky of the BBC, which have been
incurred by the BBC as a result of travel, entertainment and hospitality
provided to any third party.”.
2. This request was
initially made to the Department for Culture Media and Sport and sent on
to the BBC on 1 February 2005. The BBC responded on 22 February 2005
stating that the information requested was held for the purpose of
journalism, art or literature and therefore fell within a derogation to
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”). Information which falls
within the derogation is outside of FOIA’s jurisdiction. The request was
therefore refused.
The complaint to the Information
Commissioner
3. Mr Fitzsimmons was
dissatisfied with this refusal and made a complaint to the Information
Commissioner (“IC”) on 24 June 2005. The investigation into this complaint
was not commenced until 15 June 2006 and then not concluded until the
Decision Notice was issued on 25 March 2008.
4. During the course of the
IC’s investigation, the BBC sought also to rely upon section 12 of FOIA on
the basis that its estimate of the costs of complying with the request
would exceed the prescribed costs limit.
The IC’s Decision Notice found
that the derogation did not apply in this case. The IC upheld however the
BBC’s reliance upon section 12, suggesting informally that it should
contact Mr Fitzsimmon’s to assist him in refining his request so as to
come within the costs limit. |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043
The appeal to the Tribunal
5. Mr Fitzsimmons appealed
the IC’s Decision Notice on 28 April 2008. The appeal had been submitted
out of time, but in the light of the BBC’s failure to revert to Mr
Fitzsimmons in accordance with the informal suggestion in the Decision
Notice, the Tribunal decided to allow the appeal to proceed. The BBC told
the Tribunal that the failure to act on the Commissioner’s suggestion had
been an oversight.
6. Mr Fitzsimmons’ grounds of appeal can be summarised
as:
a. that there is no statutory time limit for the
purposes of FOIA;
b. that the BBC is unable
to provide the information within the cost limit should not prevent its
disclosure;
c. that the
Commissioner should have prioritised the public interest in this case;
and
d. the time limit should be
varied by the Information Tribunal to accommodate this public
interest.
7. The application of the
derogation in this case is not under appeal, although the Tribunal
understands that the scope of the derogation has been considered before a
differently constituted Tribunal and involving a different Appellant. The
BBC did not cross appeal in this case, such that this Tribunal has not
considered the correct application of the derogation. It has proceeded on
the basis that FOIA does apply to this request. The Tribunal noted that
the BBC, at the time of responding to this request, was operating in the
belief that the derogation did apply.
8. The Tribunal met on
13th October 2008 but adjourned in order to receive submissions
on the interplay of sections 12 and 16 of FOIA and to call for further
evidence from the BBC. The Tribunal met on a second occasion on 21
November 2008 to finally determine the appeal.
The issues
9. The Tribunal identified
the issues before it as follows:
a. the Appellant’s express
grounds of appeal as set out in paragraph 7 above;
b. whether the IC had been
correct in law in upholding the BBC’s reliance upon section 12 and in
particular whether the BBC’s estimate of cost had been
reasonable;
c. whether the IC
should have found a breach of section 16 of FOIA on the basis that the BBC
had failed to revert to Mr Fitzsimmons to advise how he might narrow or
redefine his request so as to come within the costs
limit; |
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Evidence |
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10. The main evidence before
the Tribunal was that contained in the statement of Mr Nigel Etienne, a
Projects and Planning Manager in BBC Finance. It was his responsibility to
liaise with the BBC’s Information Policy and Compliance Unit in respect of
FOIA requests relevant to BBC finance. His evidence was as to his own
estimate for compliance with the request rather than evidence as to the
estimate actually reached at the time of refusal of the request. His
estimate was initially that it would take 160 hours of staff time to
comply. This was subsequently revised downwards in a second statement to
120 hours (see paragraphs 33 & 34 below).
11. Mr Etienne explained
that there were two ways in which the expense claims for Mr Marr, an
employee of the BBC, might have been made – electronically or manually. In
relation to Ms Kaplinsky who was a contractor, all her expense claims were
made manually as part of her invoicing for her fees. In addition, Mr
Etienne told the Tribunal that the BBC incurred expenses for travel and
accommodation in relation to both persons through a central booking
system.
12. It was a key feature of
compliance with the request that it was only expenses incurred in relation
to hospitality/dealings with third parties (in Mr Marr’s case central
government) that were within the scope of the request. Mr Etienne
explained that this entailed significant work in identifying which
expenses related to third party dealings as opposed to other types of
journalistic activity.
13. Thus, in relation to Mr
Marr’s electronic expenses it was said that the BBC needed 26 hours to
search their data base for his expense claims (submitted by Mr Marr
electronically), to refine this to search for travel and hospitality and
then refine further to find references to government departments. It was
noted that if the text fields entered by Mr Marr did not contain any such
reference, further investigation work would be required to ascertain
whether a particular expense claim fell within the request. There was no
time estimate given for this further work.
14. Mr Etienne gave details
as to what would be required in relation to the manual expense claim forms
for Mr Marr. In the light however of the BBC’s subsequent discovery that
these were no longer held for the relevant period, the Tribunal did not
take this particular evidence into account.
15. For Ms Kaplinsky, who
only submitted manual expense claims via the ‘artists contracting
process’, the search was said to entail accessing this system (presumably
electronically), reviewing all payments to her for the relevant period in
order to identify payments for expenses (as opposed to fees) and to note
the date and number of invoice on which the expenses appear. It would be
necessary then to retrieve the relevant invoices from the BBC’s offsite
storage facility and manually to review each relevant invoice to extract
those which fell within the request. It was said that this would entail
one week’s worth of work.
16. In addition to Mr
Etienne’s statement, the Tribunal was provided with copies of sample
online expense claim forms (not relating to Mr Marr). It was not provided
with any examples of manual expense claim forms. The Tribunal was
concerned that had there been manual monthly expense claim forms provided
by either individual this would have considerably reduced the scope of the
exercise. The Appellant had produced such a form for Michael Grade and was
arguing that similar |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043
such forms must exist for Mr Marr
and Ms Kaplinsky. The Tribunal decided to adjourn to call for further
evidence on this point.
17. Hence, the Tribunal asked the
BBC to provide information as to whether Andrew Marr and Natasha Kaplinksy
provided their manual expenses claims on an ad hoc or a monthly basis or
both and sample copies of manual ad hoc claims and manual monthly claims
made by these two individuals. The Tribunal received a second closed
bundle of evidence for the resumed hearing (see paragraph 35
below). |
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The Tribunal’s jurisdiction and the relevant
law
18. The Tribunal’s
jurisdiction on appeal is governed by section 58 of FOIA. As it applies to
this matter it entitles the Tribunal to allow the Appeal if it considers
that the Decision Notice is not in accordance with the law or, to the
extent that it involved an exercise of discretion, the IC ought to have
exercised his discretion differently.
19. The starting point for
the Tribunal is the Decision Notice of the IC but the Tribunal also
receives evidence, which is not limited to the material that was before
the IC. The Tribunal, having considered the evidence (and it is not bound
by strict rules of evidence), may make different findings of fact from the
IC and consider the Decision Notice is not in accordance with the law
because of those different facts. Nevertheless, if the facts are not in
dispute, the Tribunal must consider whether the applicable statutory
framework has been applied correctly. If the facts are decided differently
by the Tribunal, or the Tribunal comes to a different conclusion based on
the same facts, that will involve a finding that the Decision Notice was
not in accordance with the law.
20. Section 12 provides an
exception to the duty to provide information held under section 1(1) of
FOIA. This provides:
“(1) Section 1(1) does not
oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the
authority estimates that the cost of complying with the request would
exceed the appropriate limit.
(2) Subsection (1) does
not exempt the public authority from its obligation to comply with
paragraph (a) of section 1(1) unless the estimated cost of complying with
that paragraph alone would exceed the appropriate limit
(3) In subsection (1) and
(2), the “appropriate amount” means such limit as may be prescribed and
different amounts may be prescribed in relation to different
cases.”.
21. For the purposes of
section 12, the “appropriate limit” is prescribed in the Freedom of
Information and Data Protection (Appropriate Limit and Fees) Regulations
2004 (“the Regulations”). Regulation 3 provides so far as
relevant:
“(1) This regulation has
effect to prescribe….. the appropriate limit referred to in section 12(1)
and (2) of the 2000 Act…. |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043
(2) In the case of a public
authority which is listed in Part I of Schedule 1 to the 2000 Act, the
appropriate limit is £600.
(3)In the case of any other public authority the
appropriate limit is £450.”.
22. Regulation 4 (3) & (4) provides
that:
“(3) In the case in which this
regulation has effect, a public authority may, for the purposes of this
estimate, take account only of the costs it reasonably expects to incur in
relation to the request in-(a) determining whether it holds the
information;
(b) locating the
information, or a document which may contain the
information
(c) retrieving the
information, or a document which may contain the information;
and
(d) extracting the
information from a document containing it.
(4) To the extent to which any
of the costs which a public authority takes into account are attributable
to the time which persons undertaking any of the activities mentioned in
paragraph (3) on behalf of the authority are expected to spend on those
activities, those costs are to be estimated at a rate of £25 per person
per hour.”
Given the £450 costs limit and
the notional hourly rate of £25, this equates to a figure of 18 hours of
work before the costs limit is reached.
23. A public authority does
not of course have to rely on section 12; it is free to comply with a
request even if it estimates that the cost of doing so will exceed the
appropriate limit. If it does rely on section 12, it is not required to
make a precise calculation for the time costs of complying with the
request. What is required is an estimate. We take it as implied, however,
that the estimate must be arrived at on a reasonable basis. This was also
the view expressed by a differently constituted Tribunal in Urmenyi v
Information commissioner EA/2006/0093, at paragraph 16.
24. Also under consideration
in this appeal is section 16, the duty to provide advice and assistance.
This provides that:
“(1) It shall be the duty of a
public authority to provide advice and assistance, so far as it would be
reasonable to expect the authority to do so, to persons who propose to
make, or have made, requests for information to it.
(2) Any public authority
which, in relation to the provision of advice or assistance in any case,
conforms with the code of practice under section 45 is to be taken to
comply with the duty imposed by subsection (1) in relation to that
case.”.
25. The Secretary of State
for Constitutional affairs has produced a Code of Practice under section
45 on the discharge of public authorities’ functions under Part I
of |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043
FOIA, which at paragraph 14 states that:
“Where an authority is not
obliged to comply with a request for information because, under section
12(1) and regulations made under section 12, the cost of complying would
exceed the “appropriate limit” (ie: cost threshold) the authority should
consider providing an indication of what, if any, information could be
provided with the cost ceiling. The authority should also consider
advising the applicant that by reforming or re-focussing their request,
information may be able to be supplied for a lower, or no,
fee.”.
26. In the case of Brown
v Information Commissioner EA 2006/0088, a differently constituted
Tribunal found that a failure to consider acting in accordance with
section 16 and the course of action set out in the paragraph of the Code
above, was such that the public authority could not rely, in the
particular circumstances of that case, on section 12. A live issue before
this Tribunal was whether, in the absence of the BBC having at any stage
reverted to the requester, and consistent with the Brown case it
ought not to accept reliance upon section 12, however reasonable the
estimate.
27. Finally, the Tribunal
noted that the suggestion made in the Decision Notice that the BBC should
revert to Mr Fitzsimmons to discuss how he might revise his request so as
to bring it within the costs limit, was just that – no more than a
suggestion. This was done informally and was not a so-called ‘specified
step’ under section 50(4) of FOIA. That provision provides:
“Where the Commissioner decides that a public
authority—
(a) has
failed to communicate information, or to provide confirmation or denial,
in a case where it is required to do so by section 1(1),
or
(b) has
failed to comply with any of the requirements of sections 11 and
17,
the decision notice must
specify the steps which must be taken by the authority for complying with
that requirement and the period within which they must be
taken.”.
28. It should be noted that
failure to comply with ‘a specified step’ may lead to enforcement action
by the IC and proceedings for contempt of court – see section 54 FOIA.
Public authorities are not obliged as a matter of law to comply with
informal suggestions in Decision Notices. |
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Appeal Number:
EA/2008/0043
Decision
Mr Fitzsimmons’ grounds of
appeal
29. The Tribunal considered first
the express grounds of appeal set out by Mr Fitzsimmons:
a. that there is no statutory time limit for
the purposes of FOIA:
As is explained in paragraph 23
above and featured in a previous Information Tribunal case in which Mr
Fitzsimmon’s was the Appellant, an upper costs limit is prescribed in
legislation and a notional hourly rate applied (£25 per hour). Whilst the
legislation does not spell out the time limit, it follows that from the
statutory provision that the public authority may only carry out 18 hours
work at the notional rate before it reaches the prescribed cost limit.
There are not therefore limits arbitrarily applied by the BBC or the IC.
Nor are they matters of discretion which can be approached in terms of
‘reasonableness’.
Mr Fitzsimmons referred on a
number of occasions to the power in section 12(3) (see paragraph 21).
He took this as evidence that the limit maybe varied whereas this
provision simply provides powers for the legislation itself to make
different provision in different cases. The word “prescribe” in this
context means prescribe in legislation.
b. that the BBC is
unable to provide the information within the cost limit should not prevent
its disclosure:
It has never been the BBC’s
position and certainly is not said by the IC in the Decision Notice that
the effect of the cost limit is to prevent the BBC from making disclosure.
The BBC has chosen to rely upon the cost limit in refusing disclosure. It
has been free and remains free to make disclosure if it so wishes (subject
of course to any restrictions that arise from the Data Protection Act 1998
or the bounds of confidentiality).
c. that the Commissioner should have
prioritised the public interest in this case:
Section 12 does not involve the
application of any public interest test. The Tribunal’s role in this
regard is simply to consider whether the IC was right in upholding the
public authority’s entitlement to rely upon the section 12 cost limit. It
is beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to consider whether in
deciding whether to make voluntary disclosure, the BBC should have given
greater priority to the public interest as argued by Mr
Fitzsimmons.
d. The Tribunal
understands the time limit should be varied by the Information Tribunal
to accommodate this public interest:
this ground of appeal to be, in
effect, that the costs limit should be varied. As this is a matter of
statutory provision and no discretion is provided within that provision,
this is beyond the powers of all involved, the BBC,
the |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043
Commissioner and the Tribunal. |
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Section 12: reasonable estimate
30. The Tribunal proceeded
to consider whether the BBC had been entitled to rely upon section 12 and
therefore to satisfy itself whether the cost estimate for compliance
provided by the BBC was reasonable. It took this to mean that the estimate
must be sensible, realistic and supported by cogent evidence (Randall v
Information Commissioner EA/2007/0004).
31. The Tribunal was
concerned in a number of regards with the way in which the BBC had
approached the estimate and indeed presented its case on
appeal.
32. First, the Tribunal was
concerned that Mr Etienne had needed to make a second statement to correct
a significant error in the first. The first statement had estimated the
costs in relation to a period running from when Mr Marr and Ms Kaplinsky
started working for the BBC until the date of the statement. This was
obviously wrong as the period in relation to which expense statements
would need to be scrutinised was from their start dates to the date of the
letter of request (treated in this case as the date upon which the request
was transferred from the DCMS to the BBC). This raised the question
whether the estimate as put together at the time of the refusal of the
request had made the same mistake.
33. As a result of this
mistake, the BBC revised its time estimate down from 160 to 120 hours to
comply with the request. This made sense in that the original statement
had said that the period under scrutiny for Mr Marr was 8 and Ms Kaplinsky
5 years, when in fact this should respectively have been 5 and 3 years.
Despite this the BBC did not reduce the number of anticipated hours for
scrutinising Ms Kaplinksy’s manual expense claims, said to be a full weeks
work. There was no explanation for this and the Tribunal did not consider
that this could be viewed as reasonable. A reduction was
required.
34. The Tribunal’s next
concern was that despite directing that it be provided with samples of the
manual expense claims for the two individuals, it had been given copy
documents which appeared to be payment dockets. These related to Ms
Kaplinsky only and not Mr Marr as the Tribunal were told that all manual
expense forms for Mr Marr had been destroyed (in accordance, it was said,
with their data retention policy). This of course meant that the estimate
given to the IC and reflected in both witness statements of Mr Etienne had
been wholly incorrect in this respect. It had been asserted in his witness
statement that complying with the letter of request in relation to Mr
Marr’s manual expense forms would take 2 weeks of work. This simply fell
away on further investigation. The Tribunal considered that the BBC
should, in forming the estimate, have carried out the preliminary steps of
asking its storage contractor a) whether the information still existed and
then b) if so, what would be involved in its recovery. Had they gone
through these simple preliminary steps, the BBC would have known to reduce
its cost estimate.
35. The Tribunal spent
sometime considering the costs said to relate to the BBC’s central booking
system costs. These were costs incurred by the BBC for Mr Marr’s travel
which were paid for centrally. The Tribunal considered that the request
was |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043 |
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unclear as to whether Mr
Fitzsimmons had wanted information as to expenses incurred by the BBC in
relation to Mr Marr or only expenses incurred by Mr Marr which he then
claimed back. Mr Etienne’s statement included a significant amount of time
for the provision of information from the central booking
system.
36. The Tribunal was of the
view that it was a reasonable interpretation of the request that
information as to central booking costs was required. It was not convinced
however that these costs had in fact been included in the original
estimate. The Tribunal noted that in correspondence between the BBC and
the IC the BBC only referred to expenses claimed back. The Tribunal noted
that neither it nor the IC had had sight of any documentation showing how
the BBC had originally calculated its estimate.
37. Given its doubts over
whether these costs had been included in the original estimate, it decided
to discount this aspect in the calculation of whether the costs limit
would be reached.
38. The Tribunal’s next
concern was that on scrutinising the sample electronic claim forms it
appeared that it would not always be possible to identify to whom the
expenses related (for instance, who Mr Marr lunched with). This was
important as the letter of request only concerned expenses incurred by Mr
Marr in his dealings with Government departments.
39. Mr Etienne had told the
Tribunal about this difficulty in his first witness statement, referring
to the need for further investigation but without quantifying the time
this would take. This was less than helpful to the Tribunal as it was left
guessing how much time this aspect would take. It was however prepared to
accept that the BBC would need to be involved in significant and in all
likelihood problematic further investigation in tying down dates with
events so as to work out if the electronic expense claims came within the
request.
40. Whilst the Tribunal took
into account the above flaws in the estimate and reduced the proposed
hours of work in compliance accordingly, the Tribunal did accept as
reasonable in all other respects the assessment of the BBC as to the
approximate cost of compliance. Reducing the estimate in relation to the
costs relating to Mr Marr’s manual expenses and all central booking
expenses, this still left the estimated costs for the online expense
claims for Mr Marr and Ms Kaplinsky’s manual expense claims (reduced to
reflect the number of years she had worked for the BBC). The Tribunal
accepted moreover further significant investigation would be required in
relation to Mr Marr’s online electronic expenses. This would clearly take
the hours of work required over the 18 hours limit.
41. In the light of the
above concerns however, the Tribunal did carefully consider whether the
estimate was so flawed that it could simply not be relied upon. It was
certainly the case that the Tribunal was not impressed with the way in
which the BBC had approached the forming of the estimate and that in
certain respects this had resulted in the costs being significantly
overstated. In other respects they had been understated.
42. The Tribunal reminded
itself however that section 12 was designed to free public authorities
from the burden of complying with requests the costs of compliance
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043
which are above the statutory
threshold. The purpose of section 12 would be undermined if the estimate
required were to be so detailed and precisely accurate that the public
authority ended up spending significant time simply in the production of
the estimate. An estimate needs to be reasonable in an overall sense. It
should not contain errors of such magnitude that either the costs limit is
not in fact reached or it is so flawed that no confidence can be placed
upon it.
43. The Tribunal was
satisfied, on balance, that the estimate was sufficiently reliable to mean
that overall it was reasonable. In forming this view, the Tribunal noted
first that complying with the request in relation to Ms Kaplinsky’s manual
expenses alone would reach the costs limit. Added to this were the clearly
reasonable time estimates for the preliminary searches of Mr Marr’s online
expense claims forms relevant to the request. The Tribunal was moreover
prepared to take into account the costs of further investigation in
relation to Mr Marr’s online expense claims, albeit unquantified. It would
have been better if the BBC had quantified the time taken to carry out
this exercise, but having alluded to it in Mr Etienne’s statements, the
Tribunal considered it would not be appropriate to leave these obviously
very real costs out of account.
44. The Tribunal concluded
that the BBC had been entitled to rely upon section 12 on the basis that
its estimate of compliance took it above the costs limit.
Section 12: failure to assist Mr Fitzsimmons in refining
his request
45. The Tribunal considered
then whether the BBC’s failure to revert to Mr Fitzsimmons in order either
to indicate what could be provided within the costs limit or to assist him
in refining the request meant that it ought not to be able to rely upon
section 12. This would be in accordance with a previous decision of the
Tribunal, differently constituted in the case of Brown (see
paragraph 27 above). The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner’s position,
in the further submissions called for between hearing dates, was that
sections 12 and 16 were not inextricably linked and that whilst subject to
duties under section 16 to advise and assist, a public authority was
entitled to rely upon section 12 on the basis of the request before it.
The BBC accepted in principle that it may be relevant to consider
compliance with section 16 in determining whether section 12 applied, but
not on the facts of this particular case.
46. With due respect to the
decision in Brown which was not, in any event, binding, the
Tribunal came to a different conclusion on this point of law. The Tribunal
considered that sections 12 and 16 needed to be considered separately from
each other. That this was the case was reflected, quite simply, in the
fact that they appeared in two separate free standing provisions. There
was no indication on the face of the legislation that Parliament intended
them to be interlinked in the way previously interpreted by the
Tribunal.
47. That they should be
approached separately, was reflected in the fact that the two sections had
different enforcement mechanisms. Where an authority incorrectly relied
upon section 12 (and assuming no other exemption applied) this would lead
to a breach of the duty to disclose under section 1(1). A finding to this
effect in a Decision Notice by the IC would in the normal course of events
lead to a specified |
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formal step under section 50(4)
of FOIA (see paragraph 28). Non-compliance with such a ‘specified step’
could lead to proceedings for contempt of court. This had to be contrasted
with non-compliance with section 16 for which there was, in the Tribunal’s
view, no formal adverse consequences other than possibly a practice
recommendation under section 48. There was no enforcement mechanism for
non-compliance with a practice recommendation.
48. On this point, the
Tribunal noted that the IC had argued that implicit in section 50 was the
power to issue a formal ‘specified step’ where there was a breach of
section 16. The Tribunal did not accept this submission as it was of the
view that section 50(4) set out the limits of the IC’s powers so to act.
The Tribunal considered that insofar as non-compliance with ‘specified
steps’ could lead to contempt proceedings, the clearest wording would be
required to substantiate such a power and that this was not the case
here.
49. The Code of Practice
(see paragraph 26 above) further reflected the Tribunal’s interpretation
that sections 12 and 16 of FOIA had to be considered separately. Paragraph
14 of the Code applied “where an authority is not obliged to comply
with a request” indicating that an authority would consider section 12
first but then as a next and free standing step may need to consider
assisting the requester to refine down his or her request.
50. The BBC was at the time
of refusal adamant that the derogation applied. It would, in the
Tribunal’s view, have been unreasonable to expect it to have gone through
the motions of advising the requester of either what information could be
provided within the costs limit or advising him how he might refine his
request to do the same, simply then to refuse on the basis of the
derogation. To conclude otherwise would be to, in effect, require the BBC
to treat all requests as subject to FOIA for the purposes of advice and
assistance under section 16, regardless of whether or not the derogation
applied.
51. The Tribunal left open
the question whether, where there were two ways in which a request could
be reasonably interpreted, one of which would definitely take the request
over the limit and one of which would not, the public authority ought in
order for the eventual estimate to be reasonable, to revert to the
requester to clarify the request. In this case, there had been doubt as to
whether the expenses for central booking should be included. In the event,
even without their inclusion the Tribunal took the view that those parts
of the estimate considered reasonable took the BBC over the costs limit.
Thus, this particular point did not fall to the Tribunal to decide. It was
of the view however that in this limited way (and without reference to
section 16), the question of reverting to the requester may have a direct
bearing on compliance with section 12.
52. Thus, in conclusion on
this part, the Tribunal was of the view that a failure to revert to Mr
Fitzsimmons at the time of refusal did not lead to a conclusion that the
BBC could not rely upon section 12. |
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12 |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043 |
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Section 16: duty to advise and assist
53. The next step for the
Tribunal was to consider whether a failure to revert to the requester as
discussed above amounted to a breach of section 16. For the reasons set
out above, the Tribunal accepted that it had been a reasonable position
for the BBC to take at the time of refusing the request, that it did not
need even to consider reverting to the requester
54. The Commissioner’s
position now, as set out in his further submissions, was that if the
Tribunal were to uphold reliance upon section 12, it ought to go on to
find a breach of section 16. This was ,of course, inconsistent with the
Decision Notice, which had not found a breach of section 16. The BBC
conversely argued that a breach of section 16 should not be found on
account of the BBC’s genuine belief, at the time of refusal, that FOIA did
not apply.
55. The Tribunal considered
that having concluded that the BBC had been justified in not reverting to
the requester at the time of refusal it would be incorrect to find a
breach of section 16 now. The Tribunal’s task was to consider how the BBC
should have acted at the relevant time, in this case date of
refusal.
56. Clearly if a new request
were to be made in circumstances in which it had been determined that the
derogation does not apply and the BBC chose to rely upon section 12, the
BBC would, in accordance with its duties under section 16, need to go on
to discuss with a requester how he or she might refine a request. This
would not be, however, to prejudge where such discussions might eventually
lead. The BBC had, in this case, reserved its right to argue that other
exemptions, including commercial confidentiality, might
apply.
57. In all the
circumstances, the Tribunal did not consider that there had been a breach
of section 16. |
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13 |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0043 |
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58. The Tribunal upheld the
IC’s Decision Notice. It agreed that the BBC was entitled to rely upon
section 12, although critical of the way in which it had approached the
estimate. The Tribunal also concluded that there had been no breach of
section 16 on the basis that at the time of the refusal the BBC had been
genuinely convinced that on account of the derogation, FOIA did not
apply.
59. The decision of the Tribunal is
unanimous. |
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Signed: Melanie Carter Deputy
Chairwoman Date: 3 December 2008 |
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14 |
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