EA_2008_0002
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Information Tribunal Appeal
Number: EA/2008/0002
ON APPEAL
FROM
Information Commissioner’s
Ref: FS50082955 |
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Determined on the papers
Decision Promulgated
On 7 April and 9 May 2008
13
May 2008 |
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BEFORE
CHAIRMAN
ANDREW BARTLETT
QC
and
LAY MEMBERS
DAVID WILKINSON DAVE
SIVERS |
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Between
ANTHONY
CRAVEN
Appellant
and
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent |
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Representation:
The Appellant in person
For the Respondent: Jane Oldham |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002
Decision
The Tribunal upholds the decision notice dated 2 January 2008
and dismisses the appeal.
Reasons for Decision
Introduction
1. This appeal is brought
by Mr Craven, who runs a national support group, called HIPS(97), for
victims of failed home income plans. He has built up considerable
expertise on the matter of home income plans and has been campaigning for
a number of years. We were shown a recent email from the daughter of a
gentleman who suffered a loss which has not been compensated, and a letter
from Dr Lynne Jones MP, referring to the injustice over home income plans,
which has dragged on for many years. This appeal is concerned with a
report on the sale of home income plans written many years ago by the
Financial Intermediaries Managers and Brokers Authority
(“FIMBRA”).
The request for information
2. By letter of 7 March
2005 to the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) Mr Craven requested a
copy of a report by FIMBRA on the West Bromwich Building Society (“WBBS”),
written in the early 1990s. The FSA in its response confirmed that it held
a version of a draft report satisfying this description, but declined to
release it.
3. Upon internal review by
the FSA, the FSA released to Mr Craven a copy of a statement made in open
court in a libel action brought by WBBS arising from the leaking of the
draft, but maintained its refusal in relation to the draft report itself,
relying on the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) s43 (prejudice to
commercial interests) and s44 (information subject to a prohibition on
disclosure). The Building Society had been contacted by FSA but had
refused its consent to the release of the draft report.
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002
The statutory provisions
4. The information request
was made in pursuance of FOIA s1. The material parts of the two sections
relied on as justifying the refusal to release the information are as
follows:
43(2) Information is exempt
information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to,
prejudice the commercial interests of any person (including the public
authority holding it).
44(1) Information is exempt
information if its disclosure (otherwise than under this Act) by the
public authority holding it - (a) is prohibited by or under any enactment
...
5. The s43 exemption is
qualified, being subject to the public interest test set out in s2(2)(b).
The s44 exemption is absolute: see s2(3)(h).
6. The prohibitory
enactment relied on for the purpose of s44 was the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”) s348. This provides, in essence, that
information received by the regulator in the course of its functions
relating to someone’s affairs must not be disclosed without the consent
both of the person from whom the information was obtained and of the
person to whom the information relates, unless the information has already
been lawfully made available to the public. The material terms of the
section are:
348(1) Confidential information
must not be disclosed by a primary recipient, or by any person obtaining
the information directly or indirectly from a primary recipient, without
the consent of--
(a) the person from whom the primary recipient obtained
the information; and
(b) if different, the person to whom it
relates.
(2) In this Part "confidential information" means information
which--
(a) relates to the business or other affairs of any
person;
(b) was received by the
primary recipient for the purposes of, or in the discharge of, any
functions of the Authority, the competent authority for the purposes of
Part VI or the Secretary of State under any provision made by or under
this Act; and
(c) is not prevented from being confidential information
by subsection (4)… |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002
(4) Information is not confidential information
if--
(a) it has been made available to
the public by virtue of being disclosed in any circumstances in which, or
for any purposes for which, disclosure is not precluded by this section;
...
(5) Each of the following is
a primary recipient for the purposes of this Part--(a) the
Authority…”
7. FSMA s349 provides for
exceptions to the prohibition in s348. Broadly, information may be
disclosed in pursuance of defined public functions.
The complaint to the Information
Commissioner
8. By letter of 9 July 2005
Mr Craven complained to the Commissioner, who commenced his investigation
in October 2006.
9. As a result of
information from Mr Craven the Commissioner discovered that the FSA held
two versions of the draft report. The draft originally referred to by the
FSA was a draft of February 1994. The second version held by the FSA was
dated June 1994. The Commissioner considered the circumstances surrounding
the discovery of the later version and in his decision notice accepted
that it was the February version to which Mr Craven’s request
related.
10. The Commissioner was
given confidential access to the February draft. He considered that the
contents fell into two categories: (a) background information obtained by
FIMBRA and (b) opinions expressed on behalf of FIMBRA. He decided that the
background information was covered by s44, because it was
information received by FIMBRA relating to the affairs of the Building
Society, the Society had withheld its consent, and the information had not
been lawfully made public. The background information therefore could not
be disclosed.
11. He considered that the
opinions were not covered by s44. He took the view that s348 was
applied by FSMA s349 and Part V of the FSMA (Disclosure of Confidential
Information) Regulations 2001 to information obtained by the FSA’s
predecessor organisations including FIMBRA. But s348 did not apply to the
opinions because FIMBRA did not receive the opinions from others but
generated them itself, and because the FSA did not receive them from
FIMBRA but had by statute succeeded to FIMBRA’s
functions. |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002 |
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12. The Commissioner
therefore considered the application of s43 to the opinions. In his view
the opinions constituted information protected by s43 because of a real
risk of damage to the Society’s commercial interests, and on applying the
public interest test he considered that the public interest in maintaining
the exemption for the opinions outweighed the public interest in
disclosure. He therefore decided that the FSA had dealt with Mr Craven’s
request in accordance with FOIA, and that no part of the February 1994
draft report should be disclosed.
13. The FSA had originally
made the same distinction as the Commissioner, and had similarly relied on
s43 in relation to the opinions and s44 in relation to the background
information. However, on reconsideration, the FSA had taken the view that
s44 applied to the whole document, on the basis that neither the FSA, nor
its formal predecessor the Securities and Investment Board (under whose
supervision FIMBRA functioned), had generated the opinions, and thus the
whole of the draft represented information received from another person.
The Commissioner in his decision notice rejected this
reasoning.
The appeal to the Tribunal
14. Mr Craven appealed to
the Tribunal. His central ground of appeal was essentially that the report
was already in the public domain, and therefore neither s43 nor s44
applied to it. He contended as follows:
(1) The report was leaked by its author, a senior legal
officer of FIMBRA.
(2) The report was quoted in
the press and on BBC radio, and during the proceedings of a Treasury
Select Committee.
(3) The report was used and
quoted in a High Court action by WBBS against FIMBRA in which WBBS alleged
that the report was defamatory.
(4) The report was used,
quoted and verified in a High Court action by the Investors’ Compensation
Scheme against WBBS.
15. On the question of
commercial prejudice to the interests of WBBS, he submitted that such
sensitivities should be given little weight because of the nature of
WBBS’s |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002 |
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conduct and its effects on
pensioners. In his view WBBS was not deserving of commercial
protection.
16. He also contended, in
regard to the public interest issue, that (1) no further claims could be
brought by the majority of investors against WBBS, since the Investors’
Compensation Scheme had sole rights where compensation had been awarded,
and in any event it was highly likely that the statute of limitations
would now bar any fresh action, and (2) it was not his intention to
publicise the report if he was granted a copy of it.
17. The appeal contained no
challenge to the Commissioner’s finding that it was the February 1994, not
June 1994, version to which Mr Craven’s request related. Nor was there any
challenge to the Commissioner’s view that s44 did not apply to the opinion
elements of the draft report. The FSA did not apply to be joined to the
appeal.
18. The Commissioner
resisted the appeal on the basis that the reasoning and conclusions in his
decision notice were correct, and were not undermined by the contentions
put forward by Mr Craven on appeal.
The nature of the draft report
19. The draft report was
made available to us in confidence. It was in the nature of an early
draft, and self-evidently incomplete. The actual contents fell short of
what was indicated by the contents list at the start. It consists of 35
pages. The “Conclusion” listed on the contents list is not included in the
draft. The text was unfinished and the appendices were not
included.
20. The headings on the
title page included: “Draft Interim Report”, “Strictly Private and
Confidential”, and “First Draft”.
21. The Commissioner’s
findings of fact in his decision notice give the impression that WBBS had
never seen or been given a copy of the draft report. That is not correct,
as is clear from a confidential letter from WBBS to the FSA dated 26
October 2007. However, it was also apparent that WBBS did not have the
opportunity to influence the contents of the draft report, that the draft
could not be regarded as a complete
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002
or balanced document, that it
might therefore be inaccurate or misleading in one respect or another, and
that it did not receive internal approval within FIMBRA.
The leaks and the High Court actions
22. The disclosure of the
draft, which Mr Craven says was by Mr Robert Guest, the author of the
draft, took place in 1994-95. We have only sketchy information from the
parties concerning the extent to which disclosure spread more widely at
that time, except that there were reports in the news media, and the draft
was referred to in Parliament, in the proceedings of the Treasury and
Civil Service Committee, on 27 March 1995. On that occasion Mr O’Brien MP
gave a summary of the contents of the draft, with some quotations from it.
Mr Craven himself read a copy of the report but did not retain
it.
23. In 1995 WBBS brought an
action against FIMBRA and Mr Guest for libel, which was settled by the
statement in open court to which we have referred, and the text of which
we have. There was no adjudication in that action on whether anything
stated in the draft was true or untrue. The statement expressly says that
the disclosure was unauthorised, and we so find.
24. In the same year the
Investors’ Compensation Scheme commenced a claim against WBBS for damages,
which culminated in a High Court judgment in 1999: Investors
Compensation Scheme Limited v West Bromwich Building Society 15
January 1999, Evans-Lombe J. This covered many of the same topics as the
draft report, running to 211 pages and containing a wealth of
detail.
The relevance of public disclosure
25. We have mentioned that
Mr Craven’s central ground of appeal was essentially that the report was
already in the public domain. This needs some refinement in order to
produce a legally valid argument.
26. If the draft report were
fully in the public domain, there would be no purpose in requesting it
under FOIA. There would also be no basis for disclosing it under FOIA, for
by FOIA s21 information which is reasonably accessible to the applicant by
other means than a FOIA request is exempt from disclosure under
FOIA.
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002 |
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27. Mr Craven said in his
notice of appeal “I readily obtained the minutes of Treasury Select
Committee meetings and reports by the media (including BBC radio) which
were available to the public.” This demonstrates that the parts of the
report which entered the public domain by this route were reasonably
accessible to Mr Craven by means other than a request under
FOIA.
28. We therefore take Mr
Craven’s appeal to relate to the information in the draft report which did
not enter the public domain as a result of the leak or by means of the
judgment given by Evans-Lombe J. Mr Craven’s argument is effectively a
contention that, since the information in the draft is partly in the
public domain, the remainder of the information should also be
disclosed.
29. From the limited
materials made available to us, it does not appear that the whole of the
draft was revealed by the Treasury and Civil Service
Committee.
30. We asked the
Commissioner for submissions on what matters were contained in the draft
which were not fully or substantially contained in the judgment of
Evans-Lombe J.
31. The Commissioner
provided us with closed submissions as requested. We were surprised to
discover that the Commissioner had not previously considered the judgment,
but found the submissions to be of assistance. The submissions identified
a significant quantity of material in the draft report which was not
contained in the judgment. Mr Craven also made submissions on this aspect:
he identified four topics which he considered were not substantially dealt
with in the judgment.
32. We were satisfied that
there were some elements of information in the draft which were not
readily available to the public, and which were therefore the proper
subject of a FOIA request. We will call these the “unrevealed” elements of
information, notwithstanding that certain journalists and MPs, and even Mr
Craven himself, may have seen them, since they are not readily available
to the applicant as a member of the public via the proceedings of the
Treasury and Civil Service Committee or the judgment of Evans-Lombe
J. |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002
33. We therefore turn to
consider the unrevealed elements of information in the draft
report.
The unrevealed background information
34. The question here is
whether the unrevealed background information in the draft report was
protected from disclosure by FOIA s44 on account of FSMA s348. The
following features appear to us to be beyond dispute:
(1) The unrevealed
background information in the draft report relates to the affairs of
WBBS.
(2) The unrevealed
background information was received by FIMBRA for the purpose of its
regulatory functions.
(3) There has been no
consent from WBBS to the disclosure of any of the background
information.
35. The only remaining issue
on the application of s44 is the effect of FSMA s348(4) in the particular
circumstances. The relevant part of s348(4) provides that information is
not subject to the ban on disclosure if it has already been made available
to the public without breaching s348. This can occur in a variety of ways
permitted by s349, often referred to as ‘gateways’.
36. From the very nature of
the case s348(4) cannot apply here, since we are considering only the
unrevealed background information. The unrevealed background information
has not been lawfully made available to the public. Those who saw it did
so as a result of an unauthorised leak. Mr Craven argued that the leak was
effectively a gateway because the information became public as a result.
We are unable to agree. The leak was itself in contravention of
s348.
37. Accordingly we conclude
that the unrevealed background information is protected by the s44
exemption.
38. Section 44 is an
absolute exemption. The unrevealed background information cannot lawfully
be disclosed under FOIA. In these circumstances it is
unnecessary |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002
for us to consider the possible
application of s43 to the unrevealed background information.
The unrevealed opinions
39. The Commissioner relied
solely on FOIA s43 in relation to the opinions in the draft
report.
40. Section 43 is only
engaged if disclosure under the Act “would, or would be likely to,
prejudice the commercial interests of any person (including the public
authority holding it)”.
41. Whatever views may be
held on whether WBBS is deserving of commercial protection, we cannot
accept the relevance of Mr Craven’s submission that they are not. That is
because the relevant question for the Tribunal is not whether WBBS
deserves protection, but simply whether there is a sufficient likelihood
of prejudice within the meaning of s43.
42. We also cannot accept
the relevance of his point that it is not his intention to publicise the
report if he is granted a copy of it. His intention may change, and in any
event disclosure under FOIA is disclosure to the public for all purposes,
without restriction.
43. WBBS submitted to the
Commissioner that release would seriously damage its commercial interests
and generate negative publicity in that it might harm the continuing
relationship between the Society and existing equity release borrowers,
affect its ability to win new business, affect consumer confidence in the
Society, expose the Society to the risk of further claims, and undermine
confidence in the Society with potential adverse consequences for
shareholding members.
44. We have taken into
account the submissions of Mr Craven concerning the age of the
information, the transfer of investors’ rights to the Investors’
Compensation Scheme, and the likely effect of the statute of limitations,
but it is clear to us that there would be a likelihood of prejudice to the
commercial interests of WBBS if the unrevealed opinions were disclosed
under FOIA. The opinions are critical of WBBS and are expressed in strong
terms. Despite the severe damage already done to the
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reputation of WBBS by the
findings of Evans-Lombe J, we are unable to take the view that WBBS has no
reputation at all to protect or that it cannot be damaged any further.
Disclosure of the unrevealed opinions would in our judgment be damaging to
the commercial interests of WBBS.
45. We therefore find that the s43 exemption
applies.
46. The next question is
where the balance of public interest lies. The information must be
disclosed unless the public interest in maintaining the s43 exemption
outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
47. We identify the following factors in favour of
disclosure:
(1) The subject matter of
the draft report – home income plans – is a matter of real public
interest, having regard to the well known and extensive problems caused by
the sale of such plans.
(2) There is a value in
openness about what went wrong with the sale of such plans. This may
assist recompense, educate consumers, and reduce such problems in the
future.
(3) Since much that is in
the draft report is already in the public domain, the interference with
the privacy of WBBS’s business affairs would be relatively
limited.
(4) The events considered in the draft report took place
many years ago.
(5) The events considered in the draft report still have
continuing effects.
48. Against the above, we
must weigh the factors in favour of maintaining the exemption. These
appear to us to be:
(6) The prospect of harm to
the legitimate interests of WBBS and its current investors.
(7) The fact that the
report was an unvalidated first draft, lacking internal approval within
FIMBRA. The opinions may be incorrect and inadequately substantiated. As
the FSA said in its internal review letter, the report was
never
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002
finalised, was not intended for
publication, and lacked both authorisation and external
validation.
(8) The fact that the
unrevealed opinions on their own, in the absence of the background
information which is protected by s44, would be of little value to the
public.
(9) The fact that most of
the circumstances referred to in the report were investigated in the High
Court damages claim, and criticisms of WBBS were either upheld or
dismissed, as the case may be, so that there is a limited public interest
in revealing the remainder of the matters. Compensation has been paid to
those who made justified claims.
(10) The unverified opinions
would be of little benefit to any consumers still in a position to bring a
claim and would not provide a sound basis for any claim.
49. We have weighed the
above factors in the light of all the material made available to us. In
our judgment the factors favouring the maintenance of the exemption
strongly outweigh the factors in favour of disclosure. In coming to that
conclusion we place particular emphasis on factors (7), (8) and
(9).
50. We have not included in
the above analysis any consideration of the position of the FSA, including
possible damage to the FSA’s interests and to the integrity of its
regulatory processes. The FSA stated in its internal review letter: “It is
in the public interest that the FSA has open and candid exchanges of
information and views with its firms, regardless of the commercial
sensitivity of the information. Disclosure to the public of this draft
report may undermine the willingness of regulated firms to engage in a
dialogue with us. The result could be a drying up of information to, and
cooperation with the FSA, which would harm its effectiveness in carrying
out its functions.”
51. The Commissioner
considered that the FSA’s position was not relevant. It is not necessary
for us to arrive at a conclusion on that point, but we would not wish to
be understood as endorsing the Commissioner’s view that the FSA’s position
was irrelevant. If the FSA’s position ought to be taken into account, that
would further strengthen our judgment that in the circumstances of the
present case the public |
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Appeal Number: EA/2008/0002
interest in the maintenance of
the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure.
Conclusion and remedy
52. For the reasons set out
above, we have reached the conclusion that the Commissioner’s decision was
correct and in accordance with law. The unrevealed background information
is protected from disclosure by FOIA s44 and FSMA s348. The unrevealed
opinions are protected from disclosure by FOIA s43, having regard to the
balance of public interest. The appeal is dismissed.
53. Our decision is unanimous.
Signed
Andrew Bartlett QC
Deputy Chairman
Date: 13 May
2008 |
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