2007_0106
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Tribunals Service
Information Tribunal Information Tribunal Appeal Number: 2007/0106
Information Commissioner’s Ref: FS50082420
Heard at Field House, London, EC4 On
Monday 17 March 2008 BEFORE |
Decision Promulgated 31 March
2008 |
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Between |
DEPUTY
CHAIRMAN
ROBIN CALLENDER
SMITH
and
LAY
MEMBERS
HENRY
FITZHUGH
DAVID SIVERS
MR A W TANNER
and INFORMATION
COMMISSIONER
and |
Appellant |
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Respondent |
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THE COMMISSIONERS FOR REVENUE
AND CUSTOMS
Additional Party
Representation:
For the Appellant:
In person |
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For the Respondent: |
Mr James Boddy (Counsel on behalf
of the Information Commissioner) |
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For the Additional Party: Ms Catrin Evans (Counsel on behalf
of Her Majesty’s
Revenue and Customs) |
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Decision |
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1.The Tribunal dealt with this
matter under the provisions of Rule 10 of the Information Tribunal
(Enforcement Appeals) Rules 2005. This appeal has been disposed of
summarily.
2.This followed an oral
pre-Directions hearing dated 2 December 2007 involving all parties and a
full oral hearing in respect of the application for summary disposal –
again involving all parties – heard on 17 March 2008.
3.The test used by the Tribunal in
dealing with this application for summary disposal under Rule 10 has been
the threshold test developed in Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules of
the Supreme Court and considered by the Court of Appeal in Swain v
Hillman and Gay [2001] 1 All E R 91 in terms of any decision to make
any Summary Order and, in particular, Rule 24.2.
4.In particular the Tribunal
adopted the Court of Appeal test from that case that the words in Rule
24.2 “no real prospect of being successful or succeeding” spoke for
themselves and meant that the Tribunal had to decide whether there was a
“realistic” as opposed to a “fanciful” prospect of
success. |
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Reasons for Decision
Introduction
5. Mr A W Tanner requested
information concerning the number of complaints made against an individual
employee of the Valuation Office Agency (VOA), a public body which is an
Executive Agency of The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs (HMRC).
6. The VOA refused to
confirm or deny whether the requested information was held in the belief
that this would constitute a disclosure of personal data that would
contravene the first Data Protection principle.
7. The Information
Commissioner found that the VOA was correct in refusing to confirm or deny
that the requested information was held, but that the refusal notice
issued by the VOA was inadequate.
8. Although the VOA failed
to comply with the procedural requirements of the Act in its refusal
notice, The Information Commissioner decided that that breach did not
necessitate remedial action. |
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9. Mr Tanner concluded that
the Information Commissioner’s decision notice failed to mention what he
described as “the Valuation Office Agency’s corrupt acts” against
him.
10. He also asserted that
the Information Commissioner had “gone out of his way to make calculated
biased remarks in claiming that the VOA had been open and accountable in
its dealings”.
11. Also, he claimed, the
Information Commissioner’s notice “insinuated that our 4-year struggle
against public sector corruption was ‘unsubstantiated and malicious’”. He
felt that this was evidence of an abuse of the rule of law and of
collusion between the Commissioner’s Office and the
VOA. |
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12. Following the oral
pre-Directions hearing on 7 December 2007 Mr Tanner was given the
opportunity ahead of the hearing on 17 March 2008 of making written
representations and of making further oral representations at the hearing
to consider summary disposal.
13. His written
representations and oral representations effectively repeated the
complaints listed above but did not challenge the applications by the
Respondent and the Additional Party for summary disposal.
14. In his written
representations dated 18 December 2007 he said: “We feel that the
Commissioners (sic) as a senior government officer should have taken note
of the broader picture and given protection to our case”.
The Questions for the Tribunal
15. The Tribunal was asked
to consider the matter by the Respondent and the Additional Party under
the provisions of Rule 10 of the Information Tribunal (Enforcement
Appeals) Rules. Those rules provide as follows:
10. - (1) Where, having
considered-(a) the notice of appeal, and (b) any reply to the notice of
appeal,
the Tribunal is of the opinion
that the appeal is of such a nature that it can properly be determined by
dismissing it forthwith it
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may, subject to the provisions of
this rule, so determine the appeal.
(2) Where the Tribunal
proposes to determine an appeal under paragraph (1) above, it must first
notify the appellant of the proposal.
(3) A notification to the
appellant under paragraph (2) above must contain particulars of the
appellant's entitlements set out in paragraph (4) below.
(4) An appellant notified in
accordance with paragraph (2) above is entitled, within such time as the
Tribunal may reasonably allow-(a) to make written representations, and (b)
to request the Tribunal to hear oral representations
against the proposal to determine
the appeal under paragraph (1) above.
(5) Where an appellant
requests a hearing under paragraph (4) (b) above the Tribunal shall, as
soon as practicable and with due regard to the convenience of the
appellant, appoint a time and place for a hearing.
(6) The proper officer shall
send to the appellant a notice informing him of-(a) the time and place of
any hearing under paragraph (5) above which, unless the appellant
otherwise agrees, shall not be earlier than 14 days after the date on
which the notice is sent, and
(b) the effect of rule 20 below.
(7) The Tribunal must, as
soon as practicable, notify the appellant and any other party if, having
given a notice under paragraph (2) above, it ceases to propose to
determine the appeal under paragraph (1) above.
16. There is currently very
little guidance provided for the Tribunal on the circumstances in which it
will be appropriate to dismissed on appeal summarily under Rule 10 (1).
Section 4 of the October 2007 Practice Note merely provides:
“Where a Chair is of the opinion
that an appeal is of such a nature that it can properly be determined by
dismissing it forthwith, the Chair may
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act pursuant to Rules 10(2) and
10(3), but the appeal may only be dismissed under Rule 10(1) by a full
Tribunal.”
17. There are two published
cases in which the Tribunal has dismissed appeals under Rule 10(1). These
are Higginson v Information Commissioner EA/2005/0008 (2 May 2006)
and Ingle v Information Commissioner EA/2007/0023 (29 June 2007).
Neither of those cases enunciated guidance about the nature of the test to
be applied under Rule 10 (1).
18. The Tribunal was asked
to dismiss Mr Tanner’s appeal summarily because the appeal was
misconceived and had no real prospect of success.
19. In particular it was
noted that Mr Tanner did not in fact take issue with the analysis in the
Information Commissioner’s Decision Notice of 30 July 2007 by which the
Commissioner reached his decision to uphold the exemption claimed by the
VOA under Section 40 (5) (b) (i) of the Act.
20. In addition the
Information Commissioner and HMRC say that Mr Tanner’s appeal is based on
a fundamental misunderstanding of the Information Tribunal’s role and that
of the Commissioner. Mr Tanner is trying, they say, to seek redress
against what he sees as the corrupt practices of the public authority to
whom he issued his information request and also against the other public
bodies who have been involved in his grievances such as the Parliamentary
Ombudsman. Having run out of other avenues of complaint he is now seeking
that redress through the Commissioner and the Tribunal.
Conclusions
21. It was clear to the
Tribunal hearing this application that it would be helpful to all parties
– now and in the future - to have certainty about the test being used for
Rule 10 (1) applications.
22. The Tribunal concluded
that the appropriate test was analogous to the test under Part 24 of the
Civil Procedure Rules 1998. This makes provision for a claim which has no
real prospect of success to be summarily dismissed.
23. Guidance on the meaning
of this test was provided in Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER (CA)
by Lord Woolf MR. He said that the words “no real prospect of succeeding”
did not need any amplification as they spoke for themselves. The court
must decide whether there is a "realistic", as opposed to "fanciful",
prospect of success.
24. Applied to the facts and
issues in this case, Mr Tanner plainly has no real prospect of succeeding.
He has not challenged the substance of
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the Information Commissioner’s
decision notice which upholds the exemption claimed by the VOA under
Section 40 (5) (b) (i) of the Act.
25. It is not open to the
Tribunal to act in the way in which Mr Tanner would like which is, in
effect, to review all the administrative acts by various public bodies
about which he complains.
26. The Tribunal understands
that Mr Tanner considers that he has a grievance. He has misunderstood
some of the language in the Decision Notice, feeling that it was somehow
directed at him. Counsel for the Information Commissioner has been at
pains to point out that the Information Commissioner has not and had never
intended to suggest that Mr Tanner’s complaints about the VOA were
“unsubstantiated and malicious”. That point was repeated and emphasized to
Mr Tanner on a number of occasions during both hearings.
27. As was pointed out to
him in questioning by the Tribunal, if Mr Tanner feels that any crimes
have been committed it is open to him to report matters of corruption or
fraud to the police for further investigation. This is something he
admitted that he had not done at any stage on these issues.
28. The Tribunal notes that
Mr Tanner conducted himself in a restrained and appropriate manner
throughout the two hearings, despite the sense of unfairness and injustice
he was seeking to articulate.
29. The Tribunal agrees that
this appeal should be dismissed summarily under the provisions of Rule
10.
30. Our decision is unanimous.
31. No order was requested or made in respect of
costs. |
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Signed
Robin Callender Smith Deputy
Chairman
Date 30 March 2008 |
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