B e f o r e :
HH GEOFFREY RIVLIN QC
SIR RICHARD MCLAUGHLIN
| SATISH CHATWANI
|- and -
|NATIONAL CRIME AGENCY
Andrew Bird and David McNeill (instructed by NCA Legal) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 10 and 14 July 2015
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Burton (President) :
". . . various employees of DDL including Batth and the first five Claimants and Dhariwal were providing a money laundering service which included the placement, layering and integration of the proceeds of crime running into millions of pounds. Batth and Dhariwal were thought to operate cash couriers recruited to place the proceeds of crime into the bank accounts of a complex network of companies, many of which were listed as traders in commodity-based goods. The others were suspected of being instrumental in the integration of this criminal money into the legitimate money system through their businesses and property interests, either playing an active part in these activities or at least being aware of them."
"116. Mr Jones [QC] [who then, as now, represented the Claimants/Complainants] emphasised that the Claimants were professionally qualified, well-established, successful businessmen with no previous convictions, and indeed a positively good character; their success as businessmen can explain any signs of wealth that may be apparent; and the tribunal proceedings exonerated them of any guilty knowledge with the VAT fraud in relation to the razor blades, which considered and exonerated their mode of commercial operations. That is all true: but successful money laundering requires men of good character to place criminal proceeds, and the statement of Mr Hickman (had it been deployed) evidences connections with known money launderers (such as Batth, Tarr and, through Batth, Sharma) and of money laundering transactions involving DDL (see paragraphs 10-23 above). That evidence is clearly sufficient to evoke a reasonable suspicion of money laundering on the part of each of the first five Claimants, either as active participants or on the basis of knowledge with regard to the company's transactions. Indeed, in my view the evidence relating to the moneys deriving from the school phishing scam (see paragraph 21 above) would, alone, give rise to such a reasonable suspicion. Where the warrant process failed was not that there were no reasonable grounds for suspicion, but that the basis of those grounds was not set out in the application to enable the magistrates to judge whether those suspicions were reasonable.
. . .
118. . . I consider the NCA did have reasonable grounds for believing that material at the various premises was likely to be relevant evidence in respect of those crimes. Both the business premises and the Claimants' homes were likely to have evidence in relation to the identified offences."
"93. - Authorisations to interfere with property etc.
(1) Where subsection (2) applies, an authorising officer may authorise -
(a) the taking of such action, in respect of such property in the relevant area, as he may specify,
(1B) Subsection (1) applies where the authorising officer is a National Crime Agency officer, an officer of Revenue and Customs, an immigration officer or an officer of the Office of Fair Trading with the omission of
(a) the words "in the relevant area", in each place where they occur; . . .
(2) This subsection applies where the authorising officer believes -
(a) that it is necessary for the action specified to be taken for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, and
(b) that the taking of the action is proportionate to what the action seeks to achieve.
(2B) The matters to be taken into account in considering whether the requirements of subsection (2) are satisfied in the case of any authorisation shall include whether what it is thought necessary to achieve by the authorised action could reasonably be achieved by other means."
"97. - Authorisations requiring approval.
(1) An authorisation to which this section applies shall not take effect until
(a) it has been approved in accordance with this section by a Commissioner appointed under section 91(1)(b), and
(b) the person who gave the authorisation has been notified under subsection (4).
(2) Subject to subsection (3), this section applies to an authorisation if, at the time it is given, the person who gives it believes -
(a) that any of the property specified in the authorisation -
(i) is used wholly or mainly as a dwelling or as a bedroom in a hotel, or
(ii) constitutes office premises, or
(b) that the action authorised by it is likely to result in any person acquiring knowledge of
(i) matters subject to legal privilege,
(ii) confidential personal information, or
(iii) confidential journalistic material.
(3) This section does not apply to an authorisation where the person who gives it believes that the case is one of urgency.
(4) Where a Commissioner receives a notice under section 96 which specifies that this section applies to the authorisation, he shall as soon as is reasonably practicable -
(a) decide whether to approve the authorisation or refuse approval, and
(b) give written notice of his decision to the person who gave the authorisation.
(5) A Commissioner shall approve an authorisation if, and only if, he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing the matters specified in section 93(2)."
"17. Thus in relation both to authorisations and approvals, the two criteria are necessity and proportionality. An authorisation will be lawful if the relevant chief officer believes the interference to be necessary and proportionate. An approval will be lawful if the Commissioner concludes that there were reasonable grounds for believing the interference to be necessary and proportionate.
18. No other criteria are stipulated by Parliament. No general discretion is conferred upon the Commissioner: if, but only if, he is satisfied, he "shall" approve an authorisation. Conversely, if he is not satisfied, he shall not approve an authorisation.
19. The wording used in s.97(5) "shall approve if, and only if, he is satisfied " is the same as the wording for approvals by a Surveillance Commissioner of certain types of surveillance in s. 36(4) of RIPA 2000. It may be contrasted with the provisions for approval by the "relevant judicial authority" under s.32A(3) of RIPA 2000 which is in the terms of a more general discretion: "the relevant judicial authority may give approval ". Likewise a Judge or Magistrate when deciding whether to issue a search warrant has a broad general discretion.
20. The task for the Commissioner when carrying out his function under s.97(5) is therefore not to exercise an original broad discretion but to consider solely whether there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the proposed action is (a) necessary and (b) proportionate. The Code of Practice ["covert surveillance and property interference" made under s.71 of RIPA which, where relevant, "shall be taken into account" by the Tribunal by virtue of s.72 of RIPA] (at para 3.6) sets out 4 "elements of proportionality" which should be considered.
21. The approval of a Commissioner is required if EITHER s.67(2)(a) OR s.67(2)(b) applies. (a) relates to the premises and (b) to the likely result of the authorised action. In the instant case approval was required because the premises were office premises. . . "
"Operation Name . . Heterodon
I have considered the application and on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, I am satisfied for the reasons which follow that the surveillance proposed is an appropriate use of the legislation and fulfils the requirement of section 93(2)(a)(b) of the Police Act 1997, namely 'preventing or detecting serious crime' and is necessary because:
Matters under investigation meet sentence criteria of serious crime. The evidence gained via this authority will support an intended prosecution.
I have considered this application and on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, I am satisfied that for the reasons which follow that the interference is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved:
There are no less intrusive means of acquiring the conversational evidence and intelligence that we seek in light of criminal behaviour of the subjects.
I acknowledge that there is likelihood that the proposed activity may lead to intrusion on the privacy of person(s) not subject to the action and should be authorised for the following reasons:
There is a slight risk of collateral intrusion but there is a focused mitigation plan in place.
Pursuant to Operation HETERODON I hereby grant authorisation for
Interference by way of entry and re entry onto the private parking area at Kanta House, Victoria Road, South Ruislip, Middlesex, HA4 0JQ, and entry and re-entry into Kanta House in order to facilitate:
- CTR [Close Target Reconnaissance] of the said office and warehouse, and if feasible the deployment, maintenance, replacement and retrieval of covert audio and video equipment therein and thereon.
- Conduct covert searches of said office(s) and warehouses for the purpose of:
- forensic examinations, including the taking of forensic samples from and covert forensic markings of the said office(s) and warehouses and its contents;
- interrogating, obtaining and copying data in respect of the memories and SIM cards of mobile phones and any electronic devices and digital storage medial including interference with wireless telegraphy in order to facilitate the aforementioned;
- Examining, obtaining details and copying documents and any other items found therein; and
- The removal and subsequent return of any items in order to facilitate the above.
All in relation to money laundering associated to the named subject(s) Harvinder Singh BATTH (DOB 06/11/1975), Harjeet Kaur DHARIWAL (DOB 26/03/1975), Cliff TARR (DOB 03/09/1959), Satish Jamnadas CHATWANI (DOB 14/03/1953), Jawahar Jamnadas CHATWANI (DOB 21/07/1948), Rashmi Jamnadas CHATWANI (DOB 13/06/1954), Rakesh TAILOR (DOB 01/07/1963) and Bhasker TAILOR (DOB 27/08/1955).
I note the subject(s) Satish Jamnadas CHATWANI (DOB 14/03/1953), Jawahar Jamnadas CHATWANI (DOB 21/07/1948), Rashmi Jamnadas CHATWANI (DOB 13/06/1954), Rakesh TAILOR (DOB 01/07/1963), and Bhasker TAILOR (DOB 27/08/1955) have no previous convictions however I am satisfied that a propensity to commit serious crime has been demonstrated.
I hereby accept ownership of this authorisation for the period specified.
In cases of Prior Approval this authority will not take effect until I receive notification of the written prior approval from the Office of the Surveillance Commissioners."
"4. The key facts as they stood in January 2015 were as follows:
(1) Operation Heterodon was and is a criminal investigation by NCA into suspected money-laundering by means which included placement and mixing of funds suspected to be the proceeds of crime into and with funds connected with the otherwise legitimate business of the Complainants.
(2) The Complainants were also suspected of fraud in relation to excise duty.
(3) 3 individuals (Rajnesh Sharma, Amit Sharma and Jatinder Singh) were convicted of money-laundering in 2014. Telecommunications evidence demonstrated a relationship between Rajnesh Sharma and BATTH and DHARIWAL
(4) A further individual, TARR, was arrested on 20th November 2014 in possession of a substantial quantity of cash
(5) TARR and BATTH appeared to work for the Complainants or their companies and were regular visitors to Kanta House
(6) The Complainants' company had paid the confiscation orders of BATTH and McAtevey
(7) BATTH had a previous conviction for money-laundering in 2010 and was married to DHARIWAL
5. NCA wished to obtain evidence as to the role of (and presence or absence of mens rea) of each of the Complainants and of BATTH and DHARIWAL
6. Up until this point the Complainants would not have been aware that they were under investigation. TARR had been arrested in Durham and was under surveillance.
7. NCA decided to move the investigation forward by, in particular:
(1) going "overt" in the sense of arresting the Complainants and searching their premises
(2) devising an strategy designed to provoke a "behavioural response" on the part of the Complainants after they were interviewed and released from custody
(3) deploying covert monitoring equipment at Kanta House which it was hoped would capture conversations which would either reveal the innocence of any given individual, or which would provide evidence of mens rea."
i) There was in the application for authorisation inadequate or misleading description of the circumstances of the Complainants, and of the company DDL and of their dealings with HMRC. A number of matters are set out in paragraphs 41 to 44 of the Mr Jones' skeleton, which are said to amount to exaggerations or misrepresentations, and it is not disclosed that the Complainants' companies have been well established, successful and productive for decades and (save for a challenge by HMRC to DDL's involvement in the importation of razor blades said to be infected by a VAT fraud, as to which DDLs appeal was allowed by the Upper Tribunal (Tax & Chancery Chamber) on 6 August 2013), the company and the group have an unblemished record with HMRC.
ii) The fact that there were 30 employees working on the premises was not disclosed.
iii) The fact that it was proposed to disable the CCTV was not disclosed (that this was part of the plan is apparent from guidance notes forming part of an Operation Order prepared in advance: "be aware that CCTV may be in operation at premises being searched take steps to disable CCTV recording").
iv) The fact that it was proposed in the course of the operation to "corral into one place" those insistent on remaining (part of the same Operation Order) or "round up any occupants" (an email from Mr Hickman dated 9 October 2014), said to amount to false imprisonment, was not disclosed.
v) The fact that there was to be the simultaneous execution of a search warrant on the premises was not revealed. Mr Jones put to Mr Hickman that the overwhelming impression created by the application was that there was going to be covert entry in anticipation of arrests in the future. He also made submissions as to the invalidity of the search warrant (as now conceded and found by the Divisional Court) and as to the fact that (as is clear from Appendix 9 to the Operation Order), more items were to be removed than could be justified as being covered by the search warrant: but since Mr Batsford did not see the search warrant, and the search warrant itself was not the subject of consideration at the time of the authorisation (and had previously been granted), it did not seem to us that that aspect of the case had a great deal of force.
vi) Mr Jones' primary submission was that there was no disclosure, in breach of the duty of candour, of the Respondent's plan, namely the Plan described in paragraph 25 of the Divisional Court Judgment, and most succinctly described in a document prepared under Mr Hickman's supervision in early January 2015, described as "Operation Heterodon Interview Strategy", ("the Operation Heterodon Document") which contained at Appendix 3 the following:
"The main objective around the planned arrests and interviews of the 7 subjects is not primarily at this stage to focus on the gathering of evidence from any accounts the suspects may provide. It is simply to provoke a behavioural reaction on their release from custody, which will ultimately allow for the capturing of unequivocal evidence, which will enhance any prosecution against these individuals . . . The disclosure plan is to ensure the suspects have some knowledge around why they have been arrested and sufficiently so as to prompt conversations between one another on release . . . The previous similar intervention of a subject connected to these individuals led to further key evidence of their criminal activities and the investigation is still ongoing. The scenario showed after the release of the suspect linked to these individuals [Mr Tarr], he was instantly in contact and communicated with those subject to these arrests for sustained periods of time speaking in detail of the criminality taking place. It goes without saying that there is a strong likelihood that with the minimal facts given to these individuals . . . the same scenario of contact will take place."
The Respondent's Plan therefore was to execute the search warrant, arrest the Complainants, interview them, without revealing the totality of the case which the Respondent had against them, and then release them to return back to the premises which would by then have been fitted with the listening devices, "provoking a behavioural reaction", namely prompting "conversations between one another on release", and thus as Mr Hickman said in an email of 31 January 2015 "it is apparent, and should be expected, that following the arrests on 28/01 legal topics will be at the forefront of conversations of those suspected of being involved in money laundering".
vii) In tandem with this submission was Mr Jones' case based upon the fact that, as appears from the application exhibited to this Judgment, two boxes were not ticked in relevant places, namely:
a) Box 3: "is there a likelihood of obtaining . . . matters subject to legal privilege" and
b) Box 13: "Please indicate if the activity is likely to result in the acquisition of one or more of the following categories of confidential information . . . matters subject to legal privilege".
In the event of course this is not relevant to whether approval was required to be sought from the Commissioner pursuant to s.97(2)(b)(i), because approval in any event was required to be sought pursuant to s.97(2)(a)(ii), by virtue of the fact that Kanta House constituted office premises. However Mr Jones submits that the duty of candour required that the box be ticked. Both Mr Hickman and Mr Batsford denied in evidence that they had a belief that there was a likelihood of obtaining information subject to legal and professional privilege. They both considered that since they were to be placing the covert listening devices in offices, the communications that would be caught would be those as between the alleged conspirators, and that if a solicitor's advice was to be sought or obtained that would be at the solicitor's offices. As it happens there was, it seems, a considerable quantity of communication subject to legal and professional privilege which was caught by the devices during the days when the devices were in place and in the event such communications have been fully protected by a combination of the operation of the Code of Practice, to which we refer below, and the Tribunal's interlocutory Order of 18 June.
"The overall issue for the Tribunal is whether the deployment was unlawful. At the interim relief hearing on 18th June 2015 the Tribunal identified 4 key areas for examination:
(1) Was there a misleading of (or material non-disclosure to) the decision-makers in relation to the financial affairs of the Complainants?
(2) Was there a misleading of (or material non-disclosure to) the decision-makers in relation to VAT affairs of the Complainants?
(3) Was there a misleading of (or material non-disclosure to) the decision-makers in relation to the operational plan / interview strategy of NCA which was "to provoke a behavioural response" which would be captured by the bugging devices?
(4) Was the deployment unlawful because there was a likelihood that material subject to LPP would be captured by the bugging devices?"
"The suspect has been linked to a number of [businesses]. It is believed that a number of financial transactions within the accounts of these businesses are associated to Fraud and the Criminal Proceeds of Crime. The value within these transactions is in excess of tens of millions of pounds."
"31. Code of Practice para 7.18 specifies that the application must include, inter alia:
• details of the offence suspected or committed;
• how the authorisation criteria have been met;
Because the only criteria to be met relate to necessity and proportionality, the application is necessarily directed to material relevant to these two matters. But of course proportionality in particular requires the applicant to set out the alleged scale of the alleged activity being investigated.
32. The Application included the following relevant facts:
- That each of the Complainants was of good character ("CRO NT" on page 3 of 16 and repeated for the three Chatwani brothers on page 4 of 16 and page 9 of 16)
- "They [the Chatwani brothers] are immensely rich. The belief is that there is some legitimacy with their business interests, but they use these businesses to shield money laundering activities" (page 4 of 16)
- "The Tailor brothers are in a similar position to the Chatwanis they both hold managerial positions within Kanta Enterprises and benefit financially from these crimes" (page 4 of 16)
- [DDL] "declared annual turnovers in 2012 and 2013 of nearly GBP 40 million in each year" (page 5 of 16)
- A certain amount of legitimate trading does take place (page 12 of 16)
- "they . hide their various enterprises behind apparently legitimate business" (page 16 of 16)
- Reference made to "the distance from any overt criminality that the Chatwani brothers maintain" (page 16 of 16)
33. In fact, in a money-laundering case, the fact of a legitimate business into which criminal funds may be placed is not a contra-indication of criminal activity. An otherwise legitimate business with a high turnover is an ideal vehicle into which to place and thus seek to conceal criminal property.
34. The issues for the authorising officer and for the Commissioner from whom prior approval was sought were not whether the Complainants were likely to be guilty or innocent, but whether the proposed activity of NCA was necessary and proportionate."
i) there was specific provision within box 13 as to how to deal with confidential material if it were obtained:
ii) there was a specific paragraph in box 14 relating to collateral intrusion:
iii) such risk was recognised by Mr Pearce, the Authorising Officer, and addressed.
Personal conversations, not to speak of "acts of intimacy" (box 14(b)), were in our judgment properly considered to be unlikely.
"I am aware of the intended arrest phase . . . due to take place at the end of January 2015 and that this authority will be used in a focused and effective manner subsequently to achieve the stated objectives of achieving best evidence."
We do not conclude that the failure to disclose the simultaneous search warrant was of itself material. Although Mr Jones urged upon us that the provisions in box 9 were excessive, and that there is no room for a blue pencil test, we are not persuaded that they were not honestly and reasonably believed to be necessary.
"23. LPP is protected in 4 ways by the statutory scheme:
- Firstly, where the authorising officer believes that the action is likely to result in LPP material being acquired, prior approval is needed (s.97(2)(b)(i) supra)
- Secondly, where the surveillance is to take place at certain types of specified premises, approval is required not only for the property interference, but also for the directed surveillance see the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Extension of Authorisation Provisions: Legal Consultations) Order 2010 SI 461. Those premises include a solicitor's office, police stations, prisons, court buildings etc. In such a case the directed surveillance is to be treated as intrusive surveillance, and so requires prior approval by a Commissioner.
- Thirdly, the 2014 Code of Practice (para 4.10ff) sets out particular requirements for cases where LPP material is likely to be acquired or is intended to be acquired. Paragraph 4.11 provides that where LPP material is likely to be acquired, the application must set out the steps to be taken to mitigate the risk and to ensure that any LPP material that is obtained is not used in any investigation or prosecution. Paragraph 4.12 provides that where LPP material is likely to be acquired or is intended to be acquired then the authorising officer and approving commissioner must be satisfied that there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make the authorisation necessary.
- Finally the 2014 Code of Practice sets out procedures for what is to happen if LPP material is encountered in the course of surveillance. The Code of Practice makes clear that LPP material cannot be used in evidence.
24. Notably for this case, paragraph 4.23 includes the following requirement:
"Public authorities should ensure that knowledge of matters subject to legal privilege, whether or not it is acquired deliberately, is kept separate from law enforcement investigations or criminal prosecutions."
25. The 2010 Order was enacted by way of response to the criticisms of the Home Secretary by the House of Lords in C v Chief Constable of PSNI  1 AC 908 @ para . But the particular protection given to legal consultations applied only to legal consultations taking place at the type of premises specified in the 2010 Order. Parliament did not see fit to require additional steps to be taken to cater for the possibility that legal consultations would take place elsewhere. A client therefore loses some elements of his statutory protection if he chooses to have a legal consultation outside the specified premises.
26. However the fact that LPP material may be encountered does not operate as an impediment to the grant of a directed surveillance authorisation, intrusive surveillance authorisation or property interference authorisation. In C v Chief Constable of PSNI  1 AC 908 it was held that Part II of RIPA could lawfully authorise surveillance of privileged conversations. As Lady Hale, speaking with the majority, observed @ para  the scheme of the Police Act 1997 "expressly contemplated that authorised bugging might result in the obtaining of privileged or other confidential information and provided extra safeguards where this was likely." See also paras  and  per Lord Phillips, who dissented on the proposition that RIPA overrode the statutory right of a detained person to consult a solicitor in private.
27. In order to apply the principles in part 4 of the Code of Practice the CMU (Covert Monitoring Unit) has its own policy for dealing with confidential material (which includes LPP material) see exhibit MJ/01 to the witness statement of Martin Jones. The purpose of this was and remains to isolate any LPP material from those charged with the investigation and potential prosecution.
28. It should be noted that the Code of Practice does not require LPP material to be deleted, and indeed stipulates that it should be made available to the Surveillance Commissioners."
i) Mr Hickman was clear (perhaps somewhat naively in the circumstances) that he never imagined that lawyers would go to Kanta House: in his experience people who have been arrested go to the lawyers' office. The listening devices in question did not record telephone conversations, so that they would only record one side of what was being said, such that even in the event of a telephone conversation in which one side would be recorded, it did not occur to him that this would amount to the giving or receiving of advice, as opposed to the fixing of an appointment. Mr Batsford, the author of the application, also explained that he did not tick the box because he did not believe that there was a likelihood of obtaining matters subject to LPP: he too thought that all discussions would take place in the lawyers' office. In answer to the Tribunal, he said that he did not think, in relation to any of the (50 to 70 over 7 years) applications that he had previously made, that he had ever ticked the box. Mr Pearce, the Authorising Officer, also gave evidence to the same effect as Mr Hickman and Mr Batsford.
ii) To return to Mr Hickman's email of 31 January referred to in paragraph 16(vi) above, he explained his reference to an expectation that "legal topics will be at the forefront of conversations of those suspected" by reference to what had been anticipated and indeed hoped for in Appendix 3 of the Operation Heterodon Document, namely that conversations would be prompted between the arrested parties as to why they had been arrested and with a view to prompting them, as there described, to "speak in detail of the criminality taking place".
"4.11 If the covert surveillance or property interference is not intended to result in the acquisition of knowledge of matters subject to legal privilege, but it is likely that such knowledge will nevertheless be acquired during the operation, the application should identify all steps which will be taken to mitigate the risk of acquiring it . If the risk cannot be removed entirely , the application should explain what steps will be taken to ensure that the knowledge of matters subject to legal privilege which is obtained is not used in law enforcement investigations or criminal proceedings."
"172. In civil cases, the courts have made very clear that a failure to comply with the duty of disclosure on an ex parte or without notice application will often result in the setting aside of the order: see for example Brink's Mat Ltd v Elcombe  1 WLR 1350, Fitzgerald v Williams  QB 657. Although it was accepted there is a difference between a civil and a criminal case, it was submitted by RT, VT and the TFT and TDT companies that the test to be applied when considering whether to quash a warrant issued under s.2(4) of the CJA 1987 was whether the errors and non-disclosure might have made a difference to the grant of the warrant. Mr Eadie on behalf of the SFO submitted that the test was whether they would in fact have made a difference. We were referred to a number of decisions including, Jennings v CPS  1 WLR 182 at 52-8, R (Mercury Tax Group) v HMRC  EWHC 2721 at paragraph 48, R (Wood) v North Avon Magistrates Court  EWHC 3614 at paragraphs 34 and 37, R (Faisaltex) v Crown Court at Preston  EWHC 1687 at paragraph 81, Burgin and Purcell v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis  EWHC 1835 at 66-71, Re Stanford (supra).
173. On the facts of this case, the difference is immaterial as we shall explain. It is therefore not necessary for us to reach a concluded view, but in a criminal case [our underlining] the authorities and consideration of public interest point, in our view, to the test being whether the errors and omissions would in fact have made a difference to the decision of the judge to grant the warrants."
i) Paragraph 4.12 of the Code of Practice, from which we have cited in paragraph 34 above, would have applied, such that both the Authorising Officer and the Commissioner would need to have been satisfied that there were "exceptional and compelling circumstances that make the authorisation necessary". Mr Bird submits, and with some force, that given that both the Authorising Officer and the Commissioner were satisfied in the circumstances that the placing of the covert devices was both necessary and proportionate, there is no reason to doubt that they would have given and approved the authorisation even had the higher test applied.
ii) However paragraph 4.11 of the Code, set out in paragraph 35 above, would also have applied.
"No award was made for non-pecuniary loss in respect of a violation of Article 8 in the cases of Niemietz v Germany  16 EHRR 97 (11/2 hours search and removal of documents, including privilege documents), Cremieux v France  16 EHRR 357 (a lengthy search and seizure at the claimant's house), Hewitson v UK  44 EHRR 30 (covert bugging in the applicant's garage over five months) and Heglas v Czech Republic  48 EHRR 44 (sustained surveillance of the claimant's mobile phone)."