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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal >> A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Pakistan) [2003] UKIAT 00198 (09 October 2003)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKIAT/2003/00198.html
Cite as: [2003] UKIAT 00198, [2003] UKIAT 198
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APPEAL No. [2003] UKIAT 00198 A (Pakistan)
Date of hearing: 19 September 2003
Date Determination notified: 09 October 2003
MS. D. K. GILL
| APPELLANT | |
| and | |
| SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | RESPONDENT |
For the Respondent: Miss K. Evans, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
2. Basis of claim (summary): The Appellant is an Ahmadi by birth, born in Lahore. She was an active member of the ladies wing of the Ahmadi community in Madina Town, Faisalabad. Since 1999, she was "Muavin Sadar Lajna", which was a post of assistant to the president of the ladies wing. She also undertook preaching. During her time in Pakistan, she lived in three places:- Faisalabad, Gujranwala and Lahore. The following sets out the main points of her accounts:
Up until August 2001 – Faisalabad:
(i) Up until August 2001, the Appellant lived in Faisalabad. Whilst living in Faisalabad, she experienced the following problems:
a) In 1974, her home was burnt by mullahs. Problems continued after that.
b) Her recent problems started in 1999. In that year, her father-in-law donated a plot of land in Madina Town for the building of an Ahmadi mosque. The mullahs of Khatme Nabuwat (KN) interrupted the building of the mosque and threatened her family.
c) In June 2001, she was beaten by boys belonging to the KN.
d) On 28th July 2001, her father-in-law was murdered on the instructions of the mullahs of KN.
e) After her father-in-law's death, the threats and harassment by KN continued. Members of it pulled her scarf from her head on a number of occasions when she was shopping.
August 2001 until February 2002 – Gujranwala:
(ii) In August 2001, the Appellant, with her husband and mother, moved to Gujranwala. They experienced some problems there.
February 2002 to end April 2002
(iii) From February 2002 to the end of April 2002, the Appellant visited the United Kingdom.
End April 2002 to June 2002 – at "habitual address":
(iv) She then returned to Pakistan. At paragraph 19 of her witness statement dated 19th March 2003 (which was before the Adjudicator), she says that "after some time they found us at my habitual address".
June 2002 to September 2002 – Lahore:
(v) In June 2002, she moved to her sister-in-law's home in Lahore. Some days later, the mullahs came to the house in a large group, used abusive language, fired weapons in the air, broke the main door and windows and tried to kill the Appellant and her family, who escaped from the back door and went to a neighbour's home.
Before this incident, she and her family received threatening telephone calls from the mullahs. They reported the threats to the police who did not listen and did not take any action. The officer in charge said that, if they approached higher authorities, the Appellant and her family would be charged for preaching their faith.
After this incident, the Appellant decided to leave Pakistan and come to the United Kingdom, where one of her sons has been granted exceptional leave to remain and another son has been granted asylum.
After the Appellant's arrival in the United Kingdom:
(vi) In December 2002 (after the Appellant's arrival in the United Kingdom), the mullahs attacked her sister-in-law's home and her daughter's home. They beat her sister and daughter and her sister's wrist was fractured.
The Appellant's husband and two daughters remain in Pakistan. Her husband is in hiding.
At her screening interview (page A3 of the statutory appeal bundle, question 1.30), the Appellant said that she had visited the United Kingdom five times previously. It is not clear whether she visited the United Kingdom five times including the last occasion in September 2002 or whether she has travelled to the United Kingdom a total of six times.
2. The Adjudicator's findings: The following is a brief summary of the Adjudicator's main findings:
(a) He accepted that the Appellant was active in the Ahmadi religion, both as an organiser and as a preacher.
(b) He accepted that her father-in-law was murdered in July 2001 but he was not satisfied that the murder was carried out on the instruction of mullahs, or that its motive was religious (for the reasons he gave in paragraph 43). If there was any religious element to this killing, he was not satisfied that it had anything do with the donation of land for the building of a mosque, for the reasons he gave in paragraph 45.
(c) He accepted that, on a number of occasions, the Appellant was threatened and harassed by people associated with the KN and that these incidents included one where she was struck by boys while on her way to the mosque, and occasions when her scarf was pulled from her head.
(d) He did not accept that the Appellant suffered persecution after moving to Gujranwala, for the reasons he gave in paragraph 47.
(e) He found that the Appellant would not have returned to Pakistan in 2002 if she had had a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan.
(f) He did not accept that there was a raid on the Appellant's sister-in-law's home in Lahore in June 2003, for the reasons he gave in paragraph 49.
(g) He did not accept that there was an attack on the Appellant's sister-in-law's and daughter's home in December 2002 for the reasons he gave in paragraph 51.
(h) He stated that if, contrary to his findings, the Appellant was at risk of persecution in Faisalabad, Gujranwala or Lahore, he found that she had available an internal flight option. She could relocate to Rabwa (now called Chenab Nagar), for the reasons he gave in paragraph 52. He also found that there was adequate state protection.3. The grounds of application challenge the Adjudicator's assessment of credibility in several respects. The grounds also challenge the Adjudicator's findings as to the internal flight option and the adequacy of state protection. Permission to appeal was granted in general terms, which meant that all the grounds were before the Tribunal.
4. At the hearing before us, we heard submissions in opening from Mr. Miyan, at which time he mentioned that he had with him a bundle of decisions which he said included reported decisions which he said showed that preachers were at risk of persecution in Pakistan. However, these documents had not been adduced before the hearing in compliance with the directions which had been issued. In any event, on examination, they all transpired to be unreported decisions which post-dated 19th May 2003, from which date Practice Direction No 10 came into effect. The procedure set out in paragraph 4 of that Practice Direction (which applies to unreported decisions promulgated after 19th May 2003) had not been followed. We therefore excluded these decisions. Mr. Miyan also sought to produce, at this late stage, a document which was part of the subjective evidence in this case and which had not been previously produced. Given the lateness of the production of this document, we decided to exclude this document as well.
5.1 We now set out the main thrust of Mr. Miyan's submissions. Members of the Ahmadi faith are under a duty to proselytise. The Adjudicator had found that the Appellant was a preacher. This means that she proselytises. A member of the Ahmadi faith would not preach to other members of the Ahmadi faith. They would preach to those who do not belong to the Ahmadi faith in order to try and convert them. Mr. Miyan referred us to material in the background documents which he submitted shows that Ahmadis are persecuted; they do not receive protection; the police fail to do anything; and they are at risk of being charged under the blasphemy laws. Paragraph 4.68 of the CIPU report dated April 2003 refers to a party called Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan (MMA), which holds 60 seats in the National Assembly. This means that it is the third largest party in Pakistan. Paragraph 4.69 of the CIPU report states that the MMA is a coalition of religious parties. In Mr. Miyan's submission, given that the KN is a religious party, this means that the mullahs of the MMA are connected to the mullahs of the KN. Whilst other organisations have been banned in Pakistan, the Pakistani authorities have not banned the KN. It is significant that, according to the Amnesty International Report at page 69 of the Appellant's bundle, the KN has formed a new Mujahideen Force. Its aim is to block the activities of the Ahmadis. Two hundred youths have signed the enrolment forms with their blood.
5.2 In Mr. Miyan's submission, the objective evidence shows that preachers of the Ahmadi faith are persecuted in Pakistan. The Appellant would not be able to relocate to Rabwa. He referred us to paragraph 6.50 of the CIPU report which states that the entire population of Rabwa was charged under Section 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code. Although this happened in 1989, the First Information Report (F.I.R.) lodged at that time was an open one and could be used at any time. The Appellant would be at risk of being charged under Section 298-C. Furthermore, paragraph 6.113 states that women have a limited internal flight alternative.
5.3 At one stage, Mr. Miyan informed us that the Appellant had only travelled to the United Kingdom twice over the 25 year period between 1974 and 1999. However, Miss Evans pointed out the Appellant's answer to question 1.30 on page A3 of the statutory appeal bundle which made reference to 5 visits. Mr. Miyan then informed us that these visits took place more recently (but before the visit in February 2002), rather than years ago. Although she returned to Pakistan, it was on the occasion of her last return to Pakistan that she felt that her life was in danger. If it were not for the fact that her life was in danger, she could have continued visiting the United Kingdom. It was to her credit that she had not claimed asylum sooner.
5.4 Mr. Miyan submitted that the Appellant was from a high profile family. Her father-in-law had been murdered. Her children have been subjected to persecution. Her sons have been recognised as refugees. Her husband is in hiding. The reason why he has not claimed asylum is because he is in Pakistan.
6.1 In reply, Miss Evans submitted that the Adjudicator had given adequate reasons for his findings of fact. She took us through the various reasons the Adjudicator had given. A multi-entry visa was issued to the Appellant in April 2001, which was valid until April 2003. She therefore did not need to delay her departure from Pakistan. Her claim was undermined by the fact that her mother-in-law had returned to Pakistan. Even if her mother-in-law was ill, she would not have returned to Pakistan if she was at risk of being targeted. The Appellant's claim had been disbelieved, for very good reasons. Miss Evans asked us to uphold the Adjudicator's findings.
6.2 In Miss Evans' submission, given the Adjudicator's findings, the internal flight option was not relevant. In any event, the Adjudicator had indicated that the only place the Appellant had experienced problems was in Faisalabad. He was not satisfied that she was persecuted in Gujranwala and he did not accept that the incident in Lahore had taken place.
6.3 The Appellant has never been charged with any offence (question 10 on page B6 of the statutory appeal bundle).The MMA is an Islamic alliance of six parties. Paragraph 4.74 of the CIPU report mentions two of these parties and states that the MMA is in power in the North West Frontier of the Pakistan. That area is nowhere near the Appellant's area. There is no evidence that the mullahs of the MMA are connected to the mullahs of the KN.
7. In reply, Mr. Miyan asked us to find that the Appellant was credible. Given that her father-in-law was 85 years old when he died, this means that her mother-in-law must be in her 80s. It is understandable that she should prefer to die in her country. In any event, a lady of her age would not proselytise. Although the CIPU Report states that the MMA are prominent in the North West Frontier of Pakistan, the laws of Pakistan apply throughout the country. Given that the MMA is the third largest party, this means that they are prominent throughout Pakistan.
8. We reserved our determination.
9. We have decided to dismiss the appeal. We now give our reasons. We approach our determination in the following way:
(1) The first issue. We consider whether the Adjudicator's credibility assessment is safe. Obviously, if the credibility assessment is unsafe, then we would need to consider remittal.
(2) The second issue. If the Adjudicator's credibility assessment is safe and his findings as to the Appellant's accounts of her experiences are sustainable, then we need to go on to consider whether his finding that she does not have a well-founded fear of persecution or treatment in breach of Article 3 in her home area is sustainable. It is only if it is reasonably likely that she would experience serious harm (a term which we use to mean persecution and Article 3 ill-treatment) in her home area that the internal flight option becomes relevant.
The second issue involves consideration of whether there is reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would face serious harm, on account of her practice of her religion (which includes preaching activities, as found by the Adjudicator). The issue of protection is also relevant.
The first issue:
10.1 The challenge to the Adjudicator's credibility assessment is set out at paragraphs 2 a) to l) inclusive of the grounds of application.10.2 We have carefully considered the reasons the Adjudicator gave for his findings of fact. He gave clear and cogent reasons. He did not accept that the murder of the Appellant's father-in-law was carried out by or on the instructions of mullahs or that its motive was religious because the murder occurred three years after the donation of the land. He found that there was no satisfactory evidential basis for the Appellant's assertion that the murder was motivated by her father-in-law's religion. The newspaper extract upon which the Appellant relied quoted a grandson of the deceased as stating that the murder arose out of a property dispute (paragraph 43 of the Determination).
10.3 At paragraph 39 of the Determination, the Adjudicator stated that he was not satisfied that any problem which the Appellant may have encountered between 1974 and 1999 was relevant to the appeal, since she had travelled to and from the United Kingdom as a visitor during this period of 25 years and did not at any time claim asylum. At paragraph 2g) of the grounds of application, it is asserted that it was unreasonable for the Adjudicator to exclude events prior to 1999 as, while these events did not lead directly to her flight from Pakistan, they contributed to her subjective fear. We noted that the Appellant's account of her early problems were that, in 1974, her home was burnt by the mullahs and that "problems continued after that". Given the lack of any details of the "problems" she experienced after the burning of the house, and given that she travelled at least four times (and perhaps even up to five times) in more recent times prior to her last arrival, we are satisfied that the Adjudicator's finding that the early events were not relevant is one which was open to him, on the evidence.
10.4 The evidence concerning the status of the Appellant's sons is not entirely clear. According to the Appellant's accounts as given to the Adjudicator (paragraph 29 of the Determination), one of her sons was granted exceptional leave to remain and the other was granted refugee status, whereas, according to Mr. Miyan at the hearing before us, both have been granted refugee status. In any event, the Appellant's claim has to be considered on its own merits. If reliance is being placed on the assertion that the fact that her sons have been granted refugee status indicates that the whole family was being targeted, then the Appellant has another hurdle to cross – namely, she would need to explain why, if her family was being targeted and her sons had fled, she did not flee at the same time or sooner than she did, and why she felt safe enough to return in 2002.
10.5 The Adjudicator took into account the fact that the Appellant had delayed leaving Pakistan after the alleged raid on her sister's house in June 2002. On the evidence before him, he was entitled to take this delay into account, especially bearing in mind that the Appellant is someone who had previously travelled to the United Kingdom some four or five times and the fact that, on her accounts, her sons had also fled to the United Kingdom and at least one of them had claimed asylum. The Adjudicator was entitled to find that, if there had been an attempt to kill the Appellant in June 2002, she would not have waited until September 2002 before coming to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, he gave another reason for not believing the Appellant's claims concerning the alleged raid in June 2002. He noted that, after this alleged incident, she did not allege that there were any further problems until she came to the United Kingdom. There was no obligation on the Adjudicator to put to the Appellant the matter of the delay in leaving Pakistan. He was entitled to assess the evidence which was before him.
10.6 In the grounds of application, it is asserted that the Adjudicator should not have taken against the Appellant her delay in claiming asylum after her arrival in the United Kingdom and that reliable information about the correct procedure for applying for asylum is not readily available in Pakistan. However, this Appellant is someone who, on her own accounts, has at least one son in the United Kingdom who had claimed asylum. The explanation in the grounds simply does not satisfactorily address this credibility issue. In any event, the delay in claiming asylum after arrival in the United Kingdom was only one of several reasons the Adjudicator gave for not believing the Appellant's accounts. In our view, the other reasons he gave were sufficient in themselves to justify his findings of fact. There was no obligation on the Adjudicator to put the matter of the delay in claiming asylum to the Appellant. He was entitled to assess the evidence before him.
10.7 For the reasons we have given above, we are fully satisfied that the Adjudicator's findings are fully sustainable on the evidence as a whole. The central issue we are concerned with is whether the Adjudicator's assessment of credibility and findings of fact are safe. For the reasons we have given above, we are satisfied that they are safe.
The second issue:
11.1 Although rejecting various aspects of the Appellant's accounts, the Adjudicator did accept that she was active in the Ahmadi religion, both as an organiser and as a preacher. He also accepted that she had experienced some problems in Faisalabad (see paragraphs 2 (b) and (c) above). The question remains, therefore, whether these findings should have led him to allow the appeal.11.2 We were invited to equate "proselytising" with "preaching". Mr. Miyan submitted that the requirement to proselytise is a tenet of the Ahmadi faith. In Mr. Miyan's submission, given that the Appellant has been found to be a preacher, this means that she has been found to proselytise, which in turn means that she proselytises to persons outside the Ahmadi religion and so would be at real risk of persecution on return. The thrust of Mr. Miyan's submission is that any Ahmadi who preaches in Pakistan is at real risk of serious harm.
11.3 Our starting point in deciding this issue must be the first sentence of paragraph 6.46 of the CIPU Assessment for Pakistan dated April 2003. This states that there are approximately 4 million Ahmadis in Pakistan. The third sentence of the same paragraph states that the most recent census estimates indicate that there are 286,000 Ahmadis in the country, although it also makes the point that religious minority groups believe that they are under-represented in government census counts. The next sentence states that the Ahmadi community itself claims a membership of approximately 4 million. We will proceed with the figure of 4 million, on the assumption that the Ahmadi community are better placed to estimate their own numbers. Our second observation is that the objective evidence contained in the CIPU and elsewhere does not indicate that all Ahmadis are at real risk of serious harm in current-day Pakistan.
11.4 If the Ahmadi religion requires all its members to proselytise (and we make it clear that we do not doubt that there is such a requirement), yet many live in Pakistan without experiencing treatment which amounts to serious harm, then it must follow that:
either: (a) most do not in practice follow the requirement to proselytise;
11.5 We reject the notion that simply because an Ahmadi preaches (or proselytises – we use the word "preach" loosely in the remainder of this Determination to cover both), he is at real risk of serious harm. Obviously, a person who preaches to strangers in the street and who is vocal and persistent is more likely to attract adverse attention from would-be persecutors than someone who preaches discreetly amongst close acquaintances or trusted neighbours.or: (b) they do so in a way which does not draw adverse attention from those who would subject them to serious harm. In other words, they in fact moderate their proselytising activities in such a way that they are able to live in Pakistan without being subjected to serious harm by hostile elements.
11.6 Whether an individual is at real risk of serious harm must be a question of fact in each case. We do not purport to list exhaustively factors which will be relevant. Much will depend on how the individual in question went about his preaching activities. For example, who did he preach to – to members of the Ahmadi faith or to outsiders? Did he engage in his preaching activities openly in public places, or discreetly behind closed doors amongst those least likely to expose him to those who might cause him serious harm? How vocal or insistent was he? What visibility did he have to those outside his faith or to hostile elements? How often did he engage in his preaching activities? How persistent was he in his preaching activities? For example, when faced with someone who showed complete disinterest, did he desist from preaching to that person or did he become more insistent?
11.7 Adjudicators would be entitled to expect an individual's claims about the way he engaged in his preaching activities in Pakistan to be borne out by his accounts of the problems he encountered from hostile elements. The objective evidence shows that elements hostile to the Ahmadi religion in Pakistan do intimidate, harass and persecute those persons of the Ahmadi faith who do not moderate their practice of their religion. If, for example, at one extreme, an individual claims to have been very vocal and persistent in his preaching activities in Pakistan, standing at street corners and calling to strangers, it would be reasonably likely (bearing in mind the objective evidence) that he would have experienced very severe difficulties indeed from hostile elements.
11.8 Where an Ahmadi claims that, if returned to Pakistan, he would practise his religion in such a way as to expose himself to a real risk of serious harm, and points to his past experiences in Pakistan as the basis for asserting that the practice of his religion would place him at real risk of serious harm in the future, then a credible account of past experiences which amount to serious harm would show that that individual's way of practising his religion (whether or not this includes preaching) would expose the individual to a real risk of serious harm. Conversely, if it was not reasonably likely that the individual experienced serious harm in the past, then it is not reasonably likely that his practice of his religion (whether or not this includes preaching) would expose him to serious harm in the future.
11.9 It is therefore very important for Adjudicators to make clear findings as to whether particular incidents alleged to have occurred in the past did occur and whether the incidents which are accepted as having occurred cumulatively amount to persecution. It is also important to make a clear finding as to whether an individual's claim that he preached in Pakistan is accepted.
11.10 The Court of Appeal's judgement in Iftikhar Ahmed (IATRF1999-0490-C(Ahmed) is not authority for the proposition that, simply because a person is a preacher, he is at risk of serious harm. In that case, the Adjudicator had made an express finding that the applicant had been subjected on a daily basis to harassment and a degree of physical violence, including being spat at and having stones thrown at him. The Adjudicator said that there were probably borderline cases but that case was not one of them. During the course of the applicant's evidence to the Adjudicator, the applicant had confirmed that he was vocal in propagating his religious beliefs. He said that his daily situation became worse and worse as time went by, between 1984 and 1995. He said that, if he returned to Pakistan and went to live in a different part of the country, he would still follow the command of his spiritual leaders and would still be vocal in his proclamation of the Ahmadi beliefs. We quote from the fourth paragraph from the end of the leading judgement in that case:
……… if, as Macdonald noted to be the position in Mendis and Ahmad, applicants have not so far done any acts which might lead to prosecution in their own countries, then they can hardly be surprised if, as in these two cases, their claims are rejected. The present case, however, seems to me strikingly different. This appellant, it is common ground, has suffered persecution in his own country, often daily, over a period of years. His religion requires him to proselytise, although it is true that not all – indeed, perhaps few – Ahmadis carry that obligation to the lengths he does. His assertion that "if returned to Pakistan and went to live in a different part of the country he would still follow the command of his spiritual leaders and still be vocal in his proclamation of Ahmadi beliefs" is in these circumstances highly likely to be true……….."11.11 We now turn to the facts of this case. As we have said above, the Adjudicator accepted that the Appellant had experienced some problems in Faisalabad. He did not make an express finding as to whether the Appellant's past experiences in Faisalabad amounted to serious harm but it is clear, from reading paragraphs 41 to 52 as a whole, that he found that they did not. In any event, he found that she was not persecuted in Gujranwala or Lahore. Whether the Appellant's home area (for the purposes of applying the internal flight option) is Faisalabad or Gujranwala, she had not experienced persecution in either. Accordingly, the internal flight option simply does not apply. If the Appellant were to return to Pakistan now and continue to practise her religion (including carrying out her preaching activities) in the way she had in the past, we are satisfied that, on the Adjudicator's findings, there is no reasonable likelihood that she would receive treatment amounting to serious harm from the KN or any non-state actors. Neither is there any reasonable likelihood that she would receive treatment amounting to serious harm from the Pakistani authorities. Whatever her particular way of practising her religion (and, in this regard, we take into account the Adjudicator's findings that she is active in her religion, both as an organiser and as a preacher), she did not experience serious harm in the past and it is not reasonably likely that she would experience serious harm in the future.
11.12 In the light of the Adjudicator's finding that the Appellant is not at real risk of serious harm, the issue of protection is not relevant.
12. Whilst not relevant to the outcome of this appeal, we deal briefly with Mr. Miyan's submission that the MMA is connected to the KN. In our view, there is no evidential basis for this assertion. It is based simply on the fact that the KN is a religious party and the fact that there is reference to the MMA being a coalition of religious parties. It is pure speculation, in these circumstances, to suggest that the MMA is connected to the KN.
13. For all of these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
Decision
The appeal is DISMISSED.
Ms. D. K. GILL
Vice President Date: 26th September 2003