United Kingdom Asylum and Immigration Tribunal

MN Pakistan [2002] UKIAT 01369

TH-05143-2000

IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL

Date of hearing: 10 April 2002

Date Determination notified: 03 May 2002

Before
Mr C M G Ockelton
Lady Bonham-Carter
Mrs A J F Cross de Chavannes
Between

 

MN	APPELLANT
and
The Entry Clearance Officer, Islamabad Respondents	RESPONDENT

DETERMINATION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Pakistan, appeals, with leave, against the determination of an Adjudicator (Mr T R Jones) dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Respondent on 6th March 2000 refusing her entry clearance with a view to settlement as the spouse of Nazeem Azad Hussain (the sponsor). Before the Tribunal she was represented by Mr T Dedezade, instructed by Steele Ford & Newton, and the Respondent was represented by Mr M Davidson. We heard submissions from Mr Dedezade but did not need to call on Mr Davidson.
2. The sponsor is disabled. He is not employed and receives substantial public funds, which appear to be paid mostly to his mother for his care. The Respondent refused the application because he was not satisfied that, at the date of the decision, the Appellant could meet the maintenance and accommodation requirements of the rules. Accommodation has since been conceded, and the only matter for us relates to maintenance.
3. The Adjudicator heard evidence from the sponsor's father and his brother. He regarded them as credible. He dismissed the appeal for two reasons. First, he took the view that the public funds paid for the sponsor were calculated on the basis of the sponsor's special requirements and disabilities, and that the Appellant could not rely on being able to 'tap into her husband's income' in these circumstances. Secondly, he regarded the promises of third party support offered by the sponsor's father and his brother as being indefinite and unrealistic.
4. The grounds of appeal, upon which Mr Dedezade relied, relate to both those issues. We will deal with each in turn.
5. On the matter of the use of the sponsor's benefits in order to maintain the Appellant, the grounds refer to Dalgit Singh Panaich (00/TH/0072). It may be helpful if we set out the relevant paragraphs of that determination straightaway:

"19. In our judgement, when benefits are paid to a person in respect of a disability, it is simply improper to conclude, without more, that that person would be maintained adequately if he or she made the benefits available to someone else. Of course, it may be the case that if another person is available to share the task of caring, the costs will be reduced: but that simply cannot be assumed; it must be the subject of evidence. Different people will be able to offer different things, from occasional transport (thus perhaps saving taxi fares) upwards. Without such evidence, it appears to us that it should normally be presumed that the adequate maintenance of the recipient of the benefits requires the whole of those benefits.

20. One factor that might help to show that the recipient of disability benefits does not require the whole for his or her own adequate maintenance would be evidence of regular savings from those benefits. It would not be enough by itself, because the savings might have been made at the cost or reducing the individual's own maintenance below the level of adequacy. But if a fact-finder is persuaded, on evidence, that savings are being made out of benefits, while the recipient of the benefits is being maintained adequately on only part of the benefits, then it may be proper to draw a conclusion that the benefits are more than adequate. We say no more than that here, because the precise implications of neither the new paragraph 6A of the Immigration Rules, nor its alleged predecessor ministerial statement, is in issue in this appeal".

6. As we pointed out at the hearing, although there was before the Adjudicator evidence of the amount of funds received, there was no evidence at all that what is received is more than enough for the sponsor's adequate maintenance, given his disability. The sponsor's father said that the care allowance paid to the sponsor's mother would not be required if his wife came to the United Kingdom to look after him: but that is not really the point. The question is whether, after the Appellant's arrival there would be sufficient resources to enable both the Appellant and the sponsor to be adequately maintained. Nothing before us suggests that the sponsor would be maintained adequately on any less money than the public funds presently being provided for him.
7. So far as concerns third-party support, the grounds complain that the Adjudicator was inconsistent in believing the witnesses but not accepting their promises to make third-party support. We are entirely unpersuaded by that argument. The Adjudicator was quite entitled, as he did, to accept the witnesses' good intentions, but not to accept their claim to be able to provide the appropriate amount of support for the sponsor and the Appellant. The Adjudicator set out in some detail his assessment of the financial circumstances of the two witnesses and their prospects and gave his reasons for finding that, despite their good intentions, he was not satisfied that the maintenance requirements of the rules could in this case be met by third-party support.
8. It is further suggested that the Adjudicator was wrong in seeking evidence of third-party support for an indefinite period. It is argued that the truth of the matter is that any third-party support would only be necessary until the Appellant was able to obtain employment for herself. It is said that there was, at the date of the decision, evidence that, in due course, the Appellant would be employed in a family business. There is, however, no clear evidence relating to what income might be expected for the Appellant, nor at what date. In our judgement, the Adjudicator was right to consider that, in the circumstances, if the Appellant was to rely on third-party support, it would be support for an indefinite period.
9. For the foregoing reasons, we regard the Adjudicator's determination as entirely correct. The Appellant's appeal is dismissed.

C M G OCKELTON