JISCBAILII_CASE_IMMIGRATION
Jain (Asylum seekers, Homosexuality, Persecution) India [2000] UKIAT 00579 (08 January 2000)
TH/7849/98
IMMIGRATION APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Date of hearing: 14/01/2000
Date Determination notified: 08 January 2000
Before
His Honour Jeremy Fordham (Chair)
Mr.M.James
Mr.N.Kumar J.P.
Between
SANJEEV TILAKARAJ JAIN | APPELLANT |
and | |
Secretary of State for the Home Department | RESPONDENT |
DETERMINATION AND REASONS
The Appellant has been given leave to appeal against the determination of an Adjudicator (Mr.M.Weisman) allowing an appeal against the decision of the Appellant dated 21 July, 1998 refusing to revoke a deportation order against the Respondent.
The reasons for the decision are set out at pages 123-130 of the Tribunal bundle.
The Respondent was in business as a dealer in gems. He had originally come to the United Kingdom, as a visitor, in 1992. He had again been admitted as a visitor, together with his wife, in 1993. In 1993 he applied for leave to remain as a businessman. This application was refused, and an appeal against this decision was dismissed. During 1994 and 1995 various applications were made by the Respondent's wife for leave to be given to the Respondent to remain in the United Kingdom. These applications were unsuccessful and the Respondent was instructed to leave the country and warned of his liability to deportation.
In April 1996 the Appellant made a decision to deport the Respondent. On 7 October 1996 the Appellant signed a deportation order against the Respondent. Various applications were made by the Respondent during 1997 and 1998 which were unsuccessful. On 8 June 1998 the Respondent and his family departed to India.
The Appellant held, following the Respondent's application to revoke the deportation order, that there were not "most exceptional circumstances" within the terms of Rules 390 and 391 of HC395 justifying revocation.
The hearing before the Adjudicator
Documentary evidence was put before the Adjudicator to the effect that the Respondent's business had suffered because of his inability to personally attend to it in the United Kingdom. There was evidence that his turnover of business had been very seriously affected.
The Adjudicator concluded that on the basis that the Respondent would be making only brief visits to the United Kingdom to attend to his business the deportation order could properly be revoked.
The hearing before the Tribunal.
Before us the Appellant was represented by Mr.J.Harper, the Respondent by Mr.C.Jacobs.
Grounds of Appeal are at page 4-5 of the Tribunal bundle.
The only real issue before us was whether the effect upon the Appellant's business of his inability to visit the United Kingdom could properly be described as a "most exceptional circumstance". Mr. Jacobs argued that it could be so described and invited us to uphold the Adjudicator's decision.
We do not agree. A deportation order is a serious executive act. The purpose of the requirement of "most exceptionable circumstances" for revocation of a deportation order within 3 years of absence from the country (Rule 390) is obvious. The Respondent was given every opportunity to avoid the consequences of this requirement, by leaving before a deportation order was made. He chose otherwise.
We differ from the Adjudicator in that we do not find the effect of the deportation order upon the Respondent's business to constitute a most exceptional circumstance. We do not find sufficient reason to interfere with the decision reached by the Appellant in this case.
The Tribunal allows this appeal.
Jeremy Fordham Chairman