O (FC) (Appellant) V. Crown Court at Harrow (Respondents) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty's High Court of Justice)
HOUSE OF LORDS
OPINIONS OF THE LORDS OF APPEAL FOR JUDGMENT
IN THE CAUSE
O (FC) (Appellant) v. Crown Court at Harrow (Respondents) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty's High Court of Justice)
In re O (Appellant) (application for a writ of Habeas Corpus) (Criminal Appeal from Her Majesty's High Court of Justice)
 UKHL 42
LORD NICHOLLS OF BIRKENHEAD
BARONESS HALE OF RICHMOND
Cf also R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester  1 AC 787, 812, para 37, where Lord Steyn said:
Kennedy LJ went on to interpret the words "exceptional circumstances" in a very broad sense, so broad that any presumption against bail in cases coming within section 25 was effectively removed. Basing his reasoning on the decision of the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division in R v Offen  1 WLR 253, para 32, he interpreted the provisions of section 25 as establishing a norm:
In other words, the judge is to consider the circumstances of the case and if he considers that to grant bail would not create an unacceptable risk he may properly be satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which justify it. This approach appears to involve interpreting the words "is satisfied" as meaning simply "considers". Such an approach may suffice to ward off complaints of breach of article 5 of the Convention, but it would be difficult to maintain that it puts into effect the apparent intention of Parliament in enacting section 25.
He therefore favoured overtly reading down section 25 in accordance with the requirements of section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to impose an evidentiary burden.
LORD BROWN OF EATON-UNDER-HEYWOOD
Paragraph 9 of the Schedule is also worth noting:
And regulation 6(6) of the 1987 Regulations (see para 5 above) was similarly amended so as to make it expressly "subject to section 25 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (exclusion of bail in cases of homicide and rape)."
Earlier he had said (para 28):
The court's reference there to "particular expedition" reflects the requirement for "special diligence" in an article 5 (3) (as opposed to an article 6(1) case.