United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

HOUSE OF LORDS

27 July 1983

IN RE BETTS (A.P.) AND ANOTHER

Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Lord Wilberforce
Lord Edmund-Davies
Lord Roskill
Lord Brightman

LORD FRASER OF TULLYBELTON

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord Brightman. I agree with it, and for the reasons stated in it I would allow this appeal.

LORD WILBERFORCE

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech by my noble and learned friend, Lord Brightman. I agree with it and for the reasons he gives I would allow the appeal.

LORD EDMUND-DAVIES

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft form the opinion prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Brightman, and I concur in the reasoning which has led him to the conclusion that this appeal should be allowed.

LORD ROSKILL

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech to be delivered by my noble and learned friend, Lord Brightman. For the reasons he gives I too would allow this appeal.


 


LORD BRIGHTMAN

My Lords,

The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 entitles a homeless person to apply to a housing authority for accommodation. If the housing authority to whom application is made considers that the applicant has no local connection with the area of that authority, the authority may be in a position to transfer the statutory responsibility to another housing authority with whose area the applicant has a local connection. The respondents to this appeal, Ronald Thomas Betts and Vivien Anne Betts became homeless through no fault of their own at a time when they were living in the area of the appellants the Eastleigh Borough Council ("Eastleigh") in Hampshire. They applied to Eastleigh for accommodation. Mr. and Mrs. Betts had formerly lived in the area of the Blaby District Council ("Blaby") in Leicestershire. Both Eastleigh and Blaby are in agreement that the responsibility for housing Mr. and Mrs. Betts properly belongs to Blaby. Mr. and Mrs. Betts, who wish to remain in the area of Eastleigh, seek to challenge that decision by way of judicial review. They were successful before the Court of Appeal.

Mr. Betts is 37 years of age. He was born in London, and in his early years worked there. In 1973 he lived and worked in Dunstable. In the following year he moved to Milton Keynes and commuted to work in London. Thereafter he lived and worked abroad for a while. In 1978 he secured a job in Leicester and went to live in a council house in the Blaby area. In the meantime Mr. and Mrs. Betts' two daughters had been born, the elder being now aged 9 and the younger nearly 5.

In August 1980 Mr. Betts left his family temporarily in order to take up employment with Southern Television as a film processor at their studios in Southampton. In October he secured rented accommodation in the Eastleigh area, and Mrs. Betts and their daughters joined him there. He gave up his Blaby council house, regrettably without giving the Council any notice and with arrears of rent outstanding. Unfortunately Southern Television lost their franchise shortly afterwards and as a result Mr. Betts lost his employment. He again fell into arrear with his rent. On 3rd February 1981 an order for possession was made against him, to take effect on 3rd March. On 6th February he was given an interview with Mr. Renouf, a senior assistant in the Estates Management Department of Eastleigh, and he applied under the Act for accommodation.

The immediate result of that application was that Eastleigh became under a statutory duty to make enquiries to satisfy themselves that Mr. and Mrs. Betts were in fact homeless, and to ascertain whether they had a "priority need" for accommodation by reason of dependent children and whether they had become homeless "intentionally" within the meaning of the Act; section 3(1) and (2). Furthermore Eastleigh became entitled, if they thought fit, to make enquiries as to whether the applicants had "a local connection with the area of another housing authority"; section 3(3). Eastleigh also became under a duty to secure that temporary accommodation was made available for occupation by Mr. and Mrs. Betts pending any decision which Eastleigh might make as a result of their enquiries; section 3(4). Eastleigh has performed the duty of securing temporary accommodation for Mr. and Mrs. Betts by making a dwelling house available for them at 85 High Street, Eastleigh.

As a result of enquiries, Mr. Grant, the Chief Housing Officer of Eastleigh had satisfied himself by 25th February 1981 (see his letter of that date) that Mr. and Mrs. Betts were homeless, had a priority need for accommodation, and were pot homeless intentionally. Eastleigh thereby became under a duty under section 4(5) of the Act, replacing their previous duty under section 3(4), to secure that (permanent) accommodation became available for Mr. and Mrs. Betts subject however to section 5. Section 5 defines responsibility as between different housing authorities, and it is with this section that this appeal is concerned. In his letter of 25th February Mr. Green added ". . . your application under the Act has been notified to Blaby District Council because you have lived in this borough for less than 6 months, and are not employed in this borough and do not have any relatives here. Your rehousing is therefore considered to be their responsibility." This assessment of the situation is accepted by Blaby, but not by Mr. and Mrs. Betts.

I turn now to the provisions of section 5. If that section does not apply, Eastleigh accept that the responsibility is theirs under section 4(5) to secure accommodation for Mr. and Mrs. Betts. So far as relevant, section 5 reads as follows:-

"5.(1) A housing authority are not subject to a duty under section 4(5) above -

(a) if they are of the opinion -

(i) that neither the person who applied to them for accommodation or for assistance in obtaining accommodation nor any person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him has a local connection with their area, and

(ii) that the person who so applied or a person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him has a local connection with another housing authority's area and

(iii).....

(b) if they notify that authority -

(i) that the application has been made, and

(ii) that they are of the opinion specified in paragraph (a) above.

(2) In this Act 'notifying authority' means a housing authority who give a notification under subsection (1) above and 'notified authority' means a housing authority who receive such a notification.

(3) It shall be the duty of the notified authority to secure that accommodation becomes available for occupation by the person to whom the notification relates if neither he nor any person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him has a local connection with the area of the notifying authority but the conditions specified in subsection (4) below are satisfied.

(4) The conditions mentioned in subsection (3) above are -

(a) that the person to whom the notification relates or some person who might reasonably be expected to reside with him has a local connection with the area of the notified authority, and

(b).....

(7) Any question which falls to be determined under this section shall be determined by agreement between the notifying authority and the notified authority or, in default of such agreement, in accordance with the appropriate arrangements.

(8) The appropriate arrangements for the purposes of this section are any such arrangements as the Secretary of State may by order direct.

Section 19(1) of the Act provides that unless the context otherwise requires local connection shall be construed in accordance with section 18, which enacts as follows:-

18.(1) Any reference in this Act to a person having a local connection with an area is a reference to his having a connection with that area -

(a) because he is or in the past was normally resident in it and his residence in it is or was of his own choice; or

(b) because he is employed in it, or

(c) because of family associations, or

(d) because of any special circumstances."

Subsections (2) and (3), which I need not read, explain when residence is not of a person's own choice, and when a person is not to be considered as employed in an area.

It is obvious that time consuming and expensive disputes might arise between housing authorities as to the existence of a "local connection". Such disputes are not in the interest either of housing authorities or of homeless persons. The purposes of the Act demand speedy solutions to questions of doubt. To avoid such disputes, and to settle them quickly and cheaply if they arise, certains steps have been taken on behalf of housing authorities. First, in order to facilitate agreements between notifying authorities and notified authorities as required by section 5(7) a national "Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the Homeless" was negotiated between the Association of District Councils, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities and the London Boroughs Association at the time when the Bill was being considered by Parliament. This Agreement has been adhered to by the majority of housing authorities. Secondly, by the Housing (Homeless Persons) (Appropriate Arrangements) Order 1978 the Secretary of State for the Environment, in exercise of his powers under subsection (8) has established the "Appropriate Arrangements" set out in the schedule to the order for the purpose of settling unresolved disputes between housing authorities. These arrangements are in a form which was agreed by the three associations who negotiated the Agreement on Procedures. They provide for any disputed question under section 5 to be determined speedily either by a person agreed upon by the authorities concerned or by a person chosen from a panel. These arrangements came into operation on 21st January 1978, that is to say, a few weeks after the 1977 Act came into force. There is evidence that the Agreement on Procedures has worked well, and that as a result there have only been about 50 references under the order since the Act came into force.

The Agreement on Procedures does not purport to impose a legally binding code on housing authorities who adhere to it. It is ' merely a policy document. Its tone is set by paragraph 1.2 which reads as follows:-

"With this [subsections (7) et seq. of section 5] in mind the three associations have agreed on arrangements for referrals which they recommend to the local authorities who are primarily concerned with providing for homeless households. Section 5 of the Act lays down the general procedure to be followed where it appears that a local authority other than the authority to whom application is made by a homeless household, .... should be made responsible. There are, however, considerable areas of possible disagreement and dispute in the interpretation of the Act, and although in the last resort these can only be decided by the courts, the Associations are anxious to avoid as far as possible legal disputes between local authorities. They therefore issue this agreement on the procedures and criteria to be followed, and recommend it for general adoption by all their members."

After intermediate paragraphs, the agreement then picks up the statutory expression "local connection" and gives guidance on "normally resident", "employed", "family associations" and "special circumstances". The guidance on "normal residence" is in the following terms:

"A local connection may be:

(i) That the household is, or in the past was, normally resident in the area. It is suggested that a working definition of 'normal residence^' should be that the household has been residing for at least 6 months in the area during the previous 12 months, or for not less than 3 years during the previous 5 year period. In this connection, residence up to 6 months under one or more tenancies subject to Case 13 of Schedule 15 of the Rent Act 1977 should be disregarded for the purposes of defining 'normal 'residence'."

The exclusion of certain Rent Act lettings relates to winter and holiday lettings.

With this explanation of the statutory background, I return to the narrative of events. Following upon the Chief Housing Officer's letter of 25th February 1981 informing Mr. and Mrs. Betts that their application had been notified to Blaby, Blaby duly offered accommodation to Mr. and Mrs. Betts within their area. This was not acceptable to Mr. and Mrs. Betts. Eastleigh then obtained an order for possession of 85 High Street, Eastleigh, where Mr. and Mrs. Betts had been provided with temporary accommodation pursuant to section 3(4). This order is not being enforced pending the result of these proceedings. On 1st April 1982 Mr. and Mrs. Betts' solicitors informed Eastleigh of their clients' intention to apply to the High Court for judicial review of Eastleigh's decision. Later that month Mr. Betts obtained full-time employment as a warehouseman in the Eastleigh area, and shortly afterwards Mrs. Betts secured contract work with British Rail. On 2nd June 1982 Mr. and Mrs. Betts moved for judicial review. There was at that time an assertion on the part of Eastleigh that Mr. and Mrs. Betts were intentionally homeless as a result of their refusal of Blaby's offer of accommodation. This assertion, if correct, would have relieved both housing authorities of the major obligation imposed by the Act. The relief originally sought by the notice of motion accordingly included a declaration that Mr. and Mrs. Betts were not homeless intentionally. However this point is no longer pursued by Eastleigh, and the only relief outstanding is an order of mandamus requiring Eastleigh to carry out their supposed duty under section 4(5). As I have already indicated the existence of that duty is not in dispute if Eastleigh are unable to rely on section 5. Accordingly an injunctive order against Eastleigh would not be appropriate if their reliance on section 5 is misplaced.

The attack on Eastleigh hinges on the Chief Housing Officer's letter of 25th February 1981, and the inference to be drawn from his statement that "your application under the Act has been notified to Blaby District Council because you have lived in this borough for less than 6 months." The evidence in relation to that letter is somewhat brief, but is not challenged by Mr. and Mrs. Betts. Mr. Renouf deposed that after he had reported to Mr. Grant, the Chief Housing Officer, the result of his preliminary enquiries, Mr. Grant "confirmed that this application should be referred to the Blaby District Council under section 5 of the 1977 Act because the applicants had no local connection with the respondents but they had a local connection with Blaby District Council." This was elaborated by Mr. Grant in his own affidavit in the following terms:-

"The Applicants' application for accommodation came before me on the 23rd February 1981 when I had to give a decision as to whether they should be offered accommodation. After considering a report from Mr. Renouf, my Senior Assistant (Estates Management), I decided that the application should be referred to Blaby District Council under Section 5 of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 as I considered that the responsibility for housing the Applicants lay with that Council. The decision was taken by me having regard to the wording of the Act together with the recommendations set out in the 'Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the Homeless - Revised 6th June 1979' issued by the Association of District Councils, Association of Metropolitan Authorities and the London Boroughs Association.....

Upon considering the report of Mr. Renouf, the crucial factor in my decision was that the Applicants did not have a 'local connection^' with the Borough of Eastleigh, within the meaning of Section 5 of the 1977 Act. The phrase 'local connection' is defined in Section 18(1) of the 1977 Act, but as Section 18(l)(b) and Section 18(l)(c) were not applicable, unless the applicants were 'normally resident' in the Borough within the meaning of Section 19(l)(a) or unless any special circumstances applied, a local connection with the Respondent would not be established. In considering the question of 'normally resident' I had regard to the revised 'Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the 'Homeless' which states that a 'working definition of 'normal residence' should be that the household has been residing 'for at least six months in the (Borough) during the 'previous twelve months' (clause 2.5). The Applicants having only resided in the Borough for some four months before the date of their application on the 6th February 1981, I considered that a 'normal residence' had not been established within the meaning of the Act. The 'Revised 'Agreement on Procedures for Referrals of the Homeless' is in wide use by Housing Authorities when considering a referral under Section 5 of the 1977 Act, and Blaby District Council fully accepted the working definition of normal residences."

The motion came before Mr. 3ustice Webster in October 1982. The decision made by Eastleigh was attacked on three grounds, but two were—abandoned. The ground which survived related to the meaning of "normally resident" in section 18(l)(a) of the Act. Counsel contended that -

(1) Eastleigh had misdirected themselves as to the meaning of those words, or

(2) They had fettered their discretion in deciding how to apply those words to the facts before them, or

(3) Their decision as to the question of whether the applicants were normally resident in the Eastleigh area was a decision which no authority properly directing themselves could have reached on the facts before them.

After considering the affidavit evidence the learned judge said that he was not satisfied that the Chief Housing Officer had misdirected himself as to the meaning of normal residence; or that he had confined himself to the suggested working definition of that expression in paragraph 2.5 of the Agreement on Procedures; or that he had regarded the decision which he had to make as being fettered in any way by the terms of that agreement; or that his decision that the applicants were not normally resident in the Eastleigh area was one which could not have been reached on the material before him had he properly directed himself. The motion was accordingly dismissed.

In December 1982 your Lordships' House gave judgment in R. v. Barnet London Borough Council ex parte Shah [1983] 2 WLR 16. This case was thought by the applicants to open up new horizons. In Shah certain immigrant students who had no right of abode in the United Kingdom claimed to qualify for mandatory awards under the Education Act 1962. Under section 1 of that Act and regulations made thereunder it was the duty of every local authority, in certain circumstances, to bestow awards on persons who "are ordinarily resident in the area of the authority", and had been so resident for the three preceding years, and possessed the requisite educational qualifications.

Lord Scarman, with whom ail their Lordships agreed, stated the problem and answered it in the following terms:

"Two questions of statutory interpretation, therefore, arise. The first is: what is the natural and ordinary meaning of 'ordinary residence in the United Kingdom' . . . ?

The second is: does the statute in the context of the relevant law against the background of which it was enacted, or in the circumstances of today, including in particular the impact of the Act of 1971 [Immigration Act 1971], compel one to substitute a special, and, if so, what, meaning to the words 'ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom'?

For the reasons which I shall endeavour to develop I answer the two questions as follows. The natural and ordinary meaning of the words has been authoritatively determined in this House in two tax cases reported in 1928. To the second question my answer is 'No'. The Act of 1962 and the Regulations are to be construed by giving to the words 'ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom' their natural and ordinary meaning."

The natural and ordinary meaning of the words "ordinarily resident", as laid down in those tax cases, is explained with complete clarity in the different speeches of your Lordships' predecessors, the key phrases being "residence in a place with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary absences", Viscount Cave; "'The regular order of a man's life, adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes", Viscount Sumner; "According to the way in which a man's life is usually ordered", Lord Warrington of Clyffe. Lord Scarman's general conclusion, therefore, was that:

"Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the statutory framework or the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning, I unhesitantly subscribe to the view that 'ordinarily resident' refers to a man's abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being, whether of short or long duration."

The instant case came before the Court of Appeal in March 1983. The argument there, as also before your Lordships, was that Eastleigh could not properly transfer their responsibility to Blaby unless they were of the opinion that the applicants were not, on 6th February 1981, normally resident in the Eastleigh area; that they formed that opinion by the rigid application of a guideline that normal residence short of six months was not enough to constitute a local connection with the Eastleigh area; and that the real question for the court was the meaning in the context of "the words "normally resident". After reviewing the evidence, Stephenson L.J. reached the conclusion that the Chief Housing Officer "did fetter the Council's decision by a rigid application of the suggested definition of normal residence" in the Agreement on Procedures. Stephenson L.J. then considered the authorities on "ordinary residence" to which he was referred by the applicants' counsel, including not only Shah but also Macrae v. Macrae [1949J P. 397 where Somervell L.J. pointed out, in the context of a matrimonial cause, that "ordinary residence can be changed in a day". These authorities, said the learned Lord Justice, showed that "a person may be normally resident where he intends to settle - not necessarily permanently or indefinitely." The judgment of Griffiths L.J. was to the same effect:-

"'Normal residence' within the meaning of this Act is in my opinion to be construed in the same sense as 'ordinarily resident' was construed by the House of Lords in Shah. It requires a consideration of many features of the residence and is not to be decided solely by the application of a six month rule. It follows that as the Housing Officer applied the six month rule to decide 'normal residence' he misdirected himself in law when forming his opinion on normal residence and thus on whether the Betts family had a local connection with Eastleigh's area."

Finally, Purchas L.J.:-

". . . .if the appellants had been asked by an enquirer as to where they were normally living between October 1980 and January 1981 I have little doubt that they would have answered 'in Eastleigh'. In my judgment this would be the normal reaction, as an objective test, of any person in the particular circumstances in which the appellants found themselves at that times. In the light of these authorities, the adherence to an arbitrary period of residential qualification cannot be the correct approach to section 18(i)(a) of the Act."

My Lords, in my respectful view the manner in which the applicants have approached this case, and were successful in persuading the Court of Appeal to approach it, is misconceived. Eastleigh are relieved of their obligations under section 4(5) if they are "of the opinion" specified in paragraph (a)(i) and (ii) of section 5. The requisite "opinion" is that the applicants do not have (in the present tense) a local connection with the Eastleigh area but do have a local connection with the Blaby area. "Local connection" is not a defined expression in the sense that it means (inter alia) that the applicant "is or in the past was normally resident in [the area] and his residence in it is or was of his own choice". Section 18(1) does not entitle the reader to construe section 5(l)(a) by substituting "is or was normally resident in", or "is employed in", or "has family associations with" for the words "has a local connection with". What section 18(1) does is to say that a reference to a person having a local connection with an area is a reference to his having such a connection because he is, or in the past was normally resident there, or because he is employed there, or because he has family associations with that area or because there are special circumstances. Section 18 specifies those factors alone upon which the local connection is to be founded. A local connection not founded upon any of the four stated factors is irrelevant. The fundamental concept of section 5(l)(a) is local connection, not any local connection, but a local connection having any of the origins described in section 18(1). The opinion which has to be formed by a notifying housing authority in a residence case is not whether the homeless person is now or was in the past normally resident in the area of the notifying authority, but whether the applicant has now a local connection with either area based upon the fact that he is now or was in the past normally resident in that area.

The approach of the respondents is very different. They ask the question, are they now normally resident in the Eastleigh area? They answer that question affirmatively and then claim as a result, by definition, a local connection with Eastleigh which invalidates the opinion reached by Eastleigh under section 5(l)(a). This erroneous approach emerges with clarity from the terms of their notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal, the first ground of which contains the following:

"The fundamental question was what is meant in section 18(1)(a) of the said Act by the term 'normally resident'."

Stephenson L.3. accepted that definition of the issue which was thought to before the court when he said that:-

"The applicants' case here and below is that the council have not succeeded in transferring their responsibility to Blaby District Council. They can only do that if of opinion that the applicants were not on 6th February 1981 (or before that) normally resident in their area."

My Lords, that is not the fundamental question. The fundamental question is the existence of a "local connection". In construing section 5 it is only to be expected that the emphasis falls on "local connection", and not on past or present residence or current employment, etc. The Act is one which enables a homeless person in certain circumstances to jump over the heads of all other persons on a housing authority's waiting list, to jump the queue. One would not expect any just legislation to permit this to be done unless the applicant has in a real sense a local connection with the area in question. I accept that "residence" may be changed in a day, and that in appropriate circumstances a single day's residence may be enough to enable a person to say that he was normally resident in the area in which he arrived only yesterday. But "local connection" means far more than that. It must be built up and established; by a period of residence; or by a period of employment; or by family associations which have endured in the area; or by other special circumstances which spell out a local connection in real terms.

I return to the Agreement on Procedures. Faced with section 5 of the Act, a housing authority is involved, not with the question whether the applicant is or was normally resident etc. in the area in question, but whether the applicant has a local connection with that area. Has the normal residence of the applicant in the area been of such a duration as to establish for him a local connection with the area? To answer that question speedily it is sensible for local authorities to have agreed guidelines. I see nothing in the least unreasonable with a norm of six months' residence during the previous twelve months, or three years' residence during the previous five years. Seeing that the section is concerned with a subsisting and not with a past local connection, it is also reasonable to work on the basis that, after five years have gone by, no local connection based on residence is likely to have any relevance.

So I start my conclusions on this appeal by expressing the view that paragraph 2.5 of the Agreement on Procedures is eminently sensible and proper to have been included in the agreement. Although "an opinion" formed by a housing authority under section 5(1) must be concluded by reference to the facts of each individual case, there is no objection to the authority operating a policy or establishing guidelines, for reasons which the authority may legitimately entertain, and then applying such policy or guidelines generally to all the applications which come before them, provided that the authority do not close their mind to the particular facts of the individual case. There is ample authority that a body which is charged with exercising an administrative discretion is entitled to promulgate a policy or guidelines as an indication of a norm which is intended to be followed. See, for example, the speech of Lord Reid in British Oxygen Company Ltd v. Board of Trade [1971] AC 610.

As regards the meaning of "normally resident" in the context of section lS(l)(a), this will take its colour from the fact that residence of any sort will be irrelevant unless and until it has been such as to establish a local connection with the area in which such residence subsists or has subsisted. I doubt whether in these circumstances any elaborate attempt at a definition of "normally resident" will be profitable. They are ordinary English words, which in many contexts will mean what this House said "ordinarily resident" meant in Shah. But they are only a subsidiary component of the formula which a housing authority will be applying under section 5 of the Act. If the residence of an applicant has been of a sufficient duration to create a local connection, no difficulty is likely to arise in deciding whether such residence was normal. But if it were necessary to decide such a point in a particular case, I do not think that the housing authority would be wrong if they applied to the words "normally resident" the meaning which in Shah was attached to the words "ordinarily resident", remembering that the real exercise will be to decide whether the normal residence has been such as to establish a subsisting local connection.

That leaves me with a single question, which is the ultimate one in this appeal; whether Eastleigh misdirected themselves in reaching the opinion that the applicants did not have a local connection with the Eastleigh area. The onus of establishing this is upon the applicants. They rely principally on the wording of the letter of 25th February 1981 which says that Blaby have been notified "because you have lived in this borough for less then six months". The question before Eastleigh being whether the applicants had a local connection with the Eastleigh area as a result of residence, I see nothing whatever wrong with the decision by Eastleigh that as the applicants had lived in the area for less than six months, it was considered that they did not have a local connection with that area. It is true that the letter does not expressly refer to the absence of a local connection, only to the briefness of the residence, but it is to be observed that in his affidavit of 21st June 1982 which I have quoted, Mr. Renouf attributes the decision under section 5 to lack of a local connection, which is the correct approach.

In my opinion the applicants have not made out any ground for attacking the validity of the opinion formed by Eastleigh under section 5(1). Eastleigh therefore are not under a duty under section 4(5) of the Act to house the applicants. I would allow this appeal.

In re Betts (A.P.) and another (A.P.)
JUDGMENT
Die Mercurii 27° Julii 1983

Upon Report from the Appellate Committee to whom was referred the Cause In re Betts and another, That the Committee had heard Counsel on Tuesday the 12th day of this instant July upon the Petition and Appeal of Eastleigh Borough Council of Civic Offices, Leigh Road, Eastleigh, Hampshire praying that the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely an Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 3rd day of March 1983, might be reviewed before Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament and that the said Order might be reversed, varied or altered or that the Petitioners might have such other relief in the premises as to Her Majesty the Queen in Her Court of Parliament might seem meet; as also upon the Case of Ronald Thomas Betts and Vivien Anne Betts lodged in answer to the said Appeal; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in this Cause:

It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen assembled, That the said Order of Her Majesty's Court of Appeal of the 3rd day of March 1983 complained of in the said Appeal be, and the same is hereby, Reversed save for legal aid taxation of the Respondents' Costs and that the Order of Mr. Justice Webster of the 26th day of October 1982 be, and the same is hereby, Restored: And it is further Ordered, That the Respondents' Costs in respect of the said Appeal to this House be taxed in accordance with Schedule 2 to the Legal Aid Act 1974: And it is further Ordered, That the Appellants' Costs in the Court of Appeal and in this House be paid out of the Legal Aid Fund pursuant to section 13 of the Legal Aid Act 1974, the amount of such last-mentioned Costs to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments: And it is also further Ordered, That the Cause be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice to do therein as shall be just and consistent with this Judgment.

Cler: Parliamentor: