In this case, where the facts are simple, but the relevant statutory provisions are a maze, I content myself with saying that I think the judgments of the majority of the Court of Appeal on when the imported timber ceased to be cargo, and whether the port of Cardiff and Penarth includes the vicinity thereof, are clear, convincing and correct; and I should like to adopt them as my own.
I would therefore dismiss the appeal.
Viscount Dilhorne
My Lords,
The respondents, John Bland & Co., Ltd., are timber merchants and importers. Their timber yard is outside but, it is common ground, in the vicinity of the dock estates at Cardiff. The other respondents are also timber importers. Three of them have their yards in the dock estates. The yards of the other three are outside the dock estates, but in their vicinity.
Section 1(1) of the Docks and Harbours Act, 1966, so far as material, reads as follows: -
"No person shall engage any other person for employment, or employ any other person, as a dock worker in a port specified in Schedule I this Act unless he holds a licence for the purpose and except in accordance with the terms of the licence ..."
Cardiff is one of the ports listed in the Schedule.
Section 2(2) of the Act provides that for the purposes of the Act the area of a port shall, subject to the power of the Minister to vary its limits, be taken to be the area of the port as designated for the purposes of any labour scheme for the time being applicable to the port, and by section 58 a "labour scheme" is defined as meaning a scheme for the time being in force under the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1946.
The labour scheme applicable to the port of Cardiff is the Dock Workers Employment Scheme, 1967, made under that Act and to be found in Schedule 2 of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) (Amendment) Order, 1967, (S.I. 1967 No. 1252). It came into force on the 18th September, 1967.
Clause 1(3) of the Scheme states that it relates to the ports named in the Appendix of the Scheme. Cardiff is one of those ports. The Appendix ends with the following words: -
"In this Appendix 'port' means the area of that port as laid down by or under any Act of Parliament, Order-in-Council, provisional Order or any instrument made under an enactment passed or made with reference to that port, except where otherwise defined for the purposes of any dock labour scheme referred to in clause 1(3) of the Scheme, in which case it shall have the meaning set out in that dock labour scheme".
In relation to Cardiff the dock labour scheme referred to in clause 1(3) is the approved dock labour scheme for that port under the Essential Work (Dock Labour) Orders, 1943 to 1945 (clause 1(3)(b).
A dock labour scheme for the South Wales ports was made under the Essential Work (Dock Labour) Order, 1941. Under the heading "Dock Labour Scheme for the South Wales Ports" appear the words: -
"The Ports and the Areas covered by the Scheme are set out in the Appendix".
That Appendix reads as follows: -
"For the purposes of the South Wales Dock Labour Scheme, the expression 'Port' shall include the following places:
" (1) Cardiff and Penarth - the whole of the Dock Estates.
" (2) Newport - The Alexandra Docks (North and South), New River Wharf (Great Western Railway Co.), Jacks Pill, Victoria, Ponty-pool and Ebbw Vale Wharves (Richard Thomas & Co. Ltd.), Moderator Wharves (Robert Gilchrist & Co. Ltd.) and Great Western Wharf (Basic Slag and Phosphate Co.'s Ltd.)
" (3) Barry - The Nos. 1 and 2 Docks (including Timber Ponds) Basin (No. 3 Dock) and all warehouses, quays, open storage places and timber yards in the Dock Area.
" (4) Port Talbot - All the Dock Estate.
" (5) Swansea - King's, Queens, Prince of Wales, South and North Docks and River Wharves Seaward of New Cut Bridge and Swansea Bay; and
" (6) Llanelly - All the Dock Estate".
It was vigorously contended on behalf of the appellant that the Appendix did not contain an exhaustive definition of the ports. In Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps[1], Lord Watson said:[2]
"The word 'include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word 'include' is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to 'mean and include' and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions".
The Appendix was intended to define the ports and areas covered by the Scheme. It was not intended to enlarge the meaning of any words or to add to the natural significance of any word. In my opinion, it was not only intended to but does in fact exhaustively define the areas at each of the ports covered by the Scheme.
In my opinion, the word "port" in section 1(1) of the 1966 Act must consequently be construed as meaning in relation to Cardiff the whole of the dock estates.
Section 1(1) in relation to Cardiff does not, however, only apply to the dock estates, for by section 58(4) of the 1966 Act the reference in that subsection to a port has to be interpreted as including a reference to any place in the vicinity of that port.
So in relation to Cardiff, section 1(1) prohibits the employment by an unlicensed employee of any person as a dock worker in the dock estates or in their vicinity.
John Bland & Co. Ltd are unlicensed employers and so, if they employ a dock worker in their yard, they are in breach of section 1(1) and commit a criminal offence punishable with a fine not exceeding £500 (section 1(4).)
Section 58 of the Act defines a "dock worker" as a "person employed or to be employed on dock work", and section 51 enables the question whether any work is dock work to be referred to an industrial tribunal. The question whether work at their yard was dock work was referred by John Bland & Co. Ltd. On such a reference any person who employs others on work of that description is entitled to appear and be heard, and if he does appear, the decision of the tribunal will be binding on him. The other respondents did appear before the tribunal and were joined as parties in the Court of Appeal.
Clause 10(1) of the Dock Workers' Employment Scheme, 1967, reads as follows: -
"No person other than a registered employer and the National Board" (the National Dock Board) "shall engage for employment or employ any worker on dock work nor save as hereafter in the Scheme provided shall a registered employer engage for employment or employ a worker on dock work unless that worker is a registered dock worker".
Breach of this provision is also a criminal offence, punishable in the case of an individual with imprisonment or a fine or both, and in the case of a body corporate with a fine.
John Bland & Co. Ltd. as unlicensed employers are in breach of section 1(1) of the 1966 Act if any of their workmen in their yard are employed on dock work, and also, if their workmen are so employed, as unregistered employers in breach of clause 10(1) of the Scheme if that covers areas in the vicinity of the dock estates.
Section 58 of the 1966 Act defines "dock work" in relation to any port as meaning "work which is treated for the purposes of any labour scheme as dock work at that port". So the question whether there is a breach of section 1(1) and also of clause 10(1) depends on whether work in John Bland & Co.'s yard was treated for the purposes of the Dock Workers' Employment Scheme 1967, as dock work at Cardiff.
At Cardiff, as I have said, the Scheme covers and only covers the dock estates. There is no provision in the Scheme or in the Act under which it was made similar to section 58(4) of the 1966 Act bringing in to the area covered by the Scheme places in the vicinity, and I doubt whether under the powers given by the 1946 Act and in particular in view of section 1(6) of that Act, it would be intra vires to make a scheme which applied to areas outside, but in the vicinity of a port.
It follows that the words "places or premises to which the Scheme relates" in the definition of "dock work" must be interpreted in relation to Cardiff as meaning places or premises in the dock estates, and that the effect of section 58(4) is negatived by the definition of "dock work" Even if the work done by their workmen in their yard would be classified as dock work if done in the dock estates, it means that neither section 1(1) nor clause 10(1) apply to work in the yard of John Bland & Co Ltd. or to the work in the yards of the other respondents outside the dock estates, and that neither John Bland & Co. Ltd. nor they are in breach of these provisions.
The respondents also contended that work in their yard was not ordinarily performed by dock workers. "Dock worker" in the Scheme has the meaning assigned to it in the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1946, clause 2(1), and section 6 of that Act defines "dock worker" as meaning: -
"a person employed or to be employed in, or in the vicinity of, any port on work in connection with the loading, unloading, movement or storage of cargoes, or work in connection with the preparation of ships or other vessels for the receipt or discharge of cargoes or for leaving port".
To be a dock worker a person must be employed or to be employed in, or in the vicinity of a port. If the Scheme relates only to a port, and in the case of Cardiff to the dock estates, the words "in the vicinity of" are otiose. Their inclusion in the definition of "dock worker" cannot operate to extend the ambit of the Scheme. It is not at first sight easy to see the reason for their inclusion. Our attention was, however, drawn to the Dock Labour Scheme for the Port of London. There "port" is defined as meaning the Port of London as defined in the Port of London Acts 1920 to 1935, and in addition for the purposes of the Dock Labour Scheme to be deemed to include the premises in or in the vicinity of the Port of any Port Transport Employer carrying on Port Transport in a Port Transport Undertaking. Whether such a definition is within the powers given by the 1946 Act, which itself defines the word "port", is not a question that arises for decision now. It may be that similar definitions, including areas in the vicinity of ports are included in other dock labour schemes, and that it was on this account and in order to make it clear that a person working in the vicinity of a port where the vicinity was deemed to be included in the port was a dock worker that these words were inserted in the definition.
It was repeated in the proviso to clause 1(3) of the Dock Workers' Employment Scheme, 1967, it being provided that the scheme should not apply to a dock worker at any port unless he came within the definition. Such a proviso cannot, in my view, be interpreted as extending the scope of the Scheme.
Clause 1(3) states that the scheme is to apply to the same classes or descriptions of dock workers as immediately before the operation of the Dock Workers' (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1947, were included in any dock labour scheme or port registration scheme then in operation. It may have been thought that possibly the definition in some of these schemes was more extensive than that of the 1946 Act, and that the proviso was inserted ex abundanti cautela. However, this may be, as I have said, the terms of the proviso cannot and do not extend the Scheme.
I now come to the question whether the work done in the yard of John Bland & Co. Ltd. is work "in connection with the loading, unloading, movement or storage of cargoes" "Cargo" is defined in section 6 of the 1946 Act as including "anything carried or to be carried in a ship or other vessel", a definition repeated in section 58 of the 1966 Act.
Since 1965 the system of work at Cardiff is that timber is unloaded from a ship on to bearers on the quayside It is taken from there by fork lift to an area of about 33 acres in the dock estates rented by Fletchers Wharves, Ltd., where it is stored and where it may remain for periods in excess of 24 hours and sometimes as long as three months. It is taken away from this storage area in lorries. All the work of unloading the timber from a ship and moving it to Fletchers' premises and loading it there on to lorries is done by registered dock workers Timber is taken in the lorries to John Bland & Co.'s yard and there piled.
The definition of "cargo" is not expressed to include anything which has been carried in a ship or vessel. If it had been, then anyone who loaded, unloaded, moved or stored anything which had been so carried would, provided he satisfied the other requirements of the definition of "dock worker", be covered by it, but, although there is no express inclusion of anything which has been carried in the definition of "cargo", it would be wrong to regard goods as ceasing to be properly described as cargo directly they are over the ship's side. In my opinion, goods which had been brought in a ship to a port would still be properly described and referred to as cargo while being unloaded, moved, and if the goods are stored after being unloaded, while being stored. The industrial tribunal expressed the opinion that the timber has ceased to be cargo when stacked in the off-quay storage area, i.e. on the ground rented by Fletchers. While they may be right in this, I prefer not to express any opinion on the point for the question we have to decide is not when the timber ceased to be cargo, but whether on arrival and while in John Bland & Co.'s yard, it can properly be described as cargo.
In my opinion, when taken from the rented area in the dock estates, it may be, as I have said, three months after storage there and delivered to John Bland & Co.'s yard and the yards of the other respondents whether in or outside the dock estates, it cannot properly be so described.
Some reliance was sought to be placed on the fact that in the Dock Labour (Compulsory Registration) Order, 1940, Port of Cardiff and Penarth Amended Scheme which came into force on the 4th January, 1943, the Schedule stated inter alia that Port Transport Work at the Ports of Cardiff and Penarth should include "handling sawn timber up to and including piling in yard ..." and that in the amended definition of "dock work" for the purposes of the Dock Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1947, it was stated that dock work in the ports of Cardiff and Penarth "shall comprise" (inter alia) "handling sawn timber up to and including piling in timber merchant's yard"
In my view, these definitions cannot affect the definition of "dock work" in the 1967 Scheme or the definition of "dock worker" in the 1966 Act. Under that Act a person is only a dock worker if he is doing work in connection with a cargo or preparing vessels or ships for the discharge or receipt of cargo. The proviso to clause 1(3) of the 1967 Scheme, to which I have already referred, makes it clear that it does not apply to a person unless he is so employed or to be employed
For these reasons John Bland & Co Ltd. and the other respondents do not require to be licensed under the 1966 Act or registered under the 1967 Scheme in respect of workers in their yards for, in my opinion, those workers are not dock workers as defined in the Scheme and 1946 Act and work in the yards outside the dock estates is not work at places or premises to which the Scheme relates.
In my opinion, this appeal should be dismissed.
Lord Pearson
My Lords, I concur, and would dismiss the appeal.
Lord Diplock
My Lords,
I had prepared a speech setting out my reasons for coming to the same conclusions as your Lordships and the majority of the Court of Appeal upon the cargo point and the vicinity point. These points depend upon the construction of a statute and of a statutory scheme.
What matters in a case of this kind is that the decision of this House should result in the meaning of the legislation being certain.
The reasons for dismissing the appeal on both points which I had drafted where in substance the same as those which will be expressed by my noble and learned friend, Lord Cross of Chelsea, although the actual words that I had used to express them inevitably differed from those which appear in his speech. Lest unintended semasiological distinctions between the wording of our speeches should be used in future cases to cloud the meaning of the statute or the scheme, I am content to adopt as my own the reasoning of my noble and learned friend, Lord Cross of Chelsea.
Lord Cross of Chelsea
My Lords,
The question at issue in this case is whether the stacking at the yard of the respondents, John Bland and Co. Ltd., which lies just outside the boundary of the Cardiff docks, of timber which has been brought to Cardiff by sea, has lain for a time at Fletchers' storage area within the docks, and has been brought from there to the respondents' yard by lorry, is "dock work" within the meaning of the Docks and Harbours Act, 1966. By section 58(1) of that Act "dock work" is defined as meaning in relation to any port work which is treated for the purpose of any labour scheme as dock work at that port, and "labour scheme" is defined as meaning a scheme for the time being in force under the Dock Workers' (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1946. By section 1(1) of that Act the Minister is given power to make schemes for ensuring the greater regularity of employment of dock workers and for securing that an adequate number of dock workers is available for the efficient performance of their work. Section 1(6) provides that such a scheme may relate to any port or ports in Great Britain or to any part of any such port, and for every port or part of a port to which it relates either to dock workers generally or to any class or description of such workers. Section 6 contains the following definitions:
" ' Cargo' includes anything carried or to be carried in a ship or other vessel;
" ' Dock worker' means a person employed or to be employed in, or in the vicinity of, any port on work in connection with the loading, unloading, movement or storage of cargoes, or work in connection with the preparation of ships or other vessels for the receipt or discharge of cargoes or for leaving port;
"' Port' includes any place at which ships are loaded or unloaded."
It is clear from this definition that a man is not a dock worker for the purpose of the Act or of any scheme made under the Act if the work on which he is engaged is not work in connection with "cargo"; and the first point which arises for decision in this case - and which is independent of the terms of the relevant scheme - is whether timber which has arrived by lorry at John Bland's yard and is being stacked there is "cargo" within the meaning of the 1946 Act. Assuming that it is "cargo", the further question which arises is whether the fact that John Bland's yard is not within the area of the Cardiff docks prevents the relevant scheme applying to it. There is no doubt that the yard is in the "vicinity" of the port and that the Minister by reason of the definition of "dock worker" could have made a scheme which extended to men engaged in the appropriate work at the yard. It is said, however, that by reason of the definition of "port" and of "dock work" contained in it the relevant scheme is confined to work done within the dock area.
The tribunal decided both points in favour of the respondents. The Divisional Court decided the cargo point in favour of the Board, but the vicinity point in favour of the respondents. In the Court of Appeal the Master of the Rolls was in favour of the Board on both points, but the majority - Fenton Atkinson and Megaw L.JJ - were in favour of the respondents on both points.
I will deal first with the "cargo" point. The Divisional Court reasoned in this way. "Cargo" is defined as anything "carried or to be carried" in a ship. The words "carried in a ship" in the context in which they are used are clearly not confined to things which are actually being carried in a ship, but cover things which have been carried in a ship. So if you read the definition of "cargo" with the definition of "dock worker", you find that a dock worker is a person employed or to be employed in, or in the vicinity of, any port on work (inter alia) in connection with the unloading, movement or storage of anything which has been carried in a ship. So long, therefore, as the thing in connection with which the man is working can still be identified as having been at any time in the past carried in a ship, it is "cargo" for the purpose of the definition even though having regard to what has happened to it since it left the ship and the time that has elapsed since it left the ship, no one - as a matter of the ordinary use of the English language - would dream of still describing it as cargo. I cannot agree that the definition of "cargo" in the Act of 1946 obliges one to depart from the ordinary meaning of the word so far as concerns anything which has been carried in a ship. In ordinary parlance all things carried in a ship do not automatically cease to be cargo as soon as the ship berths and they are taken out of her. Depending on how they are dealt with, they may continue to be fairly describable as "cargo" for a period - in some cases possibly a considerable period - after they have left the ship. On the other hand, goods which are to be carried on a ship - prospective cargo - are not so naturally described as "cargo", and that perhaps is why the legislature thought it necessary to make it clear by express words that "cargo" in this Act was to include prospective cargo. With regard to goods which have been unloaded from a ship, one has - as I see it - to ask oneself whether what has been done with them up to the time when the question whether they are still cargo has to be answered can fairly be regarded as ancillary to and in a broad sense part of their carriage by sea. In any given case it may be difficult to decide where to draw the line. That difficulty is indeed illustrated in this case by the fact that Fenton Atkinson L.J. considered that this timber remained cargo until it was loaded on to John Bland's lorry at Fletchers' storage area, whereas the tribunal thought that it ceased to be cargo when it was stored in that area. Your Lordships are not called upon to express any opinion on that point and, indeed, the materials before us are not adequate to enable us to do so. But it is, to my mind, clear that this timber was at all events no longer "cargo" when it arrived at John Bland's yard and was unloaded and stacked there.
In order to decide the "vicinity" point it is necessary to consider some of the provisions of the relevant scheme, i.e., the Dock Workers' Employment Scheme, 1967, set out in Schedule 2 to the Dock Workers' (Regulation of Employment) (Amendment) Order, 1967, which replaced an earlier scheme made in 1947.
Clause 1(3) of the Scheme provides - so far as it is relevant to this case - as follows:
"The Scheme shall relate to the ports set out in Appendix 1 hereto and at each such port it shall apply to the same classes or descriptions of dock work and dock workers as, immediately before the coming into operation of the said Scheme of 1947, were included in any dock labour Scheme or port registration scheme then in operation in respect of that port, that is to say - ....
"(b) at each of the other ports, the approved dock labour scheme for that port under the Essential Work (Dock Labour) Orders 1943 to 1945 or, as the case may be, the port registration scheme approved as respects that port under the Dock Labour (Compulsory Registration) Order 1940.
"Provided that the Scheme shall not apply to a dock worker at any port unless he is employed or registered for employment in, or in the vicinity of, that port on work in connection with the loading, unloading, movement or storage of cargoes, or work in connection with the preparation of ships or other vessels for the receipt or discharge of cargoes or for leaving port".
Cause 2 contains a number of definitions of which the following are material:
"' The Act' means the Dock Workers' (Regulation of Employment) Act 1946;
" ' Cargo' and 'dock worker' have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Act.
" ' Dock work' means operations at places or premises to which the Scheme relates, ordinarily performed by dock workers of the classes or descriptions to which the Scheme applies".
Clause 10(1):
"No person other than a registered employer and the National Board shall engage for employment or employ any worker on dock work, nor save as hereafter in the Scheme provided shall a registered employer engage for employment or employ a worker on dock work unless that worker is a registered dock worker.
"(2) It is hereby declared that a contravention of any of the provisions of the preceding paragraph is an offence as provided in section 1(5) of the Act".
Appendix 1 lists a number of ports, arranged in groups, to which the Scheme relates. Group M., headed "South Wales Ports", includes "(2) Cardiff and Penarth". At the end of the list there follow these words:
"In this Appendix 'port' means the area of that port as laid down by or under any Act of Parliament, Order-in-Council, provisional order or any instrument made under an enactment passed or made with reference to that port, except where otherwise defined for the purposes of any dock labour scheme referred to in clause 1(3) of the Scheme, in which case it shall have the meaning set out in that dock labour scheme".
There was a Dock Labour Scheme for the South Wales Ports made under the Essential Work (Dock Labour) Order, 1941, and continued in force by the Essential Work (Dock Labour) Order, 1943, as though made thereunder (which I will call the "local scheme"), and which it is common ground is the document to which one is directed to turn by clause 1(3) of the Scheme and by the note at the end of Appendix 1. The local scheme starts with the words:
"The Ports and Areas covered by this Scheme are set out in the Appendix".
The Appendix, so far as relevant, says:
"For the purposes of the South Wales Ports Dock Labour Scheme, the expression 'Port' shall include the following places - (1) Cardiff and Penarth - The whole of the Dock Estates".
In order to discover - for the purposes of the 1967 Scheme - the classes or descriptions of dock work and dock workers included in the local scheme immediately before the original Scheme made under the 1946 Act came into operation, one is sent on to the relevant Port Registration Scheme - for the local scheme says that "port transport worker" means "a person engaged in port transport work, who is registered in the live register"; that "port transport work" has the meaning assigned to it in the Port (Transport) Registration Scheme; and that "Port Registration Scheme" means "a scheme approved by the Minister under the Dock Labour (Compulsory Registration) Order, 1940; and as amended in accordance with the Essential Work (Dock Labour) Order, 1941". The Port Registration Scheme for the port of Cardiff and Penarth provided that "Port Transport Work" had the meaning set out in the Schedule and that "port transport worker" meant a person engaged in "Port transport work who is registered in the live register". That schedule was itself revised on 27th June, 1947 (with the substitution of the expression "Dock Work" for "Port Transport Work") for the purpose of applying to the original Scheme made under the 1946 Act which came into operation on 28th June, 1947. The schedule, as revised, after the heading "Dock Work at the Ports of Cardiff and Penarth shall comprise" sets out a number of types of work, including "3. Handling sawn timber up to and including piling in timber merchant's yard".
In order to understand the vicinity point one has to grope one's way through this maze of referential statutory provisions, but in the end the points which emerge for decision are, as I see them, short ones.
Despite the argument of counsel for the Board, I have no doubt that the words "the whole of the Dock estates", which are used with reference to the port of Cardiff and Penarth in the appendix to the local scheme and are imported into the 1967 scheme by the note at the end of Appendix 1, are an exhaustive definition and that when the 1967 scheme speaks of the Port of Cardiff and Penarth, it does not include land outside the dock estates even though in their vicinity. That conclusion is not, however, in itself sufficient to decide the "vicinty" point in favour of the respondents, for the Minister in making a scheme under the 1946 Act in relation to a port has power by reason of the definition of "dock worker" in the Act to make the scheme apply to work of the appropriate character performed in the vicinity of the port to which the scheme relates. The scheme of 1967 reproduces the definition of "dock worker" contained in the 1946 Act, and in the courts below the appellant contended that the proviso to clause 1(3) was not a limiting, but an extending proviso equivalent to a direction that the scheme should apply to all dock workers at any port if they were employed in, or in the vicinity of, the port. The argument found favour with the Master of the Rolls, but it was not relied on before us. I have no doubt that the proviso is a limiting provision - probably inserted ex abundanti cautela in case one or more of the schemes brought into the 1967 scheme by reference for the purpose of deciding the classes or descriptions of dock workers to which it applied at a particular port might define "dock workers" in terms wider than the definition in the 1946 Act. Although, however, the proviso is a limiting proviso, it does repeat the reference to the vicinity of the port contained in the 1946 Act, and I do not think that there is anything in the references to dock workers or dock work in the local scheme and the port registration scheme which is necessarily inconsistent with the application of the 1967 scheme to work done not within but in the vicinity of the port. But the rock upon which the appellant's case founders is, to my mind, the definition of "dock work" in the 1967 scheme. That is, as I have said, "operations at places or premises to which the Scheme relates, ordinarily performed by dock workers of the classes or descriptions to which the Scheme applies". If "the places or premises to which the scheme relates" mean the area of the port, then the work in question in this case - even if it was work in connection with cargoes - would not be "dock work" for the purposes of the scheme, and John Bland would be entitled to employ men to do it who were not registered dock workers. By virtue of the definition of "dock work", the words "dock worker" in the scheme would have been limited, in the case of any port the definition of which did not include its vicinity, to men doing dock work in the port area. It is not easy to see why, if the draftsman of the scheme intended "dock work" to be limited to work done within the port area, he did not say so in terms instead of using the phrase "places or premises to which the scheme relates". But it is even more difficult to see what else he could have meant. The appellant argued that "places or premises to which the Scheme relates" mean "places or premises in, or in the vicinity of, the port where dock workers to whom the scheme relates are employed". But I find it very difficult to think that anyone who wanted to describe the places in which work done could constitute "dock work" by reference to the definition of "dock workers" would have set about doing it in this way.
So even apart from the consideration that this scheme makes it a criminal offence to employ on "dock work" anyone who is not registered as a "dock worker", I would hold that the respondents are right on the "vicinity" point as well as on the "cargo" point. But this conclusion is, to my mind, much strengthened by the provisions contained in clause 10 of the scheme. In view of them this scheme should, I think, be construed so far as possible in such a way that an employer of labour can know before he employs a man on any work whether or not the work is "dock work" But if the appellant is right on the "vicinity" point, he would not know that in any case in which it was open to doubt whether or not the place where the man was to be employed was or was not in the "vicinity" of the port.
I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed with costs
