Die
Lunae, 20°
Aprilis 1953
Parliamentary
Archives,
HL/PO/JU/4/3/1022
HOUSE OF LORDS
Lord
Normand
Lord
Oaksey
Lord
Morton
of
Henryton
Lord Reid
Lord
Cohen
THOMAS
v.
MARSHALL (Inspector of
Taxes)
20th April 1953.
Lord
Normand
MY LORDS,
I have
had the advantage of reading the Opinion about to be delivered
by
my noble and learned friend, Lord Morton of Henryton, and I
agree
with him that this appeal must be dismissed for the reasons
given by him.
He has quoted and commented upon certain
observations made by me in
St. Aubyn v. Attorney-General
[1952] A.C., 15. I must confess that I there
used language of
a breadth which lends itself to misunderstanding and that
I ought
to have expressly qualified my words in the manner which my
noble
and learned friend indicates.
Lord
Morton of Henryton
MY LORDS,
My noble
and learned friend, Lord Oaksey, has asked me to say that he
concurs
in the Opinion which I am about to deliver.
Lord
Morton of Henryton
MY LORDS,
The
question which arises on this appeal is whether interest upon
two
Post Office Savings Bank accounts, one in the name of the
Appellant's son
Michael, and the other in the name of the
Appellant's daughter Heather,
and interest upon two holdings of
£1,000 3 per cent. Defence Bonds, in the
names of Michael
and Heather respectively, ought to be treated, for all the
purposes
of the Income Tax Acts, as the income of the Appellant.
The
relevant facts are fully set out in the Case Stated and may
be
summarised as follows: —
On the
20th December, 1933, a Post Office Savings Bank account was
opened
by or on behalf of the Appellant in the name of Michael (born
8th
September, 1933) with a deposit of £50, and on the 28th May,
1936, another
Post Office Savings Bank account was opened by or
on behalf of the Appellant
in the name of Heather (born 1st
February, 1936) with a deposit of £50.
Thereafter the
Appellant paid further sums into the same bank for each
of his
children. Various sums were drawn from the accounts from time
to
time and were expended for the children's benefit. On 31st
December,
1948, Michael's account was in credit £844 9s.
0d. and Heather's account was
in credit £844 8s. 3d. In the
year 1945 the Appellant bought £1,000 3 per
cent. Defence
Bonds for each of the two children. All the sums paid into
the
children's bank accounts, and the said Defence Bonds, were
absolute
and unconditional gifts made by the Appellant to his
children.
The
Inspector of Taxes treated the interest upon the two Savings
Bank
accounts, exclusive of interest upon interest, and the
interest upon the two
2
holdings
of Defence Bonds as being income of the settlor for the purposes
of
the Income Tax Acts. This he did in reliance upon the terms of
section 21
of the Finance Act, 1936. That section provides as
follows: —
By
subsection (1)—" Where, by virtue or in consequence of any
settlement
" to which this section applies and during the
life of the settlor, any income
" is paid to or for the
benefit of a child of the settlor in any year of assessment,
"
the income shall, if at the commencement of that year the child was
an
" infant and unmarried, be treated for all the purposes of
the Income Tax
" Acts as the income of the settlor for that
year and not as the income of any
" other person."
By
subsection (9): —
" In
this section—
" (b)
the expression ' settlement' includes any disposition, trust.
"
covenant, agreement, arrangement or transfer of assets;
" (c)
the expression ' settlor', in relation to a settlement, includes
any
" person by whom the settlement was made or entered into
directly or
" indirectly. ..."
Counsel
for the Appellant sought to rely upon certain other subsections
in
the course of his argument, but I think it is unnecessary to
set them out, as I
understand that all your Lordships are of
opinion that they throw no light
upon the question which arises
for decision.
For the
sake of simplicity, I shall consider only the gifts to Michael, as
the
gifts to Heather stand on precisely the same footing.
Counsel
for the Appellant does not seek to draw any distinction between
the
interest on the Bank account in Michael's name and the interest on
the
Defence Bonds bought in Michael's name, and it is common
ground that if
the gifts of money and Defence Bonds were "
settlements " within the meaning
of section 21 of the Finance
Act, 1936, the Appellant was the settlor. It is
also common ground
that income was paid to Michael by virtue or in
consequence of
these gifts. Thus the only point for determination is—Were
the
absolute gifts in question " settlements " within the
meaning of section 21
of the Finance Act, 1936? This question has
been answered in the affirma-
tive successively by the
Commissioners, by Donovan, J. and by the Court of
Appeal.
My Lords,
I too would answer this question in the affirmative. It is true
that
an absolute gift of money or of an investment would not ordinarily
be
described as a " settlement ", but it is expressly
enacted that in section 21
the expression " settlement "
includes, inter alia, " Any . . . transfer of assets
".
For my part, I see no escape from the conclusion that the
Appellant made
a transfer of assets, in the ordinary meaning of
that phrase, when he used
his own money to make a payment into
Michael's bank account and to
purchase Defence Bonds in Michael's
name. Sir Andrew Clark, for the
Appellant, invited your Lordships
to put a limited and special meaning upon
this phrase. I shall
shortly examine his arguments, but it should be said at
once that
the matter is by no means free from authority.
In
Hood-Barrs v. C.I.R. 27 T.C., 385 the Court of Appeal
had to decide
whether a gift of shares by a father to each of his
two infant and unmarried
daughters was a "settlement"
within section 21 of the Act of 1936. The
Court uanimously held
that it was, because it was a " transfer of assets ",
and
declined to give that phrase a limited meaning. That decision
is not, of
course, binding upon your Lordships' House, but in my
view it was correct
and is indistinguishable from the present
case. It is, I think, unnecessary to
consider the decision in
Yates v. Starkey [1951] Ch. p. 465 as the facts
differed
widely from the facts of the present case, but Jenkins,
L.J. observed: " For
" their meaning "—i.e.
for the meaning of the words " settlement" and
"
settlor " in section 21—" I must go to the
definitions provided by subsection
" (9), construe those
definitions, and apply them according to their true
"
construction, however remote from the ordinary conceptions of '
settle-
" ' ment' or ' settlor' the content of the
definitions may in any given
" instance appear to be."
This observation, with which I agree, is particu-
3
larly
relevant to the argument presented by Sir Andrew Clark in the
present
case.
Sir
Andrew, while conceding that each of the gifts now in question
might
be described as a transfer of assets, if this phrase were to
be given its ordinary
meaning, contended that as the word "
settlement" was the only word used
in the charging subsection
(1), it was " the dominant word "; and that a
transaction
did not come within section 21 unless it was " something in
the
nature of a settlement". It follows, he said, that a
transaction which might
ordinarily be described as a transfer of
assets did not come within section
21 unless (a) it was
accompanied by some restraint on alienation, such as
would subject
the transferee to some action at law or in equity if he
attempted
to alienate the subject of the gift, or (b) the income and
the
capital of the subject of the gift were given to different
persons, or (c) the
legal title and the equitable interest
in the subject of the gift were conferred
on different persons. In
any one of these three cases, he said, and it may
be in other
cases, a transfer of assets would be something in the nature of
a
settlement, but an absolute and unconditional gift is the
antithesis of a
settlement and cannot be a " transfer of
assets" within the meaning of
section 21.
My Lords,
in the words used by Lord Greene, M.R. in Hood-Bans v.
C.I.R. 27
T.C. at p. 402, this is a " subversive suggestion " as to
the meaning
and operation of such an interpretation clause as
subsection (9) (b) and I
cannot accept it. The object of the
subsection is, surely, to make it plain that
in section 21 the
word " settlement" is to be enlarged to include
other
transactions which would not be regarded as "
settlements" within the
meaning which that word ordinarily
bears. Its effect is that wherever the
word " settlement"
occurs in section 21 one must read it as " settlement,
"
disposition, trust, covenant, agreement, arrangement or transfer of
assets ",
and if " by virtue or in consequence of"
any of these transactions or deeds
income is paid to or for the
benefit of a child of the settlor, section 21 comes
into
operation.
I can find
no context here which should lead your Lordships to give,
for
instance, the words " transfer of assets " any
meaning other than that which
they ordinarily bear, or to infuse
into them some flavour of the meaning
ordinarily given to the word
" settlement". Further, Sir Andrew's conten-
tion, if it
were accepted, would create grave uncertainty as to the
precise
content of each of the words used in subsection (9) (b).
What, for instance,
is a covenant " in the nature of a
settlement"? And what is the difference
between a "
settlement", in the ordinary meaning of that word and a trust
"
in the nature of a settlement". Sir Andrew submits that
uncertainty also
results if an absolute gift is held to fall
within section 21, for it may be a mat-
ter of great difficulty to
determine, in certain cases, whether income is paid to
or for the
benefit of a child of the settlor " by virtue or in consequence
of "
such a gift. For example, said counsel, if a father
gives his child a motor-car
or jewellery, and the child sells the
gift and invests the proceeds, is the income
from the investment
paid to the child " by virtue or in consequence of"
the
gift, or is it paid to him or her in consequence of the sale
of an asset
which belonged absolutely to the child?
My Lords,
I can find no force in this argument. It is true that
difficulties
may arise of the kind suggested by counsel. In each
case it will be for the
Commissioners to make a finding as to
whether the income in question was
or was not paid to or for the
benefit of the child " by virtue or in consequence
" of"
the settlement. These are not difficulties in construing the
section
but difficulties in applying it to the facts of particular
cases. Their existence
affords no reason for imparting uncertainty
into the meaning of the words
used in subsection (9) (b).
I must,
however, refer to certain authorities relied on by Sir Andrew
Clark
as supporting his argument. He first referred to the cases
of C.I.R. v.
Morton 1941 S.C., 467, Chamberlain v. C.I.R. (1943)
25 T.C., 317 and Lord
Vestey's Executors v. C.I.R. (1949) 31 T.C.,
1. These were all decisions as
to the effect of section 38 (2) of
the Finance Act, 1938. That section provided
that if and so long
as the terms of any settlement answered a particular
4
description,
any income arising under the settlement "from the property
"
comprised in the settlement" should be treated as the income of
the settlor,
and the definition subsection—section 41 (4)
(b)—is in substance the same
as section 21 (9) (b)
of the Act of 1936, except that the words " or transfer
of
assets " are omitted. Sir Andrew does not rely upon the
decisions in these
cases, but he does rely upon certain
observations which appear in the
judgments.
My Lords,
1 can derive no assistance from any of these observations. They
were
very fully analysed by Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R., in his judgment
in
the present case. I agree with that analysis and I need not repeat
it.
It is to be noted that the observations in question were not
directed to the
section now under consideration ; further, in each
of these cases it was unani-
mously held that there was a "
settlement," within the meaning of sections 38
and 41 (4) (b)
of the Act of 1938, and the attention of the Court of Session
in
Morton's case, and of this House in the cases of
Chamberlain and Vestey,
was directed to determining
what was " the property comprised in the
" settlement ".
Sir Andrew
next sought support from the case of St. Aubyn v. A.G.
[1952J
A.C., 15 and particularly from observations of Lord
Simonds and Lord
Normand as to the meaning of the words "
Where a person dying after the
" commencement of this Act has
made to a company to which this section
" applies a transfer
of any property " in section 46 of the Finance Act, 1940.
The
majority of this House decided that in paying cash for 100,000
prefer-
ence shares, for which he subscribed, the second Baron St.
Levan did not
" make a transfer of any property " to St.
Aubyn Estates Limited within the
meaning of section 46.
Lord
Simonds said, at page 32: " The first point arises on the
subscription
" by Lord St. Levan for 100,000 preference
shares. For these he paid cash
" according to the ordinary
use of language. Did he then ' transfer property '
" to the
company within the meaning of section 46? My Lords, I have no
"
hesitation in saying that the payment of cash to a company upon a
sub-
" scription for shares is not a transfer of property to
the company. No one,
" lawyer, business man or man in the
street, was ever heard to use such
" language to describe
such an act and I decline to stretch the plain meaning
" of
words in an Act of Parliament in order to comply with what is said to
be
" its purpose. . . . The question is not at what
transaction the section is,
" according to some alleged
general purpose, aimed but what transaction its
" language,
according to its natural meaning, fairly and squarely hits. Apply-
"
ing this, the one and only proper test, I say that when Lord St.
Levan paid
" for his shares he did not transfer property to
the company."
Lord
Normand said, at page 43: " The first point is whether Lord
"
St. Levan, when he paid £100,000 for the preference shares in
the company,
" made a transfer of property within the meaning
of section 46. My opinion
" is that ' transfer of property'
are not the usual words which would be
" naturally selected
to describe a payment of money, though it cannot be
" denied
that money is property or that payment is a transfer. I think that
if
" it had been intended to strike at money payments the
simple words necessary
" to make that intention clear would
have been added."
The
observations of Lord Simonds were clearly directed only to the
section
then under consideration and to the meaning of the words "
transfer of any
" property " in the context wherein they
then appeared. In my view they do
not assist the appellant in the
present case. On the contrary, I think that the
transaction in the
present case is one which the phrase " transfer of assets "
in
the section now under consideration " fairly and squarely hits."
It is no
doubt possible to read Lord Normand's observations as
referring generally
to the meaning of the phrase " transfer
of property ", but I feel sure that my
noble and learned
friend intended to deal only with the meaning and effect
of the
words " transfer of property " in section 46 of the Finance
Act, 1940,
and to concur with the view of Lord Simonds that Lord
St. Levan, in paying
cash for preference shares, did not transfer
property to the company within
the meaning of the section.
5
Finally,
Sir Andrew referred to a series of decisions upon the meaning of
the
word "settlement" in section 47 of the Bankruptcy Act,
1883. That
section provides as follows: —
"
47.--(1) Any settlement of property not being a settlement
made
"before and in consideration of marriage, or made in
favour of a pur-
" chaser or incumbrancer in good faith and
for valuable consideration,
" or a settlement made on or for
the wife or children of the settlor
" of property which has
accrued to the settlor after marriage in right of
" his wife,
shall, if the settlor becomes bankrupt within two years after
"
the date of the settlement, be void against the trustee in the
bank-
" ruptcy, and shall, if the settlor 'becomes bankrupt
at any subsequent
" time within ten years after the date of
the settlement, be void against
" the trustee in the
bankruptcy, unless the parties claiming under the
"
settlement can prove that the settlor was at the time of making the
"
settlement able to pay all his debts without the aid of the
property
" comprised in the settlement, and that the interest
of the settlor in
" such property had passed to the trustee
of such settlement on the
" execution thereof.
" (3)
' Settlement' shall for the purposes of this section include
any
"conveyance or transfer of property."
Section
168 provides—
" In
this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—
" '
Property' includes money, goods, things in action, land, and every
"
description of property, whether real or personal and whether
situate
" in England or elsewhere; also, obligations,
easements, and every des-
" cription of estate, interest and
profit, present or future, vested or
" contingent, arising
out of or incident to property as above defined."
In Re
Player \ 5 Q.B.D. 682 it was held by a Divisional Court
(Mathew,
Cave and Wills JJ.) that a gift of £650 made by the
bankrupt to his son, in
order to pay for the stock in trade
necessary to enable the son to commence
a business, was not a "
settlement" within section 47. Cave, J. after setting
out the
history of the earlier statutes dealing with this matter, said at
p.
686:-
" It
is contended that by virtue of the interpretation clause in the
"
Act of 1883, when applied to s. 47, every gift by a father to
children,
" if followed within two years by the father's
bankruptcy, is within that
" section, and that a son can be
compelled to refund all moneys given
" to him within that
period for his maintenance or advancement in life.
" It seems
to me a very strong thing to say that a definition of ' property '
"
not to be found in the section itself which deals with this matter,
but
" found in the interpretation clause applying to the
whole Act, should
" have an effect going so much further than
the legislature has gone
" before. I do not think it was
intended that s. 47 should have that
" effect. One must look
at the whole of the language of the section
" in applying
that definition, and consider what is meant by ' settlement'.
"
Although ' settlement', by the 3rd subsection ' shall for the
purposes
" of this section include any conveyance or transfer
of property', yet I
" think the view of my brother Mathew is
well founded, and that a
" settlement in the ordinary sense
of the word is intended. The transac-
" tion must be in the
nature of a settlement, though it may be effected
" by a
conveyance or transfer. The end and purpose of the thing must
"
be a settlement, that is, a disposition of property to be held for
the
" enjoyment of some other person. Thus a purchase by the
father of
" shares, which are registered in the son's name,
and upon which the
" son receives the dividends, is within
the statute. But where the gift
" is of money to be expended
at once, the transaction is not, in my
" opinion, within s.
47 of the Act of 1883. It would not have been
" within the
Act of 1849, and I do not feel bound by reason of the
"
interpretation clause in the Act of 1883, the effect of which is, I
think,
" restricted toy the terms of s. 47 itself, to put a
construction upon the
" words of that section which has never
been put upon similar words
6
"
before the Act of 1883 was passed, and which would bring about such
"
serious and far-reaching consequences."
In Re
Vansittart [1893] 1 Q.B., 181 Vaughan Williams, J. adopted
the
reasoning just quoted, and held that a gift of jewellery by
the bankrupt
to his wife within two years of his bankruptcy was a
" settlement" within
s. 47 and therefore void against
the trustee in the bankruptcy, because
" the donor
contemplated the retention by his wife of the present which
"
he gave her." In Re Tankard [1899] 2 Q.B., 57 Wright J.
followed the
two cases just cited, and in Re Plummer [1900]
2 Q.B., 790 the Court of
Appeal approved of all three cases. In
the last-mentioned case Lord
Alverstone M.R. observed: "
There are two lines of cases bearing upon
" the subject,
which I will indicate as follows. If there is a gift by a
"
father to a son of money or proceeds of property which can be
traced,
" and the money or proceeds is or are intended to be
retained or preserved
" as the property of the donee, that
money or those proceeds will be
" property in ' settlement'.
On the other hand, if there is a gift of money
" or proceeds,
but it is not intended that the money or the proceeds shall
"
be retained by the donee in the form of money, but shall be
expended
" at once, that will not be a ' settlement'."
My Lords,
I give full weight to the fact that in s. 47 of the Bankruptcy
Act,
1883, the Legislature first used the word "settlement" and
then
defined it, in the same section, as including any transfer of
property, and
I would not seek to draw any distinction between the
phrase " transfer
"of property " and the phrase "
transfer of assets " which occurs in s. 21 (9)
of the Finance
Act, 1936. To this extent, the two sections resemble one
another,
and Sir Andrew Clark relies strongly upon the observation of
Cave
J. in Re Player, that to come within s. 47 " the
transaction must be
" in the nature of a settlement, though
it may be effected by a conveyance
" or transfer." I am
content to assume in favour of the Appellant that the four
cases
on s. 47 just cited were all rightly decided, and that the
observation just
quoted puts a correct construction on s. 47. In
my opinion, however,
these cases do not help the Appellant. In
none of them was it doubted
that an absolute gift could be a
"settlement" within s. 47, and in two
of them such a
gift was held to be a settlement. The Court, however,
felt able to
put some restriction upon the ordinary meaning of the words
"
transfer of property " by reason of the fact that the whole
object of the
section, as appeared from its terms, was to make
certain transactions
void as against the trustee in bankruptcy ;
and it was thought that a
transfer of money, which was to be at
once expended and could not be
traced, was not within the
intendment of the section. I can find no words
in s. 21 of the
Finance Act, 1936, which should lead your Lordships to
put a
limited meaning upon the words " transfer of assets," and
if and
so far as one can gather the intendment of s. 21 from its
wording, I think
it was intended to throw the net as widely as
possible, and to sweep in all
kinds of transactions which would
not ordinarily be regarded as settle-
ments, provided only that "
by virtue or in consequence" thereof any
income is paid to or
for the benefit of a child of the settlor.
In my
judgment the argument for the Appellant receives no countenance
from
the wording of section 21 or from any of the authorities relied
upon
by Counsel. I would dismiss the Appeal with costs.
Lord Reid
my
lords,
I concur.
Lord Cohen
my
lords,
I also concur.
(19379r)
Wt. 8218—43 35 5/53 D.L./PA
