United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

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either in directions to juries by individual judges, or in the more
considered pronouncements of the body of judges which preceded
the formal Court of Crown Cases Reserved. Expressions will he
found which indicate that to cause death by any lack of due care
will amount to manslaughter; but as manners softened and the law
became more humane a narrower criterion appeared. After all
manslaughter is a felony, and was capital, and men shrank from
attaching the serious consequences of a conviction for felony to
results produced by mere inadvertence. The stricter view became
apparent in prosecutions of medical men or men who professed
medical or surgical skill for manslaughter by reason of negligence.
As an instance I will cite R. v. Williamson 3 C. & P. 633 (1807)
where a man who practised as an accoucheur owing to a mistake
in his observation of the actual symptoms inflicted on a patient
terrible injuries from which she died. ' To substantiate the charge
" of manslaughter," Lord Ellenborough said, " the prisoner must
" have been guilty of criminal misconduct arising either from the
" grossest ignorance or the most criminal inattention." The word
" criminal" in any attempt to define a crime is perhaps not the
most helpful: but it is plain that the Lord Chief Justice meant
to indicate to the jury a high degree of negligence. So at a
much later date in Rex v. Bateman 19 Cr. App. Rep. 8
(1925) a charge of manslaughter was made against a qualified
medical practitioner in similar circumstances to those of
Williamson's case. In a considered judgment of the Court
the Lord Chief Justice, after pointing out that in a civil case
once negligence is proved the degree of negligence is irrele-
vant, said, " In a criminal Court, on the contrary, the amount
" and degree of negligence are the determining question. There
" must be mens rea." After citing Cahill v. Wright 6 E. & B. 891
(1856), a civil case, the Lord Chief Justice proceeds: " In explaining
" to juries the test which they should apply to determine whether
" the negligence in the particular case amounted or did not amount
" to a crime, judges have used many epithets such as ' culpable,'
" 'criminal' 'gross,' 'wicked,' clear,' 'complete.' But whatever
" epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or not in order
" to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that in the
" opinion of the jury the negligence of the accused went beyond
" a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed
" such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to
" a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment."
Here again I think with respect that the expressions used are
not, indeed they probably were not intended to be, a precise
definition of the crime. I do not myself find the connotations of
mens rea helpful in distinguishing between degrees of
negligence nor do the ideas of crime and punishment in them-
selves carry a jury much further in deciding whether in a
particular case the degree of negligence shown is a crime and
deserves punishment. But the substance of the judgment is most
valuable, and in my opinion is correct. In practice it has generally
been adopted by judges in charging juries in all cases of man-
slaughter by negligence, whether in driving vehicles or otherwise.
The principle to be observed is that cases of manslaughter in
driving motor cars are but instances of a general rule applicable
to all charges of homicide by negligence. Simple lack of care such
as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for purposes of the
criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high
degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is
established. Probably of all the epithets that can be applied
" reckless " most nearly covers the case. It is difficult to visualise
a case of death caused by " reckless " driving in the connotation
of that term in ordinary speech which would not justify a
conviction for manslaughter: but it is probably not all embracing
for reckless " suggests an indifference to risk whereas the accused
may have appreciated the risk and intended to avoid it and yet

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shown such a high degree of negligence in the means adopted to
avoid the risk as would justify a conviction. If the principle of
Bateman's case is observed it will appear that the law of man-
slaughter has not changed by the introduction of motor vehicles on
the road. Death caused by their negligent driving, though un-
happily much more frequent, is to be treated in law as death
caused by any other form of negligence: and juries should be
directed accordingly.

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makes criminal. If it were otherwise a man who killed another
while driving without due care and attention would ex necessitate
commit manslaughter. But as the summing-up proceeded the
learned Judge reverted to and I think rested the case on the prin-
ciples which have been just stated. On many occasions he directed
the attention of the jury to the recklessness and high degree of
negligence which the prosecution alleged to have been proved and
which would justify them in convicting the accused. On considera-
tion of the summing-up as a whole I am satisfied that the true
question was ultimately left to the jury, and that on the evidence
the verdict was inevitable. For these reasons I came to the con-
clusion that the appeal should be dismissed.

'

Lord Thankerton

MY LORDS,

I have had the privilege of considering the Opinion which has
just been delivered by the noble Lord on the Woolsack, and I
desire to express my complete concurrence with it.

Lord Wright

MY LORDS,

I also agree; and I am asked by my noble and learned friend
Viscount Finlay, who has also had the privilege of considering
the Opinion which has just been delivered, to say that he agrees.

Lord Roche

MY LORDS,
I also concur.