United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

The case appears to me an extremely clear one. The question is the construction of section 168 of the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897, which is set out on page 4 of the appellant's case—“All bonds, assignations, conveyances, instruments, agreements, receipts, or other writings made or granted by or to or in favour of the local authority under this Act shall be exempt from all stamp duties.” Now it is contended that the words “under this Act” relate to the local authority—that so long as the writings, deeds, and so on are made or granted by or to the local authority under that Act they enjoy the benefit of the exemption. In my opinion that is not the correct construction of the section. I think that in order to enjoy the exemption conferred the deeds must not merely be in favour of that authority, but they must be made or granted under the powers of the Act. It is not enough that the authority entrusted with the powers of that Act in some other capacity and for some other purpose has the deed. It is the same authority, but the deed in question is not one for the purposes of the Act in respect of which alone the exemption is granted.

I cannot put the matter more clearly than it is put in the words of the certificate granted by the Commissioners, which is quoted by the Lord President in his judgment. He says—“The Commissioners were of opinion when they considered the case that the feu-contract was chargeable with stamp duty in respect”—then follows a quotation from the certificate—“that the exemption from such duty contained in section 168 of the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1897 applied only to writings made or granted by, or to local authorities acting under and in pursuance of, the powers conferred by that Act, and that the said County Council in entering into the said feu-contract were not acting as a local authority under the said statute, and had no power under it to acquire land for the purpose of the housing of the working classes, or for any of the purposes set forth in Part III of the Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890 and the Housing, Town Planning, &c., Act 1909.” I agree with that entirely. That seems to me really to exhaust the subject. I cannot agree at all with the construction put upon the section in Lord Johnston's judgment, where he appears to restrict these words “under the said Act” to defining a local authority—that is to say, that so long as it is a local authority under that Act it does not matter whether the deed had any connection with the purposes of that Act. That seems to me to contradict the plain meaning of the section.

The rest of Lord Johnston's judgment is taken up with showing how closely connected the purposes of the Housing of the Working Classes Act may be said to be with the purposes of the Public Health Act. All that may be perfectly true, but it is quite irrelevant. It is absolutely impossible to say that this certificate was granted under the Public Health Act. It was granted under an Act relating to purposes closely connected, it may be, with public health, but it was not granted under that Act.

It is admitted that the case cited in 22 Rettie ( Lanarkshire County Council v. Inland Revenue, at p. 615, 32 S.L.R. 480) did not govern this case, and the matter seems so very clear that in spite of the extremely able argument we have listened to I think the appeal fails owing to its own inherent defect. For these reasons I think the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Viscount Haldane—On both points I agree, and I do not desire to add anything to what has been said from the Woolsack.

Lord Dunedin—I concur.

Lord Parmoor—1 concur.