United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

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URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1915/52SLR0910.html
Cite as: 52 ScotLR 910, [1915] UKHL 910

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SCOTTISH_SLR_House_of_Lords

Page: 910↓

House of Lords.

Monday, February 1, 1915.

(Before Earl Loreburn, Lords Atkinson, Parker, Sumner, and Parmoor.)

52 SLR 910

Maisel

v.

Financial Times, Limited.

( On Appeal From The Court Op Appeal In England.)

Subject_Reparation — Slander — Veritas — Innuendo — Proof of General Character.
Facts:

The appellant complained of certain Words as bearing the innuendo that he was of dishonest character. The respondents referred to a series of acts by the appellant, which they alleged proved his dishonesty. The appellant claimed to have these allegations struck out of the pleadings as irrelevant.

Held that as the appellant maintained that the statements complained of meant that he was a dishonest person, the respondents were entitled to prove him to be so in justification of their statements.

Headnote:

Their Lordships' judgment was delivered by

Judgment:

Earl Loreburn-It is not necessary to call upon counsel for the respondents in this case, because, in my opinion, the order

Page: 911↓

of the Court of Appeal is quite right. This is an action for libel setting out a statement about the arrest of the plaintiff upon a charge of fraud and other things about him. The plaintiff in his statement of claim interprets the libel by an innuendo. In the first place he says that in substance the acts referred to were dishonestly done, and in the second place he says that the libel in substance means that he, the plaintiff, was a man of dishonest character and unfit to be a director. Upon this the defendants justify and give particulars of other dishonest acts besides those referred to in connection with the arrest, by which they seek to establish that the plaintiff is a man of dishonest character and unfit to be a director by reason of various things he has done or that had occurred to him. The Court of Appeal thought this was right, because there were two distinct charges, according to the plaintiffs own interpretation, which were contained in this libel. Phillimore, L.J., says a few words which I will venture to repeat—“If the libel says of the plaintiff, ‘You did one specific act, you stole a hatchet,’ it is fair enough justification to say those words are true in their natural and ordinary meaning, ‘you did steal it.’ But if the allegation in the libel is an allegation of conduct, or life, or character, or the converse thing, then it is not enough to say the words are true. You have got to say the words are true because the plaintiff has done so and so. If the imputation is that the plaintiff is a thief, you have got to say it is true that he is a thief because he stole on this or that or the other occasion, or tried to steal on this, that, or the other occasion, and was only prevented by main force, or something of that kind.”

Now, inasmuch as by the construction which the plaintiff himself has placed upon the libel the defendants are sued for charging generally that he is a dishonest person (I am not using particular language, but in substance that he is a dishonest person), it is quite obvious that they are entitled to give particulars to show why they say that the plaintiff is a dishonest person, and for that reason I think that the appeal ought to be dismissed.

Lords Atkinson, Parker, Sumner, and Parmoor agreed.

Appeal dismissed.

Counsel:

Counsel for the Appellant— Schwabe, K.C.— W. B. Odgers. Agent— W. G. A. Edwards, Solicitor.

Counsel for the Respondents— Duke, K.C.— H. Fraser. Agents— Nicholson, Graham, & Jones, Solicitors.
1915

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