United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Lord Chancellor (Loreburn)—These cases are difficult enough, and we are sometimes apt to forget that what is decided in the County Court is much more a question of fact than a question of law, and if it is a question of fact then it is for the County Court Judge to decide it.

There cannot be imagined a part of this difficult Act more difficult to determine upon than that which relates to what are injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of a man's employment. In the present case the only question decided in the Court of Appeal was that they would not disturb the finding of the learned County Court Judge upon the question whether this injury by accident arose out of the employment.

I think that Fletcher Moulton, L.J., who was the judge in the minority in the Court of Appeal, stated the law fairly enough, or rather stated what was the point of view from which a judge ought to approach cases of this kind. He said—“It is true that when we deal with the effect of natural causes affecting a considerable area, such as severe weather, we are entitled and bound to consider whether the accident arose out of the employment or was merely a consequence of the severity of the weather to which all persons in the locality, whether so employed or not, were equally liable. If it is the latter, it does not arise out of the employment, because the man is not specially affected by the severity of the weather by reason of his employment.”

When I turn to what the learned County Court Judge says, it may be possible, indeed it is possible, by a process of ingenious verbal criticism to apply the same kind of canon to these words as used in the old days to be applied by special demurrer to the pleading of either the plaintiff or the defendant. In substance the learned County Court Judge seems to me to have found that in this case the man was not specially affected by the severity of the weather by reason of his employment. It is quite unnecessary to scan with minuteness every phrase which he used, but in substance I think that this was what he decided. If so, I see nothing in the evidence which disentitled him to find that fact, and being so found as a fact, it is binding.

I will only say this further—to be perfectly strict and accurate it is somewhat lax to speak of this statute as though it referred to “an accident.” I am quite conscious that I myself, as well as others, have fallen into that lapsus linguce, but at times it may be apt to confuse one's idea of what is enacted in this particular Act of Parliament. The Act of Parliament does not speak of “an accident” it speaks of injury “by accident” arising out of and in the course of the employment. Therefore I shall move your Lordships to dismiss this appeal.

Lord Atkinson—I concur.

Lord Shaw—The findings of the learned County Court Judge are really two in number. First, negatively, he has found that this unfortunate man was not injured by accident arising out of his employment. Secondly, positively, he has found that being set to ordinary outdoor work he was injured by the severity of the weather. Both these findings are findings of facts, and I do not think that it is the province of a Court of Appeal to disturb such findings. I agree in the course proposed.

Lord Mersey—I agree.