United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Lord Chancellor (Loreburn)—In cases under this Act, in the same way as in cases under any other Act or at common law, the plaintiff must prove his case; and although he may establish a state of facts which leads one to think that his version is quite a possible version of what took place, he must do something more than show a state of facts which is consistent either with one view or with another view. I should myself greatly regret that we should come to this form of argument — that we should attempt to infer a conclusion of fact in one case from a comparison with other findings in other cases and upon other evidence; but that, I am sorry to say, is really the way in which the appellants here have been driven to eke out their contention. Findings of fact in one case are really no help in finding the facts in another, unless it be that they may illustrate the way in which learned judges are accustomed to look at evidence. Is there here any evidence in support of the finding of the learned County Court Judge? He says that the deceased man died “from apoplexy brought on by the strain while engaged in the heavy work of building the pack.” Was there any evidence to support the finding that the apoplexy was brought on by the strain? The only piece of evidence that has been referred to is this, that the doctor says that “the man's arteries, especially the arteries of the brain, had degenerated, and great effort in doing anything might cause them to rupture. On the other hand, they might have ruptured while he was asleep in bed. The arteries were in such a state that they might rupture with slight exertion or with no exertion at all.” It seems to me that in this state of facts, unfortunate as it may be for the deceased man and for those whom he has left behind him, we, as a court of justice, are bound to say that this state of facts is equally consistent with the one conclusion or with the other, and therefore the appellants have not made out their contention that this was a death from an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. It is, of course, a commonplace to say that one must be very sorry for people who suffer and get no redress, but we are bound to administer the law, and I think that we should be wanting in our duty if we did not do in cases of this kind what we are compelled to do in cases of another kind.

Earl of Halsbury—I am of the same opinion. Propositions must be proved in a court of law by proof of evidence, and that is not satisfied by surmise, conjecture, or guess.

Lord Atkinson concurred.

Lord Shaw—I am of opinion that this unfortunate man died of apoplexy. I do not think that it is proved in this case that there was any accident at all, or that there was any strain, ordinary or extraordinary, which caused the apoplexy to which he succumbed. I therefore say nothing with regard to the previous cases; but I hold, as the Earl of Halsbury has said, and as I expressed in the recent case of Marshall v. Owners of the Wild Rose, supra, p. 701, ( [1910] AC 486), that in the region of proof it is not legitimate to hold as sufficient what is mere conjecture.