United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

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URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1909/47SLR0557.html
Cite as: [1909] UKHL 557, 47 ScotLR 557

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SCOTTISH_SLR_House_of_Lords

Page: 557↓

House of Lords.

(On Appeal from the Court of Appeal in England.)

Thursday, May 20, 1909.

(Before the Lord Chancellor (Loreburn), Lords Macnaghten, Gorell, and Shaw of Dunfermline.)

47 SLR 557

Brook

v.

Meltham Urban District Council.

Subject_Local Government — Sewers — Duty to Receive Waste from Factories — Sufficiency of Purification Works to Deal with Waste — Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876 (39 and 40 Vict. cap. 75), sec. 7.
Facts:

The Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876, sec. 7, provides that every sanitary authority having sewers under their control shall give facilities for carrying into such sewers liquids from factories within their district, “provided also that no sanitary authority shall be required to give such facilities as aforesaid where the sewers of such authority are only sufficient for the requirements of their district.”

Manufacturers claimed to have waste liquids from their factories received into the sewers of a local authority. The actual drain pipes were admittedly large enough, but the sewerage system included purification works which were only sufficient for the other requirements of the district.

Held that “sewers” included the purification works which were part of the system through which the sewage flowed.

Guthrie, Craig, & Company v. Magistrates of Brechin, 1888, 25 S.L.R. 288, 15 R. 385, distinguished.

Headnote:

The appellants, who were Yorkshire manufacturers, claimed for an order against the Local Sanitary Authority (respondents) to allow the liquids from their factories to empty into the respondents' sewers. The County Court Judge held that certain outfall or purification works in the respondents' sewerage system were insufficient to receive the appellants' liquids, and dismissed the case on the ground that such works were “sewers” in the meaning of the proviso quoted supra. This order was reversed by the Divisional Court ( Channell and Sutton, JJ.), and restored by the Court of Appeal ( Vaughan Williams, Moulton, and Buckley, L.JJ.).

At the conclusion of the argument for the appellants their Lordships gave judgment as follows:—

Judgment:

Lord Chancellor (Loreburn)—In my opinion the Court of Appeal came to the right conclusion in this case. Section 7 of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act of 1876 gives certain rights to manufacturers of carrying the liquids proceeding from their factories or manufacturing processes into the sewers within their district. But if that is examined, to put it in one sentence, it is merely by way of grace and of favour. I need not repeat what has been very well said by Channell, J., and Moulton, L.J., on that subject. The right, whatever it is, is qualified by two provisos, and Mr Danckwerts very legitimately tried to steer his argument between those two provisos. Looking at the second proviso, my own view is that this is a case in which “the sewers of such authority are only sufficient for the requirements of their district.” The word “sewer” does not necessarily bear the same meaning as in the Public Health Act 1875, whatever the meaning in that Act may be. I think that in the present case it includes these works which are a part of the system through which the sewage flows to the river where it ultimately escapes. That will be sufficient to justify the decision of the Court of Appeal, and it is, indeed, following it. It is therefore unnecessary to say anything with regard to the meaning of the first proviso beyond this—that a strong argument might perfectly well have been addressed to the House in reference to that proviso also.

Lord Macnaghten and Lord Gorell concurred.

Page: 558↓

Lord Shaw—I agree, but in doing so I should like to refer to the Scotch case of Guthrie, Craig, & Company v. Magistrates of Brechin, 15 R. 385, 25 S.L.R. 288, which has been referred to. In my opinion the highest deference is rightly paid to any judgment of that very great and distinguished Judge the late Lord President Inglis; but I dissent from the view which seems to have been entertained by Channell, J., that that judgment in the Scotch Court was in any way a disturbing factor in the present case. I may say, personally, that I cannot better express the judgment which I should form upon the merits of that case, and its relation to the present case, than by repeating the judgment of the learned County Court Judge in the present instance. He says, “the judge” (referring to Lord President Inglis) “there speaks of pipes, but he is distinguishing the pipes from the land and the sewage farm to which the sewage was carried. So far as it appears there was no piping, there was nothing artificial, but the pipes referred to there were pipes which carried sewage on to a farm, and then it was disposed of by course of nature; there were no artificial works.” That case, so far as fact is concerned, shows the whole width of the distinction from the present case, in which you have a series of artificial works, the entry to which, no doubt, is the pipe which drains through the locality, but the exit from which is the effluent pipe, and it is only when the sewage reaches the effluent pipe that it becomes innocuous in the sense of the statute, and the statutory duty of disposal of the sewage is not performed until the effluent pipe is reached and the discharge therefrom in that innocuous condition, or in innocuous circumstances, occurs. But for that Scotch decision, which has, I think, been misapprehended, and so treated as a disturbing element, I presume that all the learned Judges in the courts below would have been unanimous in their judgments, in the sense adopted by the Court of Appeal. I think that the decision arrived at by the learned Lords Justices was right.

Appeal dismissed.

Counsel:

Counsel for Appellants— Danckwerts, K.C.— Ellison. Agents— Van Sandau & Company, Solicitors.

Counsel for Respondents — Scott Fox, K.C.— Lowenthal. Agents— Rawle, Johnstone, & Company, Solicitors.
1909