United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Lord Chancellor—I do not think it is necessary in the least to invoke in this case the rule that charitable bequests are an object of peculiar favour, because I do not think the points put by Mr Cripps had any real substance.

With regard to the first question, whether the trustees have an option to apply any part of this fund otherwise than to the charitable purpose designated by the will, I do not think that is the true construction of the clause. I think the words which are used “any part or parts thereof” have relation to the time or times when the distribution may become practicable by reason of the fund becoming available.

With reference to the second point made by Mr Cripps, whether the bequest is bad because there was an option to retain indefinitely and so frustrate the trust or so render uncertain its objects, I do not think that is the meaning of the clause. The word “indefinitely” appears to me really to be redundant, meaning the same in substance as the words “for such time or times as they may think fit.” Of course the administration of a trust is always subject to the control of the Court if there is maladministration. Even if the word “indefinitely” meant something much more than that, I am by no means satisfied that the will could be set aside on that ground, but the point does not arise.

Earl of Halsbury—So far as I am concerned I think the Lord Ordinary's judgment perfectly satisfies everything that ought to be said upon the subject.

Lord Ashbourne—I agree.

Lord Robertson—I concur.

Lord Collins—I agree.