Headnote:
Appeal
in formâ pauperis from a judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ireland (
Lord Ashbourne, L.C.,
FitzGibbon and
Holmes, L.JJ.,
Walker, L.J., dissenting), who had reversed a judgment of
Barton, J.
The appellant, who was a Roman Catholic, had been appointed, with the approval of the National Board, to give manual instruction, chiefly in sewing, in a National school under Presbyterian management.
The respondent was a member of a Presbyterian congregation, and was a ruling elder in the church, and called a meeting of the parents of children attending the school, at which several of those present came to an arrangement to withdraw their children from the school because a Roman Catholic teacher had been appointed.
The salary of the appellant depended upon a capitation grant, and the result of the action of the parents was to reduce her salary considerably, and eventually she was compelled to resign her appointment.
She brought an action against the respondent, in the Chancery Division, claiming an injunction and damages.
Barton, J., pronounced a judgment in her favour, which was reversed by the majority of the Court of Appeal, as above mentioned, on the ground that there was no evidence of an unlawful combination.
Judgment:
Lord Chancellor (Loreburn)—This is a case in which I desire to say as little as I can, because I feel that it is a sad story, and I do not wish to aggravate any of its features by unnecessary observations. It is an action for conspiracy, and no other ground of action is relied upon. In such a proceeding it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove a design common to the defendant and to others to damage the plaintiff without any just cause or excuse. That, at all events, it is necessary to prove. Now, a conclusion of that kind is not to be arrived at by a light conjecture; it must be plainly
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established. It may, like other conclusions, be established as a matter of inference from proved facts, but the point is not whether you can draw that particular inference, but whether the facts are such that they cannot fairly admit of any other inference being drawn from them. In my opinion it has not been proved that there was a design intentionally to damage the plaintiff, although I think that the intention may have been to make a protest, which may be thought reasonable or unreasonable, against the course which had been taken. Nor do I see evidence of combination between the defendant and others. I will only add two observations. The first is that I am not prepared myself to assent to all the propositions that are laid down in the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Ireland; and the second is, that I hope that this case will not be regarded as indicating that the opinion on a matter of fact of a judge of first instance ought to be set aside without grave reasons. The judge of first instance has opportunities which no other Court has of arriving at a just conclusion with regard to the facts, and I think that it is always necessary that there should be strong ground before he is overruled as to the inferences at which he arrives. But in this case I think that there was strong ground, and that the conclusion of the Court of Appeal was right.
Earl of Halsbury—I am of the same opinion. In one sense I agree with the view which the Lord Chancellor has suggested to your Lordships. On the other hand, I feel some difficulty in dealing with the case, because it seems to me that there is no evidence of the facts on which reliance is placed here—that is to say, no evidence showing such facts as would under any circumstances that have been suggested give a ground for action. To put the matter plainly, what I mean is this—what is suggested is that there was a combination between the defendant and some others (I observe that there is a vagueness in stating who the co-conspirators were) to bring about the dismissal of this lady. My first objection is that I think, whether it would form a ground of action or not, that it is not established by the facts put in proof. If it were true that there had been such a combination, and if the object was what is suggested, to cause her to be dismissed, not upon any ground of personal objection to her or any spite or ill-will to her, but upon the ground that in the view of the parents and of the persons procuring the combination it was an undesirable thing for a Roman Catholic to be put in that position, I am of opinion that it would form no ground of action. But the difficulty which I have in dealing with it is that I think that it fails from the beginning. There is no sufficient evidence of any combination. There is no evidence upon which I think that any Court ought to rely, even if it were a ground of action, for saying that in this case there is any proof of the combination in the sense in which it is necessary that there should be combination in order to form the ground of an action for conspiracy. In contenting myself, as I do, with saying that I think that there is no evidence, I wish to guard myself against its being supposed that I should think that there was a cause of action even if the proposition which has been put forward by the learned counsel were established, namely, that there was a combination to do this thing. It appears to me that it would be impossible, under the circumstances, to contend that it was not the perfect right of any parent to take that view, however unreasonable it might be, and if he took that view it was perfectly competent to him to consult other parents in the same place and to ask them to aid and assist him in doing what was within his right, namely, withdrawing the children from the school—although the effect might be that it would cause the dismissal of the schoolmistress. Therefore while I content myself with saying that I think that there is no evidence of the broad proposition which is put forward, namely, that this was done as a combined act; on the other hand, it must not be supposed that if what was suggested had been proved, namely, that there was that combination, I at all events should be of opinion that it would not form a ground of action at law.
Lord Macnaghten—I am of the same opinion. I agree substantially with the judgment of Lord Ashbourne and the judgments which have been delivered here. I do not think that there is any evidence to support the appeal and to restore the judgment of Barton, J.
Lord James of Hereford—I concur.
Lord Robertson—I do not think that this House is required to discuss once more the delicate questions of the law of conspiracy merely because this case is labelled as belonging to that chapter of the law, when there are no facts to justify the description. Like Lord Ashbourne I can see no trace of conspiracy, and, indeed, the learned counsel for the appellant was faint and deprecatory in suggesting rather than asserting who were the conspirators, although this is the base of the action. Again, I see no evidence whatever of any pressure or inducement, or any interference with the choice, liberty, or will of any given person. The picture of social life presented in the evidence is not a pleasing one, nor was the respondent's part laudable; but we are in search of actionable wrong, and there is none here. The fact that religious dislike was the motive of the persons whose conduct is impugned cannot infuse into their acts a quality of illegality which does not otherwise belong to them.
Lord Atkinson—I concur in thinking that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ireland was right, and that there is no evidence to sustain the cause of action declared — namely, an agreement “to prevent by undue pressure, inducement, and influence divers persons from exercising
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their lawful right of sending their children to” the school in question “according to their free choice, liberty, and will”—nor do I think that there is evidence to sustain the other causes of action which have been suggested in the course of the argument both here and in the Court below.
Lord Collins—I am of the same opinion.
