United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Lord Chancellor—We have had a very long and ingenious argument on this question, which seems to me to be a very plain one. I certainly do not mean to go through all the different and ingenious hypotheses which have been put forward in order to show that the plain words of the Act of Parliament may be cut down and reduced to an absurdity. I think, so far as there is any argument at all, that the whole question turns upon the word “conveyance,” and, although with some hesitation and a considerable amount of circumlocution, the learned counsel has addressed to us what I must admit to be a learned and ingenious argument, it simply comes to this—That the statute is intended in its operation to apply only to land, or what would be equivalent to land in its natural sense. But the whole of that argument seems to depend upon the use of the word “conveyance,” which he says only means, according to the technical view of the question, a conveyance of land or realty in some form whether it be land or not. My answer to that is that it is not true. The word “conveyance” means what it says. It conveys any property. I find that Wharton in his Law Lexicon defines it as “an instrument that transfers property from one person to another.” That is all; and although it may be perfectly true to say that where you are dealing with personal property it may pass, and does pass, completely by mere delivery, it is a very illogical consequence of that proposition to suggest that it may not pass in any other way, and that you may not convey it by an ordinary conveyance. I think you may. I think that really disposes of the whole argument. When I look at the statute itself and see what it does, I am content to apply it to the particular facts with which your Lordships have to deal. It seems to me that it would be impossible to say, having regard to the particular facts with which your Lordships have to deal, that the case is not included in the language of the statute. We have heard a great deal about ambiguity, about confusion, and about alternative constructions, but when I apply the language of the statute to the transaction which is engaging our attention it appears to me to be as clear as possible that in the ordinary natural meaning of the words therein employed the statute does apply to this transaction. I decline to go into hypotheses about other cases in which it might be supposed that this language would be too wide, and would include something else. It is enough for me to say that, as applicable to this particular transaction, the words seem to me to be absolutely clear, without confusion, and without any alternative construction at all, and to apply literally and strictly to the transaction in question. For these reasons I move your Lordships that the judgment appealed from be affirmed, and the appeal dismissed with costs.

Lord Macnaghten—I am of the same opinion.

Lord Shand—I also am of the same opinion. It appears to me that the very purpose of the Act of 1895 was to enlarge the subject of taxation, so that personal property bought by sale should be liable to duty just as heritable property was previously liable. The Act, I think, succeeded in its purpose, and I agree in the opinions of their Lordships in the Court below, and with the Lord Chancellor and Lord Macnaghten, that the judgment must be affirmed and the appeal dismissed.

Lord Lindley—I am of the same opinion. I think that the case becomes absolutely clear if you read the section shortly, leaving

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