United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Lord Ashbourne—I entirely concur. Of course it is obviously competent for the Legislature if it pleases in its wisdom to make the provisions of an Act of Parliament retrospective; but before giving such a construction to an Act of Parliament one would require that it should either appear very clearly in the terms of the Act or arise by necessary and distinct implication. Now, such reading as I have given to this short statute suggests to my mind that it conveys very clearly that the provision on which the controversy arises is not retrospective. It has been suggested that clause 3 only comes into operation where holdings are let as market gardens after the commencement of the Act, and that the 4th section deals with the cases which are not covered by the 3rd section, that is, leases current at the date of the commencement of the Act. But to prevent all misconception, and to show that it was not intended to go the least further in that direction, it says at the end of it that although the provisions of the Act are to attach to current leases under certain conditions, they are to do so as if there had been an agreement in writing made after the commencement of the Act, showing that the governing words all through are “after the commencement of the Act,” as my noble and learned friend on the woolsack said.

It is not necessary to go into any discussion of the meaning of the word “then,” or any of the other topics that have been introduced. I agree with the construction given by the Lord Ordinary, and I assent to the motion which has been made by my noble and learned friend.

Lord Shand—I am of the same opinion.

It is not necessary in my view of this case to invoke the rule or principle under which a right to claim payment on the part of a tenant for improvements made prior to the passing of an Act of Parliament, and so to give so improbable a retrospective effect to the Act, must be given expressly or by necessary implication by the provisions of the statute. It seems to me there is here no ground to support the tenant's claim even by ingenious and strained interpretation of the sections of the statute.

For the reasons stated by the noble and learned Lord on the woolsack, and by the Lord Ordinary in the note to his judgment, I agree that the meaning of the word “then” in section 4 of the Statute of 1897 is “thereupon” or “thereafter,” and that the clause includes and refers only to improvements made by the tenant after the date of the Act. But if this were not so, I think the result would be the same as found by the learned Judges of the Second Division.

Lord Davey—I am of the same opinion.

I think it is important to observe that market gardens, as was pointed out by Mr Haldane, are within the Act of 1883, and this Act of 1897 makes further and more beneficial provisions for market gardens by way of amendment of the I. and III. parts of the schedule to the previous Act. But those amendments are only made under certain conditions and in certain cases, and the question is, in what cases are those amendments to be made. Now, under section 3 of the Act it is very clearly pointed out that the provisions of that section apply only “where after the commencement of this Act” there is an agreement in writing that a holding shall be let or treated as a market-garden—that is to say, that so far as the landlord is concerned he does for the first time treat or let the land as a market-garden after the commencement of the Act. There, necessarily, the amendment can only come into operation as regards improvements which are made after the commencement of the Act.

Then under section 4 the case is contemplated where there is “a lease current at the date of the commencement of the Act,” under which land has in fact with the knowledge of the landlord, but without his written consent or under a written agreement, been treated as market garden, and the tenant “has then executed thereon, without having received previously to the execution thereof any written notice of dissent by the landlord, any of the improvements in respect of which a right of compensation” is given to a tenant by this Act, then the provisions of the Act shall apply as if there had been a written agreement. I should have thought that the meaning of that clause was sufficiently obvious. It puts a market garden, which has been allowed by the landlord to be treated as a market garden in the same position as regards this Act as if a written agreement had been made after the commencement of the Act to treat it as a market garden, but only on the condition that the tenant has “then executed thereon” improvements without having received from the landlord written notice of dissent. I construe the word “then” in that clause as meaning “thereafter.” “Then,” of course, “is at the commencement of the Act,” and “atthat date,” and I construe it to mean that “thereafter” or “thereupon” he has executed improvements. It may be that the other meaning which Mr Haldane attached to it, and which the Inner House have favoured, is more like the prima facie meaning, but it is clearly capable of meaning “has thereupon,” and I think the structure of the section requires it to mean that.

I see no reason or sense whatever in making the previous execution of the improvements the condition of the Act coming into operation. If it had any meaning at all, it would rather, I think, have the effect of making old improvements within the Act and not new improvements. However that may be, there is this second objection to reading it as Mr Haldane read it, that it would put the landlord in this position, that he would be rendered liable to compensate for improvements by not having given any written notice of dissent when it was not any of his business to give a written notice of dissent at the time

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