United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Lord Chancellor—If this was a question depending upon a conflict of evidence in which the conduct and demeanour of the witnesses were susceptible of being considered by the tribunal before whom the case originally came, I should have placed very great weight upon the decision of the learned Judge of first instance who found in favour of the plaintiffs in this case. But I cannot help thinking that the facts in this matter speak for themselves.

When it is sought to make the Harbour Trustees liable for the damage to this ship because of some negligence or other in the performance of some duty, I ask myself what is the duty and what is the breach of duty suggested? The duty, I suppose, is that in the directions given to this vessel, and the various vessels that come into the harbour, reasonable care should be taken in providing, as far as it is possible, safe berths for them. I do not know now what the breach is supposed to be, because really if one looks at what one might call the absolutely uncontradicted testimony in this case there is no doubt that on the night of the 21st or on the morning of the 22nd a most unusual and extraordinary storm arose, and whatever effort has been made to minimise that state of things, it stands now, I think, beyond all question that the state of the weather on that night was extraordinary and unusual. I think one of the learned Judges pointed out what is perfectly true, that hardly any vessel in the harbour that night escaped absolutely unharmed, and not only in that harbour but in various ports of the west coast of Scotland great damage was done by the storm of that night.

Then it is suggested that the harbourmaster, in doing what was his ordinary duty after the vessel was loaded, in taking the vessel away to make place for other vessels that were entitled in their turn to go and load, three vessels being expected to load that very night, was guilty of a negligent breach of the duty to take reasonable and ordinary care, because some hours later than the time that the direction was given an extraordinary storm arose. The mode in which that contention is sought to be established is to say that the harbourmaster ought to be so perfectly accurate a prophet of the weather that he ought to have been able to foresee what happened in the state of the weather as it then was, the wind having been east-south-east originally, and the ordinary course being, as it is alleged when a storm begins in that way, that it would gradually go round to the north-west, the north-west wind being one which renders this particular berth hazardous to the vessel which occupies a position there.

I can only say about that that it is very easy after the event has happened to speculate upon it, and to say the harbourmaster ought to have foreseen it. It is an ordinary condition of mind I suppose. People feel a strong temptation to say “I told you so” when a calamity has happened. But looking at what took place at the time when they were not rendered wise by the event afterwards, it appears to me that there is no foundation at all for the complaint against the harbourmaster. That the master of the vessel himself did not want to move—that he did not want to take the trouble to move away from the berth in which he was then lying is true. He was reluctant to move—so far I agree that the evidence establishes that, but I think it was only that it was inconvenient to move, and that he did not want with the wind blowing hard to have the trouble of moving. But the notion that he was going to encounter some extraordinary change of

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