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Lane & Ors v Esdaile & Ors [1891] UKHL 4 (05 May 1891)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1891/4.html
Cite as:
[1891] AC 210,
[1891] UKHL 4
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[HOUSE OF LORDS.]
05 May 1891
LANE AND ANOTHER APPELLANTS; AND ESDAILE AND ANOTHER RESPONDENTS.
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LORD HALSBURY L.C. , LORD BRAMWELL , LORD HERSCHELL , LORD MACNAGHTEN , LORD FIELD and LORD HANNEN.
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H. James Q.C. (Ashton Cross and Frederick Low with him) instructed by (J. E. Turner) for the appellants
Byrne Q.C. and H. B. Howard instructed by (Winter & Co.) for the respondents
LORD HALSBURY L.C.: -
My Lords, I am of opinion that this preliminary objection ought to prevail. An appeal is not to be presumed but must be given. I do not mean to say that it must be given by express words, but it must be given in some form or other in which it can be said that it is affirmatively given and not presumed. In the particular case now before your Lordships the appeal is certainly not given in express words. The words used are “leave of the Court”; and although it may be that in some sense the leave of the Court, whether it is given or withheld, becomes an order (that I will not stay to discuss), that is not the ordinary mode in which it would be described. It is to be something that is done by the order of the Court. I confess myself I should hesitate if it was only to turn upon the question of language, because although a thing might be called an order, or might be called a judgment, or might be called a rule, or might be called a decree, it might well be that nevertheless by reason of the context it would come within the obvious meaning and purpose of the statute; so that although it was no one of those things in name it might be one of those things in substance, and therefore would come within the general provision that an appeal should lie.
But when I look not only at the language used, but at the substance and meaning of the provision, it seems to me that to give an appeal in this case would defeat the whole object and purview of the order or rule itself, because it is obvious that what was there intended by the Legislature was that there should be in some form or other a power to stop an appeal - that there should not be an appeal unless some particular body pointed out by the statute (I will see in a moment what that body is), should permit that an appeal should be given. Now just let us consider what that means, that an appeal shall not be given unless some particular body consents to its being given. Surely if that is intended as a check to unnecessary or frivolous appeals it becomes absolutely illusory if you can appeal from that decision or leave, or whatever it is to be called itself. How could any Court of Review determine whether leave ought to be given or not without hearing and determining upon the hearing whether it was a fit case for an appeal? And if the intermediate Court could enter and must enter into that question, then the Court which is the ultimate Court of Appeal must do so also. The result of that would be that in construing this order, which as I have said is obviously intended to prevent frivolous and unnecessary appeals, you might in truth have two appeals in every case in which, following the ordinary course of things, there would be only one; because if there is a power to appeal when the order has been refused, it would seem to follow as a necessary consequence that you must have a right to appeal when leave has been granted, the result of which is that the person against whom the leave has been granted might appeal from that, and inasmuch as this is no stay of proceeding the Court of Appeal might be entertaining an appeal upon the very same question when this House was entertaining the question whether the Court of Appeal ought ever to have granted the appeal. My Lords, it seems to me that that would reduce the provision to such an absurdity that even if the language were more clear than is contended on the other side one really ought to give it a reasonable construction.
My Lords, I confess that when I look both at the subject-matter with which the order deals and at the language of the order itself it seems to me obvious that it was intended that the decision should be final (whether that is said in terms or not seems to me to be immaterial), unless the Court of Appeal, the body there prescribed, in the exercise of that jurisdiction should give leave to appeal. As no leave has been given in this case, and as no appeal can be brought unless leave has been given, I am of opinion that this preliminary objection ought to prevail, and that this appeal should be dismissed, and I so move your Lordships.
LORD BRAMWELL: -
My Lords, I have had a difficulty of the kind which I will describe. When the first Judicature Act passed it took away the jurisdiction of this House, and therefore under that Act there could be no appeal from any order made by the Court of Appeal. It cannot be said therefore that when that Act passed it was the intention of the Legislature that such an appeal as this should not take place, because in truth it was impossible that it could, there was no appellate tribunal from the Court of Appeal. Then, when the next Act passed which restored the jurisdiction of this House, it enacted that every order and judgment (I am not thinking of the particular words at this moment) made by the Court of Appeal should be appealable to this House. Well, if the refusal of the Court of Appeal to permit the appeal was an order by them that order would come within the very terms of the Act of 1876 which restored the jurisdiction of this House. Then it might be argued, here you have a case within the very words of the Statute of 1876, that is to say an order. But all my noble and learned friends, I know, think that this is not such an order - that if you think fit to call it an order, if the right name to give it is “an order,” at all events it is not such an order as it was intended by the Statute of 1876 should be appealable. I think no reasonable man could set up his own particular doubt in opposition to the opinions of five persons who are so much entitled to his respect as my noble and learned friends are; and therefore I concur, I am content to concur, that this refusal of the Court of Appeal to permit an appeal, if an order at all, was not an appealable order under the Statute of 1876.
LORD HERSCHELL: -
My Lords, I concur in thinking that this appeal cannot be entertained. It cannot be doubted that the object of the 15th rule of the 58th Order was to make the judgments, after the lapse of a year, practically final. It is clear that some time must be fixed at which the right of appeal should cease, otherwise parties would never know what their rights were, and there would be no possibility of people being safe in dealing with the fruits of a judgment because the judgment might be still subject to appeal. But then it was thought that there might be special circumstances in which the Court of Appeal might relax that rule and consider that, notwithstanding it, an appeal should be permitted. I think that the matter was intrusted, and intended to be intrusted, to their discretion; and that the exercise of a discretion of that sort intrusted to them is not, within the true meaning of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, an order or judgment from which there can be an appeal. My noble and learned friend on the Woolsack has pointed out the inconveniences which would arise from a contrary decision; and I am certainly fortified in that conclusion by the view which was taken by the Court of Appeal with reference to a very similar provision. In sect. 45 of the Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict.c. 66), which provides for appeals to a Divisional Court from an inferior Court, it is provided that “the determination of such appeals respectively by such Divisional Courts shall be final unless special leave to appeal from the same to the Court of Appeal shall be given by the Divisional Court by which any such appeal from an inferior Court shall have been heard.” In that case the discretion is intrusted to the Divisional Court. In the case of
Kay v. Briggs 22 QB 343. the Divisional Court had refused leave to appeal. Thereupon it was attempted in the Court of Appeal to review their determination in that respect. The Court of Appeal took the view that they were unable to entertain the question and could not review the decision of the Divisional Court; and the Master of the Rolls uses language which appears to me to be quite appropriate to the present question. He says: “If this Court could overrule the discretion given by that section to Divisional Courts the practical effect would be to allow an appeal here in every case, because the facts of each case would be brought before us in order to enable us to decide whether or not we ought to overrule that discretion. I think that the real meaning of sect. 45 is to confine the power to give leave to appeal absolutely to the Divisional Courts.” Now if you substitute for “the Divisional Courts” “the Court of Appeal,” every word of that is strictly applicable to the present case; and indeed if the contention of the appellants were well founded I think it would follow that under this sect. 45 there could be an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a refusal by the Divisional Court, and an appeal again from the Court of Appeal to this House; so that every County Court case might be brought up to this House upon the question whether an appeal should be allowed or not.
My Lords, I am quite aware that Sir Henry James on behalf of the appellants attempted to distinguish the two cases by reason of a difference of language. In the present case it is said that no appeal shall lie after a year except by special leave, whilst in the other case it is said that the determination of the appeal shall be final unless special leave to appeal be given. I do not think there is any difference in the meaning of those two expressions. What interpretation are you to put upon the expression “shall be final”? None but this in that context, that the determination of the appeal by the Divisional Court shall not be made a subject of appeal unless special leave be given. What difference is there between that and saying that no appeal shall lie unless special leave be given? My Lords, I think that there is no substantial difference between the two, and that if we were to accede to the argument for the appellants we should be bound to overrule the case of
Kay v. Briggs 22 QB 343 and to pronounce a decision which would be as prejudicial in the case of all County Court appeals as to permit the appeal would be in this case.
LORD MACNAGHTEN: -