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(Before
Ante, June 28, 1889, 26 S.L.R. 600, and 16 R. 876.)
Subject_Husband and Wife — Foreign — Heritable Estate of Wife in England — Sale of Wife's Estate with her Consent — Husband's Right to Proceeds — Jus Mariti — Donatio inter virum et uxorem — Surrogatum — Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries (3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 74).
The wife of a domiciled Scotsman, with concurrence of her husband, sold a heritable estate belonging to her in England and acknowledged the conveyance before two commissioners appointed under the Act for the Abolition of Fines and Recoveries (3 and 4 Will. IV. c. 74), and “declared that she did intend to give up her interest in the said estate without any provision made for her in lieu thereof.” Her husband received the price, and applied it to his own purposes. The spouses subsequently separated by mutual consent, and the wife executed a deed of revocation of all her donations and provisions in favour of her husband. She then sued him for declarator that the amount in his hands was a surrogatum for her heritage and not subject to the jus mariti.
Held ( rev. the decision of the First Division) that the price of the wife's interest in the estate did not belong to her as a surrogatum for her heritable estate.
This case is reported ante, June 28, 1889, 26 S.L.R. 600, and 16 R. 876.
The defender Ralph Dalyell Welch appealed.
At delivering judgment—
There can be no doubt, as I have said, that the rights of the spouses as regards moveable property must, in the circumstances of this case, be regulated by the law of Scotland, but it is equally clear that their rights in relation to heritable estate are governed by the law of the place where it was situate. This is not denied by the respondent, but it is said that as soon as
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It is therefore, in my opinion, not accurate to treat the purchase money of the Overton estate as the proceeds of a heritable estate belonging to the wife, and as surrogatum for that estate. It was an estate in which both spouses possessed undetermined interests, the extent of their respective interests depending on whether there was issue of the marriage, and which of them survived the other. It was heritable estate of the husband as well as of the wife, and could not be disposed of to a purchaser without the concurrence of both of them. The purchase money of the estate in which they were thus interested cannot, in my opinion, truly be regarded as the price of a heritable estate of the wife's, which, according to the law of England, becomes the husband's only by the jus mariti, and which, if the law of Scotland be applicable, must be regarded, if the wife permits her husband to retain it, as a donation by her to him. The right of the husband to the proceeds does not flow only from the jus mariti. It cannot be dissociated from the real property law of this country, which gave the husband the estate and interest which I have described in the heritable property possessed by his wife at the time of the marriage. The price received from the purchaser represents as much the husband's estate and interest as the wife's. The wife, it is true, was by the sale deprived of the interest which she had in the heritable property, but I do not think that her assent to the entire price being received by her husband, without that provision being made for her which she could have insisted on as the price of her concurrence in the conveyance, can be regarded as a donation. There could have been no sale without the concurrence of the husband, and if he gives that concurrence on the terms that the whole purchase money of the estate in which they both have an interest shall be received by him, I do not think that this can be regarded as a donation of all the purchase money, or even of so much of it as might be found on an actuarial calculation to represent her interest, especially where, as in the present instance, the husband has, in order to complete the sales, entered by the deed of conveyance into an onerous covenant by reason of the charge which existed on the property. But it is perhaps hardly necessary to determine whether the purchase money could be regarded as a donation by the wife to the husband to the extent to which it represented her interest as ascertained on an actuarial calculation, inasmuch as the claim in this action is not to have it ascertained how much of the purchase money received in 1877 represented the interest of the wife in the heritable subject, and to treat so much of the purchase money as should be found to represent that interest as a donation inter virum et uxorem, but to treat the entire price of the estate as surrogatum for the heritable estate of the pursuer.
For the reasons I have given, I think it is impossible to do so, even allowing the fullest effect to the Scottish law as regulating the matrimonial rights of the parties. I think the difference between the view I have indicated and that of the Court below has probably arisen from the circumstance that the contention mainly urged upon them on behalf of the appellant appears to have been that the purchase money, according to the law of England, became the husband's upon the conveyance; and that their attention was not so definitely directed as your Lordships' has been to the fact that, having regard to the English law of real property, the price could not properly be regarded as representing the heritable estate of the wife, and as surrogatum. Therefore I am of opinion that the interlocutors appealed from ought to be reversed, and the defender assoilzied from the conclusions of the summons, and I move your Lordships accordingly.
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Their Lordships reversed the interlocutors appealed from.
Counsel for the Appellant— Rigby, Q.C.— M'Laren. Agent— A. Beveridge, for Carment, Wedderburn, & Watson, W.S.
Counsel for the Respondent—The Lord Advocate— Strachan— Moore. Agent— Charles Turner, for John Elder, S.S.C.