Judgment:
The
Lord Chancellor said he had very little to say in this case. The appellant sought to reduce and set aside a disposition which he had executed of all his goods under a well-known process for the relief of insolvent debtors, called a
cessio bonorum. He said that that disposition included something that was incapable of alienation, and therefore the deed was to that extent void. The House had already decided that the appellant had no vested interest in the funds arising out of his marriage contract, but it was said that he had still a contingent interest in the event of his surviving his former wife. The case had been very ably argued by the junior counsel for the appellant; but there was really no substantial ground for interfering with the judgment of the Court below. The contingent interest referred to would not be an alimentary provision at all, but would be alienable, and therefore was carried by the
dispositio omnium bonorum. The interest, in any event, is very small, and the Lord Ordinary took the proper view of the case, and his interlocutor should be affirmed.
Lord Chelmsford concurred, and said that by the previous decision of the House the appellant had forfeited all the interest which he took by virtue of the marriage-contract. If there was a contingent interest which he might have over and above in the event of his surviving his wife, that was an interest which he could dispose of, and which he had disposed of. The decision below was perfectly right; and it was painful to think of the money and time that had been wasted in such a litigation as this.
Lord Westbury also concurred, and said one of the reasons for reducing this deed was that it had been executed in a dark and dirty dungeon, when the husband was a debtor; but the law expressly provided that the debtor could, in such circumstances, execute a valid deed called a
dispositio omnium bonorum. The other ground was that a wrong construction had been put on the marriage-contract; but that was no ground for reduction. If the interest which the appellant still has in his marriage-contract is inalienable, then it has not been alienated. If it was alienable, then it was conveyed by the disposition, and cannot now be altered. This case was an instance of great pertinacity in litigation, and it was to be regretted that, owing to the respondent not appearing, it could not be dismissed with costs.