United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Lord Chancellor Westbury.—My Lords, in this appeal the action was originally brought in the Court of Session by Mr. Adamson, in his character of inspector of the poor of the parish of Glasgow, against the Trustees of the Clyde Navigation, and the issue raised in this action is not at all distinguishable from the two cases upon which your Lordships have just pronounced an opinion, namely, Jones v. The Mersey Harbour Board. The principles which are applicable to the decision of the case, and which are embodied in the Statute which is now the General Poor Law Act of Scotland, namely, the 8 and 9 Vict. cap. 83, passed in 1845, are precisely the same as the principles which are applicable to the interpretation of the law of England upon which your Lordships have just expressed your opinion.

By the 34th section of that Act of 1845 it was enacted, that where an assessment was to be imposed, the Parochial Board may resolve, that one half of such assessment shall be imposed upon the owners and the other half upon the tenants or occupants of all the lands and heritages within the parish or combination rateably according to the annual value of such lands and heritages.

The appellants in the present case, the Trustees of the Clyde Navigation, are, on behalf of the subscribers or shareholders in that undertaking, the owners and occupiers of very large docks and other public works which have been erected by them on the river Clyde, for the purpose of improving the navigation. And the question which was raised by them in answer to the demand that they should be rated to the poor, was precisely the same as the question raised by the Mersey Docks and Harbour Trustees—the plea in law for the defenders, the Clyde Trustees, being thus expressed: “Any property vested in the defenders having been vested in them as trustees for public purposes, and the revenues derived therefrom, and from the trust under their management having been all appropriated by Statute to specific public purposes,” and so on. These grounds of defence are, I take it, identical with the defences raised by the Mersey Harbour and Dock Board.

Now, the local legislation applicable to the docks and harbour held by the Clyde Trustees appears to have had this for its object, that the property alleged by the appellants to be appropriated exclusively to public purposes, is appropriated only in this sense, namely, that the revenues which the trustees are authorized to raise by the tolls and imposts upon shipping using the harbour and the docks are dedicated by the Act to the purposes of maintaining and improving the harbour and navigation of the river Clyde, and for paying the debt contracted in the formation of the works. And any surplus is directed by the Act to be applied in making additional improvements. Now, beyond the money required for the purpose of maintaining these docks and this harbour, there is a very large revenue out of which the subscribers or shareholders receive the interest upon the money which they advance for the construction of these docks, and there is still a surplus which is applicable to the purpose of making additional improvements by way of the extension of the docks, and, if necessary, of the harbour.

The question, therefore, recurs in this case, which is to be decided only upon the same principles as those which were discussed in the two cases last decided, namely—Are these public purposes in the sense of being Government public purposes—purposes connected with the use of the Crown so as to warrant the exemption of the Trustees, as the occupiers of this property, from a liability to be rated to the relief of the poor? I apprehend, that this case is not distinguishable, either in principle or in its details, from the cases which have just been decided, and that your Lordships will adhere to the same ratio decidendi, and will hold, that the purposes to which the revenues of the Clyde navigation are applied are undistinguishable from those in the Mersey Docks case; and that consequently there is no ground for the exemption of the Trustees.

The interlocutor of the Court below is not confined merely to that point; but that is the only point which has been made the subject of appeal. I think, therefore, that your Lordships will concur with me in the conclusion, that it will be right to affirm the order of the Court below so far as it is now appealed from; and consequently to dismiss this appeal, and, as a necessary consequence, to dismiss it with costs.

Lord Cranworth.—My Lords, the question here is substantially the same as that in Jones v. The Mersey Docks, though it arises under a different Act of Parliament.

By the Scotch Poor Law Act, 8 and 9 Vict. c. 83, the parochial board in every parish may resolve to raise the necessary funds by assessment in any one of three different modes. The first mode is by assessment of one half on the owners, and the other half on the occupiers, of all lands and heritages within the parish. This was the mode of assessment adopted by the parochial board of the city parish of Glasgow; and the rates now in question were imposed by that board on the appellants as owners and occupiers of the quays, wharfs, and docks of the river Clyde at Glasgow.

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